The Arab Uprisings and the EU's Migration Policies—The Cases of Egypt,Libya, and Syria

The article analyzes the European Union's (EU) migration strategies toward the Arab states in the light of the Arab uprisings in a comparative context. Going through migratory processes related to Egypt, Libya, and Syria, the article discusses Middle Eastern migration and its diverse manifestations, critically assessing the relevance of the EU's migration policy ambitions vis-à-vis the different challenges in the Mediterranean region. In its theoretical approach, the article draws on the concept of non-traditional security, demonstrating that migration constitutes an anarchistic element in the relations between states, which goes beyond traditional foreign policy means. The article characterizes recent EU initiatives concerning migration and demonstrates that despite the fact that the EU has declared migration “one of the strategic priorities in the external relations of the Union,” it seems apparent that the EU has not been able to develop adequate new approaches regarding migration. Many of the suggested initiatives within the framework of the new EU foreign policy setup have not been established yet—they remain preliminary works in progress, projects in different stages or legislative procedures under negotiation between EU institutions. Summing up the cases of Egypt, Libya, and Syria, the article concludes that the migration phenomenon since the start of the Arab unrest in early 2011 constitutes a highly important issue in European–Middle Eastern relations, regarding which, the EU foreign and security measures seem to be relevant only to some degree.     

Undermining,defusing or defending European integration? Assessing public communication of European executives in times of EU politicisation

How do mainstream political executives cue their politicised constituencies on European integration? Moving beyond static expectations that EU politicisation induces executives to either undermine, defuse or defend integration, this article theorises executives’ incentives under different configurations of public and partisan Euroscepticism in their home countries. Expectations are tested on the sentiment and complexity that executives attach to European integration in almost 9,000 public speeches delivered throughout the Euro Crisis. It is found that national leaders faced with sceptical public opinion and low levels of partisan Euroscepticism rhetorically undermine integration, whereas European Commissioners faced with similar conditions are prone to defend it. These responses intensify disproportionally with growing public Euroscepticism, but are moderated by Eurosceptic party strength in surprising ways. When such challenger parties come closer to absorbing the Eurosceptic potential in public opinion, executive communication turns more positive again but also involves less clear rhetorical signals. These findings move beyond existing uniform expectations on mainstream responses to Eurosceptic challenges and highlight the relevance of different domestic configurations of EU politicisation.     

The welfare state,migration, and voting rights

This paper proposes a political economic analysis of public opinion in European Union countries toward migrants from poor countries. By focusing on redistributive policy, the analysis sheds light on specific determinants of public opinion. The theoretical analysis, based on the median voter framework, shows that one of the key variables affecting public opinion is the voting rights of migrants. Where migrants do not have the right to vote, their presence negatively impacts the poorest natives. In countries where migrants enjoy voting rights, they are able to vote on redistributive policy; therefore, the impact of migration on natives’ welfare is fundamentally different. After the theoretical analysis, the paper proposes an empirical analysis of Europeans’ attitudes toward non-Western migrants in European Union countries. This empirical analysis confirms the decisive impact of migrants’ voting rights. It shows that, in EU countries, the more educated natives are significantly less favorable to migrants from poor countries when the latter have the right to vote.     

Voting on Europe: The Potential Pitfalls of a British Referendum

As Britain prepares for a possible referendum on continued membership of the European Union, it is essential that more careful thought is paid to the dynamics of referendums. Polling data reveal the existence of a substantial knowledge deficit in the UK and other parts of the EU: large numbers of voters simply do not understand the EU. There is also reason to question the conventional view that voters can correct for such a deficit by using cues from opinion leaders and the media. The experience of recent referendums in other EU member states suggests that many voters will take part in the proposed British referendum without independent and informed knowledge of the issues at stake, that many will have been swayed by partisan elite opinion, and that many will decide on the basis of their views about domestic politics rather than their views about Europe.     

