Lessons from the malfunctioning of the Eurozone's financial system

The persisting Eurozone's crisis is a combination of a sovereign debt crisis and a banking crisis that have been triggered by the Global Financial Crisis. The sovereign debt crisis is the consequence of a policy laxity for applying the principles and fiscal rules of the monetary union, which led to macroeconomic imbalances and enforced the mispricing of risks by the markets that in turn contributed to escalate the banking crisis. To address the consequences of the Eurozone's crisis, the European Union has implemented a new crisis management framework, which, however, is not immune to trials. The present paper follows a tripartite structure and begins by examining the causes of the Eurozone's crisis and draws its lessons. Second, it examines the reforms of the new crisis management framework and highlights their key challenges. Third, in light of these lessons and challenges, a return to three ‘fundamentals’ is advocated and the case of enhancing the position of the European Union within the area of international financial regulation is built to highlight how this is an optimal policy area for addressing the endemic weaknesses of the Eurozone and how this can contribute to securing a sustainable growth. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Merged municipalities, higher debt: on free-riding and the common pool problem in politics

This paper uses the Swedish municipal amalgamation reform of 1952 to study the common pool problem in politics. The amalgams were common pools and the municipalities had incentives to free-ride on their amalgam partners by increasing debt prior to amalgamation. We find that municipalities that merged in 1952 increased their debt between 1948 and 1952 when the reform could be anticipated. The increase amounted to 52% of new debt issued or 1.5% of total revenues in the merged municipalities. But contrary to the “law of 1/n”, free-riding did not increase in common pool size.     

Debt administration in Small Island‐States

Public debt management is an infrequent focus of public administration studies. Yet without appropriate debt management, administrators have few financial resources for public service provision. Island‐state administrators face an enhanced service provision challenge. The peculiarity of island‐state economies, the unpredictability of exogenous events and the state's endogenous choices increase debt administration's importance. Via its focus on debt management office location and the administrative constraints posed by brain drain, transparency and regionalization, this paper goes beyond typical debt management studies to engage debt administration spaces. The result is a framework for studies of debt administration in Small Island‐States.     

Private Placements and the Cost of Borrowing in the Municipal Debt Market

Private placements continue to be issued in the municipal debt market and remain a topic of interest for municipalities, investors, and regulators. Private placements are often sold without an underwriter to relatively sophisticated investors and are typically “buy‐to‐hold” transactions. Therefore, compared with traditional competitive or negotiated sales, there are fewer financial intermediaries and fewer regulatory disclosure requirements that accompany private placements. Savings on “flotation” costs can be substantial enough to make private placements a less costly method of debt offering. Conditional on selectivity in the method of sale and key market covariates, private placements offer lower arbitrage yields and issuance costs compared to both competitive and negotiated debt offerings.     

Why reregulation after the crisis is feeble: Shadow banking,offshore financial centers,and jurisdictional competition

A crucial element in the complex chain of factors that caused the recent financial crisis was the lack of regulation and oversight in the shadow banking sector, which is largely incorporated in offshore financial centers (OFCs), but instead of swift and radical regulatory reform in that sector after the crisis, we observe only incremental and ineffective measures. Why? This paper develops an explanation based on a two‐level game. On the international level, governments are engaged in competition for financial activity. On the domestic level, governments are prone to capture by financial interest groups, but also susceptible to demands for stricter regulation by the electorate. Governments try to square the circle between the conflicting demands by adopting incremental and symbolic, but largely ineffective, reforms. The explanation is put to empirical scrutiny by tracing the regulatory initiatives on shadow banks and OFCs at the international level and within the United States and the European Union, where I focus on France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.     

