The public opinion–foreign policy paradox in Germany: integrating domestic and international levels of analysis conditionally

Abstract

Does public opinion influence foreign policy? International relations theory is divided on whether foreign policy outputs follow public opinion in advanced democratic countries. Using the case of cold war and post-cold war Germany, I offer an integrated realist theory of the effect of public opinion on foreign policy. I test the theory and the generalizability of the hypothesis of a public opinion–foreign policy nexus using process tracing as well as a time series analysis between the years 1973 and 2002. Using new measures, results here contradict literature on expected public opinion and policy outputs in the cold war period yet are supported after. I find that the predicted effect of public opinion on foreign policy outputs to be confounded by such factors as security threats.     

European security policy for the people? Public opinion and the EU's Common Foreign,Security and Defence policy

The democratic foundations of European integration in the foreign and defence realm are increasingly being debated. This article looks at the question of democratic legitimacy from one particular angle, by examining public opinion as measured in Eurobarometer surveys between 1989 and 2009. Based on reflections about the relation between polling results and wider questions of democracy, it examines three aspects of public opinion: general support for a common foreign and a common defence policy; differences among support rates in EU member states; and what roles Europeans would prefer for European armed forces. It turns out that general support for a common foreign policy is high, whereas the desirability of a common defence policy is much more contested. Moreover, citizens across Europe would prefer European armed forces to take on traditional tasks, as territorial defence. An EU defence policy that goes beyond strict intergovernmentalism and is directed towards protecting international law and universal human rights would thus require a significant communicative effort to become accepted.     

India’s public opinion and foreign policy: a view from New Delhi

ABSTRACT

Incoherent, or even nonexistent, is the common criticism leveled at India’s public opinion. Given this criticism, scholars of Indian foreign policy often do not consider public attitudes in their research. Contrary to this, I trace the evolution of India’s public opinion and foreign policy connections since the early 1990s to demonstrate that the Indian public has opinions on foreign policy and that those opinions have limited but growing impact on the country’s foreign policy.     

From De-Europeanisation to Anti-Western Populism: Turkish Foreign Policy in Flux

ABSTRACT

Recent Turkish foreign policy (TFP) under the successive AKP governments has seen different populist turns. A clear distinction can be made between the thin and thick populisms of TFP, based on the status of the West. The first decade of AKP rule, when foreign policy was thinly populist, was characterised by steady de-Europeanisation, increasing engagement with regional issues and a decentring of Turkey’s Western orientation. The turn toward thick populism has been characterised by anti-Westernist discourses in which the West is resituated as the ‘other’ of Turkish political identity.     

The "Essential Domino" of Military Operations: American Public Opinion and the Use of Force

It is a commonly held belief that the foreign policy issue to which the American public is most sensitive is the use of military force. Because American public opinion regarding the use of force is highly palpable, salient, and organized, and because decisions regarding the use of force are some of the most important decisions the nation ever has to consider, the analysis of public opinion regarding military involvement is academically significant and policy relevant. The indication from policymakers is that American military operations require public support. As a result, scholars and analysts have come to realize that public opinion is the "essential domino" of military operations. The relationship between mass American public opinion and the use of military force has become, therefore, the focus of numerous studies and surveys. There are currently several competing explanations—schools of thought—in the literature on why the mass public supports the use of force. This article is an attempt to identify the most prominent schools of thought on public opinion and the use of force, and the central factors associated with each school. Such a review is important to generating policy–relevant guidance pertaining to public opinion and the use of force—an objective made more pressing by the current war against terrorism.     

Purpose and behaviour: The Cuban missile conflict revisited

Fairly strong theoretical arguments posit that the use of force to achieve foreign policy objectives and the milita’ rization of society are part of a self‐amplifying feedback process. In spite of the rather coherent reasoning linking these two factors, little empirical work has attempted to demonstrate the strength of this postulated relationship. This analysis uses a system of equations to model this hypothesized feedback in the US and British societies during the 20th century. The findings presented below lend tentative support for the hypothesized feedback, though suggests that further verification might be facilitated through refinements in the operational indicators of violent foreign policy. Furthermore, the analysis demonstrates that systemic level variables contribute significantly to the propensity of the US and Great Britain to employ violence as a tool of foreign policy.     

