苏联国家控制社会的手段论析

在国家与社会的关系问题上,苏联呈现出"大国家,小社会"的显著特征.关于苏联"大国家"的具体表现,可以从苏联国家控制社会的手段加以分析.笔者认为,苏联国家控制社会的主要手段有:通过利用克格勃和告密者、思想控制、经济控制以及社会流动控制等.这些手段典型地反映了苏联"大国家"的特征.     

目标偏移和结构缺陷--从系统的观点研究苏联模式

作者认为,所谓"苏联模式"就是指苏联在社会主义建设事业中所推行的一整套理念、体制、方法和政策.它是一个综合概念,包括极端型苏联模式(苏联模式A型)和改良型苏联模式(苏联模式B型).作者不同意将苏联模式定义为"斯大林模式",因为"斯大林模式"概念缺乏学术上的准确性.苏联模式作为社会主义社会的载体是一种偏激的选择,苏联模式的目标与社会主义制度的根本目标是不一致的,甚至是违背的.苏联模式的系统结构存在致命的缺陷.苏联模式的问题不在于其集权性质,而在于其集权的"过度"性质,在于"度"上,在于这种"集权"远远超越了社会所能够容纳和承受的范畴和界限,从而使苏联社会陷入了一种"权力笼罩"的状态."非常权力"状态的生成和模式化,使正常社会走向"非常社会"状态.     

戈尔巴乔夫“新思维”背景下苏联对宗教问题认识的转向

戈尔巴乔夫上台以后,形成了以"民主化"和"公开性"为标志的"新思维"。但是在宗教领域,他及其所领导的苏联党和政府忽略了对社会主义条件下宗教问题的理论思考,在对宗教本质问题缺乏认识的前提下,单纯地将宗教政策的调整当作是营造良好社会氛围、提升国家声誉以及谋求与西方建立共同价值基础的工具,最终导致宗教矛盾激化,宗教问题延烧到社会政治领域、民族关系领域,演变成为推倒苏联大厦的重要推手之一。     

当代俄罗斯思想家亚·季诺维耶夫及其政治思想

一 写在前面的话:一个中国学者的敬意 亚历山大·亚历山大罗维奇·季诺维耶夫是当代俄罗斯思想家,也是苏联著名哲学家、社会学家、异议作家和持不同政见者.他以其高深的学术功力、犀利的春秋笔法、不群的政治观点以及独特的批评视角鹤立于苏联持不同政见群体之中,称名于当代国际学术界.在苏联体制如日中天之时,他不惜自己的政治生命和学术生命,勇敢地对斯大林模式提出批评;在漂泊和侨居西方之时,他对西方民主体制同样持"详加审查"态度①;当苏联解体、新俄罗斯治乱交替和前程未卜之际,他再次挺身而出,批评激进社会和政治改革,抨击西方化和全球化之弊,大声疾呼珍视苏维埃优秀价值观念,重建共产主义思想体系.在季诺维耶夫身上体现了自拉吉舍夫以来,俄国知识分子的群体特性:不服膺于权势和世态,忠实自由信条和人类理念.     

用"三个代表"重要思想解读苏联兴亡

"三个代表"重要思想虽然是直接针对中国的实际情况阐发的,但它应当被看作是对整个世界社会主义运动、尤其是20世纪的世界社会主义运动的经验和教训进行科学总结后所得出的真理性结论.以"三个代表"重要思想为指导考察苏联兴亡的历程可以看出:当苏联共产党比较好地坚持、贯彻了"三个代表"的时候,苏联就兴起、壮大;而当苏联共产党对"三个代表"坚持得不好、贯彻得不力、甚至出现背离的时候,苏联便趋向衰落、走向灭亡.换言之,由于在实践"三个代表"方面苏联共产党有始无终,有头无尾,致使苏联先兴后亡.     

语言政策与国家认同:原苏联民族语言政策的失误与思考

苏联成立后,没有建立将俄语作为国家通用语言进行推广的法律框架,但在具体实践中却逐渐强化了俄语作为通用语的推广力度,并将推广俄语与构建"苏联人民"联系起来。由于没有辩证地区分语言的身份标志作用与交流作用,因而引起了一些非俄罗斯加盟共和国民族主义情绪的反弹。上述失误使原苏联语言政策未能有效发挥对国家认同应有的促进作用。     

手稿趣谈

今年北京文学节的一项内容,是在鲁迅博物馆举办别开生面的"百位作家手稿展"。作协难能可贵地收集到131位知名作家的手稿,配上他们的小传和照片,集中展出后将结集出版。说难能可贵,因为当今作家大多使用电脑,笔     

超越的反思与心灵的诉求：《废置的舞台》的叙事格调

长篇小说《废置的舞台》于1994年获得俄语布克奖,该书是俄罗斯著名诗人布拉特·奥库贾瓦对20世纪二三十年代之后的苏联社会历史所进行的自传性的书写。小说中运用了假定性与真实性相结合、叙事聚焦的转换和空间对比中的陌生化等叙事手法,表现出作家对苏联时期乌托邦的解构、对苏联历史的独特反思以及对超越一切时尚潮流的自由与心灵价值的终极追求的叙事格调。     

