Keeping national parliaments informed: The problem of European legislation

Since Maastricht there has been a growing realisation in the institutions of the European Union, that the unfettered flow of information is vital to the health of the whole European project. Some moves have been made towards more transparent decision‐making, but progress has been slow and is limited by a culture which values confidentiality, particularly in intergovernmental negotiations. The free flow of information is especially important to national parliaments if they are to exercise any influence in the EU. The House of Commons Select Committee on European Legislation has recently pronounced the scrutiny system to be ‘in deep crisis’ because of chaotic decision‐making and a disregard for the rights of national parliaments. Many Westminster MPs feel frustrated by the difficulty of keeping track of EU legislation. The paper suggests that the ingredients of an improved information system already exist. A wealth of current information can be derived from EU‐related electronic databases and through direct links between the European Parliament and national parliaments. It proposes that a new current awareness service for the House of Commons, distributed via the parliamentary network and as hard copy, could focus information for MPs in a much more accessible way.     

Democratic legitimacy in the European Union: Fulfilling the institutional logic

The European Union's delicate institutional balance between intergovern‐mentalism and supranationalism has been the source of both the EU's successes and its problems. This balance is under scrutiny as representatives of Member States and EU institutions pursue their particular visions of democratic legitimacy in the course of the 1996–97 Intergovernmental Conference. This essay examines three competing conceptualisations of democratic legitimacy: the Gaullist view, which associates legitimacy narrowly with national sovereignty; a national culture perspective that posits a unique correspondence of national character and national parliaments; and a parliamentary view that associates legitimacy with the role played by parliaments in scrutinising the behaviour of executives, whether at national or European level. Only the last of these perspectives acknowledges that democratic legitimacy is a continuous variable rather than an all‐or‐nothing concept, and that the EU may therefore accumulate legitimacy by improving both the process and substance of policy making within the logic of existing institutional structures.     

Free voting in a provincial parliament: The case of ‘same‐sex’ legislation in Ontario, 1994

Previous research on parliamentary free voting, which has been confined exclusively to national parliaments and almost exclusively to the British House of Commons, has found relatively little constituency impact on members’ voting decisions, even on the most contentious issues of social policy. Since sub‐national parliaments tend to be smaller, less professionalised, and (arguably) ‘closer to the people’, it is possible that a more significant ‘constituency connection’ might be observed in these legislative arenas. This study extends the literature on this topic by empirically examining the fate of a recent homosexual rights bill in the Ontario Legislative Assembly. Contrary to expectations, none of the constituency characteristics used in logistical regression models generates a significant MLE coefficient, suggesting that Canadian provincial legislators may be even less sensitive to constituency preferences than their national counterparts.     

To have a voice in the matter: A comparative study of the Swedish and Danish European committees

This article deals with the issue of how the national parliaments might be strengthened in order to decrease the democratic deficit within the EU. It examines the parliamentary European committees in the Danish and Swedish Parliaments and concludes that their potential to influence and control their respective governments’ EU policies mainly depends on the Government's parliamentary base and opportunities for legislative influence open to parliamentary oppositions. Moreover, it examines various organisational aspects of the European committees, including distribution of tasks and internal co‐ordination within the Parliament, at what stage in the decision‐making process the European Committee and the Parliament are involved and information management. With some conspicuous exceptions, Denmark and Sweden have chosen the same organisational arrangements for dealing with EU affairs both in the Parliament as a whole and, specifically, in the European committees. The principal conclusion is that the European committees in Sweden and Denmark are effective means for giving the national parliaments a voice in EU matters, but the article also addresses some reforms to strengthen their positions.     

Mandating – a likely scrutiny instrument for regional parliaments in EU affairs?

