The Council of Australian Governments and Intergovernmental Relations: A Case of Cooperative Federalism

A series of Special Premiers' Conferences begun in 1990, andthe establishment of the Council of Australian Governments in1992, signaled a phase of "cooperative federalism" in Australia.Joint schemes of policy and legislation and new national intergovernmentalbodies were made by a series of formal agreements. The conditionsand circumstances are appraised in a discussion of the natureof intergovernmental coordination and cooperation, and fromthe critical perspective of a model of competitive federalism.It is concluded that the initiatives, largely, did not representa centralizing process, nor did they override strongly articulatedclaims for diversity. This is made clear following an analysisof the processes occurring in the newly established federalinstitutions and from a series of brief case studies. They expressedthe continuing interdependency and underlying autonomy of stateand Commonwealth governments through schemes that promised tobring agreed, joint benefits through federal solutions.     

Competing Approaches to the Study of American Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations

The development of theory in the study of American federalismand intergovernmental relations has long been marked by divergentapproaches. This article reviews the literature produced byfive "schools" within the field: (1) dual federalism, (2) cooperativefederalism, (3) pragmatic federalism, (4) noncentralized federalism,and (5) nation-centered federalism. As different as these approachesare, scholarly work in this field has made only sparing useof two other potentially useful approaches: distributive justiceand public choice theory. This article suggests how these alternateapproaches might contribute to reinvigorating a field that appearsto be otherwise at an intellectual impasse.     

Reflections of a Member of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations

There is consensus on the need for a successor to the U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations in Washington, D.C., but no agreement on how this entity should be organized and funded and what it should do. There are now many players, both organizations and individuals, in the intergovernmental field, and they need to be sorted out. A key distinction is that American federalism is both an idea and an interest, and a new ACIR should focus on the former as a neutral, independent body with informational, convener, educational, and dissemination functions. We should encourage a discussion and debate on what the new ACIR should be and how it should be structured in order to bring federalism and intergovernmental relations back to the table in Washington.     

Intergovernmental Relations in Canada: The Emergence of Collaborative Federalism

"Executive federalism" or "federal-provincial diplomacy" haslong been considered the defining characteristic of Canadianfederalism, which combines federalism and Westminster-stylecabinet government. However, these processes have come underincreasing stress in recent years from a number of forces thathave affected the nature and conduct of federalism and intergovernmentalrelations in Canada. Executive federalism has not been displaced,but has been increasingly informed by a set of practices thatwe call "collaborative federalism," characterized more by theprinciple of co-determination of broad national policies ratherthan by the more traditional pattern of federal-leadership.     

Reflections on the Spirit and Work of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations

What did the U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) accomplish before it was disbanded in 1996? Were its accomplishments sufficiently valuable to justify reestablishing the organization? This article reviews the commission’s origins, history, and accomplishments, and addresses future intergovernmental needs. The ACIR’s accomplishments were substantial, but are largely unavailable today. Lessons learned from the ACIR suggest the need to (1) recreate a network of intergovernmental advocates within the legislative and executive branches of the federal government; (2) restart the information flows and high‐level federal, state, and local policy dialogues that withered after the ACIR’s demise; (3) strengthen boundary‐crossing institutions capable of addressing metropolitan and multistate problems; and (4) develop new opportunities to achieve public policy outcomes that can be attained only by the cumulative efforts of federal, state, and local governments working together—often with private parties as well.     

National-State Relations: Cooperative Federalism in the Twentieth Century

Daniel J. Elazar's 1959 Ph.D. dissertation demonstrated conclusivelythe inadequate explanatory value of the theory of dual federalismand the prevalence of cooperative national-state relations inthe period ending in 1913. Congressional employment of totaland partial preemption and coercive regulatory powers since1965 raises the question whether the theory of cooperative federalismexplains fully the functioning of the federal system at thebeginning of the twenty-first century. An examination of national-staterelations reveals that each of the two theories retains a degreeof explanatory value. There is, however, a need for a more generaltheory incorporating elements of these theories and coerciveuse of congressional powers, highlighting the generally cooperativenature of national-state relations, and explaining the continuousreadjustment of the respective powers of Congress and states.     

