On leaving criminal organizations

Terrorist organizations, groups, cells or just ‘bunches of guys’ are systematically compared with other types of criminal or deviant organizations: organized crime such as the mafia, street gangs and religious sects. Of course there are many differences between them, especially where motivation is concerned, but they share the common factor that it is almost impossible or very difficult for individual members to step out. However, de-radicalization may follow analogous paths: aging out, accepting exit programs in prison or disengaging ideologically. The article discusses the obstacles that a government strategy that encourages desistance from terrorism by stepping out may encounter. It may be sufficient and more realistic to discourage radicals from using violence than to try to de-radicalize them by using counternarrative techniques.     

On Valuta Dealings in USSR Territory

In order to improve the procedure for handling valuta valuables in USSR territory, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet decrees:

1. To establish that operations in USSR territory to purchase valuta valuables from organizations and citizens as well as to sell such to them, is the exclusive right of the State Bank of the USSR. Other organizations may engage in such operations only when commissioned to do so by the State Bank. Valuta valuables comprise:     

Holding Organized Crime Leaders Accountable for the Crimes of their Subordinates

Criminal law doctrine fails to provide an adequate solution for imputing responsibility to organized crime leaders for the offenses committed by their subordinates. This undesirable state of affairs is made possible because criminal organizations adopt complex organizational structures that leave their superiors beyond the reach of the law. These structures are characterized by features such as the isolation of the leadership from junior ranks, decentralized management, and mechanisms encouraging initiative from below. They are found in criminal organizations such as the American Mafia, the Japanese Yakuza, and even outlaw motorcycle gangs. The paper offers a doctrine that may transcend this shortcoming. Referred to as “leaders’ liability,” this doctrine will be assessed and appraised through a comparison with competing theories such as accomplice liability, Organisationsherrschaft, and conspiracy.     

THE ELUSIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS AND CRIME: AN ASSESSMENT ACROSS DISADVANTAGED AREAS OF THE SOUTH BRONX

Several theoretical perspectives posit a negative association between the extent of a neighborhood's organizational infrastructure and crime; yet, empirical support for this proposition has been limited in that researchers generally examine only a few types of organizations or combine them into one aggregate measure. Studies with few measures may omit organizations that are effective at reducing crime, whereas those using aggregate measures obscure differences across organizations in their ability to control crime. Using data from 74 block groups in the South Bronx, NY, this research seeks to specify more clearly the relationship between organizations and crime in a disadvantaged urban environment. We examine the relationship among nine different types of organizations and violent and property crime controlling for prior crime, land use, and area sociodemographic characteristics. Consistent with theories that highlight the importance of organizations for establishing ties outside the neighborhood, we find that block groups with more organizations that bridge to the larger community experience a decrease in crime. Property crime also is reduced in block groups with more organizations that promote the well‐being of families and children. We find that schools are associated with an increase in property crime, whereas the effects of other organizations are context specific and vary based on neighborhood racial composition, commercial land use, and disadvantage.     

The role of counterintelligence in countering transnational organized crime

Summary TOC behaves like or assumes the structure and the operations of a secret orga-nization. Powerful TOC organizations grow in symbiosis with the security structures of their host countries. In recent years, the way in which criminals in organized groups think has made them very successful. They are serious about their ‘business,’ and those who would defeat them must understand this. Counterintelligence personnel are especially well-equipped for this task because they are trained to deal with secret structures. Therefore it is worthwhile and necessary to attempt to gain more and better knowledge of TOC by employing the approach and methods of counterintelligence. This approach has after all been quite successful in the past in countering hostile intelligence and security services.     

Who Develops a University Invention? The Impact of Tacit Knowledge and Licensing Policies

In this paper, I propose a theoretical model to illustrate how the inventor know-how affects whether the inventor starts a firm to develop her idea or licenses an invention to an established firm for development. Inventor start-ups are characterized as development organizations that serve a temporary role in the invention–innovation process, developing an invention until they can sell the developed invention to an established firm that owns requisite complementary assets for commercialization. This model is then used to analyze the role and impact of a university technology transfer office (TTO) on this process to understand how TTO’s may both positively and negatively impact the transaction. The model posits a general theory of inventor–entrepreneur behavior in university and corporate research labs based on two factors: the importance of know-how and the distribution of inventors’ personal costs to transfer that know-how.     

