Difficult Europeans: NATO and Tactical/Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons in the Cold War

This analysis examines NATO’s tactical/non-strategic nuclear weapons in the Cold War both for their perceived deterrent value against the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact and as potential war fighting weapons. Within this debate lay questions related to extended deterrence, security guarantees, regional or theatre conflict, and escalatory potential. A central tenet that emerged in Europe was that nuclear weapons needed emplacement on the territory of non-nuclear NATO members to make deterrence more tangible. It raised huge questions of consultation. Once the Soviet Union had intercontinental missiles, the credibility of American readiness to use nuclear weapons in defence of its allies came into question. European alternatives and different consultation mechanisms to facilitate nuclear use became central to intra-NATO relations. Actively debated across NATO, they directly concerned above all the United States, Britain, and France—the nuclear weapons states in the NATO area—and West Germany, the potential main battleground in a Warsaw Pact invasion. Although dormant in NATO since the end of the Cold War, these issues will likely see revisiting in both Europe and other regional trouble spots.     

Evaluating Polysemy: An Analysis of The New York Times' Coverage of the End of the Cold War

This study examines The New York Times' definition of the end of the Cold War and its portrayal of the social movements that successfully challenged Communist authority in Eastern Europe. The analysis is located within and draws its significance from two research traditions. The first examines the degree to which media texts have a polysemic character, while the second tradition has explored the influence of Cold War ideology on the American news media's definition of international affairs. The Times' definition of the Cold War, its portrayal of the emerging post-Cold War world, and its depiction of collective action produced a text characterized by limited polysemy. This restricted polysemy was a product of the newspaper employing frames that resonated with American political values, excluding or minimizing frames divorced from mainstream American political beliefs, constructing a selective tradition in its definition of the past, and limiting the polysemic implications of particular frames.     

Reflections on the Cold War: A comment

For mutually reinforcing cultural reasons, the study of international history at American universities has declined. Nevertheless, opportunities for multinational research on the Cold War are greater than ever. Much innovative work takes place abroad or outside conventional history departments. This article appraises the contributions of three leading scholars in the field. It adumbrates the failure of the Roosevelt administration to formulate a coherent policy for postwar Germany and emphasizes the fitful process through which the Truman team despaired of accommodation with the USSR. It intimates that Marc Trachtenberg's elegant structural analysis may make that process seem clearer than the truth, and underscores the findings of Klaus Schwabe and Georges Soutou, who show that Europeans had their own concerns and did not view the Cold War through the optic of the bilateral Russian-American relationship.     

俄罗斯(前苏联)与印度海军合作关系分析

冷战时期,基于抗衡美国、控制印度洋的共同战略,苏印进行了有效的海军合作。在前苏联支持下,印度海军迅速壮大,前苏联也因此而加强了在印度洋的存在。冷战后,俄印在互利贸易的基础上建立了合作研发的新型海军合作关系,印度的远洋控制战略使其更加依赖俄罗斯的海军武器,双方合作的深度和广度大幅提升。俄印海军合作的目标中有一定针对中国的因素。近年来其合作面临着印度与美国等西方国家海军合作的压力,但俄罗斯对印度海军的影响将是长期的。     

Trick or truth? The British ANF proposal, west Germany and US nonproliferation policy, 1964-68

The deployment and control of nuclear weapons in Europe was a major aspect of Cold War diplomacy. The Multilateral Force (MLF) is a prime example. First proposed in 1960, the MLF attempted to reconcile European demands for collective alliance control within the broader framework of US nonproliferation policy. The MLF was opposed by both Britain and France, who feared the proposal would lead to a nuclear armed West Germany. To counter the MLF, the Wilson government advanced an alternate scheme - the Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF). This article examines British objectives in advancing the ANF. It contends that the ANF was not a cynical attempt to frustrate the MLF, as suggested by previous commentators, but embodied a serious attempt by the Labour government to implement a nonproliferation regime.     

