Mutual Optimism as a Rationalist Explanation of War

Blainey (1988) argued that crises are more likely to end in war when two nations disagree about their relative power. Fey and Ramsay (2007) claim that this widely used “mutual optimism” explanation is theoretically incoherent. Their criticism neglects the need to specify a behavioral causal mechanism that links beliefs to the outbreak of war. We show how the rationalist game‐theoretic work on the causes of war provides such mechanisms—the risk‐return trade‐off and costly signaling—and demonstrate that these models are immune to Fey and Ramsay's critiques. We also show that the class of models Fey and Ramsay propose make the substantively unwarranted assumption that an actor can unilaterally impose peace on an opponent who strictly prefers war. Their finding that war does not occur in equilibrium has nothing to do with mutual optimism. We conclude that the mutual optimism explanation can be grounded on firm rationalist foundations.     

The Armed Peace: A Punctuated Equilibrium Theory of War

According to a leading rationalist explanation, war can break out when a large, rapid shift of power causes a credible commitment problem. This mechanism does not specify how inefficient fighting can resolve this cause, so it is an incomplete explanation of war. We present a complete information model of war as a sequence of battles and show that although opportunities for a negotiated settlement arise throughout, the very desirability of peace creates a commitment problem that undermines its likelihood. Because players have incentives to settle as soon as possible, they cannot credibly threaten to fight long enough if an opponent launches a surprise attack. This decreases the expected duration and costs of war and causes mutual deterrence to fail. Fighting's destructiveness improves the credibility of these threats by decreasing the benefits from continuing the war and can eventually lead to peace. In equilibrium players can only terminate war at specific windows of opportunity and fighting results in escalating costs that can leave both players worse off at the time peace is negotiated than a full concession would have before the war began.     

Domestic divisions and external actors in Libya’s civil war

With the Libyan National Army having failed to capture Tripoli, Libya’s civil war – which has attracted foreign support on both sides – is now stalemated around the town of Sirte. The parties are abiding by a ceasefire agreement, but there is little prospect they will reach a political settlement before fighting resumes and the conflict becomes further internationalised.     

Prosecution of grave violations of human rights in light of challenges of national courts and the intenational criminal court: The congolese dilemma

The war in the DRC has resulted in one of the world’s worst humanitarian crisis with over 3.4 million displaced persons scattered throughout the country. An estimated 4 million people have died as a result of the war. The most pressing need to be addressed is the question of justice and accountability for these human rights atrocities in order to achieve a durable peace in the country and also in the Great Lakes region. It is particularly true in post-conflict situations where justice systems have been either partially or completely destroyed, that national courts are not capable of arriving at a uniform stance, or willing to provide justice for atrocities in the immediate future. As a result, international justice seems to be a crucial and last resort that must continue to be fortified against efforts to undermine it. However, even if the ICC achieves its full potential, it faces a number of challenges. Firstly, it is realistically not able to address all situations in which national courts are unwilling or unable to prosecute perpetrators. Secondly, there are temporal and other jurisdictional limitations on what cases the ICC can hear. Accordingly, the ICC will only have the power to try people accused of the gravest human rights violations committed after 1 July 2002; the date the Rome Statute which established the ICC took effect. As a result, only a small number of individuals responsible for the atrocities committed will be tried by this Court. Thirdly, is the establishment, of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), one of the civilian institutions that emerged from the peace talks, meant to end impunity or to cover up gross violations of human rights committed in the DRC? It remains to be seen how it will function and interact with the courts.     

Uncertainty and Incentives in Crisis Bargaining: Game‐Free Analysis of International Conflict

We study two different varieties of uncertainty that countries can face in international crises and establish general results about the relationship between these sources of uncertainty and the possibility of peaceful resolution of conflict. Among our results, we show that under some weak conditions, there is no equilibrium of any crisis bargaining game that has voluntary agreements and zero probability of costly war. We also show that while uncertainty about the other side's cost of war may be relatively benign in peace negotiations, uncertainty about the other side's strength in war makes it much more difficult to guarantee peaceful outcomes. Along the way, we are able to assess the degree to which particular modeling assumptions found in the existing literature drive the well‐known relationship between uncertainty, the incentive to misrepresent, and costly war. We find that while the theoretical connection between war and uncertainty is quite robust to relaxing many modeling assumptions, whether uncertainty is about costs or the probability of victory remains important.     

If They Endorse It,I Can't Trust It: How Outgroup Leader Endorsements Undercut Public Support for Civil War Peace Settlements

Civil wars are a greater source of violence than any other type of conflict, yet little is known about one of the key determinants of civil war peace settlement success: civilian support. We evaluate how a core component of nearly all peace settlements, leader endorsements, affects public support. We predict that individuals in conflict settings will view settlements endorsed by outgroup leaders as less trustworthy and that they will become less supportive. We conduct an endorsement experiment with nearly 1,000 respondents in South Sudan in 2016, taking advantage of a brief cessation in a devastating civil war. Public support for a tentative settlement drops precipitously when it is endorsed by an outgroup leader but does not increase when it is endorsed by an ingroup leader. We find suggestive evidence that effects are strongest for individuals with the greatest reason to fear outgroup leaders: those whose communities were targeted most violently by that outgroup.     

