Caught in the Act: The Smoking Gun View of Ministerial Responsibility

While any discussion of ministerial responsibility must in part focus on ministerial resignations, finding out when ministers resign is only the tip of the iceberg. A full assessment of ministerial responsibility would look at the relations between ministers and their senior bureaucrats, as discussed in Bill Blick’s article. It would look at the impact of managerialism on ministerial accountability, especially in the light of privatisation and contracting out. It would assess the impact of other mechanisms of accountability, including the senate. The subject of this article must always be put into a broader context. This article concentrates on ministerial resignations drawing on evidence from Britain, Canada, the federal government in Australia and the government of New South Wales. When do ministers resign?     

Not Just Parliamentary 'Cowboys and Indians': Ministerial Responsibility and Bureaucratic Drift

A strict interpretation of the doctrine of individual ministerial responsibility requires that the minister alone bear public responsibility for her department's actions. Critics charge that it is not sensible to hold a mminister solel responsible for departmental errors when government departments are so large and complex, and senior bureaucrats so powerful in their own right; senior bureaucrats should be made directly accountable to Parliament. The paper uses a game theoretic model to show that this criticism is misguided. To the extent that politicians more effectively police the bureaucracy when they are governed by a doctrine of ministerial responsibility than when they are not, the doctrine strengthens accountability. Much of the doctrine's force comes from the threat of ministerial resignation, but the opportunities that the doctrine creates for opposition parties to embarrass the government also contribute to its efficacy.     

The Bureaucrat Who Fell Under a Bus: Ministerial Responsibility, Executive Agencies and The Derek Lewis Affair in Britain

Various concerns have been raised about the practicability of Next Steps and the adequacy of accountability mechanisms in Britain, particularly after the dismissal of Derek Lewis as chief executive of the Prison Service. This article critically reviews these concerns. It argues that the agency model is viable notwithstanding doubts about the practicability of the policy–operations distinction; that Next Steps is not the cause of defective accountability or the scapegoating of bureaucrats by ministers; and that a commonly proposed solution—making agency heads accountable to parliamentary select committees—has fundamental drawbacks of its own. The conventional wisdom that Next Steps cannot work ignores important evidence and badly needs reassessment.     

Ministerial expertise and the Dutch case

Abstract. The prevalent Dutch prototype of 'specialist ministers' is critically examined. To this purpose a typology of ministerial expertise is proposed along with guidelines for measurement. Diachronic data concerning all Dutch ministers and all ministerial appointments covering the 1848–1986 period show that the specialist thesis should be amended. In general, political know-how within Dutch cabinets has been underestimated, partly because of methodological inadequacies. One of four conceivable types of ministerial expertise proves to be predominant: the expert minister experienced in both departmental and political affairs.     

Crisis Accountability: Ministerial Resignations in Sweden

Accountability processes after crisis events sometimes entail harsh criticism from public and political players alike, forcing cabinet ministers to be on top of the political game and sometimes even resign. However, harsh accountability processes are just as likely to leave ministers undamaged. This article combines two existing theories that propose different factors to account for variation in outcomes: ministerial resignations as a consequence of cabinet formation and individual positions; or resignations as a result of blame management strategies involving individual actors within the cabinet and beyond. Ten crisis episodes in Sweden are analysed and compared. The findings suggest that individual political power bases and experience matter to how well blame management strategies can be employed, while the composition of the government gives structural constraints. The dynamic interplay and framing battle between incumbent decision makers, and external arenas and the skill with which individual ministers engage and frame responsibility, play a key role in determining their post‐crisis careers.     

Reforming the Conventions Regarding Parliamentary Scrutiny of Ministerial Actions

Parliamentary scrutiny of government ministers is limited by the convention that one house of parliament cannot compel a member of the other house to appear before it. This convention limits the Senate's capacity to examine ministers who are members of the House of Representatives. It has its origins in UK parliamentary practice, and is given alleged legal force in Australia by virtue of section 49 of Australia's constitution. That section effectively says that Australia's current parliamentary powers, privileges and immunities are those of the UK House of Commons in 1901.
However analysis of UK practice prior to the twentieth century reveals a surprising picture. Far from protecting members of one house from the other house's inquiries, it would seem that invitations issued by one chamber to a member of the other were never refused, an element of 'custom and practice' now conveniently overlooked. Furthermore, the purpose of the powers had nothing to do with protecting ministers. On the contrary, their origins He in a desire to ensure the strength of parliamentary accountability. If modern Australian practice is to be true to historical House of Commons practice, consideration should be given to ensuring that each chamber does have guaranteed access to ministers of the other house.     

