The architecture of the Electoral College,the House size effect,and the referendum paradox

Using data from U.S. presidential elections, we show how seemingly insignificant changes to what we call the “architecture” of the Electoral College can cause different candidates to be elected President, even when no one changes how they vote. We consider varying the size of the House of Representatives, the method of apportionment, the number of “Senate” electoral votes cast by each state, and the lower bound on the number of “House” electoral votes cast by each state. We consider, in particular, elections with a “referendum paradox”. In these elections, the electoral vote winner is not the popular vote winner. Our work extends Neubauer and Zeitlin (2003) who analyzed the case of the 2000 election. We give an explanation for the effects that we observe in the data.     

Post‐Democracy,Press, Politics and Power

Transnational media corporations now wield enormous power and influence. Never has this been displayed so starkly and so shockingly as in the revelations that emerged during the Leveson Inquiry into the culture and ethics of the press in the UK. This paper considers the implications of the relationship between media elites and political elites for democratic culture and media reform. The paper argues that the culture of press–politician mutual interest in which media executives and party leaders collude will continue as long as the solutions proffered focus on the ethical constraints of professional journalists rather than wider structural issues relating to plurality of ownership and control and funding of news in the public interest.     

Word and Deed: A Deweyan Integration of Deliberative and Participatory Democracy

This article draws on the political philosophy of John Dewey as one way to re-think the relationship between deliberative and participatory democracy. Rather than focusing on differences, Dewey's ideal of democracy allows us to bridge these two theories while still being attentive to the tensions between them. In particular, Dewey helps us conceptualize deliberative and participatory practices as distinctive yet complementary phases within a larger circuit of cooperative inquiry. To illustrate the argument, a case study of one democratic experiment that effectively combined different forms of practice is presented. In doing so, it is contended that we might be able to recover and incorporate some of the more radical features of participatory democracy into deliberative practices. Participatory theory's focus on political action and structural inequality, in addition to deliberation, as essential to citizen-centered democratic practice is specifically emphasized.     

The house size effect and the referendum paradox in U.S. presidential elections

Barthélémy et al. (2014), extending the work of Neubauer and Zeitlin (2003), show that some U.S. presidential elections are subject to a ‘House size effect’ in that the winner of the election, i.e., the candidate who wins a majority of electoral votes, depends on the size of the House of Representatives. The conditions for the effect relate to the number of ‘Senate’ versus ‘House’ electoral votes won by each candidate, but the relationship is not straightforward due to ‘locally chaotic’ effects in the apportionment of House seats among the states as House size changes. Clearly a Presidential election that is subject to the House size effect exhibits the referendum paradox, i.e., the electoral vote winner is the popular vote loser, for some House sizes but not for others.     

Populist parties in European Parliament elections: A new dataset on left,right and valence populism from 1979 to 2019

Despite the increasing interest in populism, there is a lack of comparative and longterm evidence on the electoral performance of populist parties. We address this gap by using a novel dataset covering 92 populist parties in the European Parliament elections from 1979 to 2019. Specifically, we provide aggregate data on the electoral performance of all populist parties as well as the three ideational varieties of populism, i.e. right-wing, left-wing and valence populist parties. We show that there is significant variation both across countries as well as between the ideational varieties of populism. Most notably, while the success of left-wing and valence populists is concentrated in specific areas, right-wing populist parties have consolidated as key players in the vast majority of EU countries.     

The Multitude and the Machine: Productivism,Populism, Posthumanism

There has been a proliferating literature on postcapitalist and post-work futures in recent years, underpinned by policy proposals like the basic income and a reduction in working hours. It has gained increasing uptake within left electoral politics and policy making. The generational potency of these ideas require that we understand their theoretical roots. This article considers the interplay between the work of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri and the new postcapitalism exemplified by the likes of Paul Mason and Aaron Bastani, as well as its relationship with intellectual currents around Corbynism and the wider contemporary left. Through a discussion of their latest book, Assembly, it will be seen that Hardt and Negri both inform, and are increasingly informed by, the postcapitalist and post-work thinking popular on the left today—in particular at its ‘posthumanist’ fringes. However, this recent work is characterised by a series of tactical redirections that, rather than indicating renewal, reflect the potential collapse of this utopian framework for the future in the face of a rapidly unravelling global political context. Whilst the determinist understanding of social transformation cannot permit these setbacks, this shines a light on more general shifts in left strategy and analysis.     