The prosecution of Chinese organized crime groups: the Sister Ping case and its lessons

This article analyzes the investigation and prosecution of contemporary Chinese criminal organizations through the study of one major human smuggling case: the trial of “Sister Ping.” Data were obtained from media reports, court documents, and from interviews with parties familiar with the case. It is argued that modern human smuggling groups such as the one run by Sister Ping are informal and decentralized organizations against which the RICO statute may be of little use.

Rationalities and Levels of Analysis in Complex Social Issues: The Examples of School Overcrowding and Poverty

This paper presents a 5 × n table for charting complex social issues, particularly those characterized by oppression and injustice. Its five columns are Paul Diesing’s rationalities: technical, economic, social, legal, and political. Its n rows are levels of analysis from individuals, groups, organizations, communities, regions, and nations to international and global perspectives. Utilizing school overcrowding and poverty as examples of local and global social issues, the paper describes the relevance of this analytic framework for social action and research. The framework contributes a complex view of social issues that avoids oversimplifying them and suggests how they are experienced by people living with social injustice. The framework proposes cross-disciplinary projects among scholars and collaborative projects among scholars, practitioners, and advocates.     

The Proper Limits of Individual Responsibility under the Doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise

Joint criminal enterprise (JCE) as a mode of liability in internationalcriminal law is a concept widely upheld by international caselaw. It has, however, been harshly attacked by commentators,particularly with regard to what has come to be known as the‘third category’ of the notion, that of liabilitybased on foreseeability and the voluntary taking of the riskthat a crime outside the common plan or enterprise be perpetrated.This author considers that while most criticisms are off themark, at least two are pertinent: (i) that the InternationalCriminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Appeals Chamberin Tadi (1999) was wrong in indiscriminately using terminologytypical of both the civil law and common law tradition, and(ii) that the foreseeability standard, being somewhat looseas a penal law category of culpability and causation, needssome qualification or precision. Generally speaking, the notionof JCE needs some tightening up. For instance, in Kvoka, anICTY Trial Chamber rightly stressed that the contribution ofa participant in a common criminal plan must be ‘substantial’(the Appeals Chamber, however, disagreed to some extent in thesame case). Furthermore, with specific regard to the third categoryof JCE, the author, after setting out the social and legal foundationsof the foreseeability standard and the motivations behind itsacceptance in international criminal law, suggests various waysof qualifying and straightening it out. One of them could liein assigning to the ‘primary offender’ (i.e. theperson who, in addition to committing the concerted crimes,also perpetrates a crime not part of the common plan or purpose)liability for all the crimes involved, while charging the ‘secondaryoffender’ with liability for a lesser crime, wheneverthis is legally possible. The author then suggests, contraryto a 2004 decision of the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Branin, thatthe third category of JCE may not be admissible when the crimeother than that agreed upon requires special intent (this appliesto genocide, persecution as a crime against humanity, and aggression).In such cases, the other participants in JCE could only be chargedwith aiding and abetting the crimes committed by the ‘primaryoffender’ if the requisite conditions for aiding and abettingdo exist. The author then suggests that the view propoundedin 2004 by an ICTY Trial Chamber in Branin is sound, namelythat the general notion of JCE may not be resorted to when thephysical perpetrators of the crimes charged were not part ofthe criminal plan or agreement, but rather committed the crimesunaware that a plan or agreement had been entered into by anothergroup of persons. In conclusion, he contends that this qualifiednotion of JCE, in addition to being provided for in customaryinternational law, does not appear to be inconsistent with abroad interpretation of the provision of the ICC Statute governingindividual criminal responsibility, that is, Article 25, inparticular 25(3)(d).     

Criminalizing Ecological Harm: Crimes Against Carrying Capacity and the Criminalization of Eco-Sinners

This article examines how a broader class of environmentally harmful behavior can be examined from a criminological frame of reference. By using examples of soil degradation and anthropogenic climate change, it is argued that environmentally damaging behavior is similar to many other types of crime. Particularly when taken from the standpoint that environmentally harmful behavior is ultimately detrimental to human social organizations by undermining ‘carrying capacity’, outright criminalization might strike many as a valid option. Nonetheless, there are also some fundamental differences that will ultimately prevent a strict legalistic perspective from being successful in minimizing ecological harm. Instead, this article argues that criminologists need to emphasize the importance of shaming and status rewards in pursuing a greener future.     

