The electoral consequences of the financial and economic crisis in Europe

The electoral consequences of the Great Recession are analysed in this article by combining insights from economic voting theories and the literature on party system change. Taking cues from these two theoretical perspectives, the impact of the Great Recession on the stability and change of Western, Central and Eastern European party systems is assessed. The article starts from the premise that, in order to fully assess the impact of the contemporary crisis, classic economic voting hypotheses focused on incumbent parties need to be combined with accounts of long‐term party system change provided by realignment and dealignment theories. The empirical analysis draws on an original dataset of election results and economic and political indicators in 30 European democracies. The results indicate that during the Great Recession economic strain was associated with sizable losses for incumbent parties and an increasing destabilisation of Western European party systems, while its impact was significantly weaker in Central and Eastern European countries, where political rather than economic failures appeared to be more relevant. In line with the realignment perspective, the results also reveal that in Western Europe populist radical right, radical left and non‐mainstream parties benefited the most from the economic hardship, while support for mainstream parties decreased further.     

The electoral consequences of austerity: economic policy voting in Europe in times of crisis

Abstract

Voters typically observe macroeconomic outcomes in order to evaluate government performance. However, during crises, when the clarity of economic responsibility is poor and the economy is in recession, citizens need additional sources of information in order to form a reasoned opinion. Government policy response is one such source. This study shows on a sample of 24 European nations from 2004, 2009 and 2014 that in the post-crisis period, economic policies have emerged as one of the key predictors of vote choice, with government decisions to pursue fiscal austerity leading to significantly lower levels of incumbent support. Furthermore, the paper tests the possibility that the effect of austerity is conditioned by the clarity of responsibility. In multilevel systems, where policies are externally imposed, voters could be expected to hold incumbents less accountable for unpopular measures. The analysis, however, provides no evidence that policy effects depend on the extent to which national governments share policy responsibilities with supranational and intergovernmental institutions. Accountability for policy actions is primarily attributed at the domestic level as voters are able to identify the decisional role of national governments.     

Nonexpert beliefs about the macroeconomic consequences of economic and noneconomic events

Economists assume that individuals think about the economy like economists, which is especially important in all rational expectations and economic voting models. Despite contrasting evidence, there has been little research on actual nonexpert macroeconomic beliefs. In this paper, I present the results of a survey among students designed to find out whether they distinguish macroeconomically relevant from irrelevant events. I find that even people with some economic background tend to overestimate the effects of noneconomic events. This bias is a function of gender, economic training, and the preferred means of mass communication.     

Colonial legacies and economic growth

Much of the work on colonialism has been theoretical or anecdotal. In this paper, I close the gap between the literature on development and new growth theory by testing the effect of colonization on subsequent growth and development. In a sample of 63 ex-colonial states from 1961-1990, I find that colonies that were held for longer periods of time than other countries tend to perform better, on average, after independence. Finally, I show that the level of education at the time of independence can help to explain much of the development gap between the former British and French colonies in Africa.     

Institutional technology and economic growth

An endogenous model of constitutional changes and economic growth links the temporal decline in private market returns when technology is constant with the returns to rule changes realized in a political market. There is a steady state constitutional setting in which all rule changes have been incorporated that is analytically equivalent to the neoclassical steady state. As in the neoclassical model, private-sector technological progress postpones the steady state. To the extent the original constitutional setting promotes innovation, the evolutionary process toward the steady state is delayed. The model yields a theory of revolution based on forces leading to the adoption of inefficient changes in the constitutional setting.     

Social choice and economic growth

Optimal economic growth deals with the problem of how societies make tradeoffs between current and future consumption, or equivalently, how societies make decisions about investment rates. Until now, theorists have simply assumed that there is some societal utility function which planners can maximize. Social choice theorists have thrown doubt upon the concept of a societal utility function. We treat optimal economic growth as a problem in social choice theory. Assume that citizens have preferences over the various growth plans. Under what conditions will a majority rule equilibrium exist? We show that such an equilibrium can exist for a Ramsey type problem. We then briefly consider social choice in the so-called “labor surplus” economy.     

Political institutions and economic growth reconsidered

The debate on the relationship between institutions and economic development is discussed, focusing on two illustrations, i.e., the impact of democracy and political instability on economic growth. Various pitfalls of existing research are identified, like sensitivity of the outcomes to model specification, sample heterogeneity, measurement of political variables, and the treatment of the time dimension.     

Further evidence on the relationship between economic freedom and economic growth

Much of the literature on the power of elected officials and bureaucratic agencies argues, from an empirical perspective, that bureaus appears to exercise autonomy. In this paper, a theoretical model sets out the conditions under which the Congress, the President, and one agency (we use the U.S. Federal Reserve as an extended example) can dictate policy outcomes. The results of the paper include the “Congressional Dominance” theorem: If more than 2/3 of House members, and more than 2/3 of Senate members, agree on something, they get it. The theorem is obvious (the “proof” is in the U.S. Constitution), but often forgotten in the substantive literature. More realistic results are derived for situations where the preferences of members of Congress are more diverse. Powers of the President to influence policy with, and without, appointments are also analyzed.     

The two freedoms,economic growth and development: An empirical study

Log-linear methods are applied to categorical data containing economic freedom, political freedom, the level of income, and the rate of economic growth for a panel of about 100 countries from 1975 to 1992. The main results are: given economic freedom, the rate of economic growth is independent of political freedom and the level of income; given the level of income, political freedom is independent of economic freedom and the growth rate. The analysis suggests the fundamental effects of economic freedom in fostering economic growth, and a high level of income as the condition of a high degree of political freedom.     

Language nuances, trust and economic growth

Language serves two key functions. It enables communication between agents, which allows the set-up and functioning of formal and informal institutions. It also serves a less obvious function, as it provides a reassuring quality more closely related with issues linked with trust, social capital, and cultural identification. While research on the role of language as a learning process is widespread, there is no evidence on the role of language as a signal of cultural affinity. We pursue this latter avenue of research and show that subtle language affinity is positively linked with change in earnings when using English-speaking data for cities in the Golden Horseshoe area in Southern Ontario during the period 1991 to 2001. The results are robust to changes in specification, and a broad number of empirical tests.     

儒家德育及对当代德育目标的启示

儒家历来强调德育的重要地位,本文探讨了儒家追求圣贤道德至善的德育目标,与法家避忌道德最坏的德育目标进行比较,进一步阐述了儒家德育目标对当代德育目标的一些启示。     

The political consequences of thatcherism

While the economic changes effected by the British Conservative government in the 1980s are transparent, there is considerable debate as to whether there was a political dimension to the Thatcher Revolution. This paper argues that the Conservatives were successful in undertaking social structural reforms that effectively moved the political center of gravity in Britain to the right and toward the government's preferred market-oriented policy agenda. The government's strategy—manifest in the sale of council houses to tenants and of shares in privatized corporations to individuals, and its attack on organized labor—was narrowly targeted on the swing electorate among wealthier members of the lower socioeconomic strata. The Labour party has acknowledged the successes of the Conservatives' structural reforms, and has moved its policy platform, in Downsian fashion, to the right in order to regain electoral competitiveness.