Campus Religious Life in America: Revitalization and Renewal

What role does organized religion play in the life of the American campus? Among both scholarly and popular observers, the university has long been regarded as secular territory. Contrary to the .cphsecularization thesis, the history of campus religion is not a declension narrative. This essay provides an overview of the student religious landscape in America, focusing most of its attention on schools that are not affiliated with a religious tradition. It identifies six signs of religious vitality on campus: 1) the expansion of evangelicalism; 2) the revitalization of Catholic student organizations; 3) the reinvention of campus Judaism; 4) the growth of new immigrant and alternative religions; 5) the beginnings of renewal in mainline Protestant campus ministries; 6) the embrace of spirituality by student affairs professionals. Noting several recent studies on education and religiosity, it concludes that college is not especially damaging to religious commitment.     

A New Paradigm? Peter Berger’s “The Two Pluralisms”

The article discusses Peter Berger’s suggestion to replace the secularization theory by a “new paradigm” of a double plurality: the plurality of religions and the plurality (rather: polarity) of the religious and the secular sphere. Whether this constitutes a new paradigm seems just as questionable as whether it is a paradigm at all. After having discussed these two questions the article engages with the basic tenets of Berger’s concept by asking whether the paradigm is convincing. The discussion focusses on Berger’s concept of religion, which puts the secular and the religious sphere in opposition to each other – not only in the society but also in the consciousness of the religious subject.     

Politikwissenschaft als Universitätslaufbahn: Eine Kollektivbiographie politikwissenschaftlicher Hochschullehrer/-innen in Deutschland 1949–1999

Over the last fifty years, Political Science is firmly established in the German university system. The article presents the findings of a collective biography of the discipline’s professors for the period between 1949 and 1999. The empirical study puts particular emphasis on the gender distribution among tenured Political Scientists, the age at certain stages in their academic career, and aspects of regional distribution. In addition, the paper presents quantitative data for different periods between 1949 and 1999 about the regional distribution of universities at which doctoral degrees, the ‘Habilitation’, and the chairs for Political Science were achieved. The research indicates that the vast majority of active professors of Political Science in Germany in the year 1999 will have become pensioners in 2009. The paper concludes with some speculative thoughts about the situation of the German university system in general and the question, whether the discipline will survive the ongoing university reforms as a coherent academic discipline.     

Waiting for change: youth,caste and politics in India

Abstract

This paper examines waiting, caste and politics through reference to the cultural and political practices of educated unemployed young men in India. We show through ethnographic fieldwork in Uttar Pradesh how a shared sense of young male limbo sometimes erodes caste divides. While waiting in poorly provisioned north Indian universities, young men develop novel cultures that bridge caste, class and religion. They also collaborate across class, caste and religious boundaries in protests against the state and university bureaucracies. At the same time, some students have responded to a sense of ‘waiting’ by developing collusive relationships with local government and university bureaucrats. Waiting emerges not as a passive condition but as a seed-bed for new cultural and political forms.     

Continuity and change in anti-Jewish prejudice: the transmission of the anti-talmudic texts of Sixtus of Siena

ABSTRACT

One of the main elements common to both the mediaeval anti-Jewish tradition and modern antisemitism is the use of Jewish religious texts—particularly the Talmud—in order to ‘prove’ that Jews pose a threat to non-Jews. Bravo López considers how a series of anti-talmudic texts written by Sixtus of Siena in the sixteenth century were disseminated and used, up to the beginning of the twentieth century, to legitimize a threatening image of Judaism and Jews. Despite the changing historical context, that image remained virtually intact throughout the centuries, allowing these same texts to be used time and time again to ‘prove’ that it was a faithful reflection of reality. Although historical changes can account for differences in the specific motives that drove each author to use the texts of Sixtus of Siena, those authors all shared the same image of Judaism and the Jews, and they considered these texts—cited as an authoritative source, legitimizing their point of view—to be effective in support of their cause.     

