The influence of prior record evidence on juror decision making

Several researchers have investigated the impact of evidence of prior convictions on jurors' decision making. Very little is known about a related issue, the impact of prioracquittal evidence introduced by the prosecution on jurors' decisions. The Supreme Court recently held (Dowling v. U.S., 1990) that the admission of prior acquittal evidence does not unfairly prejudice the defendant. We conducted a simulation study to examine the effects of prior record evidence (prior convictions, prior acquittals, and no prior record) on jurors' decisions. We also manipulated the presence of judicial instructions on the limited use jurors can make of extrinsic acts evidence. Mock jurors were more likely to convict the defendant when they had evidence of a prior conviction than when they had evidence of a prior acquittal or no record evidence. This effect was mediated by attributions about criminal propensity. Judge's limiting instructions were ineffective in guiding jurors' use of prior record evidence.     

Community standards of criminal liability and the insanity defense

Two experiments (N=71) compare lay standards of insanity to standards incorporated in American legal codes. In Experiment 1, case vignettes provided only legally relevant information about defendants' degrees of impairment in cognition or in behavioral control. Respondents' judgments of criminal liability ornot guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) reflected an exculpatory standard of substantial impairment in both cognition and control. In Experiment 2, case vignettes provided realistic information about defendants' psychiatric diagnoses; respondents had to infer levels of cognitive and control impairment. Results showed that respondents made highly idiosyncratic inferences based on diagnostic categories, but once made, these inferences predicted NGRI judgments. Implications of the concordance between laypeople's rules for assigning NGRI verdicts and the rules used in American legal codes are discussed.Daniel Bailis gratefully acknowledges the support of Public Health Service grant No. 5T32 MH18021-07 for Research Training in Social Psychology during the time in which the present research was conducted. John Darley wished to acknowledge the generous support of the John Simon Guggenheim Foundation and Princeton University. Study 2 presents work done for the Princeton University undergraduate thesis of Tracy Waxman. The authors are grateful to Norman J. Finkel, Valerie Hans, and three anonymous reviewers for comments on an earlier draft on this article.Northwestern University.     

After Oregon's insanity defense: : A comparison of conditional release and hospitalization

This paper is one in a series of reports on the characteristics of persons committed to the Oregon Psychiatric Security Review Board (PSRB) and their treatment and disposition while subject to its jurisdiction. For the purpose of this discussion, we have focused on conditional release and attempt to answer a number of questions. How do the individuals who are placed in the community differ from those who remain hospitalized? Do the two mechanisms of conditional release in this system, by judges or the PSRB, differ in terms of the kinds of people that they are likely to release? Lastly, what features distinguish those individuals who manage to succeed in their release plans from those who do not?     

The evolution of insanity standards

Health care professionals are often called upon as expert witnesses in insanity determinations. Most are familiar with the “insanity standard” applicable in the court in which they are called to testify. It might be helpful to understand that not all jurisdictions apply the same standard and how the different standards are related. This article is intended to address the problems associated with each insanity “test” presently in use and how “determining” insanity is an evolutionary process.     

Considering forensic science: individual differences,opposing expert testimony and juror decision making

Two experimental studies examined the effect of opposing expert testimony on perceptions of the reliability of unvalidated forensic evidence (anthropometric facial comparison). In the first study argument skill and epistemological sophistication were included as measures of individual differences, whereas study two included scores on the Forensic Evidence Evaluation Bias Scale. In both studies participants were assigned to groups who heard: (1) no expert testimony, (2) prosecution expert testimony, or (3) prosecution and opposing expert testimony. Opposing expert testimony affected verdict choice, but this effect was mediated by perceptions of reliability of the initial forensic expert's method. There was no evidence for an effect on verdict or reliability ratings by argument skill or epistemology. In the second experiment, the same mediation effect was found, however scores on one subscale from the FEEBS and age also affected both verdict and methodological reliability. It was concluded that opposing expert testimony may inform jurors, but perceptions of the reliability of forensic evidence affect verdict, and age and bias towards forensic science influence perceptions of forensic evidence. Future research should investigate individual differences that may affect perception or bias towards forensic sciences under varying conditions of scientific reliability.     

Demythologizing inaccurate perceptions of the insanity defense

Public opinion data show that the most prevalent concern expressed regarding the insanity defense is that it is a loophole through which would-be criminals escape punishment for illegal acts. This article examines the extent to which the public's perceptions of the insanity defense are consistent with newly collected empirical data. Specifically, it compares perceptions of the use, success, and outcomes associated with the insanity defense to data derived from a large-scale study of insanity pleas in eight states. The analysis reveals that the public overestimates the use and success of an insanity defense and underestimates the extent to which insanity acquittees are confined upon acquittal. The role of selective media reporting in the formation of public perceptions is discussed.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1992 meetings of the Society for the Study of Social Problems. Special thanks go to John Monahan and Joel Dvoskin for reviewing an earlier draft and to Sharon Steadman for providing editorial comments.     

Ideology as determinant of views on the insanity defense

This research explores the hypothesis that an individual's position on the insanity defense is a function of his/her underlying ideology. Fifty-seven clinical psychologists and fifty-five psychiatrists in the United States responded to a questionnaire that measured their beliefs about personal vs. social responsibility for crime, the frequency of their own experience as expert witnesses in insanity cases, and their attitudes toward the insanity defense. As predicted, locus of responsibility for crime was found to have a highly significant curvilinear relationship to attitude toward the insanity defense, with very liberal and very conservative subjects being most anti-insanity defense. Psychiatrists, and those with more expert witness experience, were also significantly more favorable toward the insanity defense.     