Indebted life and money culture: payday lending in the United Kingdom

Critical social scientific research holds that credit–debt is a principal economic and governing relation in contemporary economy and society, but largely neglects money’s role in indebted life. Drawing on qualitative research in the payday loan market in the United Kingdom, the paper shows that borrowers typically relate to loans in monetary rather than financial terms and incorporate them into practices of payment, spending and online banking. To analyse how indebted life is variously experienced and enacted through money, the concept of money culture is developed to refer to money’s culture, money’s meanings and money’s affects. Borrowers enter into and negotiate payday loans through a digitally mediated money culture that both mobilizes and runs counter to money’s powerful fictions as circulating universal equivalent and calculative means of account.     

The Banking Crisis: Grid,Group and the State of the Debate

The banking crisis and the recession it induced provide a salient backdrop to domestic and international politics. ² The International Monetary Fund (IMF 2010) estimates that total banking losses between 2008 and 2010 exceeded US$2.3 trillion. This article uses grid‐group theory to review the existing literature on the causes of the banking crisis and, in doing so, distinguishes between hierarchical, individualist, egalitarian and fatalist accounts of what went wrong and of what needs to be done to prevent another crisis from occurring. It is argued that the existing reform agenda is underpinned by a hierarchical analysis of the causes of the crisis and that this risks narrowing the support base for the reform process.     

Variation in central bank independence across countries: Some provisional empirical evidence

In this paper seven hypotheses to explain variation in central bank independence across countries are tested. The predictions based upon the theory that delegation of authority by politicians to the central bank is used as a commitment device are not supported: central bank independence is not higher the larger the employment motivated inflationary bias, the higher political instability or the larger the government debt. Central bank independence is positively related to historical inflation experience and negatively with political instability. We do only find limited support for the view that countries with a universal banking system and countries whose central banks do not regulate financial institutions have more independent central banks.     

Local autonomy, tax morale, and the shadow economy

Policymakers often propose strict enforcement strategies to fight the shadow economy and to increase tax morale. However, there is an alternative bottom-up approach that decentralises political power to those who are close to the problems. This paper analyses the relationship with local autonomy. We use data on tax morale at the individual level and macro data on the size of the shadow economy to analyse the relevance of local autonomy and compliance in Switzerland. The findings suggest that there is a positive (negative) relationship between local autonomy and tax morale (size of the shadow economy).     

Do Debt Levels Influence State Borrowing Costs?

This article reports on research into the possible interest cost penalties when state governments impose increasingly high debt levels on their citizens. The potential effect of debt levels on borrowing costs is a material one, given the large amounts of state debt outstanding. At the same time that government borrowing is heavy, the demand for government obligations also appears to be strong. The authors examine state debt levels and borrowing costs over a six‐year period (2001–2006) and find little evidence of such an effect, despite rapidly growing debt burdens. Those concerned about state debt levels, the authors say, must look to sources other than investors for pressure to reduce debt issuance.     

Serial payers,serial losers? The political economy of Argentina’s public debt

A global neoliberal architecture has enabled many countries to increase their public debts to meet their fiscal needs. But since 2008 a number of European and North American economies have faced financial crises induced by unsustainable debts. This paper analyses the case of post-default Argentina since 2001, so as to better comprehend the political economy of public debt, especially in cases where governments are elected on anti-austerity platforms. Presidents Néstor and Cristina Kirchner were committed to a debt-reduction policy, yet Argentina faced a new, ‘selective’, default in 2014. This paper analyses how the country has been trapped in a cycle of debt dependency, which can only be interrupted by a comprehensive audit of the debt’s legitimacy followed by debt cancellation. Critical lessons are provided for other countries facing similar situations.     

