Mechanisms of environmental policy change in a federal system: The case of open federalism and the 2006–15 Harper government

Between 2006 and 2011, the Canadian Conservative government advocated the concept of ‘open federalism’ which sought to minimize the role of the federal government in areas falling under provincial jurisdiction. Environmental policy-making was particularly impacted with the passage of the highly contentious 2012 omnibus Jobs, Growth and Long-term Prosperity Act, commonly known as Bill C-38. This paper argues that environmental policy needs to ‘bring back federalism’ into their analysis. In order to do so, a mechanisms approach is employed and focuses on the role of both macro and meso level historical institutionalism mechanisms in explaining policy layering and policy dismantling during this period.     

The Malaise of Federalism: Comparative Reflections on Commonwealth–State Relations

The High Court's decision in the ‘Work Choices’ case expanding further the scope of the Commonwealth's enumerated powers is the latest reminder of the highly centralised nature of Australian federalism. The division of powers traditionally forming the essence of a federal system has become increasingly difficult to discern and the roles and responsibilities of the two levels of government have become entangled. While for a good part of Australia's history divided jurisdiction was deplored as an obstacle to progress in government, today the decay of the system is most likely to be lamented. Discussion of options for reform presupposes an understanding of the forces that have led to the present condition. This article examines the Australian experience in a broader comparative and historical perspective and suggests that those forces are endemic and substantial.     

Party Servants,Ideologues or Regional Representatives? The German Länder and the Reform of Federalism

This article considers recent attempts to reform German federalism, the failed 2004 reform, and the reforms agreed in 2006 and 2009. It compares partisan, ideological and territorial factors which contribute to an understanding of reform, finding that all three have a role in explaining actors’ views of reform proposals. Two other claims are developed: that in some aspects of the reforms, a division between ‘generalist’ and ‘subject specialist’ politicians became apparent; and that a decisive change between 2004 and 2006 was the formation of a grand coalition at a federal level, which paved the way for agreement upon reform proposals.     

The influence of federalism on fiscal policy making

Abstract. This article attempts to refine the statement that federal states face difficulties in fiscal policy making because of the territorial division of powers by comparing two federal countries, Canada and Germany. These two countries differ in terms of their type of federalism: Canada displaying a power-separation system and Germany corresponding to a power-sharing type. According to the authors, the territorial factor influences fiscal policy making through the distribution of taxing and spending powers as well as through patterns of intergovernmental relations. The use of fiscal policy instruments and the likely effects on conflict and cooperation in those two countries is discussed with empirical evidence. The authors come to the conclusion that federalism is indeed a constraint on fiscal policy making, but that the two types of power division face different obstacles and deal differently with fiscal problems. In the power-separation system of Canada, the federal government has encompassing competencies to use fiscal policy instruments unilaterally and without restraint, but faces a lack of concerted action with the provinces which reduces its scope of action in fiscal policy making. In the power-sharing system in Germany, concerted action facilitates macroeconomic stabilisation strategies but the compulsory negotiation system distorts the use of fiscal policy instruments by distributive bargaining.     

Between Either/Or and More or Less: Sovereignty Versus Autonomy Under Federalism

The concept of sovereignty arose with the appearance of themodern state. It has survived because the state has survivedas the seemingly necessary basis for political order. The persistenceof cultural and ethnic nationalism and international anarchyhas given the state a new lease on life. Countertendencies.includingareactionagainstthemonarchicalabsolutismassociatedwith sovereignty, have given rise to federal systemsoffering a more flexible, if less certain, combination of governmenton a large scale with relative autonomy on a smaller, localscale. Given modern realities promoting interdependence andmaking autarky both difficult to sustain and a threat to therights of minorities, it may be better to settle for the "moreor less" of federalism and autonomy than the "either/or" ofthe state and sovereignty.     

