An institutional explanation of party system congruence: Evidence from six federations

Abstract.  The allocation of resources between the federal and state levels of government is a key institutional variable explaining the congruence or similarity of party systems. It affects the incentives voters and parties face, and opportunities for cleavage mobilization. This article pioneers measures for comparing congruence across federations. Evidence from state and federal elections in six federations produces clear evidence that party systems are least congruent in decentralized federations and most congruent in centralized federations. Voter behaviour, indicated by the variation of electoral support for parties across units of the federation and the similarity of swings in support between the state and federal levels, is most responsive to the allocation of resources. Party system structure is less responsive to this variable.     

Party debate over Europe in national election campaigns: Electoral disunity and party cohesion

Few political parties are willing to lead the public debate on how the European Union should develop and parties rarely publicly discuss issues on the EU agenda. This is probably one of the most important democratic problems in the contemporary EU. When and why parties are willing (or not willing) to discuss European cooperation is therefore an essential issue in which political science should engage. Previous research has shown that parties that are internally divided on EU issues downplay these issues in order to avoid internal disputes. At the same time, parties that have severe intraparty conflicts over the issue are unable to contain the debate. Thus, parties that are unified in their position on EU issues and parties that are heavily split speak about the EU, but others do not. Also, earlier research has shown that political parties downplay issues in response to internal divisions among their supporters. It is argued in this article that the focus should not be solely on intraparty conflict or whether or not a party's voters are hesitant or disunited, but rather on how these factors interact in order to better understand how parties act strategically regarding EU issues. Using a new dataset that relies on quantitative content analysis of quality newspapers during the national election campaigns in the period 1983–2010 in France, Germany, the United Kingdom and Sweden, it is found that parties that have a high degree of internal dissent on European issues, while at the same time having an equally divided electorate, are the parties that are most present in the public debate. Hence, it is the interaction between these two important factors that explains much of the variation in the amount of attention paid to European issues in national election campaigns.     

Cycles and instability in politics. Evidence from the 2009 Danish municipal elections

Social choice theory predicts that political processes are prone to instability or outright chaos, yet the evidence that actual politics is dominated by the phenomena identified in the literature is somewhat anecdotal and widely contested. In order to systematically assess the degree to which politics is affected by cyclicality or chaos as predicted by social choice theorists we study the outcome of the 2009 municipal elections in Denmark. This yields a total of 97 cases, which allows for a systematic assessment of the frequency of cycling through a large-n study. Evidence of four cyclical results is presented.     

The causes of legal rents extraction: evidence from Spanish municipalities

This paper analyzes the causes of legal political rent extraction by using a direct measure of it, namely, local top politicians’ wages. In particular, we investigate whether local politicians’ incentives to extract rents by setting their own wages are influenced by the degree of political competition and voter information. We use a sample of the largest Spanish municipalities over the years 2008–2010. The results indicate that weaker political competition and lesser voter information are related to more rent extraction. In an additional analysis, we show that higher wages do not ensure better financial management. These findings confirm that when politicians can set their own salaries, higher wages do not mean better management, but they are just political rents.     

Assimilation and contrast effects in voter projections of party locations: Evidence from Norway,France, and the USA

Abstract. In the standard Downsian model, voters are assumed to choose parties based on the extent of ideological proximity between the voter's own position and that of the party. Yet it is also well known that there are rationalization and projection effects such that voters tend to misestimate the policy platforms of candidates or parties to which they are sympathetic by overstating the correspondence between those positions and the voter's own preferences (see, e.g., Markus & Converse 1979; Granberg & Brent 1980; Granberg & Holmberg 1988; Merrill & Grofman 1999). Here we follow insights in the psychological literature on persuasion (Sherif & Hovland 1961; Parducci & Marshall 1962) by distinguishing between assimilation and contrast effects. Assimilation refers to shortening the perceived ideological distance between oneself and parties one favors; contrast refers to exaggerating the distance to parties for which one does not intend to vote. Using survey data on voter self–placements and party placements on ideological scales for the seven major Norwegian parties, five major French parties, and two major American parties we show that both assimilation and contrast effects are present in each country to a considerable degree.We also investigate the possible effects of randomness in party placement and scale interpretation – effects that can easily be confounded with assimilation but not so easily with contrast.     