'Not Proficient in Table-Thumping': Sir Ernest Satow at Peking, 1900-1906

The deployment and control of nuclear weapons in Europe was a major aspect of Cold War diplomacy. The Multilateral Force (MLF) is a prime example. First proposed in 1960, the MLF attempted to reconcile European demands for collective alliance control within the broader framework of US nonproliferation policy. The MLF was opposed by both Britain and France, who feared the proposal would lead to a nuclear armed West Germany. To counter the MLF, the Wilson government advanced an alternate scheme ‐ the Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF). This article examines British objectives in advancing the ANF. It contends that the ANF was not a cynical attempt to frustrate the MLF, as suggested by previous commentators, but embodied a serious attempt by the Labour government to implement a nonproliferation regime.     

论冷战时期美国的南中国海政策

冷战期间,南中国海地区成为两大阵营、美苏争霸的主要场所之一,也是美国对苏、对华遏制的重点地域之一。南中国海争端虽然凸显于20世纪70年代,但在50年代就已出现,因而美国在南中国海地区的遏制战略就不可避免地要与南中国海主权问题联系在一起,这是美国逐渐形成对南中国海主权争端的立场、政策的起点和基础。本文拟对冷战时期美国对南中国海争端的立场和政策作一探讨,以期更深入地认识冷战后美国大力介入南中国海争端的深层战略考虑。     

The Pivot in Perspective: American Naval Power,Then and Now

The article examines the reorientation of the defense policy of the United States, initiated during the Bush and Obama Administrations, toward giving increased priority to the Asia Pacific region. It begins with the historical perspective of the development of American naval power in the twentieth century. The world wars, in which Europe represented the primary theater of conflict, had the effect of shifting a greater share of American military assets toward the Euro-Atlantic theatre, while the onset of the Cold War after 1945 required the United States to develop a navy of truly global strategic reach in which Atlantic and Pacific commitments were kept in balance. With the diminished concern for European security since the end of the Cold War and the emergence of the People's Republic of China as a strategic competitor in the Asia Pacific region, the United States is required in an age of defense austerity to refocus attention again to the Pacific.     

German policy in a strategic triangle: Berlin,Paris, Washington … and what about London?

The article presents the German view on the current stand and future perspectives of the transatlantic relationship. It points to the caesuras that have defined the US–German relationship since the end of the Cold War. It also details the German role in both the Afghanistan and Iraq wars following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and highlights the German discussion on its involvement in those wars. The historical strategic triangle of the US, Germany and France might develop into a Euro‐American ellipse to confront current global challenges, but, as of today, many hurdles remain, particularly the lack of a common vision and policy regarding the future political order of Europe. The article finally calls on the German government to continue its policy as a ‘civilian power’ and to repair its relations with the US after the Iraq war. International cooperation in multilateral institutions remains the main pillar of German foreign policy.     

The United States–EURATOM Agreement of 1958: The Cold War Impact

Drawing on declassified sources, this analysis examines how the Cold War influenced United States policy towards the creation of the European Atomic Energy Community [EURATOM]. In the 1950s, “the peaceful atom” became a crucial sector of the Cold War. To maintain American nuclear leadership, the Dwight Eisenhower Administration invited Western Europeans to enter into an active collaboration with the United States on peaceful uses of atomic energy. The United States encouraged the creation of EURATOM by promising that the Community would obtain more assistance in the nuclear field than any individual state. The Soviet launch of Sputnik provided additional impetus to the signing of the United States–EURATOM agreement, having strengthened American interest in a joint programme with EURATOM that would bring together American and Western European scientific and technical resources to counter the Soviet Union. The exegesis contributes to recent studies on the interaction between the Cold War and European integration.     