Empirical examination of public debt sustainability in African economies: A panel data analysis

This study intends to investigate public debt sustainability across 29 Sub-Sahara African (SSA) economies, employing various econometric specifications, for the sampled years 1996–2020. The study employs Bohn's (Are stationarity and cointegration restrictions really necessary for the intertemporal budget constraint? Journal of monetary Economics, 54(7), pp.1837–1847.) framework of sustainability as the baseline model to assess public debt sustainability across the sampled Sub-Sahara African economies. As additional tests of public debt sustainability in order to support the baseline findings, the study also employs panel unit root and timeseries unit tests. The baseline findings from the OLS, panel quantile and instrumental panel quantile regressions show that public debt is sustainable across the panel of SSA economies. The positive and statistically significant response of primary balance under the Bohn's framework of sustainability manifest that the intertemporal budget constraint is not violated in the sampled economies. The consistency in the estimates under the OLS, panel quantile and instrumental panel quantile regressions also show that the estimates are robust throughout the estimation process. Also, utilizing the panel unit root test for public debt sustainability, the findings show that public debt is stationary over the sampled years which implies that intertemporal budget constraint holds and that public debt is sustainable across the sampled SSA economies. However, the timeseries analysis indicate that although majority of the SSA economies have sustainable public debt ratios, four countries namely Uganda, Sudan, Togo and Cote d'Ivoire have unsustainable public debt ratios. The study has important policy implications in terms of prudent public debt management and fiscal management for the sampled SSA economies.     

The IMF's Rethink of Global Banks: Critical in Theory,Orthodox in Practice

The International Monetary Fund's (IMF) new financial interconnectedness agenda, developed in response to postcrisis calls from G20 to better understand systemic financial institutions, deploys a critical approach that stresses the spatial, political, and institutional dimensions of cross‐border financial networks. It portrays global banks as key nodes in those networks, “super‐spreaders” of systemic risk through complex business models that involve yield search, regulatory and tax arbitrage. Yet this critical view does not translate into its policy advice at country level. In regular surveillance of developing countries, the IMF remains committed to a benign view of transnational banking, even when confronted with growing cross‐border fragilities. During crises of cross‐border banking, the IMF tailors its conditionality to minimize domestic regulatory challenges to cross‐border banking models and to propose crisis measures that create new profit opportunities for transnational banks.     

Debt in just societies: A general framework for regulating credit

Debt presents a dilemma to societies: successful societies benefit from a substantial infrastructure of consumer, commercial, corporate, and sovereign debt but debt can cause substantial private and social harm. Pre‐crisis and post‐crisis solutions have seesawed between subsidizing and restricting debt, between leveraging and deleveraging. A consensus exists among governments and international financial institutions that financial stability is the fundamental normative principle underlying financial regulation. Financial stability, however, is insensitive to equality concerns and can produce morally impermissible aggregations in which the least advantaged in a society are made worse off. Solutions based only on financial stability can restrict debt without accounting for the risk of harm to persons least able to bear the risk, worsen preexisting inequalities, destroy or impair the net worth of households, and impose unfavorable distributive consequences. This article offers a new approach to assist policymakers in developing and evaluating regulation to take criteria in addition to financial stability into account, but which do not undermine the aim of financial stability. It calls for a luck egalitarian approach, offering policymakers options to take the debtor's choices into account while still accounting for cognitive mistakes people often make in debt decisionmaking. It offers a general framework for the underlying principles for the regulation of debt: its focus is not on any particular forms of debt or its regulation but in structuring debt regulation more generally. It offers a set of recommendations on how regulators can take concerns about luck and equality into account in regulatory design.     

Waste in the Sewer: The Collapse of Accountability and Transparency in Public Finance in Jefferson County,Alabama

Following failed auctions for sewer debt in April 2008, major bond rating companies downgraded Jefferson County, Alabama’s bond rating to D (default) triggering massive mandatory payments by the county to its creditors. At the time of writing, the county teeters on the brink of actual default and bankruptcy, unable to pay service on its $3.3 billion sewer debt portfolio. If the county defaults, it will be the largest municipal bankruptcy in United States history, eclipsing Orange County, California’s 1994 default. The intriguingly complex tale of the Jefferson County debt crisis is recounted here by identifying and examining failures of transparency and accountability by local bureaucratic and political actors, private financial institutions, as well as the larger regulatory framework governing public finance. Enhanced regulation of local government and the financial sector plus greater local government capacity to close accountability gaps and thus prevent future crises of similar scale in this or other jurisdictions are recommended.     

