How Does Regulation Affect the Risk Taking of Banks? A U.S. and Canadian Perspective

This historical study utilizes annual insured bank data from 1936 through 1989 to empirically evaluate the impact of bank regulation on bank risk taking in a cross-country comparison of the United States and Canada. Risk is hypothesized to be determined, in part, by the regulatory environment in which a bank operates. The findings of this analysis contributes to the contemporary deregulation policy debate, since both branch banking restrictions and deposit insurance variables are found to be detrimental to bank stability. More specifically, these results support the 1994 Riegle–Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act, which removed legislative barriers to interstate branching. These results also confirm expectations that deposit insurance increases risk taking and supports the 1991 mandate by regulators that risk-based deposit insurance be created. Further, these findings support the 1988 Basel Accord to standardize bank capital requirements internationally and to link these standards to bank risk taking.     

When do autonomous banking regulators promote stability?

Can autonomous banking regulatory agencies reduce the odds that a country will suffer a crippling banking crisis? We investigate the impact that agencies charged with banking regulation and prudential supervision can have on financial stability in the banking sector. We argue that the potential benefits of autonomy are hard to realise because banking regulators face incentives to shirk in their mandate to secure banking stability. These incentives are strongest in political systems with high numbers of veto players, where the autonomy of a banking agency is difficult to undo even if the agency is derelict in promoting banking sector stability. We test an implication of this argument, namely, that the probability of bank crisis onset should diminish with the level of autonomy of the banking agency, but only in polities with low numbers of veto points. We base our analysis of this conditional hypothesis on an original dataset of 79 countries observed between 1971 and 2009 that captures the degree of autonomy of banking agencies from political principals. Our findings confirm that the impact of banking agency autonomy on the risk of bank crisis onset is conditional on the political structure in which the agency is embedded.     

The resurgence of denial rates for home loans: an examination of disparate effects on groups of applicants in the upper Midwest

Mortgage application denial rates have increased since 2002, but it is unclear to what extent this increase in denials has differentially affected “non-traditional” mortgage applicants that do not resemble “traditional” white, non-Hispanic opposite-sex couple applicants. This article uses augmented Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data to investigate disparities in denial rates between traditional and non-traditional mortgage applicants between 2004 and 2008 in the Federal Reserve Bank's ninth district. We find evidence that lenders became more cautious in lending decisions between 2004 and 2008, treating applicants with the same incomes and requested loan amounts differently over time. After accounting for a variety of loan, applicant, lender, and environmental characteristics, we find that many “non-traditional” applicant groups across the ninth district experienced persistently higher mortgage application denial rates when compared to white, non-Hispanic opposite-sex couples. In some cases, the gap in the mortgage application denial rates between non-traditional and traditional applicants has actually increased over time.     

The reverse mortgage as an asset management tool

Abstract

Reverse mortgages are usually seen as a vehicle for increasing the income of poor, elderly households. This perspective, coupled with the relatively slow growth of reverse mortgage programs, has led some observers to question the growth potential of the reverse mortgage market. This article presents a more expansive view of reverse mortgages as a financial tool for tapping housing equity for various purposes and at various stages in the life cycle.

Three market segments for reverse mortgages are discussed: elderly persons living alone, other elderly households, and non‐elderly households. Potential uses include turning housing equity into personal human capital investment accounts, enabling children to provide care for their disabled parents, funding elderly households’ long‐term care insurance, and sustaining consumption. Recent progress in product development and availability and political pressures to find private financing for health and long‐term care suggest that the reverse mortgage market has considerable growth potential.     

Institutional shrinkage: The deviant case of Swiss banking secrecy

Using the Mahoney–Thelen causal model one would expect “layering” to be the dominant kind of institutional change affecting Swiss banking secrecy. Our research into governance in Swiss banking shows that it does not fit this theoretical model. Applying deviant case analysis we have refined our understanding of institutional change. We argue that the removal of rules and the momentum of pressure should be acknowledged when explaining variations of institutional change and we suggest that the processes of shrinkage should not be ignored.