Democracy and political corruption: A cross-national comparison

Past research on democracy and politicalcorruption produced mixed results becauseof differences in sampling and analyticalmethods. Moreover, an important shortcominghas been researchers' focus on detectinglinear effects alone. In the current study,I statistically controlled for potentiallyconfounding economic factors and usedhierarchical polynomial regression toevaluate the form of thedemocracy-corruption relationship. Resultsshowed that a cubic function best fittedthe data. Despite eruptions of corruptionamong intermediate democracies, theconsolidation of advanced democraticinstitutions eventually reduced corruption.Ultimately, the initial politicalconditions and the final democraticachievements determined the magnitude ofpolitical corruption in a country.     

New avenues in the study of political corruption

This article argues that the 1990s have witnessed a sea change in the study of political corruption, especially in political science. It explores the reasons for the relative neglect of corruption by political science in the past, and suggests that a process is underway whereby the study of corruption is becoming more integrated into the mainstream of the discipline. It explores the paradox of the co-existence of unresolved disputes about the definition of corruption with a consensus on the severity of the problem, suggesting that corruption remains a worthwhile object of investigation. Finally, it summarises how the contributions to this special issue light possible new avenues in the study of the phenomenon. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Regulating transnational corporate bribery: Anti-bribery and corruption in the UK and Germany

Recent large-scale cases involving multi-national corporations such as the BAE Systems and Siemens bribery scandals illustrate the difficulties faced by the UK and German sovereign states in controlling complex trans-national and multi-jurisdictional crimes. This article analyses the mixture of enforcement, self-regulatory and hybrid mechanisms that are emerging as part of UK and German responses to controlling transnational corporate bribery. This regulatory landscape incorporates a diverse array of direct and indirect state and non-state ‘regulatory’ actors of varying levels of formality. Mechanisms of a self-regulatory nature vary in terms of their mandatory/voluntary requirements and manufactured/organic formation. However, there is an assumption that the emergence of a variety of enforcement, self-regulatory and innovative hybrid mechanisms is sufficient but in reality this is not the case. Instead, the key argument of the article is that while these mechanisms are aiding the response, they are likely to fail leading to the default position of accommodation by state agencies, even where the will to enforce the law is high.     

Refugee status determination in Australia: breaking the rules?

This article looks at the asylum regime in Australia. In particular, it evaluates the procedures that are used to assess claims for asylum and the extent to which they meet international refugee and human rights standards. The article discusses four key issues in the adjudication programme: the appointment of decision-makers to tribunals that hear refugee applications, the accessibility of the review process by asylum seekers, questions relating to the efficiency of the procedures used and the mandatory detention system. It is argued that whereas Australia is party to the main international treaties that seek to protect refugees and asylum seekers, its asylum law and policy is in many ways inconsistent with international norms. To conclude, the author proposes the observance of human rights and refugee standards by asylum states. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Democratization and political corruption in the Philippines and South Korea: A comparative analysis

The Philippines and South Korea have long had difficult corruption problems. More recently, both have experienced significant democratization. This article compares the two cases, first developing an analysis of corruption in each country, then laying out their reform strategies and assessing their effectiveness, and finally exploring the contrasting relationships between democratization and corruption that are found in these countries. The Philippines confront reformers with more difficult challenges, beginning with the size and decentralization of the society, but other contrasts are important as well. The political will required to produce successful reform has been lacking in the Philippines, for a variety of reasons, while recent anti-corruption initiatives in Korea have had stronger backing. Recent Korean reforms also emulate the successful approaches of Singapore and Hong Kong in important ways. By itself, democratization will not check corruption in either country, but where reform is accompanied by significant resources and where democratic accountability complements political will--more true of Korea than of the Philippines--significant progress can be made.     

Offshore financial centres: the political economy of regulation

This paper claims that the regulation profile of the Offshore Financial Centres (OFCs) with respect to the international standards defined to prevent potentially harmful phenomena—such as aggressive taxation, financial instability, money laundering and terrorism finance—depends on their specific structural features. In the designing of the regulatory framework the OFCs policymakers define the optimal degree of compliance maximizing a political cost benefit function. A simple model shows that the policymaker convenience to establish an OFC jurisdiction can depend on peculiar country endowments, consistently with a path-dependency approach. The model is empirically tested using a 222 countries’ sample, using different classifications of OFCs. On the one hand we find that the probability to be an OFC is greater with higher political stability, lower crime level, lower voice in international organizations, and if the country is characterized by a Common Law juridical system. Furthermore a low resource endowment seems to have a slightly influence on the choices to be an OFC. On the other hand it seems not to be crucial to use English as official language, to be a former colony, and also the geographical position it is not fundamental. The results are used for an overall assessment of the adequacy of the international policy aimed to fill the regulation gap, raising doubts on the persistency of the name and shame approach.