The Danes and Europe: From EC 1972 to Euro 2000 – Elections, Referendums and Attitudes

Within Europe, the Danish electorate is the one that has most often expressed its opinion about the European Union in elections and in national referendums. Votes and attitudes are analysed for the five elections to the European Parliament between 1979 and 1999 and in the six referendums – from the first on membership of the EC in 1972 to the September 2000 referendum on acceptance of the euro, the European single currency. The article gives an overview of the development of Danish public opinion in relation to the European Union from 1960 to 2000, the turnouts at referendums, and the elections and results for the European Parliament. It is shown that since Denmark joined the EU, public opinion has fluctuated greatly, although the balance among Danish European Parliament members has remained stable. The reasons for the frequent use of referendums in Denmark and a thematic outline of the six referendums are put forward. The article concludes with a comprehensive analysis of public attitudes towards the referendum on the euro in 2000. It is shown that regional electoral patterns have vanished, but underlying attitudes are manifested in the public.     

Territorial Representation and the Opinion–Policy Linkage: Evidence from the European Union

A key feature of federal systems is the representation of subnational units by “territorial representatives” in policymaking at the federal level. How do such arrangements influence the linkage between public opinion and policy outputs? I argue that policymaking under territorial representation should be systematically skewed toward opinion in those states where citizens care about a policy issue and have a uniform view on it. This claim is tested using a novel data set of policy change in the European Union (EU), covering 211 policy issues and 6,506 observations of opinion–policy dyads. Results show that measures weighting opinion across member states by how much national citizens care about an issue are better predictors of policy change than EU‐wide mean opinion. Moreover, congruence between state‐level opinion and EU‐level policy becomes more likely, the more salient and clear‐cut opinion in a member state is. These findings refine our understanding of the opinion–policy linkage under territorial representation.     

Die Deutschen und die Türkeifrage: eine Analyse der Einstellungen zum Antrag der Türkei auf Mitgliedschaft in der Europäischen Union

In this paper, I examine the sources of support for Turkey’s EU-entry in the German public. I propose several models and explore their respective empirical validity using survey data gathered in May and June 2005. The analysis shows that neither trust in the federal government nor evaluations of the EU institutions play a role in attitudes toward Turkey’s bid for membership. By contrast, attitudes towards this issue are considerably affected by preferences about EU enlargement and, more strongly, by beliefs about whether Turkey at least partly belongs to Europe. Likewise, when forming attitudes towards Turkey’s bid for EU membership, Germans appear to consider the presumed consequences of including Turkey in the EU. Both East and West Germans are particularly likely to take consequences for regional security into account. The paper concludes with a discussion of several implications for German public opinion on this EU issue.     

A Nation of Sceptics? The Czech EU Accession Referendum of 13–14 June 2003

The Czech Republic's 13–14 June 2003 referendum on accession to the European Union was the seventh of nine held in candidate states due to join the EU on 1 May 2004. Despite the presence of two strong Eurosceptic parties and the perceived Euroscepticism of Czech public opinion, the pro-accession camp scored a convincing victory. This account analyses the historical, political and institutional context of the referendum and the campaign. It concludes that despite high elite contention over the EU and the overwhelming resources advantage of the ‘Yes’ camp, Czech voters were minimally influenced by the campaign. Rather, they took their cue from longstanding positive linkages of ‘Europe’ with democracy, market reform and Czech identity.     

Are Europeans ready for a more democratic European Union? New evidence on preference heterogeneity,polarisation and crosscuttingness