Assimilation and contrast effects in voter projections of party locations: Evidence from Norway, France, and the USA

In the standard Downsian model, voters are assumed to choose parties based on the extent of ideological proximity between the voter's own position and that of the party. Yet it is also well known that there are rationalization and projection effects such that voters tend to misestimate the policy platforms of candidates or parties to which they are sympathetic by overstating the correspondence between those positions and the voter's own preferences (see, e.g., Markus & Converse 1979; Granberg & Brent 1980; Granberg & Holmberg 1988; Merrill & Grofman 1999). Here we follow insights in the psychological literature on persuasion (Sherif & Hovland 1961; Parducci & Marshall 1962) by distinguishing between assimilation and contrast effects. Assimilation refers to shortening the perceived ideological distance between oneself and parties one favors; contrast refers to exaggerating the distance to parties for which one does not intend to vote. Using survey data on voter self–placements and party placements on ideological scales for the seven major Norwegian parties, five major French parties, and two major American parties we show that both assimilation and contrast effects are present in each country to a considerable degree.We also investigate the possible effects of randomness in party placement and scale interpretation – effects that can easily be confounded with assimilation but not so easily with contrast.     

On the psychological reality of party identification: Evidence from the accessibility of voting intentions and of partisan feelings

Results from a CATI survey of the 1993 Canadian federal election are presented. Response latencies to a voting intention question and a party identification question were obtained to measure the accessibility of these constructs among three groups of respondents: unconflicted partisans, who identified with a party and intended to vote for that party; conflicted partisans, who identified with a party but intended to vote for a different party; and nonpartisans. The voting intentions of unconflicted partisans and nonpartisans were expressed faster after the call of the election than before the election was called whereas those of conflicted partisans were expressed more slowly. Similarly, the party identification of unconflicted partisans was expressed faster after the call of the election whereas that of conflicted partisans was expressed more slowly. The implications of these and related results for the debate between proponents of the classical and revisionist views of party identification are discussed.     

The effectiveness of institutional borrowing restrictions: Empirical evidence from Spanish municipalities

The need for restrictions on borrowing by subnational governments is a generally accepted notion that is justified both by public choice theory and by the fact that such restrictions are in force in the majority of decentralized countries. Furthermore, recent breaches of the Stability and Growth Pact of the European Union have led to the introduction of legislative tools aimed at balancing the budget at all levels of government have come to the forefront of interest in European public finance research. This paper is concerned with the financial situation and debt level of Spanish municipalities from 1988 to 2000. We have two main objectives: the first is to assess the value of mandatory limitations on municipal borrowing and past trends in the borrowing policies adopted by Spanish local authorities. The second is to develop an econometric model using panel data stratified by population size to measure indebtedness in Spanish municipalities. These measures enable us to formulate a series of hypotheses to explain municipal borrowing practices, which are then tested empirically. The evidence thus obtained appears to support the effectiveness of institutional borrowing restrictions to introduce some financial discipline in the borrowing policies adopted by local governments in Spain.     

The Kramer problem: Micro-macro resolution with a Danish pool

In a seminal paper, Kramer (1983) posed his “problem” for the study of economic voting with election surveys: the items administered can measure neither individual nor national economic wellbeing accurately. Instead these items of economic perception are laden with erroneous judgment and partisan bias. Thus, the investigation of economics and elections should not be a survey research enterprise. Here we show, through varied analyses in an extensive, well-gathered Danish election pool, that these fears are unfounded. The presence of strong sociotropic voting effects from surveys can be established, and reconciled with the observed effects of national fluctuations in the macro economy. Indeed, the micro- and macro- processes mirror each other, so resolving the Kramer problem.     

