关于全球金融经济危机的若干思考

由美国次贷危机引发的世界金融危机和经济危机表明了美国金融霸权的衰落。这是美国经济霸权的危机,也是美国大力推行的市场原教旨主义即新自由主义的危机。这场经济危机显示出当代资本主义的最新特点,即金融产业脱离实体经济片面畸形发展,全球经济过分金融化,因而被称作“全球金融市场资本主义”。目前经济危机还在持续,与此同时,世界政治也开始进入一个动荡不安的高风险的历史阶段。     

The institutional dimensions of financial crisis management

This paper seeks to contribute to the political economy literature on the US subprime financial crisis by concentrating on the string of major financial bailouts that occurred between September 2007 and December 2008. Part of what is missing from the extant scholarship on the financial crisis is a strong analysis of the financial bailout that contemplates the changing nature of the government's response to the crisis and anchors the intervention in the key organizing rules of the post-Bretton Woods financial order. The central underlying claim is that the understanding of the crisis' impact on the US state may be enhanced if more attention is paid to the institutional-level learning processes and capacity building experiences that occurred during the worst period of turmoil as the financial system lay on the brink of complete collapse.     

Diagnosing and Explaining the Global Financial Crisis: Central Banks, Epistemic Authority, and Sense Making

This article explores a key facet of the ideational dynamic underlying the politics of the global financial crisis, examining the interpretative and communicative practices through which the two most powerful central banks in the world—the Fed and the ECB—made sense of the events. Drawing on a constructivist neoinstitutional perspective, the study traces and analyzes the diagnoses and causal accounts of the global financial crisis formulated and voiced by these two actors, mapping and examining their evolution from the beginning of the events in the American subprime market in mid-2007 through the peak of the crisis in global financial markets in mid-2009. The analysis assesses the extent to which the two central banks diagnosed and explained the crisis in ways that challenged dominant notions and conceptual assumptions regarding the economic field, particularly the financial realm, or rather in ways that served to ratify them. While in the first stages of the crisis the diagnoses and causal accounts tended to ratify dominant notions and understandings of the financial field, they later evolved as involving a partial, but still significant, reassessment of established truths. These coherent and detailed sense-making plots touched upon some of the most basic attributes of global financial capitalism, carrying with them the potential for helping to open up the political space for a reevaluation of some of its ideational underpinnings.     

Watching from the sidelines? The decline of the IMF's crisis management role

This article compares the International Monetary Fund (IMF)'s crisis management role during the Asian financial crisis in 1997–98 with the role it has played during the ‘credit crunch’ which emerged in the wake of the subprime crisis in the United States. With prominent calls for the construction of new forms of global financial governance to prevent a recurrence of the subprime crisis in the future, we explore how the designated guardian of the international financial system has responded to the credit crunch in order to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the existing system. Our comparison of the US subprime crisis and the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s indicates that the IMF has lost credibility with its members, and particularly with its principal sponsor, the United States, which has curbed its capacity to develop multilateral solutions to major financial crises.     

Human Rights and the Renminbi

The solidarity of the G‐20 nations in staving off global financial crisis two years ago has deteriorated into a brawl over currency valuations, trade imbalances and sovereign debt, reflecting the great powershift from the West to the East and the emerging economies. In this section, we invited comments from historians, a former head of state who successfully navigated the Asian financial crisis and a prominent Chinese dissident.     

The Financial Crisis of the Local Authorities in Israel: A Resource-Based Analysis

The financial crisis affecting many of the local authorities in Israel has a significant influence on their ability to supply municipal services of an appropriate amount and quality. So far, studies have been addressed to the financial crisis from a political approach by discussing aspects such as the problematic interrelation between central and local governments together with resource allocation. In this paper we investigate the financial crisis of many local authorities in Israel from a strategic point of view. However, this is by no means to argue that other approaches such as institutional and political ones are not important. Rather, the paper investigates whether the financial crisis affecting many Israeli local authorities is a result of their own strategies and practices.
Specifically, we have used the resource-based approach to explore the nature of their joint crises and the potential strategic responses that the local authorities should adopt in order to move into a more favourable state. In particular, we examine three resource-based systems: customer-oriented, organizational culture, and human resources, as the strategic roots of this crisis. We also examine the way they could produce a sustainable competitive advantage and could lead local authorities from the present position to a better one. The article recommends that the heads of local authorities should move to a resource-based strategy in order to perform both more efficiently and effectively.     

The Next 40 Years Will Be the Most Important in History

The solidarity of the G‐20 nations in staving off global financial crisis two years ago has deteriorated into a brawl over currency valuations, trade imbalances and sovereign debt, reflecting the great powershift from the West to the East and the emerging economies. In this section, we invited comments from historians, a former head of state who successfully navigated the Asian financial crisis and a prominent Chinese dissident.     

