Gubernatorial Politics in Sverdlovsk Oblast'

A Russian political scientist provides a detailed examination of politics in the Sverdlovsk oblast' of the Russian Federation. Focus includes Governor Eduard Rossel's efforts to increase the power of regions vis-à-vis Moscow, and Rossel's relations with the region's political and economic elites as well as with neighboring regional leaders. Analysis covers the politics of institutional reform, economic constraints, the politics of regional identity – including organized attempts to construct a Ural identity independent of an all-Russian identity – public attitudes, social protest, opposition politics, and clientelism.     

Four Years After the Collapse of the USSR

A prominent French political scientist and specialist on Russia introduces this special issue of Post-Soviet Affairs, The essay notes recent literature on Russia's regions and challenges analysts to rethink prevailing conceptions of center-periphery relations, centralization versus decentralization of political power, and authoritarian versus democratic politics. Focis is on regional elites' attitudes toward political inclusion and on the mutual dependence of elites.     

Indonesian West Timor: The political-economy of emerging ethno-nationalism

Encouraged by the post-Soeharto atmosphere of reform and regional autonomy legislation proposed under Habibie, the aspirations of Indonesia's regional elites have been stirred. Yet prosperity has remained elusive for many amidst continuing economic decline and as an unreformed military continues to threaten the business ambitions of regional elites. In West Timor, one of the poorest parts of Indonesia, local elites have had to contend with the added burden of the fallout from the 1999 pro-integrationist military operation in East Tindonesian military-trained tormentors, the West Timorese have paid highly for independence in the East and sufmor. Beginning with the need to host the quarter-million East Timorese refugees who fled West accompanied by their Ifered enduring economic malaise. This is reflected in the devastation of tourism and foreign investment, the suspension of major aid projects, the severing of the air-link to Northern Australia and a United Nations high-security alert in force since 2000. This crisis in which the aspirations of regional elites have been thwarted by the neglect and incapacity of central government and by the nature and political agenda of the Indonesian military elites, has provoked several reactions. As some West Timorese elites have lobbied for a share of the East Timorese petroleum revenues, the discovery of an essential Timorese-ness by others has been manifested in the ethno-nationalist Negara Timor Raya (Nation of the Land of Timor) movement.     

China and Africa: economic growth and a non-transformative political elite

Prevailing narratives in the discourse on China-Africa engagement are that China is developing Africa. This paper departs from those narratives because they disregard the agency of Africa's political elite. Basing its argument on the nature of the African political elite, the paper analyses their role in determining the impact of China's economic and trade engagement on economic development in their respective countries. To do that, it first discusses the nature and identity of African political elites, and examines how they control their states and scarce resources. Having done that, the paper then analyses their role in determining the nature and extent of development emanating from their countries’ economic engagement with China. It then concludes that it is not how much foreign states invest in African countries that determines Africa's rise, but rather political elites who influence the direction of their states’ development.     

Rise of a new elite in rural China and its characteristics

As it became clear in China that economic reforms were there to stay, more people became involved in commercial activities, including many local cadres, as they realized how they could profit in private business. Rural elites are emerging not only in the economic field but also in the cultural and social fields. The relations of the new elites with local authorities vary from province to province. The new elites may differ from the state in their interests, but may cooperate closely for the time being, although as they mature they will become more independent and harder to control politically. And once a large political crisis occurs they will replace party organizations and assume local leadership.     

Peking politics, 1918–1923

Abstract

Sometimes scholars fall into the gaps of their own arguments. A. J. Nathan, last seen asserting that European influence on China was benign, must now explain the failure of Western educated elites and their political techniques to achieve any semblance of order or development. Peking Politics, 1918–1923 attempts to plug the gap through examination of Western-influenced urban elites in the last period of Chinese history in which Western constitutional theory played any significant role. His historical outline achieves considerable success in elucidating the comings and goings of bureaucrats, bosses, and generals on the Peking stage, but is prey to serious methodological and ideological limitations. Where his data fits his hypothesis, it's usually for the wrong reasons, and all too often it doesn't fit at all.     

L'affaiblissement du Parlement français dans la dernière législature de la Troisième République (1936–1940)

SUMMARY

In this article, Simone Lassig examines franchise reforms in the federal states of the German Empire before 1914. She is critical of restricting the history of the German Empire to the history of Prussia. From this viewpoint, electoral reforms in several of the German federal states are used to indicate the capacity of the political elites to resolve problems related to the system. When we observe southern and central Germany, it can be shown that the old elites were capable of learning. Although the non-socialist parties opposed every form of mass politics until the turn of the century, by limiting the right to vote, after that they opened up to the increasing demands for participation from the lower levels of society. Tendencies towards democrati;tation appeared not only in many new electoral laws, but also in the political culture, expecially in the development of new methods of parliamentary conflict. Legitimation of authoriry gained a new status: the parliamentary resolution of conflicts was revalued as against legal restrictions, and facilitated the partial integration of the formerly excluded workers' party. The concept, scarcely challenged in research, that there was only a primitive level of democratization in Wilhelmine Germany should be reconsidered at least, as a result of this analysis.     

