How Japan Can Contribute to a Peaceful World

This article discusses Japan's contribution to world peace both in the past and in the future. Japan's domestic, historical, and strategic circumstances shaped its concept of comprehensive security focused on international economic cooperation since the 1970s. Three decades of constructive relations with neighbors, including reconciliation with Southeast Asia built a strong foundation for Japan's new security role, one driven by new domestic and external imperatives. The article also documents the evolution of Japan's security policy and role in international peacekeeping, and concludes by arguing that Japan–ASEAN partnership is a key component of Japan's new security role, including permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council. In developing this new role, it is critically important that Japan engages its neighbors in ASEAN (and elsewhere) to gain their support for this new role.     

Singapore: Recent developments in terrorism and Japan's role

The threat of terrorism to Singapore remains serious, given the spread of radical ideology in Southeast Asia. Aware that it is a prime terrorist target, Singapore's response has been the most vigorous of all the states in the region. It has instituted a comprehensive homeland security structure, stepped up security cooperation with the USA and has been at the forefront of many US-led counter-terrorism initiatives in the region. Japan's regional role is important as Japan cannot opt out of the global war on terrorism given its huge stake in the security of the Straits of Malacca and the stability of the littoral states. Japan's contribution lies in capacity building, in helping states build up their indigenous counter-terrorism capabilities. Japan also needs to take a much more proactive, strategic role in the Malay archipelago in regional “hearts and minds” strategies to counter radical ideology, as well as develop functional security linkages.     

Japan's Official Development Assistance: The Japan ODA Model That Began Life in Southeast Asia

This paper traces the history of Japan's Official Development Assistance centered in Southeast Asia through the decades from the 1960s to the 2000s. The characteristics of the “Japan ODA model” are examined and three conditions for economic growth generated by ODA are proposed. Whether or not the “Japan ODA model” is applicable in other regions is also discussed.     

Japan's Cold War Diplomacy and its Return to Southeast Asia

With Japan viewing Southeast Asia as its natural sphere of influence and a region of immense economic complementarities and potential, it was no surprise that Japan moved quickly in the post-war period to shore up and rebuild its influence in this strategically vital region as the European colonial powers departed from Southeast Asia. Using reparations, followed by aid and trade, Japan soon became a key economic and strategic state actor in Southeast Asia.

Providing a valid counterpoint to communism, Japan proved an attractive economic model that enabled it to grow its influence in the region substantially. Using deft and low-profile diplomacy Japan became an economic leader and driver of economic growth and prosperity in Southeast Asia, supplementing and supporting US Cold War regional objectives. During times of conflict, Japan worked to reduce tensions and restore order using its unique brand of Asian diplomacy, not losing sight of its long-term goal of integrating the region economically and fostering regional peace and stability.     

Germany's Constitution and participation in international peacekeeping operations

In this article, Torsten Stein, Professor of Constitutional, European and Public International Law and Director of the Institute of European Studies at the University of Saarland, Saarbrücken, traces the constitutional development that has enabled Germany to take part in a meaningful way in United Nations peacekeeping operations (PKO). As in Japan, Germany's post-war Constitution (Basic Law) was held to prohibit such participation. Germany's Federal Constitutional Court, however, has found an interpretation of the Constitution that - without amending the Constitution or any other pertinent legislation - allows a "German solution" which reconciles the putative post-war prohibitions with Germany's obligations as a member of the United Nations. Stein, who is also a Colonel in the German Air Force Reserve, warns that the "five conditions" contained in Japan's 1992 Peacekeeping Operations Law are unrealistic in view of present day PKO, but envisages an interpretation of the Japanese Constitution that might follow the German example.     

The ending of Japan's ODA loan programme to China—All's well that ends well?

Official Development Assistance has been the most important instrument of Japan's foreign policy towards China since 1979 and has been useful in softening many difficulties in the bilateral relationship. Most of Japan's ODA to China consists of yen loans. Usually the Japanese government adheres to certain economic indicators set by the international banking institutions in order to phase out ODA programmes. However, in 2005 the Japanese government decided abruptly without applying the usual guidelines to end its loan aid to China by 2008, the year China will stage the Olympic Games. The article concludes that the decision was taken for political reasons, taking into consideration the criticism of certain Chinese policies, the deterioration of Japan's relations with China, the fast economic development of China with its implications for Japan's interests, and a general aid fatigue of public opinion against the backdrop of Japan's economic and budgetary problems. The process leading to this decision throws an additional light on all the complexities of the bilateral relationship, including the historical legacy.     