The Mother of All Solutions for the Global Crisis

The solidarity of the G‐20 nations in staving off global financial crisis two years ago has deteriorated into a brawl over currency valuations, trade imbalances and sovereign debt, reflecting the great powershift from the West to the East and the emerging economies. In this section, we invited comments from historians, a former head of state who successfully navigated the Asian financial crisis and a prominent Chinese dissident.     

The Splintering of the G‐20

The solidarity of the G‐20 nations in staving off global financial crisis two years ago has deteriorated into a brawl over currency valuations, trade imbalances and sovereign debt, reflecting the great powershift from the West to the East and the emerging economies. In this section, we invited comments from historians, a former head of state who successfully navigated the Asian financial crisis and a prominent Chinese dissident.     

从国际金融经济体系变革看主要各方关系微妙变化

发端于美国的全球性金融危机和经济衰退继续蔓延和深化。危机暴露了长期以来一直由美欧主宰的现行国际金融经济体系的不合理,扩大广大发展中国家的代表权、发言权和决策权已势在必行。主要各方围绕金融、经济和政治权益,正在展开重大博弈。国际金融经济体系改革能否成功将取决于各方能否在平衡权益上达成妥协,找到一种新的协调合作方式,建立一种新的运行机制。     

Perhaps this time it's different: ideas and interests in shaping international responses to financial crises

The experience of the recent two decades of financial crises shows that donor countries and international financial institutions (IFIs) can respond to a crisis in a peripheral open economy by either of two crisis management strategies: either they can impose harsh conditionality to fix the domestic economy and prevent future moral hazard problems, or they can provide last-resort credit to restore market confidence. In some cases, the crisis management strategy changes as the crisis evolves. What are the factors that determine the choice of key donor countries and IFIs? This article traces the processes by which the USA and the International Monetary Fund designed the crisis management strategy in respect to the Asian crisis, and how Germany and the European Central Bank designed the response to the eurozone crisis, in order to understand how ideas regarding the causes and solutions of a financial crisis interact with the interests of key donor countries. The article argues that in both cases ideas and interests are mutually constituted, but in each case the mechanism that linked ideas and interests was different: whereas in the Asian case US interests led to policy innovation and experimentation and to a change in the crisis management strategy, in the European case ideas played a greater role in shaping German interests. The article explains this difference on the basis of the lessons learned by IFIs from the Asian crisis, which were then implemented in the eurozone case.     

Avoiding crisis contagion: Poland’s case

This paper examines the major reasons for limited crisis contagion to Poland in the period 2007–09. At this time Poland was the only European Union (EU) member that grew in the midst of the Great Recession and financial crisis. The following analysis focuses on domestic polices and economics structure which made this growth possible. Poland’s modest levels of private and public debt, low share of mortgages in bank assets, limited decline in real estate prices, and proactive policies by domestic and foreign banks substantially buffered Poland’s financial sector. At the same time, real economy was aided by a high share of domestic consumption as opposed to exports, a favorable labor market structure, and timely financial assistance from the EU, all that shielded it from major crisis contagion.     

Did Public Transfers Crowd Out Private Transfers in Korea During the Financial Crisis?

How effective are public transfers in protecting households facing financial crisis-induced negative shocks? Existing studies have not yet carefully considered the inter-relationship between public transfers and the existing private transfer network. In the context of the financial crisis in Korea, this paper investigates the possible crowding-out effect of public transfers on private transfers by explicitly considering the endogenous responses of private transfers against public transfers. By using two Korean household-level panel data sets for the periods of 1995–1998 and 1998–2003, we found a post-crisis, but not pre-crisis crowding-out effect of public transfers; more importantly, a crowding-in effect is observed during the crisis. The results suggest that private transfer networks were strengthened under the initial phase of the financial crisis, which possibly complemented public transfers due to the lack of effective formal safety nets, while public transfers became effective after the crisis, thereby replacing private transfers. Our results suggest that particularly at the initial stage of the crisis, the government could have played an important role in assisting households to weather the negative impacts of the crisis.     

Mayoral scalar strategies and the role of the central state after the financial crisis

Much has been written about state rescaling, politics of scale and the rise of cities and regions in Europe. Little is known, however, about the impact of the financial crisis on these processes. By taking the view of city mayors, this paper presents a comprehensive and timely re-evaluation of central tenets of this literature in the turbulent aftermath of the financial crisis. The analysis shows the variegated pathways of state rescaling before and after the financial crisis, the multifaceted scalar strategies with which mayors have responded in different countries and cities, and the impact of such strategies on their perception of a centralisation towards the national state. The paper concludes by emphasising the continued dominance of the central state, whereas potentials for the rise of cities are rather to be sought at subnational than at European or global scales.     