The psychological roots of populist voting: Evidence from the United States,the Netherlands and Germany

What are the psychological roots of support for populist parties or outfits such as the Tea Party, the Dutch Party for Freedom or Germany's Left Party? Populist parties have as a common denominator that they employ an anti‐establishment message, which they combine with some ‘host’ ideology. Building on the congruency model of political preference, it is to be expected that a voter's personality should match with the message and position of his or her party. This article theorises that a low score on the personality trait Agreeableness matches the anti‐establishment message and should predict voting for populist parties. Evidence is found for this hypothesis in the United States, the Netherlands and Germany. The relationship between low Agreeableness and voting for populist parties is robust, controlling for other personality traits, authoritarianism, sociodemographic characteristics and ideology. Thus, explanations of the success of populism should take personality traits into account.     

Authoritarian populism and response to COVID-19: A comparative study of the United States,India, and Brazil

As the phenomenon of populism is in the preliminary stages of exploratory research, the present study involves an empirical investigation involving a case study of the United States, India, and Brazil to examine whether a correlation exists between populism and management of COVID-19. The study adopts the ideational approach of populism as a set of ideas or discourse to review how core conceptual features of populism have impacted on management of COVID-19. The study has two main objectives: (1) to examine whether populism in the United States, India, and Brazil has determined “a populist response” to the pandemic in dealing with the health crises and (2) to explore the management of COVID-19 in the states led by right-wing populism and the commonality of populist approaches adopted in handling the health crisis. Comparing the three states' statistical data of management models, the study has argued that common populist mechanisms such as distrust for experts, contempt for institutions, and suspicion of “others” have guided the US, India, and Brazilian leadership response to COVID-19. It further argues that leadership in the United States, India, and Brazil has prevented effective management by politicizing the crisis, aggravating social polarization, and contradicting expert advice. Moreover, populist and nationalist orientation of the leadership has evaded responsibility in these states with the leadership blaming ethnicities for spreading the virus and by weakening societal solidarity.     

Campaign claims,partisan cues,and media effects in the 2011 British Electoral System Referendum

Campaigning in the British Electoral System Referendum of 2011 provoked much controversy. Accusations of negativity and dissemination of misinformation came from both sides. Using panel data spanning the crucial period of the campaign, this paper examines shifts in perceptions and intentions associated with information and opinion. First, it takes into account ‘baseline’ effects such as initial partisan cues. Then, in the context of criticism of the low quality information content of the campaign, it asks how much changes in the attitudes of respondents affected electoral system opinion, and the extent to which these changes reflected learning and the provision of information or misinformation. The roles of the Electoral Commission, television coverage, and newspapers are also examined.     

Empowered and enraged: Political efficacy,anger and support for populism in Europe

This article addresses the psychological dynamics between internal political efficacy, emotions and support for populism. Contrary to the extended idea that populism is associated with low levels of political competence, it is argued that individuals’ self-competence beliefs enhance populist attitudes. Individuals who conceive themselves as able to understand and participate effectively in politics are more critical towards politicians and more prone to consider that citizens could do a better job. The article also hypothesises that internal efficacy enhances the likelihood of experiencing anger, which in turn promotes populist attitudes. Experimental and comparative observational evidence shows robust direct effects of internal efficacy over populism, as well as a smaller indirect impact via feelings of anger. These findings raise important questions regarding the nature of populism and how to fight it in our emancipated and information-intensive democratic systems.     

Exploring the Paradox of Liberal Democracy: More Political Communications Equals Less Public Trust

Francis Fukuyama asks: ‘Is liberal democracy prey to serious internal contradictions, contradictions so serious that they will eventually undermine it as a political system?’ This paper argues that one of these ‘internal contradictions’ is the political communications process and it can be sufficiently serious to undermine the democratic system—but such an undermining is not inevitable.     

Managerialism, Accountability and Democracy: A Victorian Case Study

Managerialism has made a substantial contribution to providing a more cost conscious, efficient and effective public service. But the Victorian case also raises concerns about whether managerialist techniques will be pursued within a wider constitutional, political and legal framework which recognises the need for discussion, debate and accountability in democratic policy-making.     

‘Enoch Powell Speaks for Britain’: The Press,the Public and the Speech

This article explores popular reactions to Enoch Powell's speech in Birmingham on 20 April 1968. It describes the protests by sympathetic workers, such as the Smithfield meat porters, and the responses of the press, both nationally and in the West Midlands. It considers the speech's impact on immigrants themselves and it makes the case that Powell's real significance was as an early champion of a particular kind of anti‐Establishment populism, which has now become a very familiar feature of our political landscape.     