ABSTRACT

Scrutinising governments lies at the heart of parliamentary activities in EU affairs. This applies to national as well as to regional parliaments, most of which possess a toolbox of scrutiny instruments, including the power to mandate, allowing for the strongest form of scrutiny vis-à-vis governments. The article investigates the existence of mandating tools in the 70 regional parliaments equipped with legislative competences in Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK, whose role in EU affairs has been strengthened by stipulations in the Lisbon Treaty. It is argued that mandating tools are, first, not widely used; second, they are more commonly applied in cases where national parliaments act as ‘policy shapers’ – enabling policy transfer – and if meso-level factors involving territorial politics create further incentives. In sum, the regional parliaments in six member states are still trying to find a place in the maturing EU multi-level parliamentary system.     

National Parliaments in the European Union: Are There Any Benefits to Integration?

Abstract: Scholars and observers alike agree that the European Union has weakened national parliaments. This article posits that such a view, while generally accurate, ignores ways in which the EU has helped national parliaments in their function as regulators of society. It identifies two key mechanisms: precedent setting and policy transfer. First, the EU has produced laws on topics considered beyond the traditional remit of national parliaments. The EU's intervention has justified the production of unprecedented domestic laws that go well beyond the incorporation of EU principles. This has expanded the legislative reach of national parliaments. The article considers the experiences of Italy and The Netherlands in the area of antitrust. Second, the EU has fostered an environment conducive to cross‐national lesson drawing. The resulting knowledge has helped the design of more effective domestic legislative frameworks. This has confirmed the viability of national parliaments as regulatory institutions. The article examines the Open Method of Co‐ordination and its application to the areas of employment and social inclusion. It concludes with a discussion of parliaments in future Member States and in Mercosur.     

National Parliaments and European Integration: What We Know and Agenda for Future Research

The role of national legislatures in European integration first received serious attention in the mid-1990s in connection with debates on the EU's democratic deficit. Since then, both academics and politicians have entered a lively debate on how best to involve national parliaments in EU affairs. The purpose of this article is to examine critically the state of research on the role of national parliaments in European integration and to use that existing knowledge to suggest avenues for further research. The main argument is that through focusing almost exclusively on scrutiny of European affairs, the literature has failed to acknowledge the multiple constraints that impact on legislatures. There is a demand for more theory-driven analyses of actual behaviour that extend beyond describing formal procedures and organisational choices. Future research should also pay more attention to the strategies of political parties and to the incentives of individual MPs to become involved in European affairs.     

Spokes in the wheel. European affairs and the parliamentary administration of German Landtage

ABSTRACT

Over the last decades, regional parliaments were considered to play a minor role in European affairs. Not only was the salience of the EU low at the regional level, but politicians elected into these bodies also often lacked vested interests and capacities to become more involved in dealing with complex multi-level questions. After the constitutional strengthening of regional parliaments in EU decision-making, this paper considers one under-researched aspect behind the growing appetite of regional parliaments to become more involved in the scrutiny of EU affairs: the role of unelected parliamentary officials. Based on qualitative interviews in 12 German regional parliaments, the authors highlight how regional parliaments exert control over their governments and what role horizontal administrative networks among parliamentary staff play in the engagement of regional parliaments in EU affairs.     

Conclusion: regional parliaments – a distinct role in the EU?

ABSTRACT

Regional parliaments can shape EU policy-making via a range of domestic and European channels. In the context of a renewed interest in the subnational level, this article aims to address three core questions: have regional parliaments really been empowered by the early warning system provisions? Which factors explain differences in strength and mobilisation? Finally, what kind of a role do regional parliaments play in EU policy-making today, now that they have had several years to react to the trend towards multilevel parliamentarism? The authors argue that regional parliaments do indeed have the potential to contribute a distinct perspective to EU policy-making, even if their current level of activity is still low. Their distinctive territorial focus sets them apart from national parliaments. Their level of activity still varies greatly between parliaments depending on a number of factors.     

