Roe v. Wade and the history of abortion regulation

In "Roe," the Supreme Court found that the privacy right in the 14th amendment's view of "personal liberty" encompasses a woman's right to choose an abortion. The Court found that "abortion is a fundamental right." These conclusions are mistaken. The Court's analysis of "the history of abortion regulation" had a lot of errors and did not consider the state of technology in which abortion evolved. Sir Edward Coke, a 16th and 17th century jurist, said that abortion was a "great misprison." Quickening, the point at which a woman feels life, was used to determine fetal viability. State courts, therefore, viewed "abortion after quickening as common law crime." By the end of 1868, 30 to the then 37 states had passed laws restricting abortion. The Supreme Court said that the 19th century laws were passed to guard the mother's health "against the dangers of unsafe operation." In the 15 months before "Roe," 5 state courts said that their abortion laws were constitutional. They said that this was "intended to protect the lives of unborn children." Therefore, the Court's belief that "the state courts focused on the State's interest in protecting "the health of the mother" was unexplainable. The Court said that in many states the woman couldn't "be prosecuted for self-abortion." 17 states did "incriminate the woman's participation in her own abortion," but the Court did not note this. The Court's premise about the greater hazards of late abortions is mistaken. The states were concerned, in the late 19th century, about whether the attempted abortion caused the death of a child. The "right to an abortion" can only be seen as "fundamental" if it is "implicit" in the "ordered liberty" concept or "deeply rooted" in US tradition and history. "Roe" struck down the abortion laws of all 50 states and should be overturned.     

Brief for bioethicists for privacy as amicus curiae supporting appellees

Amicus, an ad hoc group of philosophers, theologians, attorneys, and physicians, believe that adults should consult their doctor when making personal decisions. The doctor-patient relationship would be protected under the Constitution. In "Griswold v. Connecticut," the Supreme Court said that a state law which forbid married couples from using contraceptives was unconstitutional; that the couples should have a right to privacy. In "Roe," the Supreme Court recognized that a patient and her doctor should have privacy. In "Doe v. Bolton," the Supreme Court found that the State of Georgia was violating the patients' and physician's freedom. In "Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth," the Supreme Court said that a general informed consent provision was alright because it did not take away the abortion decision. The post- Roe state laws were ways to control doctors and patients so that a particular philosophical view could be imposed. The major question in Webster is whether personal decisions should be made by doctors and patients or the state. Both parties must agree to the decision. Section 188.205 of the Missouri law was before the Court in Webster. This section makes it illegal for public funds to be used to encourage a woman to have an abortion that wasn't necessary to save her life. There are medical conditions for which abortion is reasonable - Tay-Sachs disease, for instance. The child usually dies by 3 years of age. Without genetic screening, many at-risk couples would abort all pregnancies. 95% of all prenatal screenings are negative. State medical treatment decisions are arbitrary and impersonal. Having control over important personal decisions is necessary for freedom.     

The evolution of computer/privacy concerns: Access to government information held in the balance∗

Computers are a mainstay of most record systems at virtually all levels of government. The vast accumulation of personal information by governments has raised concerns about the erosion of personal privacy caused by the speed and efficiency of computers. For more than 30 years, realistic and sometimes exaggerated concerns about the proper role of computers in society have driven the public policy debate, resulting in a raft of legislation designed to protect the privacy of individuals about whom government keeps records.

But these computer /privacy concerns threaten legitimate public and media access to government records. The dangers to access were underscored by the Supreme Court in a holding that publicly available records regained privacy interests when drawn together in a centralized government computer. In other words, the form in which records were kept rather than their content could control access.

This article suggests that understanding the origin and context of the computer /privacy conflict will better prepare access proponents to deal with attempts to curtail legitimate access to government information because of privacy concerns.     

Closing the Floodgates on Privacy Class Actions: Lloyd v Google LLC

In Lloyd v Google LLC [2021] UKSC 50, the Supreme Court overturned the Court of Appeal's decision, which had allowed a claim under the Data Protection Act 1998 to proceed as a representative action under CPR 19.6. This is significant because the Court of Appeal's decision arguably paved the way for further data protection/privacy claims to be brought as opt-out ‘class actions’ using this procedure. This case note summarises the Supreme Court decision and assesses its implications for both the procedural law of collective redress and the substantive law of privacy in England. It argues that the Supreme Court's reasoning in relation to both of these areas is sound as a matter of precedent and statutory construction. As a matter of public policy, the decision is likely to re-enliven debate about the availability of collective redress in English law and whether the existing collective proceedings regime should be broadened.     

