勃列日涅夫时期苏联知识分子的政治立场——剖析知识分子抛弃苏联的一个历史原因

随着苏联文化教育事业的发展，到勃列日涅夫时期，知识分子成为一个重要的社会政治阶层。但在这一时期知识分子遭受了种种不公正的待遇，这影响了他们的政治立场，使他们与苏联党和政府之间产生了隔阂与矛盾。到戈尔巴乔夫时期，在公开性与民主化的影响下，这种隔阂与矛盾突然间爆发出来，使知识分子成为苏联剧变的推动力量。     

论苏联共产党的官僚特权阶层

本文指出 ,苏联官僚特权阶层是在缺乏民主、高度中央集权的斯大林模式下形成和发展起来的 ,它经历了一个长期的演变过程。苏联特权阶层在演变过程中显现出来的特点是 :隐秘性、专权性、保守性、欺骗性和贪婪性。为了防止特权阶层的出现 ,各级党的生活必须保持高度民主的、自由讨论的和战斗的性质。要对特权阶层制度进行改革 ,就要对它产生的根源作比较深入的理论探讨 ,特别要对斯大林时期的党建模式同列宁时期的党建模式进行历史比较和分析 ,才能找到改革的突破口     

勃列日涅夫时期的苏美关系评析

本文对勃列日涅夫时期的苏美关系及其对苏联兴亡的影响进行了详尽而深入的评析,认为该时期苏联对美外交呈现出主动的、进攻的态势,具体可以划分为4个阶段.从某种意义上说,勃列日涅夫时期的对外争夺战略为苏联的解体奠定了历史基础.     

勃列日涅夫时期苏联对斯大林的再评价问题

经历了赫鲁晓夫的“解冻”,勃列日涅夫时期对斯大林的重新评价问题显得非常突出。从1964年到1982年,分三个阶段,勃列日涅夫时期对斯大林的态度发生了明显的转变。从最开始的维护苏共20大、22大决议到最后实质上为他恢复个人名誉,但在形式上却没有太大的变化。     

勃列日涅夫时期的苏越关系(1965—1985年)

勃列日涅夫执政时期的苏越关系是苏越关系史上重要的历史时期。在这一时期中,出现了苏越的迅速接近以至于结盟的特出事件,对东南亚地区和中苏美大三角战略关系产生了很大影响,因而引起了国内外学者的关注。众所周知,正是在勃列日涅夫时期,苏越从各自的战略利益出发,缔结了带有军事同盟性质的“友好合作”条约。越南依靠苏联的支持,出兵     

帮助你深入了解苏联的一部力作——读陆南泉等主编的《苏联真相——对101个重要问题的思考》一书

本书由新华出版社于2010年10月出版,分上中下三册,共155万字.全书分六编:十月革命与列宁时期'斯大林时期;赫鲁晓夫时期;勃列日涅夫时期;戈尔巴乔夫时期与苏联剧变的原因与教训.     

勃列日涅夫时期对斯大林的评价问题

由于对斯大林的批判是赫鲁晓夫当政时最重要的一项政治活动,而这项活动又使苏共的路线、方针和许多苏联人的命运发生了重大转折,所以人们对倒赫上台的勃列日涅夫将如何对待斯大林问题给予极大关注,勃氏在上台五年后才正式表明在该问题上的立场.在苏共中央正式发表的专门评价斯大林的决议和文章中,勃列日涅夫时期的评价和赫鲁晓夫时期基本上是一致的,但在领导人平时发表的讲话及各类论著中,赫鲁晓夫时期多侧重于揭露斯大林的错误,勃列日涅夫时期则多侧重于肯定斯大林的功绩.     

对外战略:解读苏联剧变的一个视角

苏联剧变的原因是多方面的,除了政治、经济、民族等的原因外,本文认为,肇始于斯大林沙文主义外交而形成于勃列日涅夫时期的苏联霸权主义对外战略,在苏联剧变过程中起了关键性的作用,它具体反映在苏联不堪重负的国力资源、超出实力的国际角色定位、错位的外交意识形态和失衡的外交决策机制上,因此,对外战略从以上四个方面对苏联剧变发生影响.     

苏联走近衰亡的勃列日涅夫时期

长期以来,勃列日涅夫时期给人的印象是稳定.而人们往往忽视重要的一点,这种稳定在勃列日涅夫执政的相当一个时期里意味着停滞.如果从总的发展趋势看,如果从苏联作为一种社会主义制度的变迁的角度分析,勃列日涅夫执政18年,完全可以说是停滞、聚集危机因素与苏联走近衰亡的时期.导致这个时期停滞的主导原因是改革的停滞.停滞带来的严重社会经济问题有社会、政治问题日趋增多与尖锐;经济增长率递减和停滞;粗放型的经济增长方式和经济的低效日益严重;军备竞赛拖垮了苏联经济和悄悄地重新斯大林化.     