THE DEVELOPMENT OF A DEATH CULT IN 1930s JAPAN AND THE DECISION TO DROP THE ATOM BOMB

In the 1930s Japan developed a death cult which had a profound effect on the conduct of the Japanese armed forces in the Pacific War, 1941–1945. As a result of government directed propaganda campaign after the overthrow of the Shogunate in 1868, the ruling military cliques restored an Imperial system of government which placed Emperor Meiji as the Godhead central to the constitution and spiritual life of the Japanese nation. A bastardised Bushido cult emerged. It combined with a Social-Darwinist belief in Japan's manifest destiny to dominate Asia. The result was a murderous brutality that became synonymous with Japanese treatment of prisoners of war and conquered civilians. Japan's death cult was equally driven by a belief in self-sacrifice characterised by suicidal Banzai charges and kamikaze attacks. The result was kill ratios of Japanese troops in the Pacific War that were unique in the history of warfare. Even Japanese civilians were expected to sacrifice their lives in equal measure in the defence of the homeland. It was for this reason that American war planners came to the shocking estimate that as many as 900,000 Allied troops could die in the conquest of mainland Japan – Operation DOWNFALL. Contrary to the view of numbers of revisionist historians in the post-war period, who have variously argued that the atom bombs were used to prevent Soviet entry into the war against Japan, Francis Pike, author of Hirohito's War, The Pacific War, 1941 – 1945 [Bloomsbury 2015] reaffirms that the nuclear weapon was used for one purpose alone – to bring the war to a speedy end and to save the lives of American troops.     

The Bush Administration's 'Alliance-Based' East Asia Policy

The US will face major foreign policy challenges in East Asia in the twenty-first century. In this article, Ralph A. Cossa, president of the Pacific Forum CSIS, Honolulu, examines the Bush administration's policy towards East Asia which he argues continues to be alliance-based. The principal issues include: the precarious situation on the Korean Peninsula; China's potential emergence as a regional power and the sensitive topic of the Taiwan Strait, Japan's struggle with economic and constitutional reform and an unstable Indonesia. The administration's stated commitment to missile defense has been well publicized and the security implications of this for the region are also examined by Cossa. Although a ''Vision statement'' on the Asia-Pacific is still lacking and needed, he argues that the basic components of the Bush administration's Asia strategy appear to be well-formed.     

Providers Not Protectors: Institutionalizing Responsible Sovereignty in Southeast Asia

Abstract

Despite their declaratory support for the United Nations' adoption of the “responsibility to protect” (R2P) principle, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) governments nonetheless reject the UN proposition that military intervention can and should be employed for implementing the R2P. However, this reluctance has not precluded the development of an ethic of responsible sovereignty in Southeast Asia. But rather than responsibility as protection as assumed by the R2P, ASEAN countries arguably define responsibility in terms of provision for the well-being of their populaces. The development of such an ethic in Southeast Asia has been uneven as evidenced by the Myanmar government's initial reluctance to receive foreign humanitarian assistance following Cyclone Nargis in 2008. That said, as the contemporary policy debate and regional institutional developments in Southeast Asia together attest, an ethic of responsible provision is emerging among ASEAN states.     

Japan as the “Indispensable Nation” in Asia: A Financial Brand for the 21st Century

This article addresses Japan's global financial “brand.” It first examines the concept of a national “brand” and the difficulties associated with creating a desirable image of a country among outsiders. It adopts an instrumental concept of branding, which focuses on the behavior that the national image should elicit from foreign countries. It also notes that effective branding must accurately reflect reality. For Japan, the goal should be to promote economic cooperation where mutual interests exist. Efforts should be focused on East Asia, where mutual economic interests are least fully realized, and where Japan's national image appears to be an important stumbling block. Japan should seek to demonstrate the potential for transition to a “post-developmental” financial model and to be the “indispensable partner” for regional cooperative and development initiatives. This will require continued progress in cleaning up and improving the competitiveness of Japan's financial institutions and financial system.     