Conforming to the rule of law: when person and human being finally mean the same thing in Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence

The Fourteenth Amendment was intended to protect people from discrimination and harm from other people. Racism is not the only thing people need protection from. As a constitutional principle, the Fourteenth Amendment is not confined to its historical origin and purpose, but is available now to protect all human beings, including all unborn human beings. The Supreme Court can define "person" to include all human beings, born and unborn. It simply chooses not to do so. Science, history and tradition establish that unborn humans are, from the time of conception, both persons and human beings, thus strongly supporting an interpretation that the unborn meet the definition of "person" under the Fourteenth Amendment. The legal test used to extend constitutional personhood to corporations, which are artificial "persons" under the law, is more than met by the unborn, demonstrating that the unborn deserve the status of constitutional personhood. There can be no "rule of law" if the Constitution continues to be interpreted to perpetuate a discriminatory legal system of separate and unequal for unborn human beings. Relying on the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court may overrule Roe v. Wade solely on the grounds of equal protection. Such a result would not return the matter of abortion to the states. The Fourteenth Amendment, properly interpreted, would thereafter prohibit abortion in every state.     

Police hiring and retention of sexual minorities in Georgia and Texas after Lawrence v. Texas

In this telephone interview study, hiring and retention policies and practices relevant to sexual minority officers among twenty selected police departments in Georgia and Texas were examined. The authors examined policies and practices in place before and after the U.S. Supreme Court's 2003 decision in Lawrence v. Texas, in which the Court struck down Texas' sodomy law on grounds that it violated due process and the right to privacy, in effect decriminalizing homosexual conduct throughout the nation. Conclusions and policy implications for law enforcement hiring practices in light of this landmark decision are discussed.     

最高人民法院关于无效行政行为的探索

最高人民法院从司法审查引发出对无效行政行为制度的探索,虽没有使用“自始没有任何法律效力”和“无效”等概念,却在民事诉讼领域形成了有关基础行为的构成要件,在对行政行为的司法审查中形成了重大明显瑕疵的类型化和明显性判断标准,并形成了排除具有重大明显瑕疵行政行为公定力、相对人拘束力和司法强制执行力的无效行政行为制度雏形,为我国今后立法积累了丰富的素材。从最高人民法院的探索轨迹及其重大明显瑕疵的类型化,可以发现无效行政行为规则的鲜明中国特色,司法的制度生成意义和生成机制。     

Setting the stage: Arnold Schwarzenegger and video games prepare for battle in the United States Supreme Court

Video games often feature a character that evolves into an iconic superhero. In a strange twist of fate, the video game medium will have the opportunity to become a superhero itself. The recording, comic book, and movie industries have rallied around video games as the case of Arnold Schwarzenegger vs. Entertainment Merchants Association and Entertainment Software Association reaches the Supreme Court of the United States. The case concerns a 2005 California ban on the sale of violent video games to minors. The law was later overturned by the District Court and the 9th Circuit Court on appeal. At issue is whether the law violates the First Amendment of the Constitution. Do video games deserve the full protection of the Constitution as a legitimate form of speech, or should it be limited due to its alleged effects on the psychological well-being of minors? This Article will look at the impact this case may have when it reaches the Supreme Court, an analysis of the issues that will be argued, and the history of legislation involving violent video games.     

Blurred vision: How supreme court FOIA opinions on invasion of privacy have missed the target of legislative intent

The framers of the Freedom of Information Act believed that in order to make informed decisions concerning self‐rule in the democracy, citizens needed access to government information. However, the law also acknowledges the importance of protecting privacy—two of the FOIA's exemptions allow federal agencies to withhold information that would invade the privacy of individuals. The purpose of this article is to explore the legal conflict between an individual's right to privacy and the public interest in disclosure of government information. In an examination of seven United States Supreme Court decisions on this subject, this article questions whether the Court has fairly balanced the conflicting values of access and privacy within the guidelines established by Congress in the FOIA.     