Challenging Executive Dominance in European Democracy

Executive dominance in the contemporary EU is part of a wider migration of executive power towards types of decision making that eschew electoral accountability and popular democratic control. This democratic gap is fed by far‐going secrecy arrangements and practices exercised in a concerted fashion by the various executive actors at different levels of governance and resulting in the blacking out of crucial information and documents – even for parliaments. Beyond a deconstruction exercise on the nature and location of EU executive power and secretive working practices, this article focuses on the challenges facing parliaments in particular. It seeks to reconstruct a more pro‐active and networked role of parliaments – both national and European – as countervailing power. In this vision parliaments must assert themselves in a manner that is true to their role in the political system and that is not dictated by government at any level.     

An information network of officials? Dissecting the role and nature of the network of parliamentary representatives in the European Parliament

Enhancing the role of national parliaments in the European Union’s decision-making process has for some time been a popular way in which policy-makers have sought to address legitimacy problems in the European Union, the Early Warning Mechanism being only one example. In response to these developments, an increasing number of scholars have addressed the question of how parliaments make use of these powers in practice. An important dimension of the process – the role of parliamentary officials in parliamentary scrutiny and control – has so far been neglected in the literature. Against this background, this article examines the role of the representatives of national parliaments in the European Parliament with the aim of understanding the role and the nature of this ‘bureaucratic network’. While falling short of an epistemic community, these officials play an important role in enabling parliamentary scrutiny through the dissemination of information.     

Parliaments as changing institutions and as agents of regime change: Evolving perspectives and a new research framework

In this review, the scholarly literature dealing with the role and dynamics of parliaments as institutions that undergo change within themselves and that support and enhance change in the larger regime is considered. One central theory of scholarship dealing with parliamentary change, that of legislative institutionalisation, is examined and found wanting as an explanation of change in mature parliamentary institutions. In discussion of analyses of five instances of parliamentary change, it is shown that parliaments can change in a wide variety of contexts and conditions ‐ including such well‐established legislatures as the United States Congress after over 200 years of evolution. There is no ‘end of history’ in parliamentary change, only the possibility of sometimes startling change from what has gone before. The examination of five instances of parliamentary change also supports the thesis that parliamentary institutional change, and regime change enhanced by parliamentary change, are inexorably linked. Finally, a tentative research framework is evolved from the above analyses and proposed as a means for considering the role of parliaments as changing institutions and as institutions enhancing systemic change.     

Parliamentary scrutiny as a function of interparliamentary cooperation among subnational parliaments

ABSTRACT

The paper analyses the scrutiny activities of three different types of institutionalised form of interparliamentary cooperation with participation of subnational parliaments: the Conference of European Legislative Assemblies; the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference; and the Interregional Parliamentary Council of the Grande Région. For the purpose of analysis, the analytical parameters of parliamentary functions are modified and applied to the forms of institutionalised interparliamentary cooperation. It is shown that the exertion of scrutiny activities increases in relation to the age and institutionalisation of an interparliamentary cooperation. Ex ante control, which may consist of as little as demands, develops more easily than ex post control. Moreover, the exercise of the scrutiny function becomes more difficult when the level(s) that populate(s) the interparliamentary cooperation is/are not congruent with the level(s) that populate(s) the executive body of the respective international organisation. Interparliamentary cooperation of subnational parliaments struggles to scrutinise an organisation in which national executives play a major role.     

National parliaments and the European Union: part of the problem or part of the solution to the democratic deficit in the European constitutional settlement?

European integration is as much an opportunity as a threat to national parliaments. The view that national parliaments have been the main losers in the process is not substantiated by empirical evidence. National parliaments have adapted their structures and procedures to keep pace with the increasing scope of integration. This process has included strengthening the constitutional powers of parliaments in some of the member states. The recognition in the Nice and Laeken declarations that national parliaments have an important role in enhancing the democratic legitimacy of the Union and the key provisions of the draft protocols on the role of national parliaments and subsidiarity adopted by the Convention on the Future of Europe will ensure that national parliaments have the opportunity and the means, if they so choose, to be closely involved in Union affairs. Constitutional change at the Union level is likely to trigger normative and procedural change in the member states.     

