Why does the Senate “win” in conference committee?: A stability explanation

This paper develops a bicameral stability model wherein the conference committee serves as a vehicle for mutually advantageous bicameral exchange. The goal is to maintain a single party's bicameral majority. Majority party leaders use the conference committee to attenuate the outlying positions of House standing committees that threaten the bicameral majority. Conference outcomes favor the Senate because it is more vulnerable to party turnover. Statistical results on data from the U.S. Congress, 1949 through 1991, demonstrate that when one party holds a bicameral majority, a relative increase in conference bills preserves at the margin, Senate majority-party seats at the expense of House majority-party seats.     

Presidential coattails, incumbency advantage, and open seats: A district-level analysis of the 1976–2000 U.S. House elections

This study extends the analysis of presidential coattails to the most recent U.S. House elections. Building upon previous research on this subject, it draws a clear distinction between open and incumbent-held seats and presents evidence about several measures of presidential coattails. In particular, the analysis attempts to estimate, controlling for incumbency, the strength of presidential coattails (the proportion of the vote received by a congressional candidate that is due to the presence of the presidential nominee on the ballot) and the effectiveness of a president's coattails (the number of districts gained or retained by a party because of the net influence of presidential candidates). The results show that, contrary to earlier findings and trends, the unique impact of presidential coattails in open seat races did not decline. The results also suggest that several representatives who played a very prominent role in crafting the Republican strategy to win back control of the House in 1994 were the beneficiaries of the coattail effect.     

Seat biases of apportionment methods for proportional representation

In proportional representation systems, an important issue is whether a given apportionment method favors larger parties at the expense of smaller parties. For an arbitrary number of parties, ordered from largest to smallest by their vote counts, we calculate (apparently for the first time) the expected differences between the seat allocation and the ideal share of seats, separately for each party, as a function of district magnitude, with a particular emphasis on three traditional apportionment methods. These are (i) the quota method with residual fit by greatest remainders, associated with the names of Hamilton and Hare, (ii) the divisor method with standard rounding (Webster, Sainte-Laguë), and (iii) the divisor method with rounding down (Jefferson, Hondt). For the first two methods the seat bias of each party turns out to be practically zero, whence on average no party is advantaged or disadvantaged. On the contrary, the third method exhibits noticeable seat biases in favor of larger parties. The theoretical findings are confirmed via empirical data from the German State of Bavaria, the Swiss Canton Solothurn, and the US House of Representatives.     

Aggregate level forecasting of the 2010 general election in Britain: The Seats-Votes model

The Seats-Votes model forecasts party seat shares in the House of Commons using data from general elections and opinion polls between 1945 and 2009. The model is built on a generalisation of the cube rule which provided a fairly accurate method of translating votes into seats when Britain was effectively a two party system prior to the 1970s. It combines past information on seat shares in the current Parliament with voting intention data six months prior to the general election to forecast seat shares. Applied to the task of forecasting the outcome of a general election in early May of 2010, it predicts a hung Parliament, with the Conservatives as the largest party. The relatively small sample used to estimate the model means that predictions about the size of the parties in Parliament are quite tentative, though predictions about the likelihood of a hung Parliament are more certain.     

Primary Elections for Britain

The coalition's programme for government promises to fund 200 open postal primaries during the current Parliament, targeted at seats which have not changed hands for many years. The lessons from the two open postal primaries used in 2009 are that they will change the numbers and characteristics of those involved in choosing candidates, the criteria for selection and the type of candidates chosen. Much will remain unchanged. Primaries are unlikely to affect the controlling influence of party in the House. The limits to their number and duration will leave most safe seats unaffected and prevent the development of any new form of accountability. Primaries will provide some voters with intra‐party competition but inter‐party uncompetitiveness will remain the norm.     