Rating the intrusiveness of law enforcement searches and seizures

This article presents the results of a survey that asked 217 subjects to rate the “intrusiveness” of 50 different types of law enforcement investigative techniques, taken primarily from U.S. Supreme Court cases. Respondents disagreed strongly with many of the assumptions the Court makes about privacy and autonomy. Additionally, three theories are developed to help explain perceptions of intrusiveness.     

Delfi AS v Estonia: The Liability of Secondary Internet Publishers for Violation of Reputational Rights under the European Convention on Human Rights

In October 2013, the European Court of Human Rights in Delfi AS v Estonia upheld a decision of the Estonian Supreme Court to impose liability on the owners of an internet news portal for defamatory comments which had been posted on their website by anonymous third parties. This note suggests that the decision is important in the context of publications with a ‘public interest’ element to them, because it appears to afford more protection to the right to reputation (deriving from the Article 8 right to privacy) and less to freedom of expression than was formerly the case. It is further argued that the Court's emphasis on the positive obligation of states to protect this right to reputation may mean that the existing English law in this area, including, potentially section 5 of the Defamation Act 2013, is inconsistent with the ECHR jurisprudence.     

Privacy on the Internet

Privacy, the right to an inviolable private life, is one of the most valued and most fragile possessions in modern human society. According to only one of the best-known definitions, privacy is the right to be left alone; the right for every human being to enjoy a space protected by law from arbitrary encroachment, including that of the government. "Every unjustified violation of individual privacy by the state, whatever the means used, must be regarded as a violation of the Fourth Amendment [to the U.S. Constitution—S.S.]," as U.S. Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis noted in his famous opinion on wiretapping.¹ Privacy is a fundamental human right, and it has been meticulously studied and analyzed. According to one classification scheme,² privacy can provisionally be divided into four types: privacy of personal data, physical privacy, territorial privacy, and the privacy of communications.     

当代中国私法进程中的民商事司法解释

当代中国正处在社会变革时期,急剧变化的社会关系需要法及时作出反应。最高法院的司法解释与民商事立法相得益彰,构成了当代中国私法进程的两条十分醒目的发展脉络,司法解释时而还扮演着"先行者"的角色。尽管存在着一些与社会变革不相协调的、引发争议甚至遭受谴责的司法解释,但作为一种具有"中国特色"的法律现象,在构建私法秩序方面,最高法院的司法解释仍大有可为。     

隐私权的判定——“合理隐私期待标准”的确立与适用

隐私权存在与否的判定问题是隐私侵权责任承担的关键所在。而美国联邦最高法院在1967年Katz v.United States案中确立的"合理的隐私期待"标准,在世界多个国家的适用已被证明是比较可行的隐私权的判定方法。我国隐私权司法实践在吸收、借鉴"合理的隐私期待"标准时应明确"私人事实"、"法律规定"、"社会习俗"和"利益平衡"四种隐私期待的客观判断要素,实现判决结果的一致性,及对他人隐私利益最大程度的保护。     

Hate Speech and International Criminal Law: The Mugesera Decision by the Supreme Court of Canada

On 28 June 2005, the Supreme Court of Canada rendered a decisionin Mugesera, bringing to an end the decade-long legal saga involvinga speech made by Leon Mugesera in November 1992 in Rwanda. Whilethe decision of the Supreme Court was handed down in the contextof an immigration case, its impact will be mostly felt in therealm of criminal law, as the court embraced international jurisprudencefor the international elements of crimes against humanity. Inaddition, the decision is important for three reasons: it (i)clarified the interrelationship between international and domesticcriminal law; (ii) examined the notion of hate crime; and (iii)analysed the concept of inchoate crimes.     