Clientelism: factionalism in the allocation of public resources in Iraq after 2003

This article examines clientelism in Iraq as a case study of one form of corruption. Iraq is an unusual case of corruption, because a key feature of Iraq's corrupt environment is an institutionalised factional political system based on sectarian quotas. The article explores the many links between clientelism and political factionalism, discussing whether clientelism arose because of factionalism, or whether factionalism merely determines the ways that clientelism currently operates in Iraq. Using fieldwork data, the findings show there are two distinct levels of clientelism in Iraq, both of which are linked to political factions: the individual level and the organisational level. First, clientelism at the individual level entails the elites of many political factions regarding ‘money politics’ as a means of influence in Iraq/Kurdistan by buying people's affiliations and thereby governing people. Second, clientelism at the organisational level entails that the spoils of political office are shared out among the elites of the political factions in a proportionate fashion. The article concludes that clientelism is a form of political rather than economic corruption; and that while there may be some immediate value in clientelism, its long-term harm outweighs its short-term value.     

Political culture,state elites and regional security in West Africa

This article analyses the dominant patterns of political culture among West Africa's state elites in an attempt to understand what standards, beliefs and principles they cherish. We suggest that although there are significant differences across the region's states, the dominant political culture can be characterised as neopatrimonial, that is, systems based on personalised structures of authority where patron–client relationships operate behind a façade of ostensibly rational state bureaucracy. In order to explore these issues the article proceeds in four parts. After providing a definition of political culture and why it is an important topic of analysis, we examine the central characteristics of the political culture held by state elites in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) region. The section ‘The Nigerian factor’ briefly discusses some of the malign effects that this culture has had upon governance and political economy issues in the regional giant, Nigeria. The final section explores whether the region's elites are living up to their own claims that they are embarking upon a serious attempt to engage in state reconstruction or are instead simply searching for alternative ways to sell their more traditional concern with regime protection. We conclude that, without a fundamental recasting of the political culture guiding the region's elites, a security culture that prioritises democracy and human security is unlikely to emerge within ECOWAS.     

Nationalism and democratic construction: the origins of Argentina and Uruguay's political cultures in comparative perspective

The article focuses on the different effects the formation of national identity had on the development of political democracy in Uruguay and Argentina. Uruguay's process of state building after the civil wars relied on political consensus regarding the rules of the game: the concept of political democracy became an integral part of Uruguay's collective identity. In Argentina, political elites after the civil wars divided on the question of national identity and the substance of political democracy. Uruguay's political identity as a partidocracia [rule by parties] is not a guarantee against authoritarianism, but the country's democratic political culture is resilient, permeating even the armed forces. In Argentina, the exclusionist character of the political process invites authoritarianism, whether of the liberal or populist‐democratic variety. This article focuses, first, on the different models of collective identity that developed after independence; second, on the distinct roles played by the two hegemonic parties in each nation ‐ the Colorados under Batlle and the Radicals under Yrigoyen; and finally, on the authoritarian periods both countries experienced in the 1930s.     

Élites gubernamentales en tres entidades federales de México (2000-2012) Un análisis estructural

This article aims at analyzing the profile and the social structure resulting from the career itineraries of governmental elites in the states of Guanajuato, the State of Mexico, and Mexico City during the 2000-2012 period. The author applies a mixed method combining the conventional sociological analysis with a network approach. The study observes in the first place the relevance of the local space for the creation and development of elites. Secondly, it identifies the regularities and divergences in the elite recruitment and development processes in the three states under study. Finally, the analysis reveals that instability in employment may be simultaneously construed as uncertainty and an asset since it allows the local elites to gather a considerable political and social capital.     

The inverted cycle: Kabul and the strongmen's competition for control over Kandahar, 2001–2006

Afghan tribes and local communities have been exposed to foreign patronage since at least the 19th century, but the scale of patronage relative to Afghanistan's internal economy increased dramatically after the late 1970s. Inevitably, this had a major impact on Afghanistan's own internal dynamics and on the mechanisms of political legitimisation. This article focuses on the province of Kandahar, which occupies a privileged space in Afghan politics and history, having given origin to almost all of the country's ruling elites. It deals with three groups of tribal strongmen, who tried to use tribally based patronage systems to stake a claim to local power.     

Urban Mobilization in Iraqi Kurdistan during the British Mandate: Sulaimaniya 1918–30

Abstract

Great Britain created ‘Southern Kurdistan’, an autonomous Kurdish entity with Sulaimaniya as its capital, under British political supervision in November 1918. Sulaimaniya became a political and social testing ground in the hands of British officers who participated in the process of building local identities by defining the arena in which the elites entered into competition, by defining the categories into which the political blocs were arranged, and by defining which leaders were recognized. Furthermore, the creation of ‘Southern Kurdistan’ allowed the extension of nationalist rethoric among its inhabitants culminating in the radicalization of Sulaimaniya's notables. Paradoxically, the peak of nationalist agitation in urban areas in 1930 coincided with the Kurdish mobilization shifting its centre of gravity to the countryside.     