NATO: The View from the East

Abstract

Relations between Russia, Ukraine and Belarus and NATO have placed more emphasis on cooperation than confrontation since the Cold War, and Ukraine has begun to move towards membership. At the popular level, on the evidence of national surveys in 2004 and 2005, NATO continues to be perceived as a significant threat, but in Russia and Ukraine it comes behind the United States (in Belarus the numbers are similar). There are few socioeconomic predictors of support for NATO membership that are significant across all three countries, but there are wide differences by region, and by attitudinal variables such as support for a market economy and for EU membership. The relationship between popular attitudes and foreign policy is normally a distant one; but in Ukraine NATO membership will require public support in a referendum, and in all three cases public attitudes on foreign policy issues can influence foreign policy in other ways, including the composition of parliamentary committees. In newly independent states whose international allegiances are still evolving, the associations between public opinion and foreign and security policy may often be closer than in the established democracies.     

When and How Parliaments Influence Foreign Policy: The Case of Turkey's Iraq Decision

Turkey's decision on its role in the Iraq war in 2003 illustrates the power—and limits—of parliaments as actors in foreign policy. Traditionally, assemblies are not seen as important players in the foreign policies of parliamentary democracies. Instead, cabinets are generally considered the chief policymaking authorities. If the government enjoys a parliamentary majority, legislatures typically support the cabinet, if they are brought into the process at all. The March 1, 2003 vote by the Turkish parliament to not allow the United States to use Turkey as a base for the Iraq invasion challenges this conventional wisdom on parliamentary influence (in addition to many interest-based explanations of foreign policy). This paper examines this decision in the context of the role of parliaments in foreign policies and explores the relationships between parliamentary influence, leadership, intraparty politics, and public opinion.     

Germany and European security governance: how well does the Birmingham model perform?

Abstract

The expansion of the security agenda after the end of the Cold War, propelled by the blowback of 11 September 2001, raises questions about the German ability and willingness to contribute to the regional and global security governance tasks facing Europe and Germany's continuing fidelity to its post-war European avocation. It also calls for a reconsideration of the Birmingham model of foreign policy analysis, particularly its emphasis on (and interpretation of) the ideational and institutional factors defining the German foreign policy agenda and shaping German foreign policy behaviour, at least with respect to the implementation (rather than formulation) of European Union security policies. Towards assessing the continuing utility of the Birmingham model, this article proceeds in three steps: the presentation of the Birmingham model and its restatement as six conjectures; a discussion of the security governance functions undertaken by the EU and the collective action problem facing Europe (and Germany) in executing them; and an empirical investigation of Germany's contribution to the EU as a security actor since 1990.     

The Evolution of Saudi Foreign Policy and the Role of Decision-making Processes and Actors

Abstract

Saudi Arabia has witnessed a centralisation of power in the office of the deputy crown prince, which has amounted to a shift in decision-making from consensual and deliberative to swift and adventurous, most markedly in foreign policy. This centralisation is coupled with an increase in institutionalisation. A new decision-making pattern and rising Iranian power in the region have affected the evolution of Saudi foreign policy. The Saudi crown prince’s strict handling of Shia dissidents acknowledges the perceived extension of the Iranian threat to internal security. The relationship between these two princes and Saudi political competition with Iran will affect the evolution of Saudi foreign policy in a critical manner in the future.     