Why Japan still matters

This article challenges the prevailing view that China is displacing Japan as Asia's leader and the pre-eminent power in Asia. On the contrary, it argues that in understanding the future of Northeast Asia and the broader Asia–Pacific, it would be a mistake to look only to a rising China and to relegate Japan to a diminishing position. China's rise does not automatically herald Japan's decline. Japan is an emerging, not a retreating power. The rise of China is both obscuring and accelerating the transformation in Japan's regional and global position. Japan is increasing its economic power, technological capabilities, military reach, soft power and diplomatic influence. Furthermore, the rise of China makes Japan strategically more important to the United States and to other countries in the Asia Pacific. Japan will become the main regional counterweight to China and an indispensable partner in America's strategy of balancing China.     

Whither Mr Abe's Japan?

This article reviews Japan's strategic options and policy initiatives under Prime Minister Abe, taking into consideration strategic changes in the region; chiefly a rising China and a United States approaching geopolitical retreat, and the policy implications of these developments. Mr Abe's announced goal is to restore Japan to its once great power status, and thus far success is proving elusive.

MAIN ARGUMENT

Hurdles in Mr Abe's path include the differing perceptions between Japan and its neighbours regarding Japan's history, and the deeply entrenched nature of these differences pose a significant barrier. A related aspect is the territorial disputes. A second task is to be a “normal” nation, that is exercising greater independence in security matters and matters of economic policy, and here differences arise with Japan's main ally, the United States. Furthermore Mr Abe also needs to convince the Japanese public as well as Japan's prospective allies about his views regarding Japan's security role in the region. A third task is to increase Japan's economic weight by turning around the Japanese economy from its existing stasis to sustained, robust growth.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Mr Abe is making urgent policy efforts in all directions and the rather uneven outcome experienced thus far has not deterred him, thus creating uncertainty for Japan, and enhancing the feeling of insecurity in the region. The ostensible policy choice facing Mr Abe now is to either persist with his existing policies, hence entrenching the increasing tensions in the region, or to accept a rapidly rising China and formulate policies more accommodative of that development.     

From “international cooperation” to “development policy”? Reform and reorientation of Japan's ODA

Japan's program for official development assistance (ODA) is a critical tool of foreign policy. However, this program has historically been driven by quantitative goals. Only in the last decade have explicit principles and implementation policies emerged that concentrate on a qualitative, more human-centered approach to ODA. According to Professor Dr. Franz Nuscheler and Ben Warkentin, Director and Research Fellow respectively of the Institute for Development and Peace, Duisburg University, Germany, this reorientation of Japan's ODA has the potential to challenge the overall stature of the country” s foreign relations. It remains to be seen, however, whether Japan's commitments to ODA reforms will be put into practice. Will Japan's ODA Charter be a tiger without teeth?     

Japan's Foreign Policy beyond Short-term Politics

In August 2009, the Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP), which had been in power since 1955, lost the general elections to a recently-formed party, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). The LDP's foreign policy had placed emphasis on relations with the US, and on international cooperation and relations with Asia. The LDP's foreign and defense policy lacked a long term vision; it was incremental, pragmatic and could be described as reactive or passive. An examination of the DPJ's foreign policy, three years after its coming to power, reveals that it has accepted part of the LDP's inheritance. The Japan-US Alliance was reasserted as pivotal to Japan's security. Cooperation with Asia has not given birth to a new regional structure or to new institutional mechanisms, and dialogue with China has not improved; incrementalism is still preferred in the field of defense. Nonetheless, the fact that Japan's opposition is now a catch-all party at the center of the political scene changes the framework of foreign and defense policy-making considerably. Therefore, the likelihood of interpartite cooperation over foreign and security policy is theoretically conceivable. Nonetheless, political and institutional constraints to change in the field remain.     