俄罗斯公司立法综论——兼与中国公司立法比较

俄罗斯的公司立法起步很早,但发展缓慢,直到20世纪90年代才形成相对独立的公司法体系。传统上,俄罗斯采民商合一的立法体例,但在民法典之外,仍制定有公司单行法,并与调整公司关系的总统命令和政府规章等规范性法律文件以及联邦最高法院和最高仲裁法院所作的司法解释一并行使调整公司关系的职能。俄罗斯公司立法注重对私权利的维护,以任意性规范为主。但在向市场经济过渡时期,实践中的公司利益冲突不仅危害社会公共利益,最终也损及股东权益。有鉴于此,立法者不得不修订法律条文,增加强制性规范,强化公权力对公司活动的干预。这虽然与我国公司立法的趋向刚好相反,但两国立法的最终目标都是在寻找一个自由与干预的最佳平衡点。     

Spanish Supreme Court provides limited relief for data controllers

Earlier this year the Spanish Supreme Court gave judgment on an application to annul the data protection regulations set out in Royal Decree 1720/2007 and to refer the Spanish implementation of the Data Protection Directive to the European Court of Justice. The application was partially successful. Some sections of the Royal Decree have been annulled but much of it was upheld. The Supreme Court also referred the Spanish implementation of the legitimate interests processing condition (art. 7(f) of the Data Protection Directive) to the European Court of Justice. The European Court of Justice’s decision could have a material impact on data controllers in Spain. If the legitimate interest condition is finally recognised it should make data protection compliance significantly easier.     

Webster and women's equality

The National Abortion Rights Action League (NARAL) and the Women's Legal Defense Fund (WLDF) co-authored an "amicus curiae" brief in "Webster." The brief was written for 77 organizations who believe in equality of women. The brief said that constitutional protection of a woman's right to choose is guaranteed by the right to privacy. The brief said that if abortions were illegal, women would not be able to take place in society equally with men. Liberty would be taken away from women. If the state interferes with abortion, the principle of bodily integrity is violated. In "Winston v. Lee," the Supreme Court found that the state could not compel a criminal to undergo an invasive surgical procedure to retrieve a bullet necessary for the state to prosecute with. 1 in 4 women have a cesarean section, which requires a larger incision in the abdomen, and has many risks. Bearing and raising children often puts a damper on women's employment opportunities. Therefore, if the Supreme Court denied women the right to bear children when and where they wanted, women would not have the right to plan their futures. If the Supreme Court were to agree that "interest in potential life outweighs" a woman's tight to procreate autonomously, states could declare all abortions illegal, investigate them to see if they were induced on purpose, and murder women who induced them. Contraceptive devices could be declared illegal. Laws could be used to force women to submit to cesarean sections and other fetal surgery. Pre-viability abortion restrictions should be rejected because they have old-fashioned notions of women's role in society. They reinforce stereotypes. Missouri's law stresses aiding "potential," rather than actual life.     

Competing Supremacies and Clashing Institutional Rationalities: the Danish Supreme Court's Decision in the Ajos Case and the National Limits of Judicial Cooperation

On 6 December 2016, the Supreme Court of Denmark (SCDK) ruled on the grounds of Ajos case. The ruling concerned the scope of the principle of non‐discrimination on the grounds of age and whether a national court could weigh the principle of non‐discrimination on grounds of age against the principles of legal controversy, as the protection of legitimate expectations. The ruling has caused a great deal of controversy as the SCDK defied clear guidelines from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in the ruling. Moreover, the case has been seen by some as an example of a new ‘sovereigntism’ in Danish law that is at odds with the project of European integration through law. This article explains the case from both an EU law and Danish constitutional law perspective. It concludes by providing a set of explanations of the new course of the SCDK in its relationship with the EU.     

From Hyderabad to Harvard: how US law schools make it worthwhile to clerk on India's Supreme Court

Since the 1990s, judges of the Supreme Court of India have hired law clerks to help them perform some of their routine tasks. However, while clerkships on the U.S. Supreme Court are considered very prestigious and are extensively written about, clerkships on India's Supreme Court are considered to be of significantly lower value by the local legal profession and teaching market in India. Instead, ironically, clerkships on the Supreme Court of India are often pursued by students interested in getting an advanced law degree (usually an LL.M.) at a U.S. law school. Relying on interviews conducted with law clerks and interns who have served on the Supreme Court of India, and using India as a case study, this paper argues that ambitious Indian law students are adopting strategies to “Americanize” themselves in order to culturally arbitrage U.S. law schools' misunderstandings of the global legal profession.