Social order through constitutional choice: A contractarian proposal

The present paper consists of two closely related parts: one which outlines a normative criterion for evaluating the legitimacy of constitutional change and one which specifies a particular proposal of a constitution. The criterion used stems directly from the "pragmatic" brand of contractarianism developed by Buchanan, where an approximate rule of unanimity is utilized. The proposal aims at the highest possible freedom of choice for individuals when it comes to defining the political system of their liking: a core (dealing with public goods and rights) is common for all, but everything else can vary between different sub-constitutions between which individuals choose.     

Political yardstick competition, economic integration, and constitutional choice in a federation:

This paper investigates the behavior of rent-seeking politicians in an environment of increasing economic integration. The focus of the paper is on the implications of globalization-induced political yardstick competition for constitutional design with a view to the current discussion in the European Union. In contrast to the established literature, we carefully portray the double-tiered government structure in federal systems. The number of lower-tier governments and the allocation of policy responsibilities to the two levels of government are subject to constitutional choice.     

The constitutional court in Italian politics

The Italian constitutional court was established as an extra‐political guardian of the constitution, but it has assumed an important role in policy‐making which is far removed from its original, intended functions. This article describes the political background to its development and analyses the variety of ways in which the court has to take decisions of considerable political sensitivity with increasing frequency. The court is most in the public eye when it carries out its functions in the referendum procedures, but its involvement is more continuous, more creative and more positive than this might suggest. The article concludes that the court has to take action in areas for which it lacks the proper instruments, and that us relationship with other institutions in the policy‐making process is worthy of more attention than such relationships often receive.     

The constitutional political economy of Gordon Tullock

This paper surveys Gordon Tullock’s contributions to constitutional political economy. His first major contribution was his joint project with James Buchanan on liberal constitutional design. The explicitly constitutional analysis of The Calculus was followed by a series of papers and books that focused on the use of resources in conflict, including Tullock’s contributions to the anarchy and rent-seeking literatures. Tullock also pioneered the rational choice-based analysis of dictatorships and the relative merits of alternative legal systems, topics that has been neglected until fairly recently by most scholars working in the CPE tradition.     

The public choice of educational choice

The very small literature explaining (i) how citizens have voted in two California voucher referenda, (ii) how legislators have voted on voucher bills in the State of Florida and the US Congress, and (iii) the variation across states in charter school provisions is summarized. New empirical evidence documenting the cross-state variation in the success of voucher referenda and voucher bills is examined. Voucher bill characteristics and state characteristics play important roles. Voucher bills have been passed only in the more conservative Republican states, and almost all of the successful voucher programs have been targeted at large, struggling school districts.     

Buchanan at the American Founding: the constitutional political economy of a republic of equals and unequals

Public Choice - James M. Buchanan cited the American Founding as an important inspiration for his constitutional vision. Buchanan and the Founders shared a belief in the moral equality of persons...     

贡斯当的宪政思想读解

作为法国近代政治思想史上的重要代表人物,贡斯当以其对自由的深刻阐述和通过宪政保障人民权利的思想而闻名于世。通过对法国大革命及西方国家历史与现实的反思,贡斯当看到了卢梭民主思想的缺陷。他指出,任何政治权力都必须受到限制,否则就会肆意扩张。要切实保障个人自由,就必须建立“五权分立与制衡”的宪政体制,划定政治权力与个人自由的边界。     

宪政视角下的中国公共行政发展

由于现代国家制度建设尚有待完善,我国公共行政学界在追踪西方学术前沿,致力于进行管理主义和政策主义公共行政研究的同时,有必要继续重视并阐发宪政主义公共行政理论。如果我们立足于从宪政视角完善有限政府的制度框架,公共行政发展将会收到事半功倍的效果;如果一味地依赖于管理主义或政策主义公共行政理论,则会事倍功半、欲速则不达。就宪政视角的公共行政规范看,中国有必要加速推进有限政府、法治政府、分权政府、诚信政府和透明政府的制度建设。