Japan's future defense capability

The primary role of Japan's Self‐Defense Forces, says Atsumasa Yamamoto, is to safeguard the independence and liberty of Japan. He notes, however, that in the post‐Cold War world, the SDF must be prepared to play a supplemental role: to help Japan fulfill its international obligations to foster global and regional stability. Whether Japan's SDF will have the capability to perform these functions in the future is the focus of this study. Major Yamamoto was seconded to IIPS in 1993 from the Japan Defense Agency, where he is a member of the Intelligence Division in the Internal Bureau.     

A Middle Power's Roles in Shaping East Asian Security Order: Analysis of Japan's Engagement from a Normative Perspective

East Asia is currently in a transitional period. Recognizing the challenges presented by China's rise to the current regional order, existing literature analyses the security situation in Asia by focusing on the material aspects of power distribution between the US and China. Few works substantively discuss the roles played by middle powers such as Japan in shaping the regional order and how they can deal with the challenges of great power competition and threats to the global rules‐based order. By employing Japan's involvement in the South China Sea issues as a case study, this article examines how a middle power attempts to shape or underpin the regional security order and if such attempts are effective. The investigation of Japan's engagement illustrates that a middle power's practical support can indirectly and gradually contribute to sustaining and defending the regional “rules‐based order”.     

Toward China's “Hub and Spokes” in Southeast Asia? – Diplomacy during the Hu Jintao and First Xi Jinping Administrations

This article reviews China's diplomacy toward Southeast Asia and ASEAN chronologically from the 1990s to 2015, focusing on the changes that occurred during the second half of the Hu Jintao Administration and the further policy adjustments made during the first Xi Jinping Administration. While there are still many uncertainties regarding the policies, and many aspects are still in progress, this study provides an outline of the current period of change in China's relations with Southeast Asia and China's more active engagement in relations with ASEAN from the late 1990s through the early 21st century.     

Geopolitics and Soft Power: Japan's Cultural Policy and Cultural Diplomacy in Asia

Japan's cultural policy and cultural diplomacy in Asia has changed dramatically over the past one hundred years, from actively introducing and imposing Japanese culture during its empire-building period, to essentially avoiding the promotion of Japanese culture in Asia for most of the postwar period due to fears of being seen once again as engaged in cultural imperialism, and more recently, to supporting and encouraging the export of Japanese contemporary culture and lifestyle in order to attain “soft power.” Looking at the fluctuations in Japan's cultural policy over these three periods allows us to understand how Japan has used cultural policy to further its geopolitical goals and more basically how it has viewed the role of “culture” in the context of its relations with Asian neighbors. In a broader sense, the Japanese experience shows that cultural policy, even when inward-looking, is not isolated from a country's geopolitical position and its ambitions in the world, regardless of the political system under which it operates.     

The National Wages Council of Singapore: Issues for consideration

There are important regional dimensions to Australia's globalisation. This article focuses on Australia's developing relations with Southeast Asia and argues that the increasing interdependence between the two regions is weakening Australia's liberal democracy while at the same time highlighting the fundamental differences in legitimacy that exist between Australia and its Southeast Asian neighbours. In this context, this article considers important aspects of Australia's military and foreign relations with the region, the state's role in weakening civil society, and the emerging pattern of conflict with Southeast Asia.     

“Great and Powerful Friends of Yesteryear”: Australia's Dilemma with “East of Suez”, 1967–71

Great Britain's decision to withdraw its forces from Southeast Asia by the mid-1970s created uncertainty for those living in the region. The potential loss of British presence led Australia to attempt to discourage Britain from leaving, while also recsognising recognising the decision as an opportunity to re-evaluate Australia's strategic outlook in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Scholars have treated Asia and the Pacific as two regions with distinct experiences related to withdrawal. Some address changing Anglo-Australian relations but include little, or no, mention of the Pacific territories. Others, writing about the Pacific, focused more the individual paths taken by each island than on connecting the larger process of decolonisation in the Pacific to the one in Asia. This article pairs Australia's Strategic Basis of Defence papers with documentary evidence across multiple departments in Canberra to understand how British withdrawal from east of Suez connected Australian concerns about security in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands. By connecting the two areas through Australian interests, the withdrawal from east of Suez can be understood as a catalyst for Australia's pursuit of a distinctive role within its neighbourhood.