Where the G‐20 Stands

The G‐20 supplanted the G‐8 as the executive committee of globalization as the emerging and advanced economies came together in the wake of the Wall Street crash to stave off depression. Now, each country is going its own way. In this section we examine whether the G‐20 can be saved, and what the countries within it must do to bring the global economy into balance.     

The Splintering of the G‐20

The solidarity of the G‐20 nations in staving off global financial crisis two years ago has deteriorated into a brawl over currency valuations, trade imbalances and sovereign debt, reflecting the great powershift from the West to the East and the emerging economies. In this section, we invited comments from historians, a former head of state who successfully navigated the Asian financial crisis and a prominent Chinese dissident.     

The G‐20 Must Get Serious About Its Commitments

The sovereign debt problem in Europe, ignited by Greece, has morphed into an economic crisis challenging the solvency of major banks and countries as well as a generalized crisis of governance. Lacking the legitimacy of public support, the leaders of the European Union's fledgling institutions have been indecisive and unable to contain the looming danger of financial contagion. Along with the economic slowdown in the United States, instability and volatility in Europe threaten to derail the fragile global recovery. In this section, several former European leaders as well as political figures from the emerging economies offer their ideas on how to fix Europe and stem the global threat.     

Is America Ready for a Post‐American World?

Globalization may not be coming apart at the seams—yet—but the seams are ever more apparent. Rising fuel prices challenge a model of global transportation based on cheap energy, reinforcing the possibility of decoupling through great regionaliza‐tion of trade. Already, 50 percent of trade among ASEAN plus China and Japan is among each other. The Wall Street meltdown has spread a lack of confidence in the American financial system and the model of deregulation which stimulated rapid globalization of capital flows. Along with other developments, all this raises the question of whether the United States is prepared to operate successfully in a world it no longer dominates. An anti‐globalization leader, a former US labor secretary, a top American intellectual and a Nobel laureate address these issues.     

The Emergence Of Multi-Inspectorate Inspections: 'Going It Alone Is Not An Option'

Drawing on data from HM Inspectorate of Prisons, HM Inspectorate of Probation, the Office for Standards in Education and the Social Services Inspectorate, this paper develops a typology of inspection, classified according to the focus of inspection. Five basic inspection types emerge, namely single institutional, multi-service, the-matic, survey and monitoring review. The typology is further categorized by a range of characteristics, resulting in a series of variants. The paper then focuses on the particular characteristic of the multi-inspectorate approach to inspection, because this is seen to offer a significant development in inspection practice that is set to expand and develop in the future. By examining operational examples of this approach it becomes clear that inspectorates are affecting the working practices of one another as they use the multi-inspectorate approach as an exercise in bench-marking.     

Facing a Post‐American World

American‐led globalization has enabled the third great powershift of the last five hundred years—the “rise of the rest” following on the rise of the West and then the rise of the US as the dominant power in the West. When China, India, Brazil, Turkey and the rest sit at the table of global power with the West what will the world order look like? Will it be post‐American? Will it be culturally non‐Western, but play by the same rules of an open international order laid down by the American's after World War II? In the following pages, leading American and Asian intellectuals ponder these questions.     

When Is Democracy Better for Economic Performance and when Is It Not: the Interaction Between Polity and Structural Factors

Is democracy or autocracy better for economic performance? Why do autocracies exhibit a greater variation in growth rate than democracies? We argue that democracy??s effects on growth are conditional on structural factors. Democracy is superior to autocracy only when structural factors, such as external threats or natural resource intensity, are not favorable to growth. Conversely, where structural factors are conducive to growth, autocracies are likely to perform better or equally well as democracies. By incorporating institutional and structural incentives into the equation, we answer the questions regarding the relative strengths and weaknesses of political regimes in pursing economic development. The empirical evidence examining postwar data significantly supports the hypotheses.     

Finally, Russia Sees America as It Really Is

America is more a creed than a nation. Our promise has always been that all individuals, despite race, religion or gender, have the equal chance to make it. The election of Barack Hussein Obama as president of the United States is thus a “soft power” coup for America's global image, which had lost its luster during the Bush years. Obama is the anti‐Bush who will lead by the power of example instead of the example of power. Yet, there are real limits. Can the power of example stop the North Korean or Iranian nuclear programs? Can it stop jihadists bent on establishing a new Caliphate across South Asia? Can it limit China's ambitions as the new power in Asia? In this section commentators from across the world offer their views.     

Short‐termism Is Undermining America

The United States accuses China of subsidizing its entire export economy through artificially undervaluing its currency. China accuses the United States of fiscal profligacy while flooding the world with easy credit to keep its economy afloat. This dispute reflects the reality that the world's two largest economies are built on opposite dynamics of production and savings vs. consumerism and debt. In Europe, the wages of unsustainable debt that financed the welfare state have also come due. Rebalancing the global economy in this context is not only a matter of fixing exchange or interest rates and extending the retirement age. It must also involve a recalibration of democracy in both East and West. Two Nobel economists, the Greek prime minister, a ranking Chinese economist and the former chief economist of the IMF address these issues.