The virtues of specialization: British and American diplomatic reporting on Russia, 1921–39

While important changes were made to the organization of the British diplomatic establishment in the years after 1918, most senior officials remained committed to the ethos of the ‘generalist’. In the United States, by contrast, significant efforts were made to inculcate the virtues of professionalism and specialization among members of the Foreign Service. This paper examines the way in which members of the American and British diplomatic establishments monitored developments in the USSR during the interwar years. It concludes that US diplomats were no better than their British counterparts at interpreting developments in Soviet Russia, despite the fact that they were generally better trained to carry out their duties.     

The peripatetic career structure of the British diplomatic establishment, 1919-39

The first part of this article examines the development of the career structure of the British diplomatic establishment after the reforms of 1919-20, arguing that the peripatetic career identified with the prewar Diplomatic Service became increasingly common for all members of the new amalgamated service between the two world wars. The average length of posting to an overseas mission or one of the geographical departments in London seldom exceeded three years or so. The second part of the article then speculates on the impact of the peripatetic career on the effectiveness of the British diplomatic establishment, suggesting that it had both postive and negative impacts.     

The peripatetic career structure of the British diplomatic establishment, 1919-39

The first part of this article examines the development of the career structure of the British diplomatic establishment after the reforms of 1919-20, arguing that the peripatetic career identified with the prewar Diplomatic Service became increasingly common for all members of the new amalgamated service between the two world wars. The average length of posting to an overseas mission or one of the geographical departments in London seldom exceeded three years or so. The second part of the article then speculates on the impact of the peripatetic career on the effectiveness of the British diplomatic establishment, suggesting that it had both postive and negative impacts.     

Meeting Hauteur with Tact,Imperturbability, and Resolution: British Diplomacy and Russia, 1856–1865

This article takes a broad view of Anglo–Russian relations in the years between the Peace of Paris, 1856, and the death of Viscount Palmerston, 1865, examining the shifts within that period in an essentially high-political diplomatic history. It traces a number of strands in geopolitics, offering a sense of the competing strategies of the European Great Powers, particularly the roles of British diplomats: the private and public communication amongst prime ministers, foreign secretaries, ambassadors, ministers-plenipotentiaries and consular officials concerning British policy towards Russia in the post-Crimean War period. It outlines the principles that underlay that policy and the ways in which the diplomatic network observed the tsar and his advisors and agents, assessed the developing situation in Russia, Central Asia, and the Ottoman Balkans, made decisions, and implemented policy. It focusses on the diplomatists’ attitudes and perceptions—how they thought about Russia and British interests and how they worked to protect them. It also analyses British policy in light of the European dimension. The years 1856 to 1865 not only witnessed Russian attempts to undermine the Crimean settlement, they also saw revisionist Bonapartist France work to destroy the constraining Vienna system of 1815—primarily in northern Italy. These policies complicated British attempts to maintain the status-quo and defend their interests in the East. The evolving situation was highly complex.     

Far Apart but Close Together: A Quantitative and Qualitative Analysis of the Career Structure and Organisational Culture of the Post-War British Diplomatic Service

A good deal has been written about the organisation and structure of the British diplomatic establishment since 1945. This analysis uses detailed quantitative and qualitative data to develop an understanding of the background and career trajectories of the most senior figures in the Diplomatic Service in 1975. By tracing their careers, it is possible to identify more precisely than before the changing educational and social background of these individuals when compared with previous generations of diplomats. This analysis also examines certain core features of the culture of the diplomatic establishment during the post-war decades, analysing how it both shaped and was shaped by particular structures and practices. Despite the existence of a peripatetic career structure that dispersed members of the diplomatic establishment around the globe, there were still numerous opportunities for the kinds of personal contact necessary to maintain an integrated culture.     