The origins of sectarianism in Egypt and the Fertile Crescent

This paper differs from previous studies in arguing that sectarianism has overwhelmingly been created consensually by/or as a result of the elites’ behavioral patterns. Religious or communal pluralism does not categorically lead to political sectarianism; The development of pluralism into political sectarianism can thus be adduced as dependent upon other factors—first and foremost the behavioural patterns of the elite. While the imperial legacy, theological controversies, and socio-economic gaps feed political sectarianism, in and of themselves they are insufficient to cause it. A survey of the history of Egypt and the other countries in the Fertile Crescent reveals that the development of political sectarianism or sectarian violence has been organically linked to elites' political behaviors and interests. sectarianism takes the form of the instrumental exploitation of a religious or communal identity or framework in order to enable political organization, the gaining of political legitimacy, the promotion of political change, or the preservation of the control held by interest groups. While in the eyes of many critics, sectarianism forms a striking example of the elites' intrinsic weakness, sectarianism is first and foremost a product of the elites’ quest for power.     

Political Order in Occupied Societies 1 : Realist Lessons from Germany and Japan

Abstract

The American occupations of Germany and Japan have many lessons to offer the United States today as it contemplates creating new political orders in Afghanistan and Iraq. The lessons that are to be drawn are not, however, the ones that are usually drawn by the current administration and others. First and foremost, a systematic comparison with the German and Japanese experiences clearly shows that the preconditions for democratization are not present in the contemporary cases, suggesting that the United States needs to recalibrate its objectives. Instead of seeking democratization, the United States should try first to create stability, even as it creates at least the institutional forms on which a more pluralistic political system can eventually be erected. The U.S. experience with state building in the Philippines and South Korea may be more relevant today than the German and Japanese cases. Other lessons that can be drawn from the German and Japanese as well as other past U.S. experiences with occupying countries include: the importance of finding a common threat that can unite enough indigenous elites that order can be established; integrating the new states into regional systems; and perhaps most importantly, using the instruments of transitional justice (trials, purges, censorship, etc.) in a fashion calculated to rehabilitate and incorporate supporters of the old regimes while delivering a modicum of justice.     

Inner‐party reforms: The SPD and labour party in comparative perspective

In the wake of the crisis of the Keynesian Welfare State the social democratic parties in western Europe have been searching for new concepts to retain their image as reform parties. One way to achieve this is to democratise and renew the intra‐party structures. In the 1980s and 90s, the SPD and the Labour Party have developed different patterns to implement the process of intra‐party reforms. The objectives are to increase the autonomy of action for the parties’ various sub‐units, in particular the party elite, and to reduce the political influence of the body of delegates. On paper the individual member is to get greater rights to participate, in practice this coincides with greater influence of powerful elites. In between, there have been different problems of the intra‐party reforms. In the SPD, personal controversies and the old battles between old and new left and the right wing still determine the political agenda. Its reform got stuck halfway after Rudolf Scharping took office as party chairman. His counterpart Tony Blair tries to continue the reform process initiated by Neil Kinnock. In the Labour Party, the modernisers have had some success in reducing the internal power of the unions and in strengthening individual members. But these are only a few steps in becoming a ‘New Labour Party’.     

Youth,politics and republicanism in the formative years of the state of Israel

The article focuses on the political establishment's attitude toward Israeli youth during the early years of statehood, viewing it from a new angle: regarding young people as a political force reflecting the effects of contemporary social development. I focus on those described as hegemonic youth, members of Israel's social and economic elites. This approach sees the attitude of the political establishment toward the youth as a political expression and suggests an instrumental approach toward youth and the youth ethos in Israeli society as a tool to construct republicanism. Hence, despite publicly having declared the need to strengthen the Zionist youth movements and young national activism, the state's financial and organizational efforts were mainly invested in generating alternatives to the pioneering youth movements, along with the effort to change their ideological and organizational base. These alternatives included ‘good citizenship’ education in schools and informal settings, which were disconnected from the Labor Movement's values and were suited to urban adolescents; the attempts to narrow the dominant position of the parties and the settler movements in pioneering missions, favoring state mechanisms instead; an increase in the state's investments in supplementary education; and the establishment of settings for youth and student clubs.     

Centre–periphery relations in Afghanistan: Badakhshan between patrimonialism and institution-building

The article offers a review of centre–periphery relations and local politics in the Afghan province of Badakhshan from the 1980s to the post-2001 era. It maps the local powerbrokers and charts the transformations that occurred during this period, with particular reference to the impact of the central government's policies on local political alignments and relations of power. The key argument is that President Karzai's and the cabinet's behaviour towards Badakhshani politics was aimed at re-establishing a patrimonial system, rather than at institution-building as claimed. Unable or unwilling to successfully deal with established local players, Kabul resorted to sponsoring new players in local politics and facilitating their rise in order to weaken more independent powerbrokers. However, a local perception of weakness in Kabul, not least due to uncertainty over the durability of the Karzai administration, led local players, old and new, to behave with very short-term horizons, as ‘roving bandits’ rather than as ‘stationary’ ones.