Toward a methodology for the comparative study of political corruption

Robust explanations of political corruption demand that research progresses beyond purely theoretical analyses and single case studies. In this article, we highlight problems of definition, operationalization and measurement of corruption that have restricted the number of truly comparative, empirical studies of the phenomenon. We suggest a few steps that might help researchers overcome methodological obstacles in their study of corruption. We introduce and evaluate one example of how the phenomenon might be comparatively operationalized and measured. While not beyond criticism, the corruption index we present will undoubtedly help light new avenues toward more comprehensive explanations of comparative political corruption. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

A convergence approach to the analysis of political corruption: A cross-national study

A convergence approach to the analysis of country-level political corruptionis proposed based on Cohen and Felson's routine activities theory of crimeand Ades and Di Tells's tripartite analysis of corruption. It argues thatalthough structural incentives, risky policies, and the lack of effectiveinstitutional guardians independently contribute to the causation ofcorruption, their convergence in time and space creates opportunities forwidespread and systematic corruption. Structural incentives are stableeconomic and cultural conditions and include economic hardships,particularism, and history of political unaccountability. Risky policiesencompass monopolistic and interventionist practices by the government inthe production, distribution, and consumption of goods and services.Institutional guardians refer to the judiciary, the press, opposition partiesand the civil society that monitor officials' behavior. Data from 99countries and territories are used to evaluate hypotheses derived from thetheory. Findings lend strong support to the proposed formal propositions.It is also suggested that useful schemes for corruption diagnosis and reformcan be developed from the theory.     

Political parties, political corruption, and the economic theory of democracy

Many prominent cases of political corruption in Western European democracies have involved political parties, yet the link between theories of political parties and theories of political corruption has not been explored. This article seeks to examine this link from the perspective of economic theories of democracy. It is argued that the economic model of party organisation is liable to encourage corrupt behaviour on the part of politicians, and that modern party organisations are coming to resemble this model, making political corruption more likely to emerge. It is suggested that this hypothesis finds some empirical support in the evidence of systematic corruption amongst Southern European socialist parties. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Politicians and bankers: The political origins of two local banking crises

This paper analyzes the role that political corruption played in banking crises in two states, Rhode Island and Maryland, where, in the 1980s and 1990s, private deposit insurance funds collapsed and state governments were forced to intervene to bail out member institutions. The argument is made that the collapse of these funds was not the result of abstract economic forces but rather was the outcome of structural weaknesses in the two banking systems, weaknesses that ultimately derived from close relationships and overlapping interests among bankers, politicians and regulators. These structural weaknesses are examined and the implications of these two case studies for private deposit insurance and self-regulation among financial institutions are considered. *** DIRECT SUPPORT *** A8806012 00002     

The C.T.A. case: A study in political corruption

Between 1984 and 1987, a wide-ranging corruption scandal in Pennsylvania resulted in the conviction and disgrace of a number of high-ranking elected officials, as well as the much publicized suicide of state Treasurer R. Budd Dwyer. This C.T.A. case initially appeared to be a straightforward and almost commonplace affair involving bribes and kickbacks to secure state contracts; but on further examination, this seemingly uncomplicated case can be shown to have involved elaborate conflicts at both state and federal level, and the direction and outcome of the prosecution were heavily influenced by political factors and bureaucratic self-interest.This paper will provide a narrative of the C.T.A. case and related incidents, and also describe the external factors which shaped the investigation. Particular emphasis will be placed on the complex relationship between state-level political interests and the activities of federal prosecutors. The C.T.A. affair offers an excellent illustration of the difficulty of gaining an accurate understanding of even an apparently simple case of political corruption, and the implication is that more elaborate incidents are even less amenable to any kind of academic or social scientific observation. The case can only be understood if full account is taken of the prosecutorial and investigative process which turned the original illegal transactions into a full-blown public scandal, factors which are often insufficiently emphasized in research on political corruption.     

Decision rules,membership and political centralization in the European Union

The decision to enter the European Union is based on a comparison of the costs of staying out and going it alone, and the costs membership. The latter depend on the degree of preference heterogeneity between prospective members and the Union as well as the decision rules employed for “constitutional” decisions. The same calculus guides the decision, by member states, to shift policies up to the Union level, only now the decision rules refer to centrally assigned policies. Preference heterogeneity makes more inclusive rules optimal in either case while at the same time reducing the attractiveness of membership or the centralization of policies to the EU level, respectively. The analysis complements and extends both traditional fiscal federalism literature as well as the more recent political economics literature on federalism.

On the political economy of the informal sector and income redistribution

In this paper we analyze a general equilibrium model in which agents choose to be employed in formal or in the informal sector. The formal sector is taxed to provide income subsidies and the level of redistribution is determined endogenously through majority voting. The model is simulated to produce qualitative results and to illustrate the differences between economies with different distributional features. We show that a distortion in the democratic rule in favor of the rich reduces transfers while the size of the informal sector may remain at high levels. Despite a greater demand for redistribution in societies where the majority has few resources (skills), we find that political systems which work in favor of a rich minority will produce little redistribution. Our results call for pro-poor measures such as free training and education programs that should be offered to those who cannot afford it.     

贪污罪犯罪对象的认定

作者阐述了贪污罪的犯罪对象限于公共财产,并论述了从混合经济中认定公共财产的原则。     

The political economy of international environmental agreements: a survey

This paper surveys the recent literature on the political economy of the formation of international environmental agreements. The survey covers theoretical modelling approaches and empirical studies including experimental work. Central to our survey is the question how the political process impacts different stages of agreement formation and stability. We distinguish the rules defined during pre-negotiations that govern negotiations, ratification and implementation. Strategic delegation and lobbying are directly relevant during the negotiation and ratification phases. Implementation, the choice of policy instruments at the national level, will also be impacted by lobbying and indirectly influence negotiations. We find that the basic theoretical framework for the analysis of international environmental agreements is largely unrelated to empirical approaches. Furthermore, we observe that models of the political process of agreement formation, like for example sequential game models, are yet to be developed.