Public Sector Reform, Intergovernmental Relations and the Future of Australian Federalism

Recent developments in the reform of intergovernmental relations have been influenced by contemporary models of public sector reform. Their systematic application to intergovernmental administration, in particular the manner in which jointly funded and managed programs are organised, may have profound and unanticipated effects on the federal system. When viewed in the context of a recent history of collaborative policymaking between political executives, the possibility that new forms of intergovernmental joint policy-making and program management might become the norm poses serious challenges to federal traditions of dual government. Arm's length and collaborative forms of joint decision making are contrasted as ideal types, and then used to analyse two case studies in collaborative intergovernmental decision-making — National Competition Policy and the National Training Agreement. It is concluded that the system-wide implications are profound if they are part of a broader trend, but caution is expressed about the powers of inertia and resistance in traditional forms of federal politics.     

Australian Public Policy, Federalism, and Intergovernmental Relations: The Federal Factor

Public policy is the overt activity of governing and what governmentshave as their primary purpose. This is so whether the politicalsystem is unitary or federal. There are many more elements thatcomplicate policymaking in a federal system. In particular,constitutional, financial, and political issues intrude becauseof the necessary interdependence of otherwise independent andautonomous national and subnational components. This articleaddresses this complexity of joint action through use of theideas about federalism, the structure of governing institutions,and the processes of policymaking. The extent to which an outcomedepends on the mixture of independence and interdependence isconceptualized as degrees of the federal factor. Linking thisconcept to particular policy arenas may provide a better understandingof federal systems than explanation from centralization or decentralizationor dependence or independence.     

Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations in 1996: The End of an Era

On 30 September 1996 the U.S. Advisory Commission on IntergovernmentalRelations (ACIR) closed its doors, ending thirty-seven yearsof advocacy for federalism and intergovernmental relations.A majority of members in the Congress felt that A CIR had becomeirrelevant to the issues facing them and agreed that littlewould be lost by terminating the commission. The Clinton administration,although supportive until near the end, withdrew its'supportout of displeasure with the commission's handling of the unfundedfederal mandates issue. The national associations representingstate and local governments were ambivalent. ACIR was no longerlooked to for solutions to the nation's intergovernmental relationsproblems. With the exit of ACIR, the federal government's lastresource for addressing broad intergovernmental issues—beyondthe confines of individual programs—is gone.     

Intergovernmental Relations and the Advocacy Coalition Framework: The Operation of Federalism in Denver Water Politics

The relationship between intergovernmental relations and theformulation and implementation of public policies is not wellunderstood by scholars. Borrowing from the advocacy coalitionframework, this study contends that public policies reflectthe strategic choices of federal, state, and local actors operatingwithin policy subsystems. The success of various governmentalpolicy strategies is dependent on the autonomy of each actorand the level of policy fragmentation within the subsystem.These variables are defined, operationalized, and examined withinthe context of intergovernmental relations in Denver water politics.     

Incremental Thinking: "Report of the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, (June 1955)"

Editor's Note : The budget reductions pushed through Congress by President Reagan have spurred interest in one of the oldest issues in American politics—the proper relationship among the various levels of government in the United States. One of the most important studies of this issue was issued by the Kestnbaum Commission on Intergovernmental Relations in 1955. The Commission attempted to devise a set of rules for determining which level of government should be responsible for particular activities. When the Commission issued its report, federal grants accounted for less than five percent of the national budget. During the next 25 years, they escalated to more than 17 percent of total outlays. But as a result of recent budget cuts, they are expected to be only about 13 percent in the mid 1980s. Clearly, states and localities will operate in a different fiscal and programmatic environment in the next decade than they did in the preceding two. This excerpt from the report of the Commission continues to be a relevant, though not universally accepted, statement of the principles that should govern intergovernmental finances.     

The Malaise of Federalism: Comparative Reflections on Commonwealth–State Relations

The High Court's decision in the ‘Work Choices’ case expanding further the scope of the Commonwealth's enumerated powers is the latest reminder of the highly centralised nature of Australian federalism. The division of powers traditionally forming the essence of a federal system has become increasingly difficult to discern and the roles and responsibilities of the two levels of government have become entangled. While for a good part of Australia's history divided jurisdiction was deplored as an obstacle to progress in government, today the decay of the system is most likely to be lamented. Discussion of options for reform presupposes an understanding of the forces that have led to the present condition. This article examines the Australian experience in a broader comparative and historical perspective and suggests that those forces are endemic and substantial.     

