Closing the door

States no longer can afford to provide illegal immigrants with the health care and education federal law says they deserve.     

The European Union as the next step of delegation and accountability

Abstract. The Principal–Agent approach guides a comparison of the scrutiny and implementation records of the EU member states. The main argument is that there is systematic co–variation. Cross–nationally, an influential scrutiny process is associated with a strong implementation record. But because both of these variables also co–vary with the North–South dimension of EU politics, a fundamental challenge for future research is to evaluate the importance of existing between–country variation relative to the new Principal–Agent relationships that are emerging within the integration process.     

In through the back door: Social equity and regional governance

Abstract

A leading impulse for new regionalism in the 1990s was the sense that suburban and central cities are economically interdependent and should work cooperatively toward common regional welfare in the face of globalized competition. If this is so, we should witness an emergence of regional policies that combat concentrated poverty, segregation, and place‐based inequalities that impose significant economic costs. This article assesses the extent and types of metropolitan equity efforts under new regionalism, the pathways through which they arise, and their prospects.

Research finds that equity‐based regional policies are increasing; they take diverse forms and are commonly shaped by state or federal programs, but they are not explicit and primary parts of regional agendas. While regional entities have not advanced explicit discussions about equity, a confluence of intergovernmental programs and quality of life issues has added regional equity to the portfolio of metropolitan goals.     

Help-seeking from public authorities: Who arrives at the agency door?

For ordinary citizens, political life is increasingly characterized by a request for a check, not a trip to the polls. Yet for all their frequency, very little is known about help-seeking encounters. This article asks the question “Who gets to the agency door?” or, more formally, “How do individuals decide to apply for public social benefits or services, and what does that decision signify?” Three topics are explored. The first defines help-seeking as a type of political participation. The second conceptualizes the process by which individuals decide to seek help from public social agencies. The third presents an agenda for research and action on the politics of help-seeking.     

Some reflections on the next twenty-five years of public choice

I gratefully acknowledge the comments of Jan Potters and Joep Sonnemans on an earlier version of this paper.     

Natural gas deregulatin: The need for further reform

Like attempts at achieving effective regulation of economic activity where it is warranted, deregulation can entail hidden complexities and produce unintended outcomes. The principle that deregulation begets “second order” effects that may necessitate further regulatory reform is epitomized in the case of natural gas. This article shows how the partial deregulation of natural gas wellhead markets under the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 caused a variety of distortions to emerge in other segments of the industry. Because the distortions are mutually reinforcing, no single policy, such as immediate decontrol of “old” gas or subjecting pipeline companies to common carrier obligations, will solve all of them; rather an integrated program of regulatory reform is required. The article concludes by outlining such a program and commenting on how its implementation through administrative and legislative actions should be carried out in order to reduce the need for further reform in the future.     

State budget stabilization fund adoption: Preparing for the next recession or circumventing fiscal constraints?

The high rate of budget stabilization fund adoption during the 1980s is often attributed to the 1980–1982 recession. In this view, states adopted funds to prevent a recurrence of the fiscal crises experienced during that recession. An alternative hypothesis is that some funds adopted during this period were intended to circumvent tax and expenditure limit laws. We find that states with TELs in place were significantly more likely to adopt statutory funds, but were significantly less likely to adopt funds with stringent deposit and withdrawal rules, suggesting that some funds were adopted to circumvent existing fiscal constraints.