稳定还是停滞——读《走近衰亡——苏联勃列日涅夫时期研究》

陆南泉教授的新著《走近衰亡——苏联勃列日涅夫时期研究》①自去年年底面世之后,不仅引起学术界,而且引起社会领域的关注,出版社不得不再版印刷以满足社会的需求。陆南泉教授长期从事苏联问题研究,早年侧重于研究苏联经济问题,后期视野更为广阔,从社会、政治、历史的角度关注苏联体制问题,解析苏联解体的原因,著述颇丰。     

Stalin's Demands: Constructions of the "Soviet Other" in Turkey's Foreign Policy, 1919–1945

Standard accounts on Turkey's foreign policy identify Molotov's communication of 1945 (better known as "Stalin's demands") as the catalyst behind Turkey's post-WWII decision to strain its relations with the USSR and turn to the United States (US) for defense support. The aim here is to complement these accounts which have stressed the military and ideological threat posed by the USSR as the catalyst behind Turkey's foreign policy change, by offering an analysis that explores the conditions of possibility for such change. The aim here is not to question the seriousness of the risks involved in failing to stand firm against the USSR in the immediate post-WWII period. Nor is it to dispute the appropriateness of Turkey's search for "Western" allies at a time when its economic, political and military vulnerabilities were acknowledged by friend and foe alike. The following mediates through accounts that stress the military threat and those that emphasize the ideological threat and presents an analysis that looks into the production of representations of the USSR as a "threat" to Turkey and the context which allowed for the production of such representations of the USSR.     

"Stuff Happens": Donald Rumsfeld and the Iraq War

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld exercised great influence over U.S. policies in the invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq. The Secretary's leadership presents a puzzle—accounts agree that Rumsfeld was a masterful bureaucratic infighter who ruthlessly gained control over the major decisions and marginalized colleagues, yet, having secured that control, was remarkably blasé about events on the ground in Iraq. I argue that Rumsfeld's paradoxical performance was rooted in key aspects of his worldview—measured through systematic content analysis of his verbal output on the principle that the words individuals say are related to the way they see the world—and his bureaucratic style, identified through interviews with Bush administration insiders. Rumsfeld's worldview centers on a low perception of the control of self in relation to macro-political events, and a very high conceptual complexity, indicating a nuanced view of issues. This low perception of control and heavily contingent worldview is the discursive, "stuff happens" side of Rumsfeld which so frustrated critics of the U.S. occupation. His bureaucratic style, however, was controlling, suspicious, and overbearing. I suggest that this approach offers a more complete explanation of Rumsfeld's actions, and so contributes to understanding of the Iraq story, as it is rooted in consideration of the basic dispositions that condition how individuals approach their roles.     

Gender equality – whose agenda? Observations from Cameroon

The political project of gender equality in Africa has gained momentum and made many achievements. However, these have been largely confined to the ‘big’ women working in the public and private bureaucratic contexts in which there is a greater commitment to gender equality. It is argued that in the context of Cameroon, until these ‘bigger’ women renew their commitment to their grassroots sisters, the experience of gender equality will remain largely unequal. Only strong links between white-collar workers and less privileged women will span this chasm.     

Staff and status in international bureaucracies: a Weberian perspective on the EU civil service

Recent studies in international relations (IR) have devoted little systematic attention to the personnel of international organizations. This article argues that the works of Max Weber could provide an orientation for future research on the cohesion and autonomy of the staff in international bureaucracies. In his writings, Weber highlights the role of bureaucratic officials as an “occupational status group” or Berufsstand distinguished by their professional ethics, privileged positions, practices of social closure and a particular style of life, which is expressed in a claim to social prestige. Weber suggests a sociological analysis of bureaucratic staff, whose group character is determined by their occupation and profession. The article outlines Weber’s understanding of the administrative official by revisiting his seminal sociological and political writings. The added value of Weber’s conception for IR is demonstrated with an empirical sketch of the EU civil service, which can be analysed as a transnational status group in the making.     

朱子学在日本江户时期急速兴起的原因及其特色

日本朱子学从原来的一种文化修养转而作为一种伦理道德和思想文化在江户幕府时期急速兴起有其深刻的社会背景。而且日本与中国和朝鲜高度集权的中央官僚统治不同,具有容纳了相对独立的子系统和严格的职业等级分工的结构特色。这种结构特色要求朱子学解决具体的“问题”而不是钟情于抽象的“主义”。因此,日本朱子学被具体诠释成日本社会各个层次乃至庶民的不同伦理文化,而呈现出多样性和庶民化的特点。     

"Small Peoples": The Existential Uncertainty of Ethnonational Communities

This exploratory paper attempts to extend the boundaries of research on the "smallness" of polities. It introduces the concept of "small peoples," a term coined by Czech author Milan Kundera to denote communities that lack a "sense of an eternal past and future." The paper posits "small peoples" as ethnic communities characterized by prolonged and deep-rooted uncertainty regarding their own existence. I argue that in modern times, "small peoples" doubt the validity of their past-based ethnic identity and the viability of their future-driven national polity . Empirically, I analyze two distinct "small peoples"—Israeli Jews and French Canadians (Québécois)—and argue that while the former have been more concerned with the future survival of their polity, the latter have been more concerned with insecurity about their identity. The paper suggests that a focus on communities and their intersubjective processes can enrich the study of states and their objective state.     