Sourcing from China: stopping the IP leaks from your clients' supply chain

Legal context: It is no secret that IP in China is a challenge. However, commercialactivity in or with China is now predictable enough that companiescan, and should, plan for it by taking control of their supplychain. This requires a combination of legal and practical measures.This article sets out some of these steps. Key points: In order to minimize the risks of IP leakage their supply chainsin China, there are three key stages of protection: (i) Pre-sourcing;(ii) Negotiating strong contracts with suppliers; and (iii)Managing the relationship with your supply chain. Practical significance: If your clients do business in China or source products fromhere and cannot answer the following questions, their IP isat risk of infringement. They need to take steps to proactivelymanage their supply chain.

• Do your clients know which factoryis producing their products?How many links are in your clientssupply chain, each one increasingthe chances for IP infringement?
• Do your clients' agreements with their suppliers adequatelyprotect their IP?
• Have your clients taken steps to prevent‘midnight productionruns’ and ‘backdoor sales’by their suppliers?
• How is the IP being provided to them?Do your clients need togive them everything for production?
• What steps have been taken post-production to ensure thatyourclients' suppliers don't continue to manufacture theirproducts?

     

The transfer of public science to patented technology: A case study in agricultural science

One of the most difficult challenges in technology transfer is to measure the movement of knowledge from basic scientific research to industrial technology. This paper will report on a study of the linkage between science supported by the Agricultural Research Service (ARS) and patented technology. This study traced the citations from U.S. patents issued in 1987–88 and 1993–94 to scientific research papers linked to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). The number of patent citations to ARS papers, and to other USDA-supported papers has increased fourfold over the six-year period. A distinct difference also exists between the patent-cited ARS papers and patent-cited extramural USDA-supported papers: ARS papers are in more agriculturally related journals, while the extramural papers were in more basic and biomedical journals. USDA-supported papers were overwhelmingly cited by U.S.-invented patents (in a patent system in which half the patents are foreign-invented). In the primary field of ARS papers (Biology), they are cited much more often by patents than Biology papers from any other publishing organization. Since the publishing organizations and support sources of all the papers cited in these patents have now been identified, we can study the transfer of scientific results to patented technology by institution, by agency, or by any other category of patent or paper holder. The authors thank the Agricultural Research Service of the U.S. Department of Agricultural, especially Dr. Richard Parry, for this paper' use of the study performed for them by CHI Research, Inc. (Grant number 59-0790-6-054)     

The limits to internationalization of scientific research collaboration

This study analyses international research collaboration for eight science-based technologies in the Netherlands for the period 1988–2004. It is found that the share of international research collaborations in research collaboration is high, but not rising during the period investigated. This result suggests that the process of internationalization has reached an end. It is also found that collaboration between academic and non-academic organizations is less likely to take place at the international level than collaboration between academic organizations. This suggests that collaborating within national research systems helps academia, firms and governmental organizations to overcome differences in norms, values and incentives. Nonetheless, international collaboration between academic and non-academic organizations is also frequently occurring. Some consider these collaborations as undesirable, insofar academic research funded domestically is ‘leaking’ to foreign firms in such research collaborations. Such unwanted knowledge spillovers has lead some to plea for a ‘technology-nationalism’ in science policy instead of a ‘techno-globalization’. An analysis of the ‘balance of trade’ in international collaborations between Dutch academia and foreign firms and between Dutch firms and foreign academia shows that fears for unwanted knowledge spillovers are unfounded.

Equal access to justice

Conclusion My concerns are unlikely to strike a note amongst those senior judges delivering “big justice” who will operate in the multi-track. They seldom encounter disabled people in their courts and when they do access, communication and representation problems are likely to have been sorted out at an earlier stage. But for those of us who have to deal with those earlier stages or are to (and already do) deliver “bulk justice” in the fast track and small claims courts, coping with disabled litigants is already a problem. Hitherto we have responded with insufficient care to their needs, but is it too late to hope that we may be encouraged (or better still constrained) to take into account their disclosed needs when managing cases so that civil proceedings may be conducted in a manner that is fair to all. If we do not face up to this now we could find ourselves and our courts in breach of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 which is intended to impose the new culture on society (including our courts). The message from society is clear: a change in the culture of civil justice is required but we must not overlook the “disability factor”. A District Judge at Preston on the Northern Circuit.     