Democracy,Government Spending,and Economic Growth: A Political-Economic Explanation of the Barro-Effect

The paper develops a political economicargument for the recently observed inverseu-shaped relation between the level ofdemocracy and economic performance. A modelis constructed that shows why and howpolitical participation influences thespending behavior of opportunisticgovernments that can choose an optimalcombination of rents and public goods toattract political support. If the level ofdemocracy remains comparably low,governments rationally choose rents as aninstrument to assure political support.With increasing democratic participation,however, rents become an increasinglyexpensive instrument while the provision ofpublic goods becomes more and moreefficient in ensuring the incumbentgovernment's survival in power. As a consequence, an increase in democracy tends toraise growth rates of per capita income.However, the beneficial impact of democracyon growth holds true only for moderatedegrees of political participation. If –in semi-democratic countries – politicalparticipation increases further,governments have an incentive toover-invest in the provision of publicgoods. This model allows to derive and testthree hypothesis: Firstly, based on asimple endogenous growth model, weempirically substantiate our hypothesis ofa non-linear, inverse u-shaped relationbetween the level of democracy and growthof per capita income. Secondly, we showthat the impact of government spending oneconomic growth is higher in moredemocratic countries. Thirdly, wedemonstrate that the level of democracy andgovernment share of GDP are correlated in au-shaped manner.     

Three Historical Perspectives on Trump,the Presidency,and American Populism

This article attempts to set up a conversation between certain aspects of the considerable scholarship on rhetoric and populist identity, on the one hand, and the historical perspectives on American populism provided by Michael Kazin; Christopher Lasch and a recent set of studies of the history of presidential rhetoric. It ends with tentative reflections on the effects of these historical perspectives for contemporary discussions.     

Democracy in an Age of Tragedy: Democracy,Tragedy and Paradox

Abstract

Democracy and tragedy captured a delicate poise in ancient Athens. While many today perceive democracy as a finite, unquestionable and almost procedural form of governance that glorifies equality and liberty for their own sake, the Athenians saw it as so much more. Beyond the burgeoning equality and liberty, which were but fronts for a deeper goal, finitude, unimpeachability and procedural norms were constantly contradicted by boundlessness, subversion and disarray. In such a world, where certainty and immortality were luxuries beyond the reach of humankind, tragedy gave comfort and inspired greatness. The purpose of this article is to draw explicit links between democracy, tragedy and paradox. Given that tragedy's political ascendancy coincided with the birth of democracy in ancient Athens, we may assume that democracy was somehow, if not implicitly, tragic. But what was it that made democracy and tragedy speak so intimately to each other and to the Athenians who created them? The answer, at least the one which this article entertains, is paradox.     

Democracy and the policy sciences: A progress report

Editorial

Democracy and the policy sciences: A progress report     

Monarchy and Democracy: A Progressive Agenda

The Blair governments since 1997 have seen the single most significant period of constitutional reform in Britain for over a century. However, they leave the monarchy, the institution at the apex of the unwritten constitution, untouched. It is argued that neither inaction nor abolition is advisable, but that reform should be undertaken, with particular attention to the rules of succession and to the royal prerogative powers, notable examples being the powers to declare war, to dismiss parliament, to assent to legislation and to appoint the Prime Minister. Those powers now exercised by the executive should be formally and linguistically separated from the office of head of state, and put on a statutory basis. The achievement of these reforms depends, however, on political will and cannot be initiated by the monarchy itself.     

Emotions and voting behavior in self-determination referendums: the case of New Caledonia in 2018

In this article we examine the impact of emotions in an independence referendum. New Caledonia – a French Pacific territory with 270,000 inhabitants – held a self-determination referendum in November 2018, in which 56% of the voters opted to remain a part of France. We conducted a post-referendum survey with 1496 respondents that included a specific battery to measure emotions as well as control variables. We find that experiencing anger with the national status of the territory increases the probability of voting for independence, while experiencing pride reduces it. These results remain after controlling for partisan, ethnic and national identification, expected effects of independence as well as sociodemographic factors. Moreover, emotions and identity interact and increase the effect of (the lack of) national identification. Beyond the effects of the traditional control variables, the results suggest that knowledge about voting behavior in independence referendums is transferable to decolonization in Pacific Islands.