Some scholars and policy makers argue in favour of increasing democratic contestation for leadership and policy at the European level, for instance by having European‐wide parties campaign for competing candidates for President of the European Commission ahead of European Parliament elections. But do such changes put the survival of the European Union at risk? According to the consociational interpretation of the EU, the near absence of competitive and majoritarian elements has been a necessary condition for the stability of the EU political system given its highly diverse population. This article contributes to the debate in two ways. First, it develops a more precise understanding of ‘problematic’ diversity by examining how three variables – the heterogeneity, polarisation and crosscuttingness of citizen preferences over public polices – affect the risk of democratic contestation generating persistent and systematically dissatisfied minorities. Second, it uses opinion surveys to determine whether the degree of diversity of the European population is problematically high compared to that of established democratic states. It is found that the population of the EU is slightly more heterogeneous and polarised than the population of the average Member State, although policy preferences in several Member States are more heterogeneous and polarised than the EU as a whole. Strikingly, however, policy preference cleavages are more crosscutting in the EU than in nearly all Member States, reducing the risk of persistent minorities. Moreover, policy preferences tend to be less heterogeneous and polarised, and nearly as crosscutting, in the EU as a whole as in the United States. For observers worried about how high polarisation and low crosscuttingness in policy preferences may combine to threaten democratic stability, these findings should be reassuring.     

Does a public sphere exist in the European Union? An analysis of the content of the debate on the Haider case

Abstract.  This article sets out how the public sphere can be studied through an analysis of the content of a specific debate. A public discourse can be said to pertain to a European Union-wide public sphere where the discourse within the EU is significantly different from that developed in non-EU countries, where such differences are not nationally defined, and where the debates in individual newspapers (which provide the fora for a public sphere) should be connected on the basis of some underlying factors. These conditions are tested with a quantitative analysis of the newspaper debate in 1999 and 2000 on the sanctions of the EU-14 against Austria. To the extent that the conditions are found, it can be concluded that there exists a European public opinion. The objective of studying this specific case is to demonstrate that, as far as an EU issue is concerned, there are already signs of an EU transnational political community.     

Agenda control in EU referendum campaigns: The power of the anti‐EU side

European Union (EU) referendums provide unique opportunities to study voters’ attitudes toward a distant level of governance. Scholars have long tried to understand whether EU referendum results reflect domestic (dis‐)satisfaction with the incumbent governments or actual attitudes toward the Union. Finding evidence supporting both domestic and European factors, the recent focus has thus turned to referendum campaigns. Recent studies emphasise the importance of the information provided to voters during these campaigns in order to analyse how domestic or European issues become salient in the minds of voters. These studies nonetheless overlook the asymmetrical political advantage in such campaigns. The broader literature on referendums and public opinion suggest that in a referendum, the ‘No’ side typically has the advantage since it can boost the public's fears by linking the proposal to unpopular issues. This article explores whether this dynamic applies to EU treaty ratification referendums. Does the anti‐EU treaty campaign have more advantage than the pro‐EU treaty campaign in these referendums? Campaign strategies in 11 EU treaty ratification referendums are analysed, providing a clear juxtaposition between pro‐treaty (‘Yes’) and anti‐treaty (‘No’) campaigns. Based on 140 interviews with campaigners in 11 referendums, a series of indicators on political setting and campaign characteristics, as well as an in‐depth case study of the 2012 Irish Fiscal Compact referendum, it is found that the anti‐treaty side indeed holds the advantage if it engages the debate. Nonetheless, the findings also show that this advantage is not unconditional. The underlying mechanism rests on the multidimensionality of the issue. The extent to which the referendum debate includes a large variety of ‘No’ campaign arguments correlates strongly with the campaigners’ perceived advantage/disadvantage, and the referendum results. When the ‘No’ side's arguments are limited (either through a single‐issue treaty or guarantees from the EU), this provides the ‘Yes’ side with a ‘cleaner’ agenda with which to work. Importantly, the detailed data demonstrate that the availability of arguments is important for the ‘Yes’ side as well. They tend to have the most advantage when they can tap into the economic costs of an anti‐EU vote. This analysis has implications for other kinds of EU referendums such as Brexit, non‐EU referendums such as independence referendums, and the future of European integration.     