Mind the gap: the importance of local institutional development in peace-building-funded security interventions

In this paper, the authors analyse current spending priorities of the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF)-funded security sector reform (SSR) programmes. They conclude that these spending priorities do not appear to support traditional components of SSR and underfund programmes needed for the development of local public administration and civil society. This is observed despite the published commitments of UN PBF funding priorities to include the strengthening of national institutions in the context of support to the wider security and justice sectors.1 ?1. See UNPBSO, Strategy 2012–2013. The underfunding of civil society and local administration has been shown to undermine PBF's goals for the type of liberal democratic reform upon which peace-building, conflict management and conflict prevention rests. Focusing on the importance of accountability, the authors build on the scholarship of the rule of law literature to explore wider concerns associated with limited support to local public institutions and civil society. Drawing on empirical research on the peace-building experience in Sierra Leone, the authors reflect on concerns with the effects of past and current funding priorities and expose a number of ‘capacity deficits’ which have emerged in the wake of PBF funding patterns. The article concludes with several recommendations for a contextual approach to the development of local institutions and civil society in PBF-recipient countries more generally, and in Sierra Leone more specifically. This work contributes to the growing literature that seeks to link security sector reform with the need for a more nuanced approach to peace-building.     

19-20世纪初俄国主要社会等级收入状况解析

19-20世纪初俄国实行等级制度,收入存在等级差异.官吏、僧侣以及自由职业者不同等级间收入差距明显,且同一等级内部收入也有分层.官吏的收入有薪金和各类补贴等,加起来相当可观.僧侣的收入来源包括土地、政府拨款、信徒缴税、主持圣礼等,收入也属上游；与前两个特权等级相比,自由职业者包括教师、医生和画家等,是社会的下层,总体收入较低.但高薪官吏只是极少数,大部分官吏不过是官僚集团可怜的雇佣;也并不是所有的自由职业者都低薪,部分医生、教师属于国家公职人员,是官僚集团的一分子,收入丰厚.     

Long-term outlook for China’s political reform

China’s post-1978 economic reform is generally acclaimed as success, for the Chinese economy has expanded nine-fold in a matter of 25 years and the country rose from the world’s 34th largest trading nation in 1978 to the third largest in 2004 ahead of Japan. Interestingly, the Chinese experiment is often described in the West as “economic reform without political reform”. This begets the question: how could a politically un-reformed system be able to deliver such an economic miracle? In reality, China has conducted, by its own standards, major political reforms since 1978. Though far short of the Western expectations, the Chinese experience since 1978 should better be described as “great economic reforms with lesser political reforms”, without which China’s economic success would be inconceivable. China’s “lesser political reforms” have reduced country’s opportunities for greater political change, thus alienating many reform-minded intellectuals. Nevertheless, it may also have helped China avert the possible economic and social upheavals which could have resulted from rushing too fast into a radically different economic and political system. There is a strongly held belief, especially among the more ‘ideological’ observers of Chinese affairs that unless there were a radical political reform, perhaps tantamount to a revolution, to rid China of its “oppressive” Communist Party, the Chinese system would inevitably collapse just like what had happened in the USSR and Eastern Europe. As the party has been in power, China had been predicted to face collapse in the aftermath of the Tiananmen crisis of 1989, the Soviet Union’s disintegration of 1990, the death of Deng Xiaoping in 1996, and the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and the 2003 outbreak of SARS. Yet all these forecasts turned out to be wrong and the track record of the China doomsayers over the past 20 years is indeed poor. Will China become a democracy through its political reform in 20 years? Indeed, a full democracy could be the best scenario for China, the region and beyond, but it is difficult to give a definitive answer, which will, to a great extent, depend on how to achieve democracy in China, i.e. the costs/risks involved, as well as what kind of ultimate shape such a democracy will take. If full-fledged democratisation will take more time, the pressure for a more accountable government and more democratic society is growing, and this trend will continue with the rise of China’s middle class and civil society. Therefore, the most likely scenario for China in the coming two decades is that China will continue its own approach to political reform, and the relative successful experience of China’s economic reform may well set a pattern for China’s political reform in the years to come. As part of Europe’s general approach towards China’s political change, it is in Europe’s interest to assist, in line with the view of most Chinese, gradual reform rather than revolution or ‘regime change’, which could produce hugely negative consequences for China itself, Sino–European relations and European interests in China and even East Asia.