府际关系视角下的对口支援系列政策

对口支援是具有中国特色的帮扶政策,对口支援与对口帮扶、对口协作、对口合作组成了对口支援的政策系列。系列对口支援政策在实施过程中建立了支援地区与受援地区之间人为的联系,这实际上扩展了府际关系的范畴。从府际关系的视角来看,系列对口支援政策建立了新型的央地关系,扩展了横向间的政治、经济联系,丰富了府际关系的内涵和形式。     

From Competitive Regionalism to Cooperative Federalism: The Europeanization of the Spanish State of the Autonomies

Intergovernmental relations in Spain have undergone a significanttransformation during the past 22 years. With the transitionto democracy, Spain has developed from a unitary-centralistinto a quasi-federal polity in which the 17 autonomous communitiesenjoy significant political autonomy. However, Spain is notonly moving toward federal democracy, it is also approachinga cooperative model of federalism in which multilateral intergovernmentalcooperation and joint decision-making supersede the bilateralnegotiations and regional competition that traditionally characterizedintergovernmental relations. The shift from competitive regionalismto cooperative federalism is the result of the progressive Europeanizationof the Spanish state and its autonomous communities, which hasencouraged consultation and cooperation between the nationalgovernment and the regions. As traditional forms of intergovernmentalrelations proved ineffective for necessary coordination andcooperation, the Spanish government and the autonomous communitiesestablished a new procedure for cooperating in European affairs-thefirst institutional framework to provide for the joint participationof all 17 autonomous communities in central-state decision-making.     

Internet Taxation and U.S. Intergovernmental Relations: From Quill to the Present

One of the most contentious issues involving federal, state,and local relations today is Internet taxation. Internet taxationis a significant battleground because it involves issues ofgreat import to federalism, including state and local autonomyand revenue adequacy. Since the U.S. Supreme Court's 1992 decisionin Quill v. North Dakota, the taxability of online transactionshas been governed by the court's physical presence nexus rule.This nexus rule has recently been called into question by variousorganizations, corporations, and elected officials. Proposalsto alter the nexus rule abound from various sources. This articleexamines the roles played by these various actors in the Internettaxation debate and explores the potential implications of changesto the nexus for federalism and intergovernmental relations.     

The U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations: Unique Artifact of a Bygone Era

The U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) befitted an era marked by low party polarization, bipartisanship, and cooperative federalism. Although the ACIR’s work was valuable, the growth of federal power, rise of party polarization, and the decline of bipartisanship, along with many other political, governmental, and social changes during its 37‐year life (1959–96), marginalized the ACIR to the point of political vulnerability. These historic changes make it unlikely that the ACIR will be resurrected in a comparable or partial form.     

The Road to South Carolina: Intergovernmental Tax Immunity and the Constitutional Status of Federalism

In South Carolina v. Baker the Supreme Court struck a powerfulblow at constitutional federalism. As a result of this landmarkcase, the question of whether issuing tax exempt bonds is asovereign right of the states or a privilege they are accordedby the national government has been settled. Relying in parton precedent from Garcia, the Court determined that immunityis not a right under the Tenth Amendment. In addition, SouthCarolina established a new doctrine of intergovernmental taximmunity which formally accords superior powers to the nationalgovernment. Taken together, these results have implicationsfor the future course of intergovernmental fiscal policy aswell as the basic character of the relationship between thenational and state and local governments.     

American Federalism: From Johnson to Bush

Intergovernmental developments for more than twenty-five yearshave produced a nation-centered federalism—strongly sofrom 1964 to 1978, somewhat less so from 1969–1988, anda little more so during the past two years. The reasons forthis fundamental systemic transformation include: (1) the demiseof the earlier, 150-year old, confederative party system andthe rise of a new political system with weak federative parties,but other more powerful political actors; (2) an operationaland local representational renaissance of the states, but alsoa concomitant decline of state and local political influencein Washington; (3) a steadily centralizing Supreme Court, withonly a few pro-state decisions until 1989; and (4) a rapid risein national preemptions and of a "new social regulation" thatwas aimed at state and local governments as much as at the privatesector, even as the states were used to implement them. Theonly real constraint on national activism since 1982 has beenbudget-driven federalism, not planned reform efforts. The currentsystem then requires political, representational, judicial,and constitutional reforms if the centralizing, cooptive, andpermissive features of contemporary federalism are to be corrected.