The rise and fall of legislative service organisations in the United States Congress

The abolition of Legislative Service Organisations by the 104th Congress (1995–96) constituted one of its earliest achievements. Although political dissensus had surrounded the role and activities of LSOs throughout their institutional existence, the Republican victory in the 1994 congressional elections was the critical factor prompting their abolition. Prior reform attempts had faltered upon the Democratic party's post‐1954 dominance of the House of Representatives and the diffuse representational and institutional benefits which LSOs conferred upon their members. However, when, under a new Republican majority, the perceived costs of LSOs were held to exceed their benefits, the organisations were rapidly terminated. The abolition of LSOs lends new and additional support to scholars who emphasise the continued salience of party to congressional politics in the United States.     

Partisan Infighting Among House Republicans: Leaders,Factions, and Networks of Interests

Congressional parties are commonly viewed as unified legislative teams, but recent intraparty battles have revealed serious ideological divisions within the House Republican caucus. Using annual ratings from nearly 300 interest groups, we estimate the ideological locations of Republican legislators in order to map their party's factional structure. Based on the distribution of interest‐group support from 2001 to 2012, we detect three Republican factions that we characterize as worker oriented, pro‐business, and ethno‐radical. We find that Republican leaders block bills by legislators in the worker and ethno‐radical subgroups and that they advance bills by members in the corporate faction.     

House Party Switchers and Committee Assignments: Who Gets “What,When, How?”

What are the political consequences for members of Congress who switch parties? Roll‐call and electoral consequences of congressional party switching have been studied, but other implications of party defections have yet to be systematically explored. In this article, I examine the committee assignments of House party switchers and argue that party leaders seek to reward members of the opposing party who join their ranks. Using committee assignment data from the 94th House (1975–76) through the 107th House (2001–02), I show that party switchers are more likely than nonswitchers to be the beneficiaries of violations of the seniority norm. The findings from this article are of interest to students of political parties and legislative institutions, and fill a gap in the literature on party switching. When you joined the Republican Conference on August 6, 1995, the elected leadership …determined that your accumulated seniority in the Congress would be credited when you joined the Republican Conference…. Therefore, the Republican Steering Committee's Seniority List ranks you nineteenth in overall conference seniority and designates May 22, 1980, as the beginning of your tenure in the House for purposes of Republican seniority. Letter from Speaker Dennis Hastert to party switcher Billy Tauzin, April 4, 2000.¹     

The Iraq War,Partisanship, and Candidate Attributes: Variation in Partisan Swing in the 2006 U.S. House Elections

Although partisan swing is often assumed to be uniform across congressional districts, our analysis of the 2006 House elections demonstrates that systematic variation exists. In addition to incumbency status, partisanship, spending, and scandal, variation in the local salience of national issues across districts affects vote shifts in these districts. Notably, partisan swing in Republican districts proved highly sensitive to the number of Iraq war deaths from that district and, to a lesser degree, to the roll‐call vote of Republican House members on the war resolution. These findings have implications for theories of anticipatory representation, retrospective voting, and electoral accountability.     

Running on Fear: Immigration,Race and Crime Framings in Contemporary GOP Presidential Debate Discourse

This analysis explores the use of “race-baiting,” known herein as “racially divisive appeals” (RDAs), and crime frames in Republican (GOP) presidential debate discourse during the 2008 and subsequent election cycles. RDAs which mobilize images of minorities as criminals, terrorists, or as populations engaged in voter or welfare fraud, are analyzed. While the strategic exploitation of racial animus in American politics has tended to be associated with the “Southern Strategy,” wherein GOP politicians wooed southern whites by fueling anxieties about blacks, this research finds that modern RDAs focus more on appealing to fears about immigrants. Reasons for this shift, as well some of the varied discursive techniques and narrative content of contemporary RDAs, are explored.     

Iraq Casualties and the 2006 Senate Elections

Prior scholarship on the effects of war casualties on U.S. elections has focused on large‐scale conflicts. For this article, we examined whether or not the much‐smaller casualty totals incurred in Iraq had a similar influence on the 2006 Senate contests. We found that the change in vote share from 2000 to 2006 for Republican Senate candidates at both the state and county level was significantly and negatively related to local casualty tallies and rates. These results provide compelling evidence for the existence of a democratic brake on military adventurism, even in small‐scale wars, but one that is strongest in communities that have disproportionately shouldered a war's costs.     

Congressional Party Defection in American History

In this paper, we analyze the roll‐call voting behavior of House and Senate members who changed party affiliation during the course of their political careers. We analyze members who switched during the stable periods of the three major two‐party systems in American history: the Federalist‐Jeffersonian Republican system (3d to 12th Congresses), the Democratic‐Whig System (20th to 30th Congresses), and the Democratic‐Republican System (46th to 106th Congresses). Our primary findings are that the biggest changes in the roll‐call voting behavior of party defectors can be observed during periods of high ideological polarization and that party defections during the past 30 years are distinct from switches in other eras because of high polarization and the disappearance of a second dimension of ideological conflict.     

How Many Seats in Congress Is Control of Redistricting Worth?