Empirical evidence of paradoxes of voting in Dutch elections

In this paper we analyze four national elections held in 1982, 1986, 1989 and 1994 in the Netherlands on the occurrence of the Condorcet paradox. In addition, we investigate these elections on the occurrence of three so-called majority-plurality paradoxes. The first paradox states that a party having a majority over another party may receive less seats. The second states that a Condorcet winner may not receive the largest number of seats and even may not receive a seat at all. The third says that the majority relation may be the reverse of the ranking of parties in terms of numbers of seats.     

Republicans in the South

This article explains the failure of the Republican party to reproduce their dominance of the South in presidential elections at lower electoral levels. First, the foreign policy and social issues that have benefitted Republican presidential candidates have lower salience in state and congressional elections. Second, sustained Republican control of the White House has exposed the party to recurrent mid-term setbacks at lower electoral levels. Third, deficiencies of local party organization and a paucity of identifiers deprives the Republicans of candidates in sufficient quantity and quality to be competitive with Democrats.     

Election Inversions under Proportional Representation

It has been shown by Peter Kurrild‐Klitgaard, using several empirical examples under the Danish electoral system, that proportional representation (PR) can produce ‘election inversions’ such that a coalition of parties collectively supported by a majority of voters fails to win a majority of parliamentary seats. However, Kurrild‐Klitgaard's examples result from imperfections in the Danish PR system introduced to serve goals other than proportionality. In this article, Kurrild‐Klitgaard's analysis is carried a step further by showing that election inversions can occur even under the purest type of PR – namely, one with (i) a single national constituency, (ii) no explicit seat threshold, and (iii) a highly proportional electoral formula. Inversions result from the unavoidable ‘whole number problem’. Recent election data from Israel and the Netherlands is examined and examples of inversions under their relatively pure PR systems are found. Inversions are also found after recalculating seat allocations without a threshold, and on the basis of the most proportional electoral formulas and when the analysis is restricted to seat‐winning parties. Kurrild‐Klitgaard's Danish data is then re‐examined in the same fashion, as is the most recent apportionment of seats in the United States House of Representatives, and more examples of inversions are found.     

Partisan Polarization and Congressional Accountability in House Elections

Early research led scholars to believe that institutional accountability in Congress is lacking because public evaluations of its collective performance do not affect the reelection of its members. However, a changed partisan environment along with new empirical evidence raises unanswered questions about the effect of congressional performance on incumbents' electoral outcomes over time. Analysis of House reelection races across the last several decades produces important findings: (1) low congressional approval ratings generally reduce the electoral margins of majority party incumbents and increase margins for minority party incumbents; (2) partisan polarization in the House increases the magnitude of this partisan differential, mainly through increased electoral accountability among majority party incumbents; (3) these electoral effects of congressional performance ratings hold largely irrespective of a member's individual party loyalty or seat safety. These findings carry significant implications for partisan theories of legislative organization and help explain salient features of recent Congresses.     

Legislator Success in Committee: Gatekeeping Authority and the Loss of Majority Control

In multiparty legislatures, the largest party or coalition may fall short of controlling a majority of plenary seats. However, plurality‐led congresses generally endow the largest parties with extensive agenda‐setting prerogatives, even when plenary majorities are lacking. In this article, we present a model and compelling evidence describing changes in the strategic behavior of committee chairs when majority control is lost. Using a dataset that includes all the bills proposed to the Argentine House in the last 25 years, we estimate success in committee in majority‐ and plurality‐led congresses. We provide extensive evidence that the loss of majority control reduces the importance of the median voter of the plurality party while improving the success of the median committee voter.     

