Federalism and Decentralization: Ownership Rights and the Superiority of Federalism

The benefits and costs usually ascribed to federalism are benefitsand costs of decentralization; they are, therefore, presentin unitary states that are in fact all decentralized. The benefitsand costs specific to federalism pertain to ownership rightsin constitutional powers. Federalism is superior to confederalismand unitarianism because the ownership rights peculiar to thatsystem of government are such that they ensure the perduranceof competition when one or more competitors are unsuccessful.They do so because under federalism, powers cannot be repossessedunilaterally. Ownership rights have to be enforced; as a consequence,there are also costs that are specific to federalism.     

Water and Federalism in the 1990s

Federalism has always been an issue in water management. Thephasing out of grants for the construction of sewage treatmentplants, the reduction of the federal contribution for constructionof water development projects, the decrease in federal expendituresfor basic water data collection, and the lack of federal fundsfor state dam-safety programs have all had an impact on watermanagement and intergovernmental relations. This article summarizescontemporary issues in intergovernmental relations and waterpolicy. First, the relationship between water, environmentalprotection, and federalism is examined. Then, the shifting financialresponsibility for water pollution control from the federalto state and local governments is reviewed.     

Federalism and the European Parliament

The European Parliament has been a source of controversy sinceits inception. Its direct election was seen as endorsing a federalstructure and political future for the European Community (laterEuropean Union). Changes in its authority and legislative powerswere seen as symptomatic of creeping federalism and the emasculationof member states' national sovereignty. The European Parliament'sconscious contribution to developing federalism and constructinga federal Europe relate to its direct election, its powers,and its proposals to hold a constitutional convention. The Anglo-Saxonmisconception of federalism is analyzed, the role of a billof rights examined, and the failures of democratic legitimacyexposed with a view to see what contribution federal bargainsmay make to close the democratic deficit and to impel a reviewof the current institutional arrangements.     

Federalism and the shadow economy

This paper analyzes the relationships between federalism and the shadow economy. The theoretical analysis leads to the conclusion that the shadow economy is smaller in federal countries than in unitary states. The mobility of individuals among competing jurisdictions leads policy makers to adopt policies that are more efficient in terms of taxation and public good provision. This increases the return for activities in the formal sector relative to those in the informal one, thus reducing activity in the shadow economy. A cross-sectional empirical analysis of a sample of 73 countries confirms this theoretical prediction.     

Federalism and Community in the American Context

The rise of modern federalism was shaped significantly by desiresto protect smaller, diverse communities against forces of imperialcentralization. The protection of community liberty was seenas a prerequisite for protecting individual liberty as well.As such, a federal polity was seen to be a limited self-governingcommunity of entrenched self-governing constituent communities.The rise of the idea of national community and the ideologyof the cosmopolitan nationstate, however, eroded the legitimacyand authority of local self-government and, thereby, federalism.Constituent communities also came to be seen as oppressive,especially of individual rights. Yet, desires for local self-governmenthave maintained a strong hold on public opinion, and recentextensions of individual rights, particularly voting rights,coupled with policy weaknesses of the national government andmodernization of state governments appear to be renewing possibilitiesfor revitalizing federalism as a self-governing community ofself-governing communities.     

Federalism in the 2000 Presidential Election

Federalism was not an explicitly prominent feature of the 2000presidential election, but it exerted significant influencein shaping the political landscape as well as the candidates'positions on the role and purposes of the federal government.America's federal system created powerful undercurrents thatinfluenced the selection of the two major presidential candidates,the campaign issues, and the candidates' messages. At the sametime, George W. Bush and Albert Gore differed considerably intheir answers to how the United States' federal system shouldfunction and the objectives it should seek. Bush favored a federalgovernment that promotes economic opportunity through a marketplaceand allows state and local governments to determine their ownmoral and policy objectives. Gore preferred a national commonwealth,where the federal government determines the moral objectivesand the states cooperate to achieve those objectives.     

Federalism in the 101st Congress

This article identifies important congressional roll-call votes,calculates a federalism score similar to that reported previouslyin Publius, and through factor analysis, examines the underlyingdimensions offederalism voting. The resulting federalism indicatorsare analyzed to determine their relationship to partisan andideological variables. Finally, the federalism orientation ofthe 101st Senate is compared with that of the 101st House ofRepresentatives as well as that of the 97th Senate.     

Asymmetric Federalism and Coalition-Making in Belgium

This article examines the asymmetric aspects of Belgian federalism.The term "asymmetry" covers many meanings. The cultural, socioeconomic,political party, and formal-institutional differences betweenthe regions of the Belgian federation clearly make Belgium astrong case of asymmetry. However, these asymmetric featureshave largely been neutralized by preferences of the major-partyleaders for building symmetric or congruent government coalitionsin the federal and regional arenas. The article not only explainswhy Belgian party elites have acted accordingly but also demonstratesthat the genuine meaning of asymmetry cannot be understood properlywithout putting the concept of asymmetry into the frameworkof party politics.     