How large a benefit is partisan control of the redistricting process? Do legal constraints on redistricting—such as the preclearance requirement of the Voting Rights Act—alter this benefit? Are institutions designed to reduce the benefit to partisan control—such as redistricting commissions—effective? To measure the effects of partisan districting on the electoral fortunes of the parties, we collect data on the partisan composition of state government, House election outcomes, and moderating institutions over an 80-year period. Our results suggest that over time, both parties have benefited from unified control, with the effects largest in states where voters were evenly divided among the parties and smallest in states where the controlling party had a large advantage in the electorate. The effects have changed over time, with both parties having equally benefited from control during the middle of the 20th century, the benefit largely disappearing in the late part of the century, and the Republican Party seeing a moderate advantage from control in the current century. The benefits of partisan control were not diminished in states with redistricting commissions. The preclearance requirement appears to have hurt the Democratic Party except when its vote share was very low. The aggregate effects of partisan redistricting are moderate in magnitude—in the modern period, this effect has typically been less than 10 House seats, with the last election where control of the House would have flipped in expectation occurring in 1954.     

Congressional Leadership 1965–96: A New Look at the Extremism versus Centrality Debate

Abstract An examination of the differences between the ideological positions of leaders and other members in the U.S. House of Representatives (1965–96) demonstrates that Republican leaders tend to be significantly to the right of the median Republican member and Democratic leaders tend to be significantly to the left of the median Democratic member. Furthermore, leaders from both parties tend to be ideologically located near the mode of their party's ideological distribution. These empirical results have implications for issues such as party polarization, conditional party government, and the possibility of separating out party and ideology.     

The behavioural consequences of institutional rules: republicans in the US house

The Republicans gained a majority in the US House from the 1994 elections, and upon taking office they rewrote the rules that determine legislative power relations. This paper combines a 1996 attitudinal survey of US Representatives with demographic information, status within the House, and party position to examine the impact of the 1995 rule changes on satisfaction, ambition, and retirement. This paper demonstrates that member reactions to reform are explained jointly by their partisanship and their relative position within their party. Senior members of any party dislike rules making power more exclusive, and dissatisfaction increases the likelihood of retirement.     

Who Benefits from the Party Organization? Evidence from Republican House Members' Attendance at Caucus Meetings

As the role of US congressional parties in the legislative process has increased, so has the importance of understanding the institutions within these organizations. In this article, we examine the weekly caucus meetings held by Republican House leaders with their rank‐and‐file. We consider how members’ characteristics relate to their decision to attend based on the collective and private benefits that caucus participation affords. Using interviews of members and staffers as well as members’ attendance records at these meetings from 2007 to 2013, we find, among other things, that members who vote less with their party or who have more seniority are less likely to attend while those in leadership positions or who are electorally vulnerable are more likely to do so. Together, these findings provide additional insights on the relationship between party leaders and their members and which members benefit from this central party‐building activity.     

Voter Turnout,Felon Disenfranchisement and Partisan Outcomes in Presidential Elections, 1988–2012

States vary in their treatment of the voting rights of convicted felons through incarceration, probation, parole, and beyond. A few states permit even incarcerated felons to vote, while others rescind the right permanently, with most states’ policies located between those extremes. This paper analyzes the relationship among voter turnout, election outcomes, and levels of felon disenfranchisement by state. The results show a pattern of divergence around the 2000 election before which turnout, disenfranchisement, crime rates, and Republican or Democratic success in elections were unrelated and since which strong correlations are found. Disenfranchisement rates no longer bear a significant relationship to crime rates, and states won by Republicans have both lower overall turnout and higher levels of ineligible felons in the voting-age population. Partisan control of state legislatures does not predict these patterns, but there is a strong regional component to the data with disenfranchisement notably higher in Southern states regardless of partisan control. Overall the data support a need for further research on the disparate treatment of felon voting rights among states which may be contributing to broader trends emerging in political science research of a growing relationship between lower voter turnout and Republican electoral success.     

The Cost of Majority‐Party Bias: Amending Activity under Structured Rules

All major legislation in the House necessitates a special rule from the Rules Committee before it can be brought to the chamber floor. These rules often strictly limit floor amendments to bills considered by the House. Scholars of political parties have argued that the House majority party can bias policy output away from the floor median through its usage of restrictive rules. In this article, we argue that in order to secure the passage of restrictive rules, the majority often makes concessions to centrist legislators through the amending process. We examine this theory using a newly collected data set that includes all amendments considered by the Rules Committee during the construction of structured rules in the 109th, 110th, and 111th Congresses (2005–2010). Our results are mixed, but they do suggest that moderate members of the majority party often receive concessions via amendments for their support of the majority party's agenda‐setting regime.     