Quality Counts: Extending the Strategic Politician Model of Incumbent Deterrence

Competitive elections are essential to representative democracy. Competition in U.S. House elections is low in part because incumbents have strategic advantages that deter strong potential candidates from running. Many observers conclude that incumbents retain their seats without full accountability to the electorate, but the mechanisms of deterrence have never been fully explored from the perspective of strong potential candidates. Based on a survey of potential House candidates designed to capture perceptions of incumbents' personal quality and reelection prospects, we find strong evidence for the "strategic politicians" thesis ( Black 1972 ; Jacobson and Kernell 1983 ). We extend the logic of the strategic model first by showing that incumbents' reelection prospects are affected by their personal quality and second by demonstrating that incumbents' personal qualities deter strong challengers from running, independent of their electoral prospects. Our findings prompt us to suggest revisions to our understanding of competition and representation in contemporary House elections .     

Using Multimember District Elections to Estimate the Sources of the Incumbency Advantage

In this article we use a novel research design that exploits unique features of multimember districts to estimate and decompose the incumbency advantage in state legislative elections. Like some existing related studies we also use repeated observations on the same candidates to account for unobserved factors that remain constant across observations. Multimember districts have the additional feature of copartisans competing for multiple seats within the same district. This allows us to identify both the direct office-holder benefits and the incumbent quality advantage over nonincumbent candidates from the same party. We find that the overall incumbency advantage is of similar magnitude as that found in previous studies. We attribute approximately half of this advantage to incumbents' quality advantage over open-seat candidates and the remainder to direct office-holder benefits. However, we also find some evidence that direct office-holder benefits are larger in competitive districts than in safe districts and in states with relatively large legislative budgets per capita.     

An integrated perspective on the three potential sources of partisan bias: Malapportionment, turnout differences, and the geographic distribution of party vote shares

Partisan bias refers to an asymmetry in the way party vote share is translated into seats, i.e., a situation where some parties are able to win a given share of seats with a lesser (share of the) vote than is true for other parties. Any districted system is potentially subject to partisan biases. We show that there are three potential sources of partisan bias: (1) differences in the nature of the vote shares of the winning candidates of different parties that give rise to differences in the proportion of each party's votes that come to be ‘wasted’—differences which arise because of the nature of the geographic distribution of partisan support; (2) turnout rate differences across districts that are linked to the partisan vote shares in those districts, such that certain parties are more likely to have ‘cheap seats’ vis-à-vis turnout; and (3) malapportionment. In the context of two-party competition over single-member districts we provide a simple formulation to calculate the independent effect of each of these three factors. We illustrate our analysis with a calculation of the magnitude and direction of effects of the three determinants of partisan bias in elections to the US House and the US Senate in 1984, 1986 and 1988; then we consider how to extend the approach to a system with a mix of single- and multi-member districts or to a weighted voting system such as the US electoral college. We then apply the method to calculate the nature and sources of partisan bias in the 1984 and 1988 US presidential elections.     

Policy representation of constituency interests

This paper examines two aspects of congressional representation: the responsiveness of House candidates to constituency opinion and the effect of candidate positions on House election outcomes. For both Democratic- and Republican-held seats, constituency liberalism (as measured by the constituency's vote for McGovern in 1972) is strongly related to the liberalism of incumbent candidates but less so to the liberalism of challengers. House election outcomes are visibly influenced by the positions of incumbent candidates but not those of nonincumbent candidates. The paper argues that elections contribute significantly to achieving congressional representation. Candidate positions are measured from a 1974 CBS survey of all major House candidates.     

Within‐party Allocation of Committee Seats: Evidence from Danish Local Elections

This article examines two traditional and four new explanations of committee composition. Using survey data on 541 Danish local politicians' pre‐election committee seat preferences and their actual post‐election committee seats, it is found that politicians are more likely to have their committee seat preferences fulfilled the less their preferences for the committees' policy domains differ from those of their fellow party members and the more specialised they are within the jurisdiction area of their preferred committee. Thus, the ex ante control of committee members sometimes observed in the American context is also relevant in the very different institutional setting of Danish local government. Moreover, a number of other explanations are found to be of equal relevance. In particular, individual‐level popular support is important to politicians' committee seat preference fulfilment and seats are distributed among party members in order to assure that everybody, at least to some extent, obtains a post that they find attractive. The findings thus suggest that ex ante control of committee members is but one of many concerns of parties. Accordingly, scholars should broaden their attention to other aspects of committee seat allocation, such as fair share norms and the popular support of politicians.     

