财产权对人格权的积极索取与主动避让

财产权与人格权的关系历来是充满争议和左右徘徊的问题。传统理论认为人格权是内在于人且具有绝对的不可侵犯性,在与财产权冲突时优先。但并非所有人格要素都是内在于人,物质性人格权,尤其是身体权和生命权具有绝对优先性,财产权面临生命和身体冲突须主动作出自我牺牲性避让,甚至是以作为方式提供救助,而一些非物质性人格利益并不具有内在性和绝对不可侵性,财产权则可以对其实施积极索取,但在一定临界点,也必须立即停止积极索取行为,只是这种避让无须作出自我牺牲,无须作为。     

The Mythology of Human Rights

Abstract. A special legal status is accorded to human rights within Western liberal democracies: They enjoy a priority over other human goods and are not subjected to the majoritarian principle. The underlying assumption—the idea that there are some human values that deserve special protection—implies the need for both a normative and a conceptual justification. This paper claims that neither can be provided. The normative justification is needed to support the priority of human rights over other human goods and to rank and balance conflicting human rights, but it can't be provided because of the fact of pervasive value pluralism, the fact that human values are many, incompatible and incommensurable. The conceptual justification is needed to avoid arbitrariness in the interpretation of human rights at the adjudication stage. Such a justification is impossible, however, as the concept of human rights, and the concepts used to justify them and to solve their conflicts are “essentially contested concepts.” The paper concludes that, provided that the interpretation of human rights presupposes value judgements and political choices, the special legal status accorded to human rights is not justified.     

In the Name of Equal Rights: "Special" Rights and the Politics of Resentment in Post–Civil Rights America

This article explores the character of conservative legal activism in post–civil rights America, arguing that this activism is motivated by two related factors: (1) resentment over the increased political participation of historically marginalized Americans and (2) principled allegations that these historically marginalized Americans are making illegitimate claims for "special," not equal, rights. I argue that the allegation of special rights is tied to the activists' resentment in multiple and complex ways. On the one hand, the allegation that the rights claims of the historically marginalized are illegitimate claims for special rights is itself an expression of resentment. Like arguments that oppose redistributive social change by relying upon discourses of color blindness, states' rights, evangelical Christianity, and community harmony, special rights talk channels resentment into recognizable and intelligible forms. But, on the other hand, the use of special rights talk is not simply cover for an underlying, fully formed resentment. Instead, the allegation of special rights propels and amplifies activists' resentment, transforming it from one that is based primarily upon competing self-interests into one that is concerned with values, morality, and national identity. Special rights talk thus partially constitutes resentment; it hardens the resolve of opponents of redistributive social change, encouraging them to understand themselves as defenders not only of their own self-interests but also, primarily even, as defenders of the core American values and ideals that are promoted by equal rights and assaulted by special rights. Thus convinced that their opposition is authorized by American tradition, conservative legal activists redouble their counter-mobilization efforts, leading to an exacerbation of already tense conflicts. A case study of the nationwide anti-treaty-rights movement grounds this analysis.     

Fundamental Rights

This essay aims at laying the foundations for a general theory offundamental rights. It starts out from a formal and structuraldefinition of the concept of `fundamental right', which is definedas a non-disposable, universal right. The author believes thatthis definition can be used as a starting point for the constructionof a theory of constitutional democracy based on four main theses.1) As fundamental rights are non-disposable and universal, theyare structurally different from patrimonial rights, which aredisposable and individual; 2) fundamental rights constitute thecontent of substantial democracy, i.e. the positive and negativelimits set on the power exercisable by the majority that comprisesformal democracy; 3) citizenship, which is still the precondition forholding many fundamental rights, is a regressive category becauseit is a source of inequality; 4) a distinction must be drawn betweenfundamental rights and the guarantees (duties and sanctions) put in place to protect them. Should a legal order make provision forfundamental rights but fail to accompany them with the necessaryauarantees, the result is a gap that the legislator and the legalinterpreter have a duty to bridge. The theory of constitutionaldemocracy thus elaborated constitutes a profound change in classical(Kelsenian) legal positivism, which is no longer suitable forpresenting the law of contemporary states governed by the rule oflaw, and calls for a more active, critical attitude towards law both by the judge and by legal science.     