苏联社会科学的命运--从斯大林的秘密"谈话"说起

苏联社会科学管理体制是在斯大林的指导下、在20世纪30年代特殊的历史条件下形成的.苏联社会科学管理体制以及苏共对社会科学领域的路线和政策导致了苏联社会科学发展的停滞和扭曲.苏共的意识形态和苏联社会科学长期被教条主义所统治.教条主义者构筑的理论不能及时而准确地反映不断变化的现实,不能对人民群众真正关心的问题给以令人信服的回答.因此,不管苏共用多么强大的宣传机器向社会灌输它的理论,仍然不能对人民群众产生应有的吸引力和号召力.这种管理体制不符合社会科学的发展规律,不仅阻碍了社会科学各个学科和马克思主义自身的发展,而且最终导致执政党永葆青春的思想源泉枯竭,使国家失去兴旺发达的动力.苏联社会科学管理体制的弊端是苏共丧失政权的重要原因.苏共执政长达73年之久,没有能够解决如何正确领导社会科学的问题,这是历史的遗憾,也是历史的悲剧.     

外国给印度尼西亚的经济援助(1956—1963年)

这篇文章概要地叙述了外国经济"援助"和印度尼西亚经济建设的关系.其中着重地从经济"援助"的用途分配对比了苏联和美国对印度尼西亚经济"援助"的性质;叙述了苏联和美国对印度尼西亚经济"援助"项目执行缓慢的情况并初步分析其原因.文章也提到我国给予印度尼西亚的经济援助.     

试析20世纪70年代中越关系剧变原因之苏联因素

20世纪70年代中越关系的变化出人意料,两国在短短的十年时间就从肝胆相照的兄弟变为不共戴天的敌人,促成这一剧变的诸多因素中,苏联因素不容忽视。苏联对第三世界政策的调整,导致其对越南政策的变化,在越南问题上由超然的脱身态度变为积极援助,中苏两国关于援越问题产生矛盾,越南出于自身国家利益考虑,推行有利于自身的倾向性政策,越南在中苏两国关系的天平上倒向了苏联一边。与此同时,苏联调整对社会主义阵营的政策,中苏关系破裂,从而影响中美关系走向,中美和解对中越关系产生诸多负面影响,两国关系交恶,矛盾冲突愈演愈烈,不断升级,最终导致中越处于全面紧张和严重对立状态,两国关系产生戏剧性变化。总之,苏联的全球性进攻战略政策对此期中越关系影响深远。     

论中苏关系恶化对中国外交的影响

20世纪50年代末至60年代中苏关系的恶化不仅对中国的政治、经济发展产生了重大影响,而且对中国的外交也产生了重大影响。中苏关系恶化,首先导致了中国外交的战略调整;其次使中国外交日趋激进,并于60年代后期发展到极端;再次,促使中国发展与亚、非、拉国家的关系;最后,促使中国领导人下决心改善中美关系,联美反苏。     

A Soviet Eye on France from the rue de Grenelle in Paris, 1924-1940

The present article is about Soviet perceptions of French politics and society as reported by the five Soviet ambassadors in Paris between 1924 and 1940, and about how their reports influenced Soviet policy making in Moscow. This article is based largely upon unpublished documents from the Soviet foreign policy archives in Moscow (AVPRF), specifically opened to researchers in the 1990s. It contends that these Soviet ambassadors established effective relationships with French counterparts and that they were pragmatic, non-ideological realists trying unsuccessfully to improve Soviet relations with France. The narrative is about the failure of these efforts over a period of sixteen years and ultimately about the failure of the Soviet Union and France to form anti-Nazi alliance during the 1930s.     

A Soviet Eye on France from the rue de Grenelle in Paris, 1924–1940

The present article is about Soviet perceptions of French politics and society as reported by the five Soviet ambassadors in Paris between 1924 and 1940, and about how their reports influenced Soviet policy making in Moscow. This article is based largely upon unpublished documents from the Soviet foreign policy archives in Moscow (AVPRF), specifically opened to researchers in the 1990s. It contends that these Soviet ambassadors established effective relationships with French counterparts and that they were pragmatic, non-ideological realists trying unsuccessfully to improve Soviet relations with France. The narrative is about the failure of these efforts over a period of sixteen years and ultimately about the failure of the Soviet Union and France to form anti-Nazi alliance during the 1930s.     