Jürgen Habermas on public reason and religion: do religious citizens suffer an asymmetrical cognitive burden,and should they be compensated?

In his recent writings, Jürgen Habermas asks how the liberal constitutional principle of separation between church and state, religion and politics, should be understood. The problem, he holds, is that a liberal state guarantees equal freedom for religious communities to practise their faith, while at the same time shielding the political bodies that take collectively binding decisions from religious influences. This means that religious citizens are asked to justify their political statements independently of their religious views, resulting in a burden that secular citizens do not experience. To compensate, Habermas demands from secular citizens that they open their minds to the possible truth content of religion, enter into dialog and contribute to the translation of religious reasons into generally acceptable reasons. This article focuses on Habermas’s assumption that religious citizens suffer an asymmetrical cognitive burden that should be compensated, and his claim that his approach to religion in the public sphere is less restrictive than that of John Rawls.     

The secular contract: sovereignty,secularism and law in Australia

What does it mean to say that a nation-state is secular? Secular law typically begins when a state has no religious competitor for authority. For this reason, it can be said that the Australian state is secular because its authority is derived from its own laws. What makes Australian law sovereign, the highest authority within the state, is its secularity. However, given Australia's colonial heritage, it is not just the absence of religious authority, such as a state religion, that gives the state its secularity. The law's foundations in colonial violence and the extinguishment of Indigenous sovereignty as a competing authority are also a crucial way in which secular Australian law can continue to operate as the sovereign authority within the state. Using the work of Charles W. Mills, I will critically interrogate how legal and political characterisations of the law as secular work to disavow the state's racialised foundations in colonial violence in the form of a “secular contract”. In developing this notion of a “secular contract” I hope to show that secularism be must re-thought of as not simply the operation of law without religion, but also, as complicit with the ways indigenous sovereignties in (post)colonial states are negated.     

Combatting antisemitism in the school playground: an Australian case study

The aim of Gross and Rutland's paper is to analyse the problem of antisemitic bullying in contemporary Australian state schools by investigating the case of Jewish children in those schools. The study is interdisciplinary, drawing on historical data and educational methodology, and employs a qualitative approach through semi-structured interviews conducted in Sydney and Melbourne with all the major actors: students (55), teachers (10), principals (4), parents (13) and Jewish communal leaders (10). Gross and Rutland argue that classical anti-Jewish stereotypes are perpetuated in the school playground, transmitted by children from one generation to the next. This finding provides an additional perspective to the general literature, which argues that racial prejudice and stereotypes are acquired primarily through home socialization, religious institutions and the media, and neglects the role of the school playground.     

The Sacred Kingdom and the Royal Wedding of 2011

Despite secularisation and increased religious diversity the UK state and the monarchy are religiously legitimated institutions which have their origins in protestant/catholic divisions over three hundred years ago but which remain strong enough to survive in the current era. The Church of England acts not only as the established church of England but as a church for the UK with respect to events such as the coronation and the royal wedding of 2011. Ecumenical and interfaith initiatives have been attempted by the government and the monarchy and were evident in attendance at the wedding but it demonstrated the ritual supremacy of the state church and the inevitable difficulties of seeking to achieve formal representation for religious diversity in the state. Attempts at more formally inclusive religious involvement in state institutions conflict with other goals such as gender equity and suggest that secular state institutions might be fairer to all religions, denominations and those with no beliefs.     

