Luhmann: Law,Justice, and Time

Time is central to Luhmann’s writings on social systems. Social systems, as systems of meaning, operate within three dimensions: factual, social and temporal. Each of these dimensions entails selections of actualities from potentialities (or contingencies) within horizons. Whilst the factual dimension involves selections based on distinguishing ‘this’ from ‘something else’, and the social distinguishes between alter and ego (asking with respect to any meaning whether another experiences it as I do), the temporal dimension operates with the primary distinction of before and after. In the temporal dimension, everything is ‘ordered only according to the when and not to the who/what/where/how of experience and action’ (Luhmann in Social systems. Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1995, p. 78). In this paper, we explore the connection between the temporal dimension of meaning within the legal system and its connection to justice. We begin by setting out succinctly the role played by justice within the legal system, as presented by Luhmann, particularly in his book Law as a social system (2004). From this beginning, we move on to consider the relationship between law, justice and time, taking two examples. The first is the temporality of judicial decisions. The second concerns the relationship between the temporal meaning of law’s own operations, and the presumption of innocence.     

Before the Law: Criminalization,Accusation and Justice

This review essay critically engages three socio-legal books directed to the changing bases of criminalization; namely, Lacey (In search of criminal responsibility: ideas, interests, and institutions, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017); Farmer (Making the modern criminal law: criminalization and civil order, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016); and Norrie, Justice and the slaughter bench: essays on law’s broken dialectic, Routledge, New York, 2016). The texts explore how modern (largely English) institutions of criminal law proscribe, assign responsibility and appear through contradictory socio-political ‘constellations’. They variously reference criminal law’s expanding punitiveness as it: embraces revived character-based ways of attributing responsibility via ideas of risk; drifts away from a social function of creating civil order; and, works through a ‘broken dialectic’ that fails to recognize its ethico-political auspices. The ensuing ‘overcriminalization’ is referenced variously, but this review questions a tendency to work off legal lexicons, with consequent limitations placed on the scope of social analysis. Referring to Roman and Cape colonial forms of criminalization, this review highlights processes of accusation that call subjects to account as criminals, thereby signalling an initiating socio-political layer upon which unequal forms of overcriminalization rest.     

Introduction: Procedural Justice, Law and Policy

Over the last few years, procedural justice has become one of the most debated fields in social science and law. Modern thinking about law, democracy and public policy inevitably leads to a consideration of appropriate procedures. Images of such procedures are culturally bound and also formed by individual cognition. The word "fair" seems to encompass the most desired features of procedures.     

正义:法律与权利

引论 :正义是人之行为的一种属性我们选用“正当行为规则”一术语来指称那些有助益于自生自发秩序之型构的“目的独立”的规则(ｅｎｄ -ｉｎｄｅｐｅｎｄｅｎｔｒｕｌｅｓ) ,并以此与那些“目的依附”的 (ｅｎｄ -ｄｅｐｅｎｄｅｎｔ)组织规则相对照。前者是内部规则 (ｎｏｍｏｓ) ,而内部规则不仅是“私法社会”〔 1〕 的基础 ,而且也是使开放社会得以形成的基础 ;而后者 ,就其作为法律来说 ,乃是确定政府组织问题的公法。然而 ,我们并不认为 ,所有事实上有可能为人们所遵循的正当行为规则都应当被视作是法律 ,而且我们也不认为 ,每一条构…     

Seeing Law: The Comic,Icon and the Image in Law and Justice

This special issue examines how the comic and the icon prefigure forms of legality that are different to modern law. There is a primal seeing of law unmediated by reading, writing or possibly thinking. This introduction identifies the primacy of the eye, the emergence of visual jurisprudence and the transformations of law as a paper-based material practice to a digitally enabled activity.     

Discipline, Assault, and Justice: Violent Parents and the Law

This article calls attention to an unacceptable double standard in American law: the lenient treatment of parental violence against children when compared to other forms of physical assault. Parts II and III critique the generous privilege of physical discipline extended to parents and the differential state response to violence when the victim is a child in the assailant's family. Appeals to family privacy and parental autonomy to justify the current double standard are examined and found wanting. Clearer and much stricter limits on corporal punishment are recommended and defended as constitutional. We further recommend that parental violence which falls outside these limits should be treated no differently than other misdemeanor and felony assaults. These two proposals give children the protection against domestic violence to which they are entitled as a matter of right and prudence.     

Enter Ghost: Haunted Courts and Haunting Judgments in Transitional Justice

How can we account for trials in which the judgment speaks not only to and about the defendants and their deeds, but also about injustices from a more distant past? Building on approaches to ghosts and haunting by Jacques Derrida and Avery Gordon, I propose to examine a set of the German post-1990 trials for human rights violations committed in the former East Germany as instances of haunted justice. Here, the courts not only adjudicated the present cases, but also tried to ‘go back and make whole what has been smashed’ (Benjamin 1969) by their own lack of judgment in the failed trials of the Nazi perpetrators. In this instance, the ‘time is out of joint’, and we see the ghosts of the failed trials of Nazi perpetrators standing next to the inheritance of impunity fostered in West German courts, and next to the now present East German perpetrators. What can justice mean in such a complex constellation of injustices? I argue that the ghostly dimension of these cases point to a need for a kind of justice and engagement that can ultimately not be found in courts—yet the courts’ engagement with this ghostly matter is nevertheless important.     

Multiculturalism,Institutional Law,and Imaginary Justice

Following Le Pen's relative successin the French presidential vote and the BritishNational Party's historic return in our own2002 local elections, the article considers theprospects for the production of morecommunicative race relations in contemporaryBritain. To this end we reassess the media'streatment of the Stephen Lawrence case andexplore the political logic of the Macphersonreport, the policy document which followed theapparent miscarriage of justice that allowedLawrence's alleged killers to walk free. Interms of our analysis of the media we areconcerned to show how the real of Britain'sordinary racism was hidden behind an ideologyof multiculturalism that scapegoated singularindividuals to cover for the structuralinequalities of wider society. The article aimsto show how the media upheld the notion ofobjective justice that institutional law wasapparently unable to secure.But while the media supported the ideology ofthe law, its exposure of the failings ofinstitutional law also led to calls for legalreform to guarantee the realisation ofinstitutional justice. Although we accept thatthe attempt to achieve legal totality isimpossible, our argument is that the critiqueof legal objectivity, which takes in subjectiverights claims, may present the possibility forthe realisation of a novel, inclusive, model ofrace relations. That is to say that althoughthe media supports the ideology of the law, thefact that this support requires a critique ofpractical law forces the law to modernisearound the idealistic demands of its ownideological structure. Akin toDouzinas,¹ who has argued for theendless expansion of rights as post-modernutopianism, we believe that this process ofmodernisation, which is arranged to maintainthe status quo through minimal reform, is thecondition of possibility of a more inclusivesystem of race relations.