European integration and electoral democracy: How the European Union constrains party competition in the Member States

The assignment of policy competencies to the European Union has reduced the divergence of party policy positions nationally, leaving the electorate with fewer policy options. Building upon insights from spatial proximity theories of party competition, the convergence argument predicts convergence particularly in policy domains with increasing EU competence. As the policy commitments that derive from EU membership increase, parties become more constrained in terms of the feasible policy alternative they can implement when in office. The analysis uses manifesto data at the country‐party system level for nine policy domains. It uses ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation with country fixed effects, a lagged dependent variable and country corrected standard errors. Controlling for other factors that could plausibly explain policy convergence, the models also assess whether the convergent effect of party positions varies across different types of parties. The main finding is that in policy domains where the involvement of the EU has increased, the distance between parties' positions tends to decrease. The constraining impact of EU policy decisions differs between Member and non‐Member States. This effect is more apparent for the policy agendas of larger, mainstream and pro‐EU parties in the Member States.     

Multilevel Governance and Business Interests in the European Union

The article analyzes how business interests responded to European integration. It draws on survey data of eight hundred German, French, British, and European Union (EU) trade associations as well as thirty-four large firms. The argument is that the multilevel governance approach to European integration captures the realities of EU interest intermediation better than neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism. The article suggests that the strategies of interest organizations depend mainly on their location in the EU multilevel system and on their governance capacities. I distinguish two kinds of governance capacities: negotiation capacities and organizational resources. The analysis proceeds in the following steps: After outlining the three theories of European integration and presenting their implications for interest groups, a brief overview of the relative importance for interest organizations of EU and national institutions over time is provided. Then, cluster analysis techniques serve to identify types of interest groups according to their lobbying strategies in the multilevel system: niche organizations, occasional players, traditionalists, EU players, and multilevel players are distinguished. The composition of these clusters and the characteristics of their members support the multilevel governance approach and indicate that multilevel players have greater governance capacities than organizations in the other clusters.     

Good governance and differentiated integration: Graded membership in the European Union

The study of European integration has traditionally focused on organisational growth: the deepening and widening of the European Union (EU). By contrast, this article analyses organisational differentiation, a process in which states refuse, or are being refused, full integration but find value in establishing in‐between grades of membership. It describes how the EU's system of graded membership has developed, and it explains the positioning of states in this system. The core countries of the EU set a standard of ‘good governance’. The closer European countries are to this standard, the closer their membership grade is to the core. Some countries fall short of this standard and are refused further integration by the core: their membership grade increases with better governance. Other countries refuse further integration because they outperform the standards of the core countries: their membership grade decreases as governance improves. These conjectures are corroborated in a panel analysis of European countries.     

The integration hypothesis: How the European Union shapes economic voting

Whereas economic perceptions influence the national vote in Western European countries, globalization, or international openness, conditions the influence of economic perceptions on that national vote. But how do attitudes toward the EU itself influence the economic vote? After establishing the presence of a national economic vote in Southern Europe (Spain, Italy, Greece and Portugal) we test the hypothesis that heightened perception of European Union economic responsibility reduces the magnitude of the national economic vote coefficient. These tests are carried out on current (2009) survey data, via logistic regression analysis of fully specified voting behavior models, estimated country-by-country and in a data pool. Clearly, the national economic vote diminishes, to the extent the EU is held responsible for the economy.     

Multilevel Governance and Shared Sovereignty: European Union, Member States, and the FCTC

The Westphalian idea of sovereignty in international relations has undergone recent transformation. "Shared sovereignty" through multilevel governance describes the responsibility of the European Union (EU) and its Member States in tobacco control policy. We examine how this has occurred on the EU level through directives and recommendations, accession rules for new members, tobacco control campaigns, and financial support for antitobacco nongovernmental organizations. In particular, the negotiation and ratification of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) and the participation in the FCTC Conference of the Parties illustrates shared sovereignty. The EU Commission was the lead negotiator for Member States on issues over which it had jurisdiction, while individual Member States, through the EU presidency, could negotiate on issues on which authority was divided or remained with them. Shared sovereignty through multilevel governance has become the norm in the tobacco control policy area for EU members, including having one international organization negotiate within the context of another.     

The politics of Artificial Intelligence regulation and governance reform in the European Union

This paper explores political drivers and policy process of the reform of the framework for Artificial Intelligence regulation and governance in the European Union (EU). Since 2017, the EU has been developing an integrated policy to tighten control and to ensure consumer protection and fundamental rights. This policy reform is theoretically interesting, raising the question of which conceptual approaches better explain it, and it is also empirically relevant, addressing the link between risk regulation and digital market integration in Europe. This paper explores the policy reform mainly by using two case study methods—process tracing and congruence procedure—using a variety of primary and secondary sources. It evaluates the analytical leverage of three theoretical frameworks and a set of derived testable hypotheses concerning the co-evolution of global economic competition, institutional structure, and policy preferences of domestic actors in shaping incremental approach to AI regulation in the EU. It is argued that all three are key drivers shaping the reform and explain the various stages of the policymaking process, namely problem definition, agenda-setting, and decision-making, as well as the main features of the outcome.

     

Multilevel governance and organizational performance: Investigating the political‐bureaucratic labyrinth

Research on governance has extensively explored the complex interactions of governmental, nongovernmental, and for‐profit entities in the execution of public policy. It has consistently failed, however, to model empirically the joint effects of political and bureaucratic actors in governance systems. To address this issue, a theory of multilevel governance built upon the foundation of representative bureaucracy was developed and tested. Results from an analysis of Texas school districts suggest that Latinos at all levels of the governance system, political and managerial, influence representation at other levels. Findings also indicate that Latinos at each level of governance have positive effects, directly and indirectly, on outcomes for Latino students. The influence of both political and managerial actors at times extends beyond the immediately adjoining level; the effects of such actors cascade through the governance system. The results show that a priority for systematic research should be the identification of approaches and settings for examining the multilevel aspect of governance. © 2004 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

The European Council and The Council of the European Union: Shapers of a European Confederation

The European Council and the Council of the European Union playkey roles in the European Union. The European Council is largelyconcerned with system-steering, while the Council of the EUundertakes sectoral policymaking. What is common to these rolesis the balancing act carried out by both institutions. Bothhave to mediate the centripetal dynamics of integration, termedcooperative confederalism here, and the centrifugal dynamicswhich are found in the strongly entrenched territorial natureof power, centered on the member states. Using new institutionalistanalysis, the article illuminates different facets of the twoinstitutions1 functioning in mediating the two dynamics.     

Federalism and the European Union: A constitutional perspective

Constitutional questions have resurfaced in the last few years with regard to the European Union. The Maastricht Treaty is a kind of constitutional reform. The rejection of this treaty by Denmark in its first referendum, and the subsequent debate of the treaty that has taken place, raise questions about both the nature of the European Union, and the process by which its rules (constitution) get revised and approved. Similar questions surround the entry of Austria and the three, additional Scandinavian countries into the Union. Perhaps, no event called the European Union's constitution, or lack thereof, into question more that way in which a new President of the Commission was chosen during the summer of 1994. This paper will reexamine the European Union's structure and procedures from a constitutional perspective. Drawing upon the author's recently completed book, Constitutional Democracy, the paper will review the purpose for the Union's existence, the implications of this purpose for the structure of the Union (federalism versus confederation), the rules for making collective decisions in the Union, citizenship, and in particular, the procedures by which the European Union's “Constitution” is written and revised. The constitutional perspective adopted is taken from public choice. The political institutions of the European Union are examined relative to those rational, self-interested individuals would choose to advance their interests.