Legislative Bellwethers: The Role of Committee Membership in Parliamentary Debate

Political parties and legislators use legislative debates to establish their reputation, challenge rivals, and engage in coalition management, among many other tasks. Yet, existing theories on parliamentary debates have abstracted away from the need for information and expertise, which are costly to acquire. Drawing on the “informational” perspective on legislative organization, we address this problem by arguing that party leaders use committees as training arenas for their backbenchers. They task their assigned members with acquiring specific expertise and then rely heavily on those members during the corresponding debates. We turn to the Portuguese legislature, from 2000 to 2015, to discuss how saliency, government dynamics, and party size affect the use of experts. We test this theory using a novel approach to classify speeches that leverages the texts of legislation as training data for a supervised approach.     

Mandating – a likely scrutiny instrument for regional parliaments in EU affairs?

ABSTRACT

Scrutinising governments lies at the heart of parliamentary activities in EU affairs. This applies to national as well as to regional parliaments, most of which possess a toolbox of scrutiny instruments, including the power to mandate, allowing for the strongest form of scrutiny vis-à-vis governments. The article investigates the existence of mandating tools in the 70 regional parliaments equipped with legislative competences in Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK, whose role in EU affairs has been strengthened by stipulations in the Lisbon Treaty. It is argued that mandating tools are, first, not widely used; second, they are more commonly applied in cases where national parliaments act as ‘policy shapers’ – enabling policy transfer – and if meso-level factors involving territorial politics create further incentives. In sum, the regional parliaments in six member states are still trying to find a place in the maturing EU multi-level parliamentary system.     

Pre-Appointment Scrutiny Hearings in the British House of Commons: All Bark,or Some Bite?

In 2007 British Prime Minister Gordon Brown agreed that House of Commons committees should start holding pre-appointment hearings for key public appointments. This was initially welcomed by MPs, who viewed it as an important step towards limiting executive power and strengthening the role of parliament. However, following the appointment of the Children's Commissioner against the advice of the relevant select committee, many MPs became disillusioned with the hearings. Based on extensive interviews with those involved in the appointments process, this article argues that while committees may lack formal veto power over appointments, they do have considerable influence. Most candidates said they would not have taken up their appointment against the advice of the select committee. So pre-appointment hearings should not be dismissed as pointless, but rather seen as an important mechanism through which committees can exert influence over public appointments. This tells us two important things about the powers of legislatures. First, it confirms that legislative influence is far more subtle than the simple exercise of veto powers, as scholars have long noted. But second, it also demonstrates that even the most central actors in the process (the MPs) may not appreciate this fact.