Ernest Satow's Early Career as Diplomatic Interpreter

This article is concerned with Satow's seven years as diplomatic interpreter in the Japan of the fateful 1860s. He was sent first to Peking because the Foreign Office in its ignorance thought that Japanese was very similar to Chinese, but this detour did at least enable him to meet there another notable British diplomatic interpreter, Thomas Wade. He soon learned better about Japanese, and once he had mastered it fluently he became a privileged observer of traditional society and culture in the crucial period when it was being shaken by the first rumblings of the Meiji era. He was therefore able to render outstanding service to his head of mission, who was himself an ex-interpreter. Satow went on to enjoy a long and distinguished career in the diplomatic corps, rising from interpreter to ambassador.     

Ernest Satow's Early Career as Diplomatic Interpreter

This article is concerned with Satow's seven years as diplomatic interpreter in the Japan of the fateful 1860s. He was sent first to Peking because the Foreign Office in its ignorance thought that Japanese was very similar to Chinese, but this detour did at least enable him to meet there another notable British diplomatic interpreter, Thomas Wade. He soon learned better about Japanese, and once he had mastered it fluently he became a privileged observer of traditional society and culture in the crucial period when it was being shaken by the first rumblings of the Meiji era. He was therefore able to render outstanding service to his head of mission, who was himself an ex-interpreter. Satow went on to enjoy a long and distinguished career in the diplomatic corps, rising from interpreter to ambassador.     

Hostage Diplomacy: Britain,China, and the Politics of Negotiation, 1967–1969

During the radical phase of the Cultural Revolution in 1967–1969, China's violation of the diplomatic norms of the international community reached an unprecedented level. Two dozen British diplomats and private citizens on the mainland became de facto hostages of their host government. In response to China's hostage-taking, the British government preferred quiet diplomacy to extreme retaliation such as a rupture of diplomatic relations and economic sanctions. It focused on negotiations through minimal publicity and reciprocal gestures. But in China, the British found a culturally different negotiating partner that was obsessed with principles rather than details. Through a step-by-step negotiating approach recommended by the Sinologists in the British Mission, London was finally successful in securing the release of its detained nationals. The lesson of Britain's quiet diplomacy was a culture-sensitive approach to negotiation and the ability to separate the hostage question from the wider political and economic relationship that would facilitate the resolution of future hostage crises.     

'Almost a law of nature'? Sir Edward Grey, the foreign office, and the balance of power in Europe, 1905-12

This article considers the concept of the balance of power as it was applied by the British Foreign Office before the First World War, focusing on 1905-12. The place of the balance of power in British thinking is discussed, focusing on the ideas of the small number of individuals that shaped British foreign policy in this period. The balance of power in the years before the war was a product of more than the military balance sheet but also of the diplomatic dynamics.     

The Greater Menace to the Peace of Nations? The 1877 Mills Mission and Direct Canadian–American Diplomatic Relations

In 1877, employing the unwanted presence of armed Sioux in western Canada as a useful mechanism, Canada’s Cabinet, represented by Minister of the Interior David Mills, unhappy with perceived British indifference to Canada’s concerns, sought to initiate direct diplomatic relations with the United States. That effort failed, and British opposition to this endeavour was so sharp that Canada made no similar initiative for half a century. Although he failed, Mills’ effort marked the birth of the Functional notion that Canada’s voice should matter more in Imperial foreign policy formulation when its direct interests were at stake, especially when dealing with the United States.     

National Security and Imperial Defence: British Grand Strategy and Appeasement, 1930–1939

British grand strategy in the 1930s had two cardinal elements: security of the home islands and Imperial Defence. This article questions the view that Britain did not have a strategic commitment to the continent of Europe till late in the 1930s. It also provides an over-arching analysis of the two distinct but intertwined periods in the evolution of national strategy and Imperial defence in that decade: before 1930 till late 1937 built around the strategy of the balance of power; and from late-1937 till early 1939 built around the strategy of appeasement. Moreover, it is impossible to understand the high level debate within the British government over strategic issues without putting the domestic political situation into the context of the impact of the First World War on Britain's society and economy. Similarly, the development of the new international order created at the Paris Peace Conference – and its demise in the ‘hinge years’ of the early 1930s – also needs to be better understood in terms of how British grand strategy emerged in this period. A rational and realistic policy, appeasement was a tactical diplomatic manoeuvre; it had no place serving as the strategic basis of British external policy.     