On the Politicisation of the European Union: Lessons from Consociational National Polities

The debate on the politicisation of the EU should consider its consociational nature. Comparing the EU to Switzerland and Belgium, this article discusses S. Hix's and S. Bartolini's contrasting views on politicisation. S. Hix's recipe for bipolar politicisation is based on some incorrect assumptions. It is not obvious that the EU is evolving towards more Left–Right polarisation. Even if this were the case, the nature of the EU implies that compromises are indispensable. Therefore, Hix's suggestions would not suffice to clarify political choice, and Euroscepticism would not be reduced. The consociational nature of the EU also makes less credible S. Bartolini's fears of possible negative consequences for governability. The politicisation of constitutive issues can even help to integrate Eurosceptic segments of public opinion. The authors suggest a middle way regarding EU politicisation based on lessons from consociational polities, and the coupling of a system of ‘negotiation democracy’ with mechanisms of direct popular participation.     

Europeans and their money: Explaining public support for the common European currency

Abstract. Using public opinion surveys conducted in the member states of the European Union, this paper seeks to provide a systematic understanding of public support for the EMU project and European–level monetary policy authority. We develop models of support for EU monetary policy that incorporate a utilitarian component and elements of multilevel governance that is emerging within the EU. These models are tested at the aggregate level of survey respondents. The results show that variations in attitudes to the common currency are driven by collectively–based considerations of the costs and benefits associated with the common currency project as well as the interaction of European–level politics and the domestic politics of the member states.     

Europeans and their money: Explaining public support for the common European currency

Using public opinion surveys conducted in the member states of the European Union, this paper seeks to provide a systematic understanding of public support for the EMU project and European–level monetary policy authority. We develop models of support for EU monetary policy that incorporate a utilitarian component and elements of multilevel governance that is emerging within the EU. These models are tested at the aggregate level of survey respondents. The results show that variations in attitudes to the common currency are driven by collectively–based considerations of the costs and benefits associated with the common currency project as well as the interaction of European–level politics and the domestic politics of the member states.     

Legitimacy through referendum? The nearly successful domino‐strategy of the Eu‐referendums in Austria,Finland, Sweden and Norway

The end of the Cold War made it possible for some neutral countries to join the European Union. However although the European integration promotes economic co‐operation it also reveals problems concerning national and regional identity. In order to legitimise EU‐membership, the new potential member states Austria, Finland, Sweden and Norway conducted referendums on whether or not they should join EU. These referendums, although different in some national aspects, are an example of an international synchronisation of the political establishments. This synchronisation is discussed in light of a ‘Domino‐Strategy’ of the referendums. Furthermore, the article describes some aspects of the referendum campaigns by stressing the importance of geographical differences, organisational standpoints, public opinion and discourse which shows astonishing similarities but also decisive differences.     

Partisan responses to Europe: Comparing Finnish and Swedish political parties

Abstract. This article analyzes party responses to European integration in Finland andSweden.We argue that such responses are shaped by seven explanatory factors: basic ideology, public opinion, factionalism, leadership influence, party competition, transnational links, and the development of integration. Each factor can lead to a positive or a negative evaluation of the European Union. In the empirical analysis, the sample includes all parties represented in the respective national parliaments, and the research material consists of party documents, parliamentary votes, statements by leading party figures, public opinion surveys, direct observation and interviews. Party competition and leadership influence are the strongest factors in the Finnish case, while public opinion and factionalism are the strongest factors in Sweden. Issue avoidance combined with the secondary importance of the EU in party politics explain why parties have been relatively successful in containing internal factionalism and discord, especially in Finland.     

Sharing the burden in a free riders’ land: The EU migration and asylum policy in the views of public opinion and politicians