Presidential Leadership on Foreign Policy,Opinion Polling,and the Possible Limits of “Crafted Talk”

The strategy of “crafted talk” (or framing) suggests that a politician uses public opinion to anticipate the most alluring, language to convince the public to follow a politician's own preferred policy (Jacobs & Shapiro, 2000 Jacobs, L. R. and Shaprio, R. Y. 2000. Politicians don't pander: Political manipulation and the loss of democratic responsiveness, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  [Google Scholar]). This manipulatory behavior by presidents has important consequences in the realm of constructing foreign policy, especially if the policy involves military service personnel, international prestige, or foreign conflict. However, no scholar has investigated White House archival data to examine the theoretical nuances of presidential “crafting” talk when constructing arguments for foreign policy. This article examines three case studies using internal polling memoranda and focus group results concerning the Vietnam War under President Johnson, the signing of the INF Treaty with the Soviet Union under President Reagan, and the Gulf War under President Bush. In each of the three cases, public opinion places serious constraints on presidential framing of foreign policy. Implications for the effectiveness of political framing and the limits of presidential persuasion are discussed.     

Russia’s Neorevisionist Challenge to the Liberal International Order

Abstract

A conventional opinion is that Russia is trying to destroy the liberal international order. Russia indeed defies it, but also justifies its foreign policy with the liberal order’s normative frameworks and reproaches the West for not standing up to these norms. Moreover, Moscow does not present any alternative vision. Russia complains about the internal contradictions of the liberal order: sovereignty vs. intervention, pluralism vs. universality, US hegemony vs. equality and democracy, although it also exploits these contradictions. In fact Russia demands an adjustment of the liberal order rather than its eradication and should, therefore, be classified as a neorevisionist power. Two elements underlie Russia’s at times aggressive foreign policy conduct. The first one, its feeling of being ill-accommodated in the present order, predefines the direction of the policy. The second, the prioritisation of foreign policy over domestic reforms, explains the intensity of Russian discontent and its occasional aggressive manifestations. Russia’s domestic consensus regarding its foreign policy, including views on the liberal international order, facilitates this aggressiveness. Three policy conclusions can be drawn: acknowledging that Russia uses the inherent contradictions of the liberal international order opens up possibilities for dialogue and an eventual overcoming of the crisis; the survival and strengthening of the liberal order depends on its embrace of all major players, including Russia, and hence, the need for some adjustments to the order itself; and finally such adjustments presuppose Russia’s readiness to shoulder responsibility for the (reformed) liberal international order.     

No,prime minister: explaining the House of Commons’ vote on intervention in Syria

On 29 August 2013, the UK House of Commons inflicted the first defeat on a Prime Minister over a matter of war and peace since 1782. Recalled to debate and vote on UK intervention in Syria, the Commons humbled the government and crucially impacted the development of UK foreign policy. This article places that vote, and the developments leading to it, in the context of the role of parliaments in security policy and explores the relationships between parliamentary influence, leadership, intra-party and intra-coalition politics, and public opinion. From an in-depth analysis of leaders’ statements and parliamentary debate, we find a combination of intra-party politics and party leadership were most significant. An additional factor – the role of historical precedent – was also important. Our analysis explores the fluidity and interconnectedness of the various factors for parliamentary influence in foreign policy and offers directions for future theoretical development and empirical research.     

Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Elite Beliefs as a Mediating Variable

Scholars have become increasingly interested in the nature of potential linkage processes between public opinion and foreign policy. The literature on elite beliefs suggests that the beliefs decision makers hold concerning public opinion may have an important influence on this relationship. This article argues that how decision makers perceive and react to public opinion depends upon their views of the proper relationship between public opinion and foreign policy choices. A theoretical framework to analyze beliefs is suggested containing two dimensions: (1) normative beliefs relating to whether it is desirable for input from public opinion to affect foreign policy choices; and (2) practical beliefs regarding whether public support of a policy is necessary for it to be successful. To explore this issue, this article reports the findings of a qualitative content analysis of Dwight D. Eisenhower's and John Foster Dulles's public opinion beliefs. Predictions of behavior are tested in a case study of the September 1954 Chinese offshore islands crisis. The results of this analysis suggest elite beliefs regarding public opinion may provide an important intervening variable worthy of further examination.     

EU External Action,Intention and Explanation

ABSTRACT

“Unintended consequences” is an umbrella concept. It comprises phenomena that differ in crucial respects and consequently, without refinement, it remains a rather blunt instrument for policy analysis. The contributions in this volume, however, show that disentangling unintended consequences by making clear distinctions between various types, makes the concept much more useful for policy analysis. Assessing the impact of EU foreign policies as studied in this volume, we show that “bonuses”, “windfalls”, “accidents”, and “trade-offs” – all unintended – are very different when it comes to the explanation of policy outcomes, or to allocating responsibility for them.     