“Now that the Milk is Spilt”: Appeasement and the Archive on Intelligence

This article assesses British intelligence and its effect on policy during the interwar years. It discusses the publically available documentation, which now includes almost all the material on the matter, though the data base has been permanently destroyed in significant ways. The paper traces the development of British intelligence between 1869–1939, involving the transition from a tradition to a system of intelligence, with the greatest change occurring during the Fist World War. The article assesses how, between 1914–39, intelligence was interrelated to bureaucratic politics, modes of decision making, and the formulation of strategic politics, modes of decision making, and the formulation of strategic policy. It discusses the structure and power of British intelligence agencies between 1919–39, their quality compared to rivals in other countries, and the impact on policy of their successes and failures. It concludes that intelligence, as an influence and a source of evidence, is essential to the study of diplomatic and strategic history, upon which its impact is complex and variable.     

Summit diplomacy of the seventeenth century: William III and Peter I in Utrecht and London, 1697-98

This article evaluates the meetings of the Russian Tsar Peter I and the English King William III in 1697-98 as the high point of Russia's 18-month Great Embassy to western Europe. The emphasis is on the diplomatic aspects of Anglo-Russian summits as well as on their results for international relations and diplomacy in Europe with particular focus on dramatic changes in Russia's attitude to international cooperation. Reform of Russian diplomatic machinery, enacted by Peter I as a follow-up of his European journey, were as well to a great degree motivated by his personal contacts with William III and his English and Dutch diplomatic advisors. Based on British and Russian archival sources, the article attempts to prove that Anglo-Russian summitry, and, in the first place, the rendezvous in Utrecht (1 September 1697, old style), signified Russia's intention to acquiesce to the raison d'etat principle in international relations and in practical diplomatic behaviour, thus abandoning religious and political prejudices that had kept Russians on the periphery of European diplomacy.     

The British consulate-general in Hanoi, 1954-73

Traditionally, there has been a rigid distinction made between British consular and diplomatic missions abroad: the former is concerned largely with trade, visas and the more mundane tasks of foreign representation, while the latter deals with the glamorous political world of interstate relationships at the highest level. As a general rule of thumb this may be true, but in accepting unequivocally this notion one overlooks those instances where a significant political role has been played by consulates. This article examines one such instance and in doing so raises questions relating to diplomatic and consular relations, disguised embassies, political reporting and the importance of experienced onsite personnel.     

A 'Week that Changed the World': Britain and Nixon's China Visit of 21-28 February 1972

British diplomats considered President Nixon's China visit of February 1972 a major political success. But while they admired the Realpolitik of Henry Kissinger, the President's National Security Adviser, they were irritated by his reticence regarding the initiative, and by the way in which this impeded their own efforts to raise the status of Britain's diplomatic mission in Peking. Initial American objections to any change in Britain's stance on the admission of the People's Republic to the UN weakened their negotiating position, and led to a protracted tussle with Peking over the status of Taiwan. Marginalized by Kissinger's conduct, the British drew some satisfaction from the fact that the State Department seemed equally by-passed     

Britain and the Bonins: discovery,recovery and reclamation

In this article, I explore a little known aspect of British and Japanese history that began not long after Japan open its ports to the west in the middle of the nineteenth century. It is about negotiations between Japan and foreign powers over sovereign control of an island archipelago 1,000 kilometers southeast of Edo (Tokyo). The Ogasawara (Bonin) Islands were first visited by Japanese in the seventeenth century, declared British territory in 1827 and then reclaimed by Japan in 1876. The diplomatic discussions involved the British and US Consuls acting under instructions from their respective governments and negotiating with the highest levels of Japanese authority during both the Tokugawa and Meiji Periods. I argue that the islands were of little importance to either the governments of Britain or America and that the British authorities were more than willing to hand over sovereign control of the Bonin Islands to the Japanese as early as 1862. Indeed, by the mid-1870s, the British authorities in England were more concerned that the Japanese would not claim the islands and that Britain would be burdened with their responsibility. In arguing this, I provide a novel perspective of Japan's struggles with becoming a modern nation in an increasingly international setting.