Regional parliaments in the EU multilevel parliamentary system

ABSTRACT

European integration has created a multilevel political system that is dominated by executive actors. Despite the increasing competences of the European Parliament, a growing EU-awareness of national assemblies and an emerging attention of regional parliaments for EU affairs, the EU polity still lacks a sound parliamentary representation. As the EU presents itself as a representative democracy, the current set-up raises questions from the perspective of democratic legitimacy. The establishment of multilevel parliamentarianism may be part of the remedy. This introduction focuses on the position that regional parliaments take in such a European multilevel parliamentary system. The authors address three relevant questions: what roles do regional parliaments take up in terms of legislation, scrutiny and networking? To what extent are they empowered by the Lisbon Treaty? And what explains the variation in their activities? The authors develop hypotheses that are, to varying degree, addressed by the contributions in this special issue.     

The law and economics of supranationalism: the European Union and the subsidiarity principle in collective action perspective

This article, prepared for an issue devoted to the work of Judge Richard A. Posner, considers the implications of law and economics for the structure of supranational organizations, with particular attention to the application of collective action theory to the relationships among states in the EU. After discussing the connections between this approach and Judge Posner’s work, the article describes collective action theory and its implications for our understanding of the state and of relationships among states. From this perspective, supranational organizations such as the EU can be understood as institutional structures that facilitate collective action among states by reducing the transactions and enforcement costs of making and implementing collective decisions. At the same time, the delegation of authority to supranational institutions creates agency costs for states and their peoples because the interests of the state and its people diverge from the interests of the collective in some instances. Viewed in this perspective, the institutional structure of the EU—like that of other supranational organizations or federal nation states—reflects an effort to strike a balance between collective decision making and local control so as to maximize the collective gains and minimize the resulting agency costs. Understood in these terms, various features of the EU’s institutional design make sense. The ordinary legislative process permits the EU to act without the unanimous consent of member states, thus reducing transactions costs in those areas where collective action is necessary, particularly in relation to the creation and regulation of the internal market. The EU reduces enforcement costs through principles of direct applicability or effects and the supremacy of EU law, which are effective legal restraints in states governed by the rule of law. The institutional structure of the EU also incorporates a representative and deliberative process for collective action that helps control the resulting agency costs for member states and their peoples through supermajority and co-decisional requirements. The collective action perspective also illuminates the function of the subsidiarity principle and the enhanced role of national parliaments in its enforcement.     

Belgian regional parliaments and the European Union: an analysis of parliamentary scrutiny in agricultural and environmental policies

ABSTRACT

Drawing on qualitative case studies of two specific European decision-making processes in the agricultural and environmental sectors, this paper discusses how and why Belgian regional parliaments activated (or not) their control mechanisms to scrutinise their respective regional ministers. The findings show that parliamentary scrutiny of the agricultural and environmental policy fields has undergone a process of institutional and behavioural Europeanisation. Belgian regional parliaments rely mostly on classical parliamentary tools aimed at gathering information and, to a lesser extent, on constraining instruments aimed at influencing their government. Rather than trying to influence the EU negotiations, the MPs try to assess the potential impact of the reforms on their regional policy sectors. The findings also demonstrate that domestic media coverage and political salience of the EU negotiation associated with important implementing powers of regional parliaments have a positive effect on the level of scrutiny conducted by Belgian regional assemblies.     

Independent Discretion or Democratic Legitimisation? The Relations between National Regulatory Authorities and National Parliaments under EU Regulatory Framework for Network‐Bound Sectors

The European legislator, being supported in that regard by the Court of Justice, confers upon national regulatory authorities (NRAs) the exercise of the most important tasks concerned with the regulation of the network‐bound sectors, while at the same time guarantees NRAs a far‐reaching independence in exercising of their discretionary powers and shielding NRAs against other public authorities, including national parliaments. This, in turn, raises many doubts from the perspective of some essential constitutional principles of the Member States, such as, among others, ‘the domain of the law,’ which reserves the regulation of issues sensitive to the citizens as an exclusive parliament's prerogative. It is submitted in this article that national parliaments should play a much more active role in regulating the network‐bound sectors. The main point