The Corrective Effect of Ministerial Resignations on Government Popularity

Using data from the United Kingdom, we estimate the effects of ministerial resignation on government popularity. We test a counterfactual argument that resignations should have a corrective effect, that is, there is an increase in popularity following a resignation when taking into account the negative effect on popularity of the resignation issue. We get empirical estimates by using the age of ministers involved in resignation issues as an instrument. Our IV estimates provide empirical support for the corrective effect .     

Ministerial Turnover and Why Reshuffles Matter for Parliament

Reshuffles are a relatively common occurrence in British politics. We expect to see them whenever a new Prime Minister enters Downing Street, after elections and following ministerial resignations. Recent research from the Institute for Government warns that the regular churn of ministers has negative consequences for policy making and for parliamentary accountability. This article summarises their latest research and what this tells us about the potential implications of Boris Johnson’s February 2020 reshuffle on government and Parliament.     

Survival of the Ministers: On Ministerial Durability in Postwar Norway

The field of ministerial durability, showing why some ministers are dismissed and others not, has increased in size over the last decade. Specifically, linking ministerial performance through resignation calls with durability has been applied to both majoritarian and semi‐presidential systems, whereas this link is less explored in consensual electoral systems. Thus, this study explores the relationship between ministerial performance and durability in postwar Norway, drawing on the principal‐agent theory for parliamentary democracies and the accountability link between party leaders and ministers. The main finding is that there are many similarities to other studies’ ministerial durability and performance. By measuring performance in resignation calls coming through the media, it is found that ministerial durability is decreased when performance is low: the more resignation calls a minister gets, the more likely the minister is to be removed by the party leader. Consequently, it is argued that ministers generally are held accountable by their party leaders whenever they are perceived to perform badly. Even though it is argued in the article that studies on ministerial durability and performance would benefit from alternative performance measures, the analysis shows that resignation calls give a good indication of how party leaders hold ministers accountable.     

Australian Ministerial Advisers and the Royal Commission on Government Administration

The role of the ministerial office was one of the key issues investigated by the Royal Commission on Australian Gvoernment Administration (RCAGA) in 1976. At the time the ministerial office was undergoing new and controversial developments. In the 25 years since the Royal Commission the new ministerial office has become a permanent and accepted part of our machinery of government. This paper reviews RCAGA’s analysis of ministerial advisers and uses research on the Keating advisers in 1995–96 to track how the institution of the ministerial office has developed since the time of the Royal Commission.     

Cognizance and Consultation of Randomized Controlled Trials among Ministerial Policy Analysts

Consultation of scientific evidence by policy actors has been the foci of attention of knowledge utilization scholars for decades. The present study questioned the extent to which randomized controlled trials (RCTs)—generally seen as the gold standard of scientific research—are known and consulted by policy analysts in ministerial settings. Using cross‐sectional data collected in 17 ministries in Québec (Canada), our study showed that fairly high levels of policy analysts report never having heard of RCTs, thus possibly hindering effective communication of scientific results to relevant policy makers. Statistical analyses reveal the importance of cognitive factors in explaining both phenomena.     

"执政方式"与"领导方式":一种政治学的规范分析

“执政”是反映国家政权归属关系的概念 ,“领导”则是反映群体中控制与服从关系的概念。“执政”反映了国家宪政样式 ,取决于是否合乎“形式正义” (宪法和法律上的正当性 )。“领导”则涉及民意、社会意识形态和社会认同等 ,取决于是否合乎“实质正义” (人民体认的伦理合法性)。“执政方式”属于国家根本政治制度范畴 ,“领导方式”则属于根本制度下的体制性范畴。一个国家的“执政方式”是相对稳定的 ,而“领导方式”却是相对变化的