The eclipse of legislatures: Direct democracy in the 21st century

Demographic, political, and technological trends are fueling an unprecedented growth in direct democracy worldwide. If the trends continue, direct democracy threatens to eclipse legislatures in setting the policy agenda. This article reviews existing scientific knowledge about the initiative and referendum – the main institutions of direct democracy – and highlights key issues for the future.     

Party Brands and Partisanship: Theory with Evidence from a Survey Experiment in Argentina

Scholars disagree about the nature of party attachments, viewing partisanship as either a social identity or a rational maximization of expected utility. Empirically, much of this debate centers on the degree of partisan stability: findings of partisan fluctuations are taken as evidence against the social‐identity perspective. But drawing such conclusions assumes that the objects of identity—parties—are fixed. If we instead allow party brands to change over time, then partisan instability is consistent with a social‐identity conception of partisanship. To demonstrate this, I develop a branding model of partisanship in which voters learn about party brands by observing party behavior over time and base their psychological attachment to a party on these brands. The model suggests that convergence by rival parties, making their brands less distinguishable, should weaken party attachments. I test this implication using a survey experiment in Argentina and find evidence consistent with the model.     

Equilibrium in fiscal choices: Evidence from a budget game

This is an applied study about the stability of collective decision-making in fiscal matters and the features of individual preferences which are sufficient to reach a social ordering. It is based on data about citizens' preferences collected through a budget game played by a sample of voters in Turin, a large Italian city. By simulating a series of individual choices, a social ordering of the municipal budget items is arrived at. The role played by restricted (i.e., single-peaked, single-caved etc.) preferences to avoid cycles in choice simulations is then assessed.     

Accountability and Coalitions: Evidence from a Negotiation Experiment

This article tests the effect of accountability on negotiation outcomes in a face‐to‐face classroom experiment. Student participants were asked to form coalitions in groups of three. In the treatment condition, negotiators were held accountable by a personal forum during the formation of the coalition. In the control condition, negotiators were not held accountable. Results show that accountability leads to lower group performance in coalition negotiations. Accountability also reduced the willingness of negotiators to include all negotiators in a “grand coalition.” Rather, accountable negotiators reached agreement with a subset of negotiators. Accountability increased the odds of reaching no agreement. These findings challenge the idea of increased performance as a result of public accountability in the context of coalition negotiations.     

Interest group–party linkage in the twenty‐first century: Evidence from Denmark,the Netherlands and the United Kingdom

This article systematically investigates interest group–party interactions in the Netherlands, Denmark and the United Kingdom based on cross‐national surveys with responses from 1,225 interest groups. The findings show that interest groups and parties still interact in the beginning of the twenty‐first century, but that the vast majority of their interaction involves a low degree of institutionalisation. Using fractional logit analysis, it is demonstrated that the strength of interest group–party linkage is primarily affected by systematic differences in state–society structures and organisational group characteristics. Moreover, differences are found in what conditions different types of interaction. Whereas historical legacies and partisan origin influence an interest group's structural party links, group resources make interactions of a less institutionalised, ad hoc nature more likely.     

Phenotypic Preference in Mexican Migrants: Evidence from a Random Household Survey

Political Behavior - Does pre-existing preference based on skin tone, facial features, and other observable characteristics, i.e., phenotypic preference, affect immigrant voters’ support for...     

Western European party systems: On the trail of a typology

Existing typologies frequently fail to bring out the extent of the development which has occurred in West European party systems. The purpose of this article is to propose a construction which is specifically applicable to the parliamentary form of government and which is of use in non‐static conditions. Whilst admitting that problems of measurement exist, the principal argument is that a distinction can be made between two levels of cohesion in a party system, the governing and the societal references. Their independent variation provides a typology which is sensitive and well‐articulated. The four major types are discussed and illustrated and some conclusions are drawn concerning the apparantly predominant West European type.