European elections—Greece

This article discusses the implications for the German federal system of incorporating the new Länder of eastern Germany following German unification in 1990. It begins by examining the relationships between federation and Läander — commonly termed ‘cooperative’ federalism — which developed in the Federal Republic after its foundation. It then discusses how the integration of the new Länder in the east has added to and seriously exacerbated a range of tensions which had begun to emerge in ‘cooperative’ federalism prior to 1990, before moving on to outline the Länder contribution to the debate on reforming the federal system which was made possible under the terms of unification. This debate was, it is argued, an opportunity missed by the Länder — or, more precisely, was one they were incapable of taking ‐ to shore up and strengthen their position as an effective counterbalance to the federation in united Germany.     

George W. Bush, the Party System, and American Federalism

George W. Bush's presidency presents two major puzzles. TheRepublican Party has traditionally stood for "limited government,"but Bush's principal legacy for federalism is centralizationof power in the federal government and the executive branch.Most modern presidents have neglected their partisan duties,but Bush has been a uniquely vigorous party leader. Here, weshow that Bush's puzzling lack of attention to federalism issuesis in large part the result of his efforts to strengthen theRepublican Party to cope with the political and electoral challengescharacteristic of the contemporary political context. We explainwhy the Bush administration's strategy for redressing the Republicanparty's shortcomings has presupposed the deprecation of federalism,and consider the implications of our argument for the developmentof federal arrangements.     

FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SURFACE MINING POLICY

The federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 not only established national performance standards and permitting procedures for the coal industry, but also provided for stateprimacy. The principle of state primary is both simple and intuitively appealing: Because states do not have adequate resources to develop effective regulatory programs, the federal government would set up comprehensive procedures and criteria to guide the states in preparing their own plans. The obvious advantage of state primacy is that i t provides for flexibility in implementation.
Ultimately, state primacy is an experiment in cooperative federalism, a sharing of authority and responsibility between the states and the federal government to insure both the general welfare and sensitivity to local conditions. The history of surface mining regulation is instructive because i t points out the pitfalls and promise of cooperative federalism as well as the critical role of the courts in making state primacy work.     

Forty Years of German Federalism: Past Trends and New Developments

This article traces the major developments in German federalismfrom 1949 to the present. From a system based on a concept of"dual federalism," which was different in important ways fromthe American system, German federalism became somewhat morelike the postwar American cooperative federalism. Criticismof this system in the 1970s led to various reform efforts, whichmade little headway until the 1980s and the formation of a CDU/CSU-FDPcoalition government under Chancellor Helmut Kohl. The "turnabout"promised by this government and carried out to some extent includedplans and policies to strengthen the Länder by some sortingout of functions. These efforts were successful at first, butthe federal government has oriented its policies more towardthe national arena. Financial constraints, the nationalizationof basic rights, technological concerns, and pressures by theEC have led to new tendencies toward intergovernmentalizingand centralizing the relations between the federation and Landgovernments.     

Federalism and the European Parliament

The European Parliament has been a source of controversy sinceits inception. Its direct election was seen as endorsing a federalstructure and political future for the European Community (laterEuropean Union). Changes in its authority and legislative powerswere seen as symptomatic of creeping federalism and the emasculationof member states' national sovereignty. The European Parliament'sconscious contribution to developing federalism and constructinga federal Europe relate to its direct election, its powers,and its proposals to hold a constitutional convention. The Anglo-Saxonmisconception of federalism is analyzed, the role of a billof rights examined, and the failures of democratic legitimacyexposed with a view to see what contribution federal bargainsmay make to close the democratic deficit and to impel a reviewof the current institutional arrangements.     

Montesquieu on Federalism and Anglo-Gothic Constitutionalism

The common perception that Montesquieu is not a major theoristof federalism is due both to the peripheral nature of his accountof confederate republics and his praise of the unitary BritishConstitution in the Spirit of the Laws. This study challengesthis view by arguing that, despite his endorsement of the separationof powers, Montesquieu had serious reservations about England'shighly centralized system of parliamentary sovereignty. Moreover,his most significant reflections on federalism were not containedin his brief treatment of confederate republics, but ratherin his lengthy consideration of Gothic constitutionalism. Iconclude that Montesquieu's complex constitutional theory involvestwo distinct dimensions including both the separation of powersexemplified in England and the federal principles in the decentralizedGothic system of medieval France.     