The Anglo-American “Special Relationship”: The Lazarus of International Relations

Scholars have variously queried the existence of the Anglo-American “special relationship,” consigned it to history as “special no more,” or demanded that Britain choose between its European and American relationships. These critiques have become increasingly prevalent since the Cold War. Yet the current British government, like many before it, continues to portray a choice between America and Europe as a “false choice,” and the “special relationship” has arguably deepened in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks. This article contends that international diplomatic history can contribute much to understanding the “Lazarus-like” quality of the “special relationship.” Specifically it argues that a number of critical continuities in post-World War II British foreign policy survived the end of the Cold War and have since contributed heavily to the determination of the British foreign policymaking elite to maintain the “special relationship” at the same time that Britain pursues a leadership role within Europe.     

20世纪70年代美国在鄂霍次克海的谍报活动探析

美国海军和美国国家安全局(NSA)等部门于20世纪70年代联合发起了在鄂霍次克海海域窃听苏联海底通讯电缆的谍报活动,它曾被认为是美国现代史上最成功的情报搜集活动之一,此即"常春藤之铃"行动。其起根发由、运策决机及东窗事发都有着比较深刻的历史背景。冷战后美国针对有关国家的类似谍报活动远未停止。     

The Offshore Balancing Thesis Reconsidered: Realism,the Balance of Power in Europe,and America's Decision for War in 1917

According to John Mearsheimer, the United States entered the First World War because the Wilson administration believed the Triple Entente was on the verge of defeat. As a result, he claims, the Americans entered the war to prevent Germany from becoming a regional hegemon in Europe. A careful and targeted examination of the relevant primary sources, however, demonstrates that Washington was largely unaware of the plight of the Allied powers in the spring of 1917; therefore, the argument that the United States was acting as an offshore balancer at this time is unconvincing. This article shows that unit-level factors and statecraft can play a larger role in international relations than structural realist theory allows and makes an empirical contribution to the World War I literature by demonstrating that balance of power considerations were not a major factor in the Wilson administration's decision for war.     

Sunset over the swamp – the independence and dependence of Belarus

The Federal Republic of Germany has since the end of the Cold War been at a crossroad in defining its role in European security. On the one hand, its contribution to democratic reform and economic stabilization in North Central Europe has enhanced enormously the prospects of representative government there; on the other, Germany remains wed to an outdated concept of military security and is reluctant to commit either the fiscal resources or the political capital to assume a role commensurate with Germany's importance in the development of a European Security and Defense Identity. Moreover, Bonn's precipitous diplomacy in the recognition of the breakaway Yugoslav states of Croatia and Slovenia betrays a willingness to permit Germany's allies to assume the less profitable burdens of hard security.     

Towards a bad end: The ethics of intervention in the former Yugoslavia

The United States’ intervention, diplomatically and militarily, in former Yugoslavia demonstrates the complexities of social justice in post‐Cold War Europe. Nominally an action to support ‘vital’ American interests, intervention equally involved a moral and ethical choice to leverage military technology and to prevent the spread of Balkan violence. Ethical politics, as Reinhold Niebuhr defines it, is an area where conscience and power meet, where ethical and coercive factors ‘interpenetrate’ in an uneasy compromise. Whether or not the will to a political ethic is sufficient to bring social justice to the former Yugoslavia remains unclear.     

The Anglo-American “Special Relationship”: The Lazarus of International Relations

Scholars have variously queried the existence of the Anglo-American “special relationship,” consigned it to history as “special no more,” or demanded that Britain choose between its European and American relationships. These critiques have become increasingly prevalent since the Cold War. Yet the current British government, like many before it, continues to portray a choice between America and Europe as a “false choice,” and the “special relationship” has arguably deepened in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks. This article contends that international diplomatic history can contribute much to understanding the “Lazarus-like” quality of the “special relationship.” Specifically it argues that a number of critical continuities in post–World War II British foreign policy survived the end of the Cold War and have since contributed heavily to the determination of the British foreign policymaking elite to maintain the “special relationship” at the same time that Britain pursues a leadership role within Europe.     