The State of American Federalism, 2005: Federalism Resurfaces in the Political Debate

After several years during which federalism was rarely a prominentor explicit issue in political debates, it was in several waysthrust into the public consciousness in 2005. It was not thatthe president or Congress ceased sacrificing state and localinterests to substantive policy goals, as shown by the costlyREAL ID Act, stringent new federal requirements in the TemporaryAid to Needy Families reauthorization, and congressional interventionin the Terri Schiavo case. However, Hurricane Katrina, and particularlythe delayed and ineffective intergovernmental response, generatedsubstantial debate about the appropriate federal role in disasterrelief. In addition, state and local governmental oppositionto the No Child Left Behind Act intensified and generated significantattention during the year, particularly as a result of a Utahstatute asserting the precedence of state over federal law anda Connecticut lawsuit against the act. Meanwhile, state governmentscontinued to address a number of policy problems that federalofficials were unable or unwilling to confront, especially regardingenvironmental, health-care, and labor issues. Finally, althoughthe Supreme Court in 2005 continued its recent (2003–2004)trend of pulling back somewhat from its late-1990s Congress-curbingdecisions, federalism issues figured quite prominently in thesenate confirmation hearings for Chief Justice John Robertsand Justice Samuel Alito.     

Recasting Federalism in Mexico

Decentralization of political power and administrative decision-makingduring the last three presidential administrations (1982–2000)has recast federalism in Mexico and sharply altered intergovernmentalrelations between the levels of government and between the principalbranches. Although decentralization cannot be equated conceptuallywith federalism, their relationship is extremely tight in Mexico.The shift toward a more decentralized regime is an outcome offederal government policies and political liberalization. Politicalpluralism and the demise of centralism were further intensifiedby the 1997 midterm elections. The rapidly changing politicalclimate in Mexico has increasingly demanded that the reallocationof power be genuine, that is, that power be shared not onlyvertically, with the various levels of government, but alsohorizontally, with the other branches as well.     

Federalism and Consociational Regimes

Federalism and consociationalism are useful means of understandingpolitical systems. Federalism and consociationalism are bothbased on compound majoritarianism rather than simple majoritarianism,and both represent modern attempts to accommodate democraticcomplexity and pluralism, but the two systems are not quitesymmetrical, and territorial organization is not the only characteristicthat differentiates them. Instead, it can be said that federalismrelates to the form of a polity, while consociationalism relatesto the character of a regime. To the extent that federalismmay also function as the character of a regime, then federalismand consociationalism may be more symmetrical. One of the ambiguitiesof federalism is that it is often both form and regime. Consociationalism,however, relates only to regime.     

Federalism and National Leadership in Nigeria

National leaders in Nigeria, most of whom have come from themilitary, have exhibited various leadership styles. These stylesboth affect and are affected by Nigeria's federal system ofgovernment. Successful leaders appear to exercise a reconciliationstyle coupled with a mobilizational capacity to institute change.Efforts to impose a unitary system on Nigeria have failed, butseveral leaders have strengthened the power of the federal government,in part through the seemingly paradoxical strategy of creatingmore states. The return to civilian government, however, willrequire a new basis of legitimacy for national leadership rootedin constitutionalism and a democratic party system.     

Values and Value Tradeoffs in Federalism

Federalism in various forms has long been associated with certainvalues of peace, security, liberty, democracy, innovation, efficiency,and equity–all of which have assumed heightened importancein the contemporary era. However, the institutionalization ofsuch values under the power-sharing requirements of a federalarrangement often have proved difficult not only because ofempirical conditions but also because of normative tradeoffsneeded to balance competing values as well as contrary consequencesof value choices. Simpler solutions might be available in principle,but under conditions of human diversity, federal solutions maybe necessary.     

American Federalism on the Horizon

The American federal system took some unpredictable twists andturns during the twentieth century. As a new century—indeed,a new millennium—begins, which trends are likely to continue,which are likely to dissipate? What issues pose the greatestchallenges for the intergovernmental system? This article plotsseveral possible paths along which the federal system couldtravel over the next decade. The fundamental issue in Americanfederalism is a perennial one: How will the balance of powerbetween the federal government and the states change? Otherkey issues facing American federalism are identified and theirlikely impacts examined. The article concludes with an assessmentthat the next decade in American federalism may be surprisinglyrobust.     

Structure and Process in Consociationalism and Federalism

It is relatively easy to characterize the institutional structureof a country as consociational or federal. The task is muchmore difficult if we turn from structure to the decision process.Within a given structure, there may be a great deal of variationwith regard to the decision process. Data for such variationare given for the decision process in Switzerland for whichthe following four types are distinguished: (1) consociationaland federal, (2) consociational and unitary, (3) competitiveand federal, and (4) competitive and unitary. Difficulties arediscussed in aggregating from such a variation to a measurefor the prevailing decision process in a country as a whole.It is suggested that the problem be disaggregated and that decisionprocesses be compared for particular issues. This can be doneboth across and within countries.