How to not speak the ‘F‐word’: Federalism between mirage and imperative in the euro crisis

The recent financial and debt crisis has resuscitated the debate about European federalism – a theme that seemed not to have survived the painful constitutional adventure that ended with the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. With the adoption of significant policy and institutional measures for tightening macroeconomic and budgetary coordination (including a constitutionally enshrined debt brake), the reforms of the monetary union have undisputedly brought the European Union further on the path towards an ever closer union. In an era where EU integration has been increasingly politicised, and Euroscepticism has been on the rise and exploited by anti‐system parties, national leaders have to face a political hiatus and respond to increased needs for symbolic and discursive legitimation of further federalisation. This is all the more crucial for French and German leaders who have brokered the main decisions during the crisis of the eurozone. Against this background, the purpose of this article is not to assess whether, or to what extent, the recent reforms of economic and monetary union have made the EU more federal. Rather, the purpose is to tackle the following puzzle: How have EU leaders legitimised the deepening of federal integration in a context where support for more European federalism is at its lowest? To elucidate this, a lexicographic discourse analysis is conducted based on all speeches held by the German Chancellor Merkel and the two French Presidents Sarkozy and Hollande, previous to, or after European summits from early 2010 until the spring of 2013. The findings indicate that federalism is both taboo and pervasive in French and German leaders' discourse. The paradox is barely apparent, though. While the ‘F‐word’ is rarely spoken aloud, two distinctive visions co‐exist in the French and German discourse. The coming of age of a political union through constitutional federalism is pictured as ineluctable, yet as a distant mirage out of reach of today's decision makers. At the same time, the deepening of functional federalism in order to cope with economic interdependence is a ubiquitous imperative that justifies further integration. The persisting gap between the constitutional and the functional vision of European federalism has crucial implications. Insofar as the Union is held responsible for not delivering successful economic policy, political leaders will fail to legitimise both functional and constitutional federalism.     

Politics like any other? Comparative politics,international relations and the study of the EU

This article disputes the claim made by Simon Hix (WEP January 1994) that ‘politics in the EC is not inherently different to the practice of government in any democratic system’ and argues against a rigid division between international relations and comparative politics. It contends first, that EU politics cannot be broken up into two categories: ‘politics’ and ‘integration'; second, that the nature of the EU system, the centrality of states and the continued importance of power considerations precludes explanations of EU ‘politics’ through the use of comparative government approaches alone; and third, that public policy cannot in general be studied without reference to international factors.     

Comparing federal institutions: Power and representation in six federations

The study of comparative federalism is often hampered by the diverse range of federal institutional arrangements in practice, as well as the ambiguity surrounding the concept of federalism. This article identifies three main conceptual approaches to federalism – sociological, constitutional, and governmental – then proposes a revised governmental approach that takes account of the institutional effects of federalism, for application in comparative politics research. Minimally defined, all federations are products of institutional rules that create separate territorial spheres of authority. This article compares Canada, the United States, Australia, Austria, Germany and Switzerland along two key institutional dimensions that structure politics in the federal state: resource allocation, and the representation of constituent units in federal-level decision-making.     

Testing Riker's Party-Based Theory of Federalism: The Argentine Case

This study seeks to advance our understanding of the institutionalunderpinnings of federalism by evaluating William H. Riker'sstudy of party causality. Using data from federal funds transfersin Argentina, a federation exhibiting high levels of fiscaldecentralization despite its centralized party system, it isshown that when governorships are held by opposition parties,the overall amount of federal funds transferred to provincesincreases considerably. In addition, changes in the partisancomposition of the national government are also associated withsteep increases in the share of provincial federal funds, whereas,more controversially and challenging prominent recent studiesof decentralization in Latin America, divided government atthe national level leads to centralization of intergovernmentalfunds. These findings support Riker's contention that politicalparties exercise a decisive influence over the distributionof fiscal powers between states and the national government.     