Human Dignity and Socio-Economic Rights

The South African Constitution numbers among a very few constitutions around the world which include justiciable socio-economic rights. One of the controversies surrounding judicial enforcement of such rights is the extent to which it is appropriate for courts to engage in policy choices in relation to the use of state resources in light of the doctrine of the separation of powers. The South African Constitutional Court has responded by developing an approach to adjudication of socio-economic rights in which the role of the court is to determine the reasonableness or otherwise of measures taken by the legislature and executive to implement such rights. However, the South African Constitution is also notable for its identification of human dignity as an underlying value and the explicit duty placed on the courts to interpret the rights protected under the Bill of Rights in conformity with this value. This article scrutinises the socio-economic rights jurisprudence of the South African Constitutional court in light of the Constitutional commitment to human dignity. It questions whether reasonableness review in socio-economic cases successfully balances human dignity with the appropriate degree of deference to the legislature and executive, in compliance with the doctrine of the separation of powers.     

纳税人权利话语之法理形构

有关纳税人权利话语的实践性议论和法律议论唤起了法学方法论的觉醒,但关于纳税人的权益如何构成一项公法上主观权利或宪法权利的争辩并没有被认真对待。如果直接从公民基本权利的性质切入,再加以层级化的结果,可以将之分为:自然权、宪法基本权利和一般法律权利三个层次,税法上的纳税人权利的主观公权利性质似乎没有疑问,但是宪法层次的纳税人权利面临着法律实践和理论的困难,在宪法解释学意义上所谓“纳税人基本权利”也许可以解释为宪法基本权利和纳税义务之间的平衡。     

The Reciprocity Theory of Rights

This article provides an explanatory account of a central class of moral rights; their normative grounding, the conditions for their possession and forfeiture, and their moral stringency. It argues that interpersonal rights against harm and rights to assistance are best understood as arising from reciprocity relations between moral agents. The account has significant advantages compared with rivals such as the interest theory of rights. By explaining the differential enforceability of rights against harm and rights to assistance, the reciprocity theory helps to refute an argument made by Cecile Fabre that the poor may have a justification for engaging in war against the affluent to compel them to fulfil their duties of assistance to the poor.     

Human Rights and Root Causes

The human rights movement has traditionally focused on documenting abuses, rather than attempting to explain them. In recent years, however, the question of the ‘root causes’ of violations has emerged as a key issue in human rights work. The present article examines this new (or newly insistent) discourse of root causes. While valuable, it is shown to have significant limitations. It foreshortens the investigation of causes; it treats effects as though they were causes; and it identifies causes only to put them aside. With these points in mind, the article counterposes an alternative approach in which the orienting concept is not root causes, but ‘planned misery’.     

表演者精神权利结构与本质探析

理论界及司法界有关表演者精神权利的问题争论较大,归根结蒂是有关表演者精神权利的结构与本质的争论,目前相关研究较少.本文着重论述了表演者精神权利的结构与本质,在有关精神权利的结构部分,论述了表演者精神权利的主体、客体和内容;在本质部分,对表演者精神权利与作者精神权利进行了比较研究,论述了两者的本质区别,突显了表演者精神权利的纯粹的人身权属性.最后还以表演者精神权利结构和本质为视角阐述了其法律特征.     

The Evolution of International Indigenous Rights in the Inter-American Human Rights System

Indigenous communities in the Western hemisphere are increasinglyrelying on international law and international fora for enforcementof their human rights. When there are no domestic laws thatrecognise indigenous rights, or such laws exist but there isno political will to enforce them, indigenous peoples in theAmericas may turn to the Inter-American human rights system.Consequently, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and theInter-American Commission on Human Rights have developed a progressivecase law in this area. In 2005 and 2006, the Inter-AmericanCourt decided seminal indigenous ancestral land rights casesand a political rights case. This article analyses these casesand the previous jurisprudence and decisions on indigenous rightsin the Inter-American system.     

物权与债权二元权利体系的形成以及物权和债权的区分

物权与债权是近现代大陆法系民法中的两个基本概念。这两个概念的形成及对它的质疑经历了三个时期。第一个时期 ,由法国的波蒂埃 (Pothier)、德国的萨维尼 (Saviney)提出了物权与债权的区别 ;第二个时期 ,是对物权与债权的认识、区分进一步深化 ,并最终完成了对二者的理论上的区分 ;第三个时期 ,出现了对物权、债权的区分表示怀疑的声音。也就是说 ,是否存在一种介于物权、债权之间的权利 ?作者认为 ,无论怎样 ,在现在乃至将来一个相当长的时期中 ,维持物权与债权区分的二元权利体系是十分必要的。基于这一考量 ,作者对物权与债权的差异、区别作了完整的阐述。     

Constitutional Rights, Balancing, and Rationality

Abstract.   The article begins with an outline of the balancing construction as developed by the German Federal Constitutional court since the Lüth decision in 1958. It then takes up two objections to this approach raised by Jürgen Habermas. The first maintains that balancing is both irrational and a danger for rights, depriving them of their normative power. The second is that balancing takes one out of the realm of right and wrong, correctness and incorrectness, and justification, and, thus, out of the realm of the law. The article attempts to counter these objections by showing that there exists a rational structure of balancing that can be made explicit by a "Law of Balancing" and a "Disproportionality Rule." These rules show, first, that balancing is not a danger for rights but, on the contrary, a necessary means of lending them protection, and second, that balancing is not an alternative to argumentation but an indispensable form of rational practical discourse.     