A more martial Europe? Public opinion,permissive consensus,and EU defence policy

EU defence policy has been extremely popular over the past three decades, averaging around 75% public support. In fact, no other policy domain is as popular and robust as the idea of pooling national sovereignty over defence. However, public support for EU defence has been dismissed as mere “permissive consensus”, rather than genuine support. Scholars have often assumed that public opinion towards European integration is passive and shallow, especially over foreign policy issues, where the public has limited understanding of the complexity of issues. Consistent with contemporary findings about the complexity of comparative foreign policy attitudes, the authors contest the permissive consensus logic and demonstrate that European publics have held coherent preferences over the use of force at the European level. The authors conclude that the slow progress of integration in this area is due to the reluctance of elites rather than to the reticence of Europe’s citizens.     

Egypt’s Foreign and Security Policy in Post-R2P Libya

Abstract

The post-intervention situation in Libya poses foreign and security policy challenges for Egypt. Egypt’s definition of the Libyan problem centres on two fundamental aspects: it is depicted as the consequence of an unfinished R2P military intervention, and perceived as part of a regional war against Islamist terrorism. All practical steps being taken by the authorities in Cairo are based on this dual framing. The implications of its positioning are, firstly, a securitised approach to foreign policy, including limited military interference and proxy support and, secondly, the emergence of a partisan position. To date, the impact of Egypt’s foreign policy line in the Libyan theatre has been limited and hence its viability risks being thrown into question.     

Italian foreign policy in the post-cold war period: a neoclassical realist approach

Abstract

Drawing on a neoclassical realist approach, this article analyses the foreign policy conduct of different Italian governments from 1994 to 2008. Pressured by the post-cold war international system, these governments have been compelled to raise Italy's profile within the international system. However, the way in which successive governments have responded has differed markedly. By looking at variables located at the domestic level – elite perceptions of the distribution of power and government instability – it is possible to explain these differences. Neo-classical realism is seen as an advance on Waltzian neo-realism precisely because it allows room for domestic as well as international (or systemic) variables, and because it has a very specific focus on foreign policy as such.     

Leaderisation in foreign policy: performing the role of EU High Representative

ABSTRACT

This article examines how the mediatised context of foreign policy provides new opportunities for political leaders to both frame and project their own leadership role to new audiences. The past ten years have witnessed a sharp rise in political leaders’ use of new social media to communicate on a range of foreign policy issues. We argue that this new media context of foreign policy, combined with a bolstered leadership mandate, has been central to the construction of a more visible public leadership role for the EU High Representative in the post-Lisbon era. Departing from recent scholarship on performative leadership and new media in International Relations theory, we develop an original theoretical framework drawing on Erving Goffman’s dramaturgy of impression management. We employ the concept of “leaderisation” to analyse how mediatisation shapes the leadership process in terms of personification and drama to enable new forms of interaction with followers. We apply this framework in an illustrative case study focusing on the process of negotiating the EU Global Strategy. This diplomatic process provided the High Representative Mogherini with a stage on which she could frame herself in a central leadership position vis-à-vis European citizens to mobilise greater legitimacy for the EU as a global actor.     

The unexpected EU leadership on landmines: the influence of the Ottawa Convention on the EU

Abstract

The European Union (EU) has led international politics on antipersonnel landmines (APLs) for a decade now, and its foreign policy in this domain is perceived as a success story. Nevertheless, at the beginning of the negotiations that led to the Ottawa Convention, the EU looked unable to play any relevant part. This article addresses the emergence of the EU's foreign policy on APLs by arguing, in a second image-reversed way, that the corresponding international regime has deeply influenced the EU. It has changed Member States' and EU institutions' preferences, and it has empowered pro-Ottawa and pro-integration actors. This article explores the intra-EU conditions that have facilitated this influence and the way in which the regime itself has shaped them.