A Reassessment of Federalism as a Degree of Decentralization

The central argument in this article is that it is wrong toconceive of federalism as simply a degree of decentralization.Decentralization can only be applied meaningfully to federalismin matters that belong to the central government. Even then,unlike unitary decentralization, which is entirely at the discretionof the central government, federal decentralization is bothmandatory and guaranteed. Much more than this, however, thekey to distinguishing federal systems from nonfederal systems,which also have "degrees of decentralization," lies in the conceptof noncentralization by which is meant that matters belongingto the states cannot ordinarily be centralized unilaterally.It is this noncentralization, which opposes decentralization(because decentralization presupposes centralization), thatmakes federalism a highly distinct form of "decentralization."     

Federal Systems in the Global Economy: Research Issues

The emerging global economy has altered makeup of federal systemsand set the stage for new international institutions. This articleidentifies key research issues that bear upon the connectionbetween federalism and globalism. Five specific research questions are considered. The first concernsthe impact of global economic change on the sovereignty of nationaland subnalional governments. Second, the effect of the globaleconomy on intergovernmental relations is considered. Next,the question of placement of economic policy responsibilitiesin a federal system is posed. Finally, the article asks whetherfederalism eases adaptation to the global economy and protectsdemocratic values.     

Splitting the Atom of Sovereignty: Term Limits, Inc.'s Conflicting Views of Popular Autonomy in a Federal Republic

In his concurrence to U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thorton, JusticeAnthony Kennedy described federalism as an attempt to "splitthe atom of sovereignty." As Term Limits demonstrates, the taskis an incredibly difficult one, which deeply rends the Court.One block, currently composed of Justices John Paul Stevens,David Souter, Ruth Baider Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer, viewthe source of constitutional authority as residing in the peopleof the nation as a whole; the other block, made up of ChiefJustice William Rehnquist and Justices Sandra Day O'Connor,Antonin Scalia, and Clarence Thomas, argue that the constitutionalwellspring is the people of each individual state. Justice Kennedy,now occupying the Court's middle ground, stresses the "dualcharacter" of federal government. The debate is much morethanacademic. Depending on how it is played out, the argument mayhave profound implications for the understanding and practiceof U.S. federalism.     

Federalism and Social Policy: The Case of Domestic Violence

This paper challenges long standing critiques of federalism that suggest it stymies the development of progressive social policies. Through a case study of national domestic violence policies in Australia, this paper argues that not only can the curses of federalism – especially conservatism, duplication and overlap – be surmounted, but even more positively, under the right condition, federalism can enhance opportunities for the development of progressive social policy. While the Howard government has adopted a conservative approach to domestic violence, federal structures have made it possible to maintain an alternative discourse at the state level. Moreover, national policy coordination machinery has opened the path for policy learning and innovation between governments in this social policy area.     

Federalism in Africa: Origins,Operation and (In)Significance

Abstract

Recent years have seen major advances in the comparative study of federalism and a growing literature on decentralization in Africa, but there has been surprisingly little systematic comparison of African federalism. This article explains several commonalities in the origins and operation of Africa's three main federal states: Ethiopia, Nigeria and South Africa. Each country used ‘holding-together’ federalism in order to accommodate ethnic pluralism. Each country—especially Ethiopia and South Africa—also experienced several key centripetal forces: dominant governing parties, top-down state administration and high degrees of fiscal centralism. Federalism mattered in offering accommodative decentralization, but in its operation subnational governments have limited autonomy because of these interlocking centralizing features. This African variant of federalism can have certain salutary features, even as it precludes the possibility of many of the theorized advantages of federalism that are predicated on real subnational autonomy.