Veto Players and Civil War Duration

Civil wars show a remarkable variation in how long they last. Some end within days; others continue for decades. What explains the extreme intractability of some wars while others are resolved quickly? This article argues that conflicts with multiple actors who must approve a settlement (veto players) are longer because there are fewer acceptable agreements, information asymmetries are more acute, and shifting alliances and incentives to hold out make negotiation more difficult. This veto player approach to explaining variation in civil war duration is tested using a new dataset containing monthly data on all parties to each civil war begun since World War II. The statistical analysis shows a strong correlation between the number of veto players and the duration of civil war.     

The Fundamentalist City,Medieval Modernity,and the Arab Spring

Abstract

The Arab World has witnessed massive popular uprisings that seek to overturn years of authoritarianism and supposedly bring about democratic change and social justice. These uprisings evoke both optimism and pessimism about religion, violence, and their connection to cities. As people in various parts of the Arab world embark on their quest for self-government, there is no telling where this great experiment will lead. Based on current indications, religion will play a decisive role in shaping the futures of these nations, and particularly their cities. These directions seem to be charted by the religious parties that have come to power, and through a series of subtle and gradual policies that are setting the foundations for future theocratic states. The aim of this article is to explore the urban processes by which religious ideologies transform into fundamentalist urban movements, and how their actions are starting to reshape the cities of the Arab World.     

Delegation with multiple instruments in a rent-seeking contest

We consider delegation in a rent-seeking contest with two players, where delegates have more instruments at their disposal than the main players. We endogenize both the decision to hire a delegate and the contingent fee offered to the delegates. We characterize the situations when either no, one or two players hire a delegate in equilibrium. We show that the decision to hire a delegate depends in a non-monotonic way on the size of the contested prize.     

Bargaining in the Shadow of War: When Is a Peaceful Resolution Most Likely?

This article derives the optimal bargaining strategies of the belligerents when each side has private but incomplete information about the expected outcome of a war, should it take place. I show that the aggressor's demand curve can be below the defender's offer curve, that wars are possible even when both sides are jointly pessimistic, and that the relative cost of a war can radically alter the types of disputes that end in war. A simple diagram provides the intuition for most of the major propositions.     

Changing the Subject: The Case for ‘Social Politics’

Running through Bernard Crick's In Defence of Politics is an implicit faith in the ability of liberal democracy to deliver progress. From the perspective of 1962 such optimism seems well founded. After the years of post war austerity there had been more than a decade of steady growth, the middle class was expanding fast providing unprecedented levels of absolute social mobility (more benign and less complicated than the relative social mobility which today's politicians disingenuously claim to pursue). Matthew Taylor explores the case for ‘social politics’.     

Trust as an alternative to risk

Many students of trust see it as a way to mitigate risk through the development of strong institutions that create trust. I offer an alternative view of trust, moralistic or generalized trust, that depends upon a psychological foundation of optimism and control. This form of trust, in contrast to arguments by Paldam and others, has “value” independent of experience. Using data from a survey of metropolitan Philadelphia in 1996, I show that if you believe that “most people can be trusted,” you are substantially more likely to see your neighborhood as safe at night even controlling for both the objective level of crime as well having been the victim of a crime, having had parents who were the victims of crime, watching local television news (which exposes people to violent events), where you live (central city and suburb), and gender. Trust thus “reduces” perceptions of risk independently of personal experience.     

Decentralization and the post–war political economy

This paper uses cross–national data for 21 OECD nations to examine whether there is evidence of a connection between measures of political and fiscal decentralization and the major, long–term, performance parameters of the post–war political economy. Findings of what is necessarily an exploratory analysis of a wide range of policy outcomes suggest that federalism and the proliferation of constitutional veto–points have inhibited the expansion of the socially protective state and that a low level of fiscal centralization appears to have restrained post–war inflationary pressures and gone along with higher rates of post–war economic growth. No evidence is found to connect either political or fiscal measures with postwar labour market performance.     

International Institutions and Compliance with Agreements

The ultimate litmus test of compliance theories occurs in situations where states' interests are directly opposed, such as competing interstate claims over territory, maritime areas, and cross-border rivers. This article considers the extent to which the involvement of international institutions in the settlement of contentious issues between states bolsters compliance with agreements that are struck. Institutions may influence the prospects for compliance actively and passively . Active institutional involvement in the conflict management process increases the chances for compliance with agreements, particularly for binding institutional activities, relative to the active involvement of noninstitutional third parties. More passively, joint membership in peace-promoting institutions enhances the likelihood that states will comply with peaceful agreements to resolve contentious issues. Empirical analyses demonstrate the relevance of international institutions for resolving contentious interstate issues both actively and passively, although the results suggest that institutions are more effective conflict managers when they choose binding settlement techniques .     