Two of a kind? Voting motivations for populist radical right and religious fundamentalist parties

Over the last two decades a number of theoretical perspectives have emphasized the growing phenomenon of extremist political challenges. These challenges come from two main sources: largely secular radical right-wing populism and religious fundamentalism. Yet the relationship between the two is still theoretically and empirically limited. Researchers have usually limited their discussion to only one of the phenomena, ignoring the fact that despite the basic distinction between the two (i.e., secular versus religious orientation), the literature points to many commonalities. This article takes up the challenge by analyzing the predictive power of socioeconomic, ideological, and security threat factors on voting behavior for populist radical right (PRR) parties and for religious fundamentalist (RF) parties. Data collected following the Israeli parliamentary election of 2003 (N = 808) offer a challenge to the conventional, secular wisdom of right-wing extremism. The radical right party family is multifaceted with at least two flanks – a hawkish nationalist flank on the one hand, and a ‘faith-based’ radical flank on the other. Implications of these distinctions for voting behavior scholars and radical right-wing scholars are discussed.     

The rhetoric of chosenness

He is author of The Chosen People in Americaand Galut: Modern Jewish Reflection on Homelessness and Homecoming.He is at work on a study of transformations in the ideas of ritual and commandment in the Judaism of the modern West.     

Accommodating Islam and the Utility of National Models: The German Case

This article questions the claim that the way German governments have responded to Muslim demands for accommodating Islam fits a German national model. The empirical focus is on Islamic religious instruction in five German Länder. The evidence presented shows that there is not one but several German models. Länder with Christian Democratic dominance were more supportive of confessional religious instruction than Länder where the left was stronger. At the same time Christian Democrats initially were more reluctant to extend the privilege of religious instruction to Muslim groups. In Länder where Article 7 III of the German constitution applied, corporatist hurdles were an obstacle for Muslim groups, but this was less the case in Berlin. Religion–state institutions are important for understanding how European countries have dealt with the growing presence of Islam, but it is equally important to understand the politically contested nature of these institutions.     

Religious Participation and Economic Conservatism

Why do some individuals engage in more religious activity than others? And how does this religious activity influence their economic attitudes? We present a formal model in which individuals derive utility from both secular and religious sources. Our model, which incorporates both demand‐side and supply‐side explanations of religion, is unusual in that it endogenizes both an individual's religious participation and her preferences over economic policy. Using data on over 70 countries from the pooled World Values Survey, we find that religious participation declines with societal development, an individual's ability to produce secular goods, and state regulations on religion, but that it increases with inequality. We also find that religious participation increases economic conservatism among the poor but decreases it among the rich. Our analysis has important insights for the debate about secularization theory and challenges conventional wisdom regarding the relationship between religious participation and economic conservatism.     

Putting Politics First: The Impact of Politics on American Religious and Secular Orientations

Nearly all research on the political impact of Americans’ religious and secular orientations assumes that such orientations are exogenous to politics. Using multiwave panel and experimental data, we find that religious and secular orientations are endogenous to political orientations. In other words, religion and secularism are a consequence as well as a cause of politics. In showing this, we make three major contributions. First, we conceptualize and measure secular orientations in a new way—not just as the absence of religion, but also as an affirmative secular identity and positive commitment to secular principles. Second, our panel and experimental data allow for the most definitive test to date of whether political orientations exert a causal effect on religious and secular orientations. Third, we isolate the conditions under which politics affects religious–secular perspectives, thus identifying the mechanism that underlies political orientations.     

The evolution of Israeli citizenship: an overview

Israel's citizenship discourse has consisted of three different layers, superimposed on one another: An ethno-nationalist discourse of inclusion and exclusion, a republican discourse of community goals and civic virtue, and a liberal discourse of civil, political, and social rights. The liberal discourse has served as the public face of Israeli citizenship and functioned to separate Israel's Jewish and Palestinians citizens from the non-citizen Palestinians in the occupied territories. The ethno-nationalist discourse has been invoked to discriminate between Jewish and Palestinian citizens within the sovereign State of Israel. Last, the republican discourse has been used to legitimate the different positions occupied by the major Jewish social groups: ashkenazim vs. mizrachim, males vs. females, secular vs. religiously orthodox. Until the mid-1980s the republican discourse, based on a corporatist economy centered on the umbrella labor organization – the Histadrut – mediated between the contradictory dictates of the liberal and the ethno-nationalist discourses. Since then, the liberalization of the Israeli economy has weakened the republican discourse, causing the liberal and ethno-nationalist ones to confront each other directly. Since the failure of the Oslo peace process in 2000, these two discourses have each gained the upper hand in one policy area – the liberal one in economic policy and the ethno-national one in policy towards the Palestinians and the Arabs in general. This division of labor is the reason why on the eve of its 60th anniversary as a state Israel is experiencing its worst crisis of governability ever. While Israel's economy is booming and the country's international standing remains high, due to the global ‘war on terror,’ public trust in state institutions and leaders is at an all-time low, so that the government cannot tend to the country's pressing business.     