The death-qualified jury and the defense of insanity

We predicted that people who are excluded from serving on juries in capital cases due to their opposition to the death penalty (excludable subjects) tend to place a greater value on the preservation of due process guarantees than on efficient crime control, and therefore are more likely to accept an insanity defense in criminal cases than are people who are permitted to serve on capital juries (death-qualified subjects). Subjects who had previously been classified as death-qualified or excludable read four summaries of cases in which the defendant entered a plea of insanity, and made judgments of guilt or innocence. In the two cases involving nonorganic disorders (schizophrenia), death-qualified subjects were significantly more likely than excludable subjects to vote guilty; in the two cases involving organic disorders (mental retardation and psychomotor epilepsy), there were no differences between the two groups. In addition, excludable subjects gave significantly higher estimates than death-qualified subjects of the proportion of defendants pleading insanity who really are insane.     

司法精神病辩护中证明模式的反思与完善

司法精神病辩护是刑事辩护制度中的一项重要内容.当前世界范围内存在两种精神病辩护证明模式:职权式精神病审查模式与对抗式精神病辩护模式.我国目前的精神病辩护证明模式属于职权式精神病审查模式,在实践中存在诸多问题值得反思.司法精神病鉴定因涉及精神病医学、心理学、法学等诸多领域的专门知识而呈现复杂性,而科学、合理的诉讼证明程序可以抵消司法精神病鉴定中的消极因素.我国职权式精神病审查模式应当吸收对抗式精神病辩护模式中的合理因素,在权力配置上逐渐限缩职权机关的权力,赋予当事人更多的权利;在证明责任上由辩护方承担推进责任,由控诉方承担说服责任;在证明标准上建立司法精神病鉴定启动与精神病辩护二元化的证明标准体系.     

精神分裂症患者病理性“正当防卫”行为的研究

目的探讨病理性防卫对精神分裂症患者凶杀行为的影响及相关犯罪学的特征。方法以61例具有病理性防卫行为的精神分裂症患者凶杀案为研究组,以73例无病理性防卫行为的精神分裂症患者凶杀案为对照组,采用犯罪学调查表进行调查分析。结果具有病理性防卫行为的精神分裂症患者凶杀案中幻觉（χ2=5.69,P〈0.05）及被害妄想（χ2=28.87,P〈0.01）多见;作案动机以病理动机突出（χ2=50.22,P〈0.01）,很少出现现实动机（χ2=15.57,P〈0.01）,案发时行为的紧迫性十分明显（χ2=63.17,P〈0.01）;刑事责任能力评定为无责任能力者明显多于对照组（χ2=16.12,P〈0.01）;疾病诊治情况,研究组未经诊治情况较多见（χ2=5.09,P〈0.05）。结论病理性防卫与正当防卫理论存在某些相同点,在具有病理性防卫行为的凶杀案中,借鉴正当防卫理论,对评定刑事责任能力具有一定的参考价值。     

Myths of the insanity defense: Inherent and procedural obstacles

Often societies perceptions can be shaped by the media not only by what it reports but by how it is reported. This article discusses the impact that the American media has had on the social perception that the insanity defense is too often successfully used to avoid legal and criminal culpability. Many of the procedural obstacles associated with the assertion of an insanity defense are poorly understood or ignored. The article further address some of the less attractive characteristics associated with the assertion of the insanity defense that are not procedurally founded but nonetheless serve as an impediment the wide spread use of the defense. In conclusion the insanity defense is submitted as an unavoidable necessary evil in a civilized society that incarcerates its criminals.     

A normality bias in legal decision making

It is important to understand how legal fact finders determine causation and assign blame. However, this process is poorly understood. Among the psychological factors that affect decision makers are an omission bias (a tendency to blame actions more than inactions [omissions] for bad results), and a normality bias (a tendency to react more strongly to bad outcomes that spring from abnormal rather than normal circumstances). The omission and normality biases often reinforce one another when inaction preserves the normal state and when action creates an abnormal state. But what happens when these biases push in opposite directions as they would when inaction promotes an abnormal state or when action promotes a normal state? Which bias exerts the stronger influence on the judgments and behaviors of legal decision makers? The authors address this issue in two controlled experiments. One experiment involves medical malpractice and the other involves stockbroker negligence. They find that jurors pay much more attention to the normality of conditions than to whether those conditions arose through acts or omissions. Defendants who followed a nontraditional medical treatment regime or who chose a nontraditional stock portfolio received more blame and more punishment for bad outcomes than did defendants who obtained equally poor results after recommending a traditional medical regime or a traditional stock portfolio. Whether these recommendations entailed an action or an omission was essentially irrelevant. The Article concludes with a discussion of the implications of a robust normality bias for American jurisprudence.     

Guilty but mentally ill: Reform of the insanity defense in Illinois

In 1981 Illinois joined several other states by passing a “guilty but mentally ill” statute. Passed as a response to perceived inadequacies in the existing insanity defense, the statute was intended to protect society better, to provide treatment for offenders, and to compel the offender to assume greater responsibility for his or her criminal acts. This study, based on court data and responses to a survey of state prosectors, suggests that the statute has not been successful in reaching its major objectives. GBMI offenders often may be placed on probation, infrequently receive treatment when institutionalized, and may use the plea to absolve themselves of responsibility for their acts.     

The insanity defense: effects of abolition unsupported by a moral consensus

The insanity defense reflects the moral judgment that some criminal defendants do not deserve criminal sanctions because of mental incapacity. This Note examines the alternative formulations, such as guilty but mentally ill and diminished responsibility, that some states have enacted in the face of growing controversy over the insanity defense. It observes that the alternatives, if used in lieu of the insanity defense, distort the criminal law and do not comport with the legal doctrine of responsibility, which eschews punishing mentally ill defendants. The Note concludes that the insanity defense should not be abolished unless the moral consensus changes regarding the criminal responsibility of mentally ill defendants.