Patterns of Onset and Decline Among Terrorist Organizations

Despite considerable speculation among terrorism researchers regarding the conditions leading to organizational desistance from terrorism, quantitative analysis of terrorism frequently focuses on terrorist attacks as the unit of analysis, resulting in a near complete absence of analyses of terrorist organizations themselves. Moreover, research on organizations that engage in terrorism has generally been limited to case studies of individual organizations. Toward a more general understanding of what conditions predict organizational desistance from terrorism, this study uses newly available data from the Global Terrorism Database to analyze the terrorist activity of 557 organizations that were active for at least 365 days between 1970 and 2008. Much like research on conventional crime, prior research on terrorism has focused almost exclusively on the onset of criminal behavior and has neglected determinants of declining activity. Here I use group-based trajectory models to investigate patterns of decline in organization-level terrorist activity. In particular I examine how patterns of onset relate to patterns of decline among these organizations. I first estimate the trajectory models for the organizations’ frequency of attacks, and then calculate the annual ratio of attacks to attacks-at-peak for each organization in order to isolate patterns of decline, independent of the magnitude of activity. I then repeat the trajectory analysis to determine if the relative shape of the organizational trajectory has significance beyond the overall frequency of attacks. I find that the speed and magnitude of an organization’s emergence are correlated with its longevity such that those organizations characterized by rapid onset are two to three times more likely than those characterized by moderate onset to reach moderate or high levels of attacks per year. Likewise, as the rate and overall volume of attacks at onset increase, so does the likelihood that the group will follow a persistent pattern of decline. I conclude with a discussion of the implications of patterns of decline among terrorist organizations for research and policy.     

Promoting university startups: international patterns, vicarious learning and policy implications

Anecdotal evidence indicates universities around the world fashion programs to permit or encourage university-linked start ups, in pursuit of improved regional wealth and job creation, often influenced by the iconic vision of Silicon Valley. This paper explores whether these programs are leading to a pattern of similar startups across the world, and gradually improving performance, or to ongoing variation in activities and outcomes, with potential for both harmful and serendipitous unintended outcomes. We use a theoretical lens of research on multiple organizations trying to learn from others—or repeated vicarious organizational learning. The paper first suggests that while startup programs share similar goals they do not generate similar startups across regions and time, with important variation in structure, links to home schools, and localization. It then posits that these programs appear to have varied outcomes in terms of their economic goals, and stresses the difficulty and importance of evaluating this issue. Finally, the paper details important potential unintended (collateral) outcomes, both harmful and valued. Dangers noted include not only traditional concerns with science norms or faculty time, but also the potential impact on humanities and the social sciences. Potential collateral benefits include facilitating the ability of students and citizens to create new forms of value more broadly. Theoretically, the paper speculates that ongoing vicarious learning by multiple organizations in this context may increase or at least sustain variation in outcomes, leading to some excellent but many indeterminate or harmful outcomes rather than homogenization among startups or outcomes. From a policy viewpoint, our review suggests that policymakers should abandon the search for a ‘secret sauce’ that will assure regional growth from startups. Instead, we suggest that they tailor programs to local skills and experience, actively monitor economic and non-economic impact, and expand the overall vision to include values and skills of autonomy and the creation of new forms of value more broadly.     

Crimes committed by terrorist groups: Theory,research, and prevention

Statement of Purpose: A decline in state-sponsored terrorism has caused many terrorist organizations to resort to criminal activity as an alternative means of support. This study examines terrorists' involvement in a variety of crimes ranging from motor vehicle violations, immigration fraud, and manufacturing illegal firearms to counterfeiting, armed bank robbery, and smuggling weapons of mass destruction. Special attention is given to transnational organized crime. Crimes are analyzed through the routine activity perspective and social learning theory. These theories draw our attention to the opportunities to commit crime and the criminal skills necessary to turn opportunity into criminality. Through these lenses, the research appraises the “successes” and “failures” of terrorists' engagement in crime. Because “failures” can result from law enforcement efforts to (1) interrupt criminal skill development, and/or (2) remove criminal opportunities via technologies and transportation systems, the research represents a best practices approach to the study and control of terrorism. This project was supported by Grant No. 2003-DT-CX-0002 awarded by the National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. Points of view in this document are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.     

ENTER THE DRAGON: INSIDE CHINESE HUMAN SMUGGLING ORGANIZATIONS*

This paper examines the inner workings of Chinese human smuggling organizations. Contrary to widely held conceptions about Chinese organized crime, most alien smugglers are otherwise ordinary citizens whose familial networks and fortuitous social contacts have enabled them to pool resources to transport human cargoes around the world. They come from diverse backgrounds and form temporary alliances to carry out smuggling operations. With the exception of a shared commitment to making money, little holds them together. The smuggling organizations mostly resemble ad hoc task forces and are assembled for specific operations. These organizations have clear divisions of labor with limited hierarchical structures. We discuss the theoretical implications of their unique organizational characteristics.