金融危机的政治学分析

金融危机实质是美国霸权的过度透支和过度消费,而阿富汗战争和伊拉克战争是金融危机的中介和催化剂,美国的自由民主与自由市场的政治经济是金融危机的制度原因。金融危机使美国在短期内再次发动战争可能性降低,同时也削弱了美国模式的国际影响力。但危机对中国和其他发展中国家也造成了伤害,国际经济政治格局其实没有实质变化,美国霸权受到的影响有限。金融危机反衬了中国发展模式的某些优势,但中国要居安思危,在处理中美关系方面保持审慎的态度,同时也要充分地利用这一契机转变经济发展模式。     

Central banks under stress: Reputation,accountability and regulatory coherence

This symposium homes in on an area of public administration that has been through a period of significant change in the last ten years. Since the global financial crisis, central banks have expanded their operations in financial markets, buying up vast quantities of assets as part of expansive monetary policy strategies. They have also played a leading role in the reform of financial regulation and have been entrusted with enhanced authority to supervise financial institutions. This activity has taken place amid heightened political contestation, with central banks increasingly viewed as the quintessence of a technocratic mode of governance that eschews traditional democratic control. The purpose of this symposium is to consider how central banks’ reputation, accountability and regulatory roles have changed since the financial crisis, and what those changes tell us about the balance of power between independent regulatory agencies and elected policy‐makers.     

Financial crises as catalysts for regional cooperation? Chances and obstacles for financial integration in ASEAN+3, MERCOSUR and the eurozone

This article compares and analyses the different answers from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations+3 (ASEAN+3), Mercado Común del Dur (MERCOSUR) and the eurozone on financial crises in their respective regions. All three regions were hit by economic turmoil between 1997 and 2012, but whereas ASEAN+3 and the eurozone answered with establishing regional liquidity arrangements (RLAs) in order to fight future crises, financial cooperation did not take off in MERCOSUR. Thus, the paper asks why some regions establish RLAs in cases of crisis and others do not. It argues that the variance of regional financial integration in different world regions is due to different interests of regional powers in their respective regions. The regional powers of ASEAN+3 and the eurozone are institutionally and/or economically highly embedded within their respective regions, but this is not the case for Brazil in MERCOSUR. China and Japan suffered from negative externalities of the Asian crisis, and, consequently, have had an interest to stabilize their neighbours’ economies after the crisis. In contrast, Brazil was able to follow a beggar-thy-neighbour strategy at the turn of the millennium, which externalized some of the costs of Brazil's own economic crisis towards Argentina. As a result, Brazil has had no interest in providing liquidity for its regional neighbours after the crisis. France and Germany are not only economically but also institutionally highly embedded in the eurozone because they share a common currency with their regional neighbours. Thus, the stability of the eurozone is a vital interest for Europe's regional powers, and they devote significant resources to stabilize the economies of the eurozone's periphery.     

Miracle to meltdown: A pathology of the East Asian financial crisis

The financial crisis in East Asia was made more dramatic by the fact that the region's performance in terms of economic growth over the preceding decade had been widely perceived as a 'miracle'. What was it that transformed the region's fortunes, and what are the chances for a speedy economic recovery? Systematic analysis reveals that, while there is no unicausal explanation, and while few if any commentators anticipated the crisis before the event, the fundamental difference from previous international financial crises is the extreme indebtedness of the corporate sector of the crisis countries. Private sector repayment difficulties and the associated banking crises triggered the sudden withdrawal of capital and the collapse of exchange rates. Failure to address the underlying private sector debt overhang, and reliance instead on conventional macroeconomic policy solutions, have led to a decline in output and a depreciation in exchange rates which have been far greater than need have been the case.     

二十国集团与国际金融体系改革

此次全球金融危机的根源是人类的系统危机。美国的金融衍生品市场为投资者创造了比发行者更低的风险,个体风险的最小化使潜在风险在系统层面体现,最终导致系统瓦解。美国和世界经济缺乏增长点,导致走出危机后的全球经济向着长时间的、严重的萧条方向发展。二十国集团因创建目的差异和内在的矛盾关系,无法解决当前世界金融体系的问题,该组织演变为国际争论中心的可能性甚至大于全球治理的模式,它需要被使用但不应被寄予厚望。当前,世界经济面临着从投机型到生产型的痛苦转型,核销投机性债务、实行金本位制度并确立新的全球储备货币是痛苦相对较小的转型方式。     

Adding rooms onto a house we love: Central banking after the global financial crisis

This article examines the extent to which central bankers have been willing and able to rethink their beliefs about monetary policy in the wake of the global financial crisis. We show that despite the upheaval, the core pre‐crisis monetary policy paradigm remains relatively intact: central bankers believe that they should primarily pursue price stability through targeting a low inflation rate in a transparent manner, and that they need operational independence in order to achieve this goal. In a bid to address post‐crisis conditions and maintain their credibility, however, central bankers have also layered new elements onto this paradigmatic core. We document both the resilience of pre‐crisis beliefs and the process of layering using computer‐assisted text analysis and qualitative analysis of 13,586 speeches given between 1997 and 2017 by central bankers from around the world.