Elections and the Development of Civil War: An Empirical Study of Sri Lanka

Present empirical research on the connection between elections and civil war often treats causality as a one-way effect because it focuses exclusively on either the onset or the consequence of civil war. What is omitted in the literature is the endogenous nature of the election–conflict nexus throughout a civil war. This article dedicates itself to filling that gap. Treating administrative units in conflict as part of a rebellion network, we apply a stochastic actor-oriented model (SAOM) to the case of Sri Lanka. We find that, on the one hand, rebellion is less likely to occur in Tamil regions if national winners in presidential elections enjoy high local approval ratings (selection effect). On the other hand, regions involved in the rebellion network converge in terms of their local support for the national winner of the presidency (influence effect). Overall, our model-based simulation analysis shows that the influence effect has a larger impact on the endogenous relationship than the selection effect.     

Decentralization and the post-war political economy

Abstract This paper uses cross–national data for 21 OECD nations to examine whether there is evidence of a connection between measures of political and fiscal decentralization and the major, long–term, performance parameters of the post–war political economy. Findings of what is necessarily an exploratory analysis of a wide range of policy outcomes suggest that federalism and the proliferation of constitutional veto–points have inhibited the expansion of the socially protective state and that a low level of fiscal centralization appears to have restrained post–war inflationary pressures and gone along with higher rates of post–war economic growth. No evidence is found to connect either political or fiscal measures with postwar labour market performance.     

Preparing physicians to contend with the problem of dual loyalty

Abstract

Dual loyalty is defined as, particularly as it pertains to the field of medicine, a conflict or potential conflict between a healthcare professional's simultaneous obligations–expressed or implied–to a patient and to a third party. Dual loyalty situations often compromise physicians' ethical behavior, leading them to participate, either knowingly or unknowingly, in human rights violations perpetrated by a third party, often the state. Classic dual loyalty situations include the participation of physicians in state-sanctioned torture or the death penalty. However, there are a number of other dual loyalty scenarios that arise routinely in clinical practice in both closed institutions such as prisons, psychiatric facilities, and the military and in open societies promulgated by discriminatory practices, policies, and laws that can lead physicians and other health care professionals to contribute to the violation of individuals' human rights. Healthcare professionals are, for the most part, not formally trained to contend with these dual loyalty conflicts. While physicians routinely learn about bioethical frameworks to assist them in resolving difficult clinical dilemmas created, for example, by modern technology that extends life or by limited resources, few are taught a human rights framework that can assist them in protecting patients' human rights in cases of dual loyalty. This paper presents a case-based approach that utilizes a human rights framework for teaching dual loyalty in the undergraduate medical education curriculum. The medical profession is in dire need of training its workforce to grapple with the myriad dual loyalty issues that confront the profession today, and must institute curriculum reform to prepare future health care professionals to deal with dual loyalty scenarios that threaten individuals' human rights.     

Persistent Fighting and Shifting Power

Three striking features about both interstate and civil war are (1) there are often periods of persistent fighting, (2) fighting commonly ends in negotiated settlements as well as in militarily decisive outcomes, and (3) fighting sometimes recurs. This article links these features to shifts in the distribution of power and to the fact that one of the functions of fighting is to forestall adverse shifts. The analysis centers on a simple model of state consolidation. The equilibrium displays these features: Fighting occurs when the distribution of power is shifting rapidly. The factions avoid fighting and cut deals when the distribution of power shifts slowly or is stable. Fighting resumes if the distribution of power again begins to shift rapidly. The analysis also shows that state consolidation can occur without fighting if the process is sufficiently slow. Fighting now rather than later can also reduce the total cost of fighting.     

Campaign contributions as valence

I study how the possibility of voters contributing to candidates in response to the candidates’ policy proposals affects the equilibrium policy in winner-take-all political competition. More specifically, I allow each partisan voter to contribute to her preferred candidate where the amount contributed depends on the relative positions of the two candidates. Candidates then use the donations to build valence through campaigning, which in turn affects the voting decision of impressionable voters. Since candidates are concerned with raising money as well as picking a policy position preferred by the median voter, I show that campaign contributions may lead to divergent equilibria in winner-take-all elections when politicians are policy-motivated, albeit only under stylized utility functions and donor densities. Further, under symmetric voter and donor densities, if either the donor density is single-peaked or the voter utility is concave, a unique equilibrium exists in which both candidates propose the ideal policy of the median voter.     

Singing in interaction

Drawing on a database of 26 hours of video-recorded Finnish conversations from three different settings – everyday conversations among family and friends, instrumental lessons and church workplace meetings – we consider the ways in which singing can be used as an interactional resource to enact the three basic communicative motives of humans: requesting, informing, and sharing. Singing has the potential to initiate joint activities, which allows the participants to share their emotional stances. The usage of singing is, however, more limited in requesting or informing – a disadvantage which people, especially in musical settings, need to deal with. There are, nevertheless, situations where the possibility to choose to perform such actions through singing can help maintain mutual solidarity between participants. We argue that people's distinct ways of interpreting spoken and sung utterances can be best understood from the perspective of participants' orientations to agency and accountability.