Corporate Compliance and Human Rights

Human rights violations by corporations are a major challenge, even if serious companies try to prevent them with their internal compliance program. Traditionally CSR and compliance were synonyms for soft law and self-regulation. Compliance, however, is increasingly establishing itself as a fundamental requirement to prevent corporate liability. Obviously, there are additional requirements for responsibility (like jurisdiction and the offence as a step towards the corporate goal). Overall, what has evolved in areas like corruption, money laundering and tax crime is gradually extending to the protection of human rights.     

我国宪法权利立法研究

对我国宪法权利的立法进行梳理后发现,很多法律规范虽宣称立法目的是维护宪法权利而实际上是在限制,立法存在着明显的权力秩序追求缺乏对宪法权利的必要尊重,宪法权利在法律规范中缺少可操作性的实施规范。宪法权利被立法所不当限制的重要原因是缺乏权利理念,需要把宪法权利确立为立法的最高价值,通过完善立法实施宪法权利。     

物权的经济分析

物权状态二元结构理论可挑战甚至取代所有权权能结构分析。一些长期争议和令人困惑的以权利、权力及其关系为内容的理论问题,运用物权二元结构理论＂公式＂求解,则可以发现入口和找到出口,且能定纷止争。权利的绝对性与相对性的对立统一性,是权利自由和受约束的方法及依据;收入分配改革的关键是限制、解放和扩展权力,即权力的合理配置;市场与政府职能分工,主要是明确公权力与市场权利的边界,公权力管制的领域限于动态权利的行使;国有物权的流失和浪费,主要是因为主体代表权没有限定权利边界而可以轻易地滥用公权力。     

析论公民权和政治权项下的结社自由

人权法上的社团是一个具有特定涵义的概念,而对该概念的正确理解是进行结社权研究的理论前提。结社权作为一项基本公民权和政治权,对个人的发展具有不可替代的价值,受到了国际法的全面保护。中国关于结社权的规定具有其特点,也存在局限。在构建中国市民社会的进程中,应该重视公民的结社权。     

青少年在线权利的法律保护

不良信息对青少年身心健康的侵蚀是不容忽视的。网络虚拟世界、网络社会对真实世界、现实社会的依附性决定了人类对网络虚拟世界、网络社会具有控制和规范的能力。就青少年而言,他们有获得有益于其身心健康、文明向上的精神产品的权利;就社会而言,为青少年提供文明、健康的精神产品是社会的义务和责任。而法律介入是保护青少年在线权利的必由之路。     

Legal Rights and Moral Rights: Old Questions and New Problems*

Abstract. The author examines the discipline of moral rights and in particular the need to embed them in a consequential system. He argues that the widely held opinion that independence from consequential evaluation is the right way of guaranteeing individual freedom is based on an inadequate appraisal of the role of moral rights in the social context. In this perspective he examines two specific cases: (1) elementary political and civil rights, and (2) the reproductive rights of women in the context of poor countries with the problem of fast population growth. He argues that a coherent goal-rights system which accommodates rights among others goals, can overcome the non-consequential arguments and justify the force of moral rights fully within a consequentiality perspective.     

Raz on Rights: Human Rights,Fundamental Rights,and Balancing

After clarifying the outlines of Raz's interest theory of rights and its relationship to aspects of the principles theory of rights, I consider how his recent observations on human rights manage to fit (or fail to fit) into the interest theory. I then address two questions. First, I elaborate on Raz's definition of morally fundamental rights, arguing that he is right in claiming that there are no such rights. I then show that the interest theory accommodates the notion that rights may take qualitative precedence over conflicting considerations—a question that has become increasingly relevant in light of recent writing on rights.     

私权平等与身份限制——再审视“公众人物”的人格权

人格权是私人享有的权利,而私人权利又可分为公权利和私权利两个方面。"公众人物"的人格权主要涉及私法与其私权利的一面。"公众人物"的人格权与一般人的人格权并无不同,现有的限制理论均有缺憾。故我们仅需界定人格权本身而无需对其主体进行分类。不必建立"公众人物"法律概念,在人格平等的私法理念下各类主体不应被区别对待。