America,India, and Kashmir, 1945–49: “If Ignorance About India in This Country is Deep,Ignorance About the [Princely] States is Abysmal”1

This analysis offers an alternative examination of American interest in India in the mid-1940s and situates the early American attitude to Kashmir into that matrix. The two years from 1945 to 1947, those of the emergence of decolonisation and the Cold War, critically influenced America’s attitude first towards India and then towards Kashmir. It has been commonplace to describe America’s early understanding of the Kashmir conflict as an issue unconnected with the Cold War until 1952–1954. Even those works, which argue for an early presence of an “east-west lens” in the American consciousness, begin from either the Communist triumph in China or the outbreak of the Korean War. This analysis, instead, shows how soon, how much, and how comprehensively various sections of American government looked at Kashmir through an international prism.     

“The Most Sophisticated Intervention We Have Seen”: The Carter Administration and the Nicaraguan Crisis, 1978–1979

In May 1977, in a public forum, President Jimmy Carter laid out the foundations of a distinctive foreign policy programme for the United States. He offered a striking shift away from the Cold War realpolitik of previous American administrations. Human rights, he declared, would be a central component of United States foreign policy. The growing instability in Central America, especially in Nicaragua, during Carter's term of office provided a major test of his Administration's new programme. And its ultimate response to Nicaraguan instability thus provides key insight into the strengths and weaknesses of the thirty-ninth President's attempt to move beyond traditional, hard-line Cold War diplomacy.     

Biting the Land that Feeds You: North Korea and the United States in the Cold War and Beyond

Throughout the Cold War, the United States struggled to understand the principles that underlay North Korean behavior in the international arena. In the post-Korean War years, American policymakers saw Pyongyang as simply a communist puppet, a servile pawn directed by Moscow and Peking. That framework was shattered when the Cold War ended but American officials still sought simplistic answers to explain DPRK behavior, usually concluding that their leaders were deranged, evil, and simply incomprehensible. However, newly released communist materials suggest that there is more than irrationality at work in Pyongyang. Instead, one can discern a basic pattern at the heart of DPRK policy, one that has internal developments at its core. Put simply, this interpretation suggests that North Korean behavior towards the West becomes more provocative when the nation is at its weakest in certain domestic areas, primarily economic development and political stability, and attributes this correlation to the dominant role of the ideology of juche (self-reliance) that virtually defines this society. Understanding this relationship between internal dynamics, ideological paradigms, and DPRK foreign relations would be a beneficial step in formulating policy towards North Korea; instead, however, American policymakers have clung to interpretations that, while easily comprehensible and politically appealing, have hindered their diplomatic efforts towards the nation since the 1950s.     

Biting the Land that Feeds You: North Korea and the United States in the Cold War and Beyond

Throughout the Cold War, the United States struggled to understand the principles that underlay North Korean behavior in the international arena. In the post-Korean War years, American policymakers saw Pyongyang as simply a communist puppet, a servile pawn directed by Moscow and Peking. That framework was shattered when the Cold War ended but American officials still sought simplistic answers to explain DPRK behavior, usually concluding that their leaders were deranged, evil, and simply incomprehensible. However, newly released communist materials suggest that there is more than irrationality at work in Pyongyang. Instead, one can discern a basic pattern at the heart of DPRK policy, one that has internal developments at its core. Put simply, this interpretation suggests that North Korean behavior towards the West becomes more provocative when the nation is at its weakest in certain domestic areas, primarily economic development and political stability, and attributes this correlation to the dominant role of the ideology of juche (self-reliance) that virtually defines this society. Understanding this relationship between internal dynamics, ideological paradigms, and DPRK foreign relations would be a beneficial step in formulating policy towards North Korea; instead, however, American policymakers have clung to interpretations that, while easily comprehensible and politically appealing, have hindered their diplomatic efforts towards the nation since the 1950s.