Structure and Perceptions: Explaining American Policy Toward China (1949–50)

American policy toward China during the early Cold War has long been considered as a prime anomaly to balance of power theory. Many realists have argued that domestic forces caused a confrontational policy, overriding structural imperative to accommodate China to balance the stronger Soviet power in Asia. Refuting the domestic explanation, I argue that balance of power consideration primarily determined the U.S. policy. Under the powerful pressure of bipolar competition, the Truman administration persistently pursued a realist policy of forming an alliance with Communist China, or at least neutralizing it, through accommodation in order to balance the Soviet Union in Asia. This policy was based on the assessment of Soviet superiority in Asia. However, my analysis of the power structure shows that there was little structural incentive for China to cooperate with the United States against the Soviet Union because the latter was in a somewhat disadvantageous position globally and had limited offensive capabilities in Asia. Further, Chinese leaders perceived the United States as the superior power in bipolarity. Consequently, China formed an alliance with the Soviet Union to check the United States according to its own balance of power logic.     

“Never a Dull Moment”: The Moscow Ambassadorship of Sir Frank Roberts in the Years of the Berlin and Cuban Missile Crises, 1960–1962

This analysis explores the largely unsung Moscow ambassadorship of Britain’s Frank Roberts (1960–1962). After examining his Embassy’s role in developing cultural and commercial relations, the article addresses Roberts’ involvement in the Berlin and Cuban missile crises. In the former case, he made a low-key but important contribution by influencing American policy; in the second, he provided insightful assessments of Soviet attitudes and thinking. Roberts’ ambassadorship demonstrated the continued importance of resident embassies and ambassadors, because of the lack of ministerial-level Anglo–Soviet relations and the need to interpret Soviet policy in crisis situations. The research contributes to the literature of diplomatic representation as well as of Anglo–Soviet relations during the Cold War.     

论俄罗斯核政策与核战略——兼用西方国际关系理论进行分析

运用西方国际关系理论对俄罗斯核政策与核战略演变进行分析研究,可以发现冷战高峰时期前苏联核政策与核战略是一个非常适宜于用现实主义分析的框架;冷战末期原苏联和冷战结束初期俄罗斯核政策与核战略是一个相当适宜于用自由制度主义分析的框架;而当前俄罗斯核政策与核战略则是一个基本适宜于用建构主义分析的框架.当前,俄罗斯在核力量建设目标上谋求与美国保持低水平的核均势.在核武器使用政策方面,俄罗斯从"不首先使用"转到"首先使用",再到"先发制人",并将核威慑作为施加压力和维持国际战略平衡的工具.俄核武库现在依然过于庞大,但在当前情况下有助于保持全球战略平衡.俄过于依赖核武器来维护其大国地位与自尊,将可能与美国陷入安全困境.俄防扩散政策有助于阻止核武器扩散和落入恐怖组织手中,但俄罗斯有时对商业利益超过对防扩散的考虑.     

苏联民族联邦制浅析

民族联邦制是苏联的国家结构形式,它在社会基础、制度资源方面存在先天不足并与联邦制的逻辑内涵存在抵触。由于苏联党政领导人在民族问题上的错误政策和行为,民族联邦制失去本来的合法化基础。苏联共产党的意识形态成为民族联邦制和整个政治体制的合法化基础。民族联邦制的异化成为苏联解体的重要原因之一。     

Bridging the Realist/Constructivist Divide: The Case of the Counterrevolution in Soviet Foreign Policy at the End of the Cold War

The surprising end of the Cold War has led to a debate within international relations (IR) theory. Constructivists have argued that the end of the Cold War is best explained in terms of ideas and agency—specifically Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev's new thinking. A few realists have countered that Soviet material decline was "endogenous" to the new ideas. Can these two theoretical perspectives be reconciled with respect to this case? They can be partially integrated with a path-dependent strategy that places an emphasis on "institutions." Nevertheless, explaining the end of the Cold War largely requires a theory of Soviet foreign policy and its relation to the state. As a former or ossified revolutionary state, Soviet foreign policy for at least several years was largely based on the principle of externalization: outside threats were used to rationalize radical centralization, repression, and the dominance of the Party. In using the USSR's institutionalized legacy as a revolutionary state, Gorbachev acted as a counterrevolutionary and reversed this process with his revolution in foreign policy. In creating a new peaceful international order, he sought—through the "second image reversed"—to promote radical decentralization, liberalization, and the emergence of a new coalition. The case examines how Gorbachev's domestic goals drove his foreign policy from 1985 to 1991.     

An Economic Bridgehead: Weimar Germany's Attempt to Mediate Between Soviet Russia and the United States

Between 1919 and 1926 Weimar Germany pursued a foreign policy that sought to place Germany in a position to mediate between Soviet Russia and the United States. In particular, Berlin was eager to act as a mediator in the economic and commercial relations between these two powers. Germany hoped that such a policy would align it with two Powers that, like itself, were hostile to the Versailles order. Berlin also hoped that such a relationship would contribute to German postwar economic recovery and thereby to Berlin's re-emergence as a Great Power in the aftermath of its defeat in 1918. This policy culminated in 1925–1926 with Berlin's efforts to arrange for American financing of a 300 million Mark credit to the Soviet Union. Ultimately this and other efforts failed as result of Germany's own financial weakness, Washington's refusal to cooperate with Berlin's initiatives, and the nature of the Soviet economic system.