Midterm Elections and Economic Fluctuations: The Response of Voters Over Time

Abstract: Recent empirical work (Alesina and Rosenthal 1995; Erikson 1990) has shown that economic conditions may not have influenced House midterm elections since 1915. I argue that economic conditions may have influenced House midterms in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, when Congress dominated economic policy‐making, parties offered starker positions on economic issues, and national issues dominated House elections. As the 20th century progressed, congressional power over the economy declined, the parties converged over certain economic policies, and district‐level forces grew more important in elections. I test the stability of the relationship between the economy and House midterms over time, using F‐tests to show how the impact of macroeconomic conditions has changed in House midterm elections from 1872 to 1994. The results indicate that the gross national product (GNP) influenced House races before 1913 but, as the 20th century continued, the importance of the economy on House midterms declined.     

The House of Lords – Into the Future?

The idea for presenting these opinions on the future of the House of Lords as an article grew out of a seminar held in the House of Lords in February 2006, an event that itself grew from the contributions to the book Parliament in the Twenty-First Century, a collection of 30 essays from academics, commentators and politicians.1 1. N. D. J. Baldwin (ed.), Parliament in the Twenty-First Century (London: Politico's, 2005). The seminar saw presentations from Lord Howe, Lord McNally and Lord Carter, and it is their observations that follow here.2 2. Lord Howe: Geoffrey Howe was Chancellor of the Exchequer (1979–83), Foreign Secretary (1983–89) and Deputy Prime Minister (1989–90); Lord McNally: Tom McNally is Leader of the Liberal Democrats in the House of Lords; Lord Carter: Denis Carter, Government Chief Whip in the House of Lords from 1997 to 2002. Sadly, Denis Carter died on the 18th December 2006. A skilled practitioner in the role of Chief Whip, he won respect from all sides of the House for his knowledge and understanding of the way the House operates and for his forthright and honest approach both to the business of the House and to his fellow peers. He is much missed by all those who knew him.      

Strategic Retirements: The Influence of Public Preferences On Voluntary Departures from Congress

Are members of Congress responsive to public preferences in their decisions to seek reelection or retire, or do members simply rely on the advantages of incumbency to secure reelection? I argue that members of Congress consider their electoral vulnerability when deciding whether or not to seek reelection, informing their reelection odds with the same short‐term electoral forces that influence election outcomes: partisan preferences, economic evaluations, and congressional approval. Considering aggregate rates of voluntary departures from the House and Senate from 1954 to 2004, I show that rates of retirement reflect, not only institutional environments within Congress, but also the mood of the electorate.     

Redistributing Campaign Funds by U.S. House Members: The Spiraling Costs of the Permanent Campaign

In this article, we document and analyze the increase in the redistribution of campaign funds by U.S. House members during the 1990 through 2000 election cycles. By examining the contribution activity of members' leadership PACs and principal campaign committees, we show that House incumbents substantially increased their contributions to other House candidates and to the congressional campaign committees. The amount of money a member redistributes is a function of that member's institutional position: the greater the position's level of responsibility to the party caucus, the more campaign money the member redistributes, particularly as competition for majority control increases. Also, a member's capacity to raise surplus campaign funds, his or her support for the party's policy positions, and the level of competition for partisan control of the institution all affect the amount the member redistributes.     

Public opinion regarding congressional leaders: Lessons from the 1996 elections

Using data from a 1996 pre-election survey, the causes and consequences of public approval of Republican congressional leaders in the 1990s are examined. Specifically, this article explores the extent of opinion formation regarding House Speaker Newt Gingrich and Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott, and then attempts to account for the sources of these attitudes using multivariate models. Comparing and contrasting these findings as appropriate with what is known regarding public attitudes toward other political entities, the article reveals in particular that economic evaluations work differently for congressional leaders than for either the president or Congress as an institution. In a second section, the electoral ramifications of public attitudes toward Speaker Gingrich in the1996 elections are examined, determining that even in the presence of a host of powerful controls public evaluations of the speaker exercised a significant influence on respondents' vote choice, not just in congressional races also far down-ticket, a finding that supports a party-oriented model of legislative organisation. The paper concludes with some thoughts on the ability of these results to be generalised.     

Agenda Control,Majority Party Power,and the House Committee on Rules, 1937–52

The role of the U.S. House Rules Committee is consequential for theories of congressional parties, yet its role during the “conservative coalition” era is not well understood. We systematically analyzed the politics surrounding all special rules considered in Democratic Congresses from 1937 to 1952. We found that Rules repeatedly used its agenda power to push to the floor conservative initiatives that were opposed by the Democratic administration, the Rules Committee chair, and most northern Democrats, especially in Congresses that followed Republican election gains. The 44 conservative initiatives we identified include many of the most important policy issues considered during the period. Our findings challenge the idea that the majority party has consistently enjoyed a veto over which initiatives reach the floor, and they underscore the limits of roll‐call‐vote analysis in assessments of agenda control.     

Black Political Representation: An Examination of Legislative Activity Within U.S. House Committees

How minority legislators influence policy development in Congress remains a relevant question for those interested in race and political representation. This article addresses this question using evidence from participation in committee work—a vantage point that has received minimal attention in scholarship on black political representation. I interpret racial differences in participation in House committees across a range of policy areas, demonstrating that black members participate at higher rates within committees than whites on both black interest and nonracial bills. The results suggest that race has a substantive effect on members' policy priorities and their legislative activity within committees.