Towards a Free Market in Religion

While most nationalised enterprises have been privatised and made subject to the market, the Church of England, with considerable but not complete autonomy, remains ultimately a state controlled and governed organisation. The growth of secularism and religious diversity has demonstrated that the Church has failed in its mission to be the Church of all the people of England. Its share of the marriage market has shrunk to one in four and most weddings are now secular. It retains a monopoly of UK state religious ceremonial but in attempting to adjust to contemporary forms of religiosity it has become, in contradiction of its founding 16th century articles, the leader of official state interfaith activities and the arbiter and broker for the participation of a restricted range of other religious denominations in state activities. Releasing the Church from state control and creating a more open market for religion and belief will create a level playing field for all denominations and a better correspondence between citizen attitudes and public actions.     

Continuity and Change in the Constitutional Experience of the German Jews

Despite the progress of Emancipation in the nineteenth century,German Jews were required to to legally recognized Jewish communities.Even after this requirement was lifted, Jewish communal liferemained strong. The community structure that the Prussian stateexpected the Jews to implement was modeled after German civiladministration. This framework, however, resembled both medievalGerman and medieval Jewish models. Thus, German Jews, whilemodernizing their own communal institutions, continued to maintainboth their own and their German neighbors' political traditions.The German Jewish communal constitutions attest to a Jewishpolitical tradition of adaptation to prevailing gentile norms,as well as retention of ancient Jewish elements.     

Three cheers for liberal modesty

ABSTRACT

Many liberals have been immodest in postulating that their own progressive, secular liberalism is the only one that can be justified in public reason. In Liberalism’s Religion, I articulate a more modest theory of liberalism and religion. While I personally endorse progressive secular liberalism, I argue that it is only one of the reasonable conceptions of liberal justice. This liberal modesty has profound, hitherto unnoticed implications for (i) the role of religious arguments in the public sphere, (ii) the legitimacy of religious establishment, and (iii) the justifiability of religious exemptions. In this article, I defend these three claims by providing replies to my critics.     

Discourse Ethics and 'the Rift of Speechlessness': The Limits of Argumentation and Possible Future Directions

Jürgen Habermas's discourse ethics – and within this framework, particularly the idea of 'moral discourses', which focuses on 'what is good for all' and is intended as a means of addressing situations where a shared substantive 'background consensus' does not exist or has broken down – is premised on the assumption that participants attempt to engage with and persuade each other through reasoned argumentation. Where does this leave (potential) participants with strong religious convictions? In several recent publications, Habermas himself has started to reflect on this question. His reflections are motivated not least by (responses to) 11 September 2001. In this context, Habermas has suggested that those with secular commitments engage in a process of self-reflection about the meaning of secularisation, the losses involved in the questioning of religious world views, and the question of how we might respond to these losses. Yet while these reflections are interesting and suggestive, Habermas's framework, as it stands, cannot easily accommodate his own recognition of the need to overcome what he has called 'the rift of speechlessness' that threatens to divide religious and secular discourses. Against this background, I consider elements of William E. Connolly's recent reflections on Neuropolitics as one example of a body of work that suggests possible alternative responses to the challenges Habermas identifies – and as a contribution that deserves to be taken seriously by those interested in the further development of discourse ethics and/or deliberative democracy.