Localism and coordination under three different electoral systems: The national district of the Japanese House of Councillors

Democratic representation involves tradeoffs between collective actors – political parties seeking to maximize seats – and individual actors – candidates seeking to use their personal vote-earning attributes (PVEAs) to maximize their own chance of election and reelection. We analyze these tradeoffs across three different electoral systems used at different times for the large-magnitude nationwide tier of Japan's House of Councillors. These electoral systems – closed and open-list proportional systems and the single non-transferable vote – differ in the extent to which they entail candidates seeking individual preference votes and in whether collective vote shares affect overall party performance. We use local resources as a proxy for PVEA and seek to determine the extent to which parties nominate “locals” and how much the presence of such locals affects party performance at the level of Japan's prefectures.     

Ideology and strategic party disloyalty in the US house of representatives

We offer a theory of strategic party disloyalty to explain roll call voting in the US House. Our theory suggests that ideologically extreme legislators become markedly less loyal to their party when it controls the majority. They stake out positions that align with the views of their extreme constituents when policy is likely to move in their direction. In contrast, ideological moderates become noticeably more loyal when they transition to the majority. Examining 35 years of ideal point estimates and measures of party unity on roll calls, we find clear evidence that member strategy, ideology, and legislative agenda setting interact to structure the frequency of defections. Further, we find evidence that defection and ideology interact to influence subsequent electoral outcomes.     

Going on the offensive: Negative messaging in British general elections

What drives British parliamentary candidates to attack their opponents? Using an original dataset of approximately 7500 general election leaflets from four elections between 2010 and 2019, we offer the first study into the conditions under which British parliamentary candidates use negative messaging. We find that leaflets from opposition candidates and candidates contesting marginal (i.e., competitive) seats are more likely to include messages about their opponent(s), which suggests that candidates respond to the incentives and pressures that come from both their local and national environment when determining whether to include negative messaging in their leaflets. Moreover, we find that, as seats become more marginal, candidates from government parties become just as likely as opposition parties to engage in negative messaging, and therefore, voters in marginal seats are likely to experience more negative campaigns than those residing in seats where the outcome is a foregone conclusion. Taken together, our findings make an important contribution to the growing body of literature that explores how candidates use negative messaging in party-centred systems.     

The Check Is in the Mail: Interdistrict Funding Flows in Congressional Elections

This article analyzes the financial ties between congressional candidates and individual donors residing outside those candidates' districts. Congressional campaigns today rely more heavily on nonresidents than in the past, with contests in the typical district drawing more than two-thirds of individual donations from nonresidents. Empirical results reveal that nonresident contributions are primarily partisan and strategic in nature, rather than access-oriented or expressive/identity-based. Funds are efficiently redistributed from a small number of highly educated, wealthy congressional districts to competitive districts anywhere in the country. Big donors direct funds where they can make a difference for party control of seats, even if those investments are hundreds, or even thousands, of miles away.     

The Geographical Challenge: How Winning Elections Has Become Much More Difficult for Labour

Labour won fewer seats in 2015 than in 2010, even though its share of the vote increased. The decline in representation was occasioned by three features of the electoral geography of the 2015 contest—a collapse in Labour support in Scotland, a particularly strong Conservative advance in marginal seats and the fact that in England and Wales Labour's vote rose most strongly in seats that the party already held. As a result, Labour's vote became markedly less efficiently distributed than that of the Conservatives—a development that could make it very difficult for the party to win an overall majority at the next election. Meanwhile, the redrawing of constituency boundaries that is currently in train will make winning a majority even more difficult. However, the next election could well produce a hung parliament, and the party should be prepared for that eventuality.