New divisions have emerged within the European Union over the handling of the recent migration crisis. While both frontline and favoured destination countries are called upon to deal with the number of migrants looking for international protection and better living conditions, no consensus has been reached yet on the quota-based mechanisms for the relocation of refugees and financial help to exposed countries proposed by the EU. Such mechanisms pose a trade-off for member states: the EU's response to the crisis offers help to countries under pressure, but it inevitably requires burden-sharing among all EU members and a limitation of their national sovereignty. Within this scenario, the article compares how public opinion and political elites in ten different EU countries view a common EU migration policy grounded on solidarity and burden-sharing. By tracing both within- and cross-national patterns of convergence (and divergence), the article shows that contextual factors influence policy preferences, with support for solidarity measures being stronger in countries with higher shares of illegal migrants and asylum seekers. While individuals’ predispositions, identity and ideological orientations account for both masses’ and elites’ attitudes towards burden-sharing measures, subjective evaluations and beliefs concerning the severity of the crisis provide additional and alternative explanations when looking at the public's preferences. In particular, it is found that concern about the flow of migrants to Europe consolidates the impact of contextual factors, whereas the overestimation of the immigrant population fosters hostility against solidarity measures, with both effects more pronounced as the country's exposure to the crisis increases. In the light of these results, the main implication of this study is that EU institutions have to primarily address entrenched beliefs and misperceptions about immigrants to enhance public support for a joint approach to migration.     

The Impact of Public Branding: An Experimental Study on the Effects of Branding Policy on Citizen Trust

Branding has become common in the public sector as brands are increasingly used to influence citizens’ associations with public organizations and public services. Using experimental research replicated in three European countries, this article investigates the effect of using the European Union (EU) brand on trust in policies. Experiments were conducted among economics students in Belgium, Poland, and The Netherlands to test the hypothesis that adding EU brand elements to policies positively affects trust in those policies. The results show a consistent positive and significant effect of applying the EU brand to trust in the policies in all countries and for both policies included in the experiment—even in The Netherlands, a country characterized by a negative overall EU sentiment. These findings provide some of the first empirical evidence of the effectiveness of branding for public policy.     

European–Mediterranean Security and the Arab Spring: Changes and Challenges

The policy of the European Union (EU) toward the Mediterranean has undergone two main metamorphoses during the last 25 years. In 1995, it started from a collective security idea with the Barcelona Process, but due to the poor success of this collective approach, it underwent a “realist turn” with the creation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2004. The Arab Spring in 2011, by questioning authoritarianism, influenced the perception of what is recognized as a security problem and who can define it. The authoritarian rulers and their supporting security forces are now challenged by their populations, and societal circumstances are so unstable that nearly every domestic problem can be politically given a spin to become a security risk. Aside from this, violent conflicts and civil wars demand an answer from the EU. In this situation, the EU's answer to the Arab Spring does not directly respond to the changing security situation in the Mediterranean. It emphasizes domestic democracy and civil society but does not take up the potential risk discourses. Concerning violent conflicts, the EU as a community is not at all active in the region but leaves this field to its member states, NATO, the Arab League, and the United Nations. Thus, the perceptions, ideas, and needs of Mediterranean security between the EU and the Southern partner states still differ harshly and seem to disregard the risk dimension of the Mediterranean security problems in this period of Arab transition.     

Majority representation and legitimacy: Survey-experimental evidence from the European Union

What can policy makers do in day-to-day decision making to strengthen citizens' belief that the political system is legitimate? Much literature has highlighted that the realization of citizens' personal preferences in policy making is an important driver of legitimacy beliefs. We argue that citizens, in addition, also care about whether a policy represents the preferences of the majority of citizens, even if their personal preference diverges from the majority's. Using the case of the European Union (EU) as a system that has recurringly experienced crises of public legitimacy, we conduct a vignette survey experiment in which respondents assess the legitimacy of fictitious EU decisions that vary in how they were taken and whose preferences they represent. Results from original surveys conducted in the five largest EU countries show that the congruence of EU decisions not only with personal opinion but also with different forms of majority opinion significantly strengthens legitimacy beliefs. We also show that the most likely mechanism behind this finding is the application of a ‘consensus heuristic’, by which respondents use majority opinion as a cue to identify legitimate decisions. In contrast, procedural features such as the consultation of interest groups or the inclusiveness of decision making in the institutions have little effect on legitimacy beliefs. These findings suggest that policy makers can address legitimacy deficits by strengthening majority representation, which will have both egotropic and sociotropic effects.