Umbilical cord blood banking and its interruptions: notes from Chennai,India

Abstract

What is the relationship between globalization and the body? In both scholarly discourse and everyday practice, the relationship between globalization and the body has been understood through the idea of accumulation – the intensified and interlinked pursuit of health and wealth. Through an examination of private umbilical cord blood banking in south India, this paper investigates the interplay of accumulation and its interruption in Indians' uptake of this practice. Although Chennai-based bankers, doctors and parents explain the recent surge in popularity for cord blood banking in the city in terms of interlinked financial and familial accumulation, investment and security, Indians' cultural and religious conceptions of the latent power of the placenta and cord often work against cord blood banking marketers' neat account of twinned economic and familial accumulation. Analytic attention to interruption highlights the tensions within and precariousness of the accumulation at the heart of the relationship between globalization and the body.     

Explaining variation and change in supervisory confidentiality in the European Union

Abstract

Some European Union member states’ financial regulators choose to make some of the data they routinely collect on individual banks publicly available. Others treat this data as confidential. What explains this difference? This paper considers the possible effects of crises, path-dependent legal institutions, and the design of deposit insurance schemes. At the national level, the paper focuses on contrasting German and Dutch cases. After the recent economic crisis, the Dutch released more data while the German authorities maintained strict confidentiality rules. The design of deposit insurance schemes provides a key reason why the level of secrecy varies, with the Dutch move from an ex post to an ex ante scheme where the government served as the ultimate backstop leading to questions about the accounts of individual banks while the German system favoured continued secrecy. The paper also describes the level of transparency at the EU level. Multilevel legal restrictions and bureaucratic capacity tilt EU banking union practices towards member states that treat financial supervisory data as confidential.     

Regulating finance after the crisis: Unveiling the different dynamics of the regulatory process

It is now widely recognized that regulatory failures contributed to the onset of the global financial crisis. Redressing such failures has, thus, been a key policy priority in the post‐crisis reform agenda at both the domestic and international levels. This special issue investigates the process of post‐crisis financial regulatory reform in a number of crucial issue areas, including the rules and arrangements that govern financial supervision, offshore financial centers and shadow banking, the financial industry's involvement in global regulatory processes, and macroeconomic modeling. In so doing, the main purpose of this special issue is to shed light on an often understudied aspect in regulation literature: the variation in the dynamics of regulatory change. Contributors examine the different dynamics of regulatory change observed post‐crisis and explain variations by accounting for the interaction between institutional factors, on the one hand, and the activity of change agents and veto players involved in the regulatory reform process, on the other.     

Emerging cohort trends in housing debt and home equity

Abstract

Financial and market conditions in the 1990s caused a sharp increase in the housing debt (in constant dollars) of households now approaching or just past normal retirement age. Households now in middle age have also set new records for housing debt and will likely continue to carry high housing debt when they reach old age in 10 or 20 years.

In the future, this housing debt burden is likely to lead to financial and housing adjustments that suggest a qualitative change in behavior when these households reach the later stages of their working life. Many will need to work longer to service housing debt. When facing a life‐cycle downturn in annual income, households will be increasingly motivated to tap into their home equity, both by borrowing, for those who stay in their homes, or by downsizing and liquidating some equity, for those who choose to move.     

Global corruption and the shadow economy: spatial aspects

Using a large sample of nations, this paper examines the relation between corruption and the shadow economy, focusing especially on geographic spillovers. The results point to complementarity between corruption and the shadow economy. We find evidence of own contagion across nations in both corruption and shadow economy activity, while cross-contagion mostly points to substitution between own shadow economy (corruption) and neighboring corruption (shadow economy). These findings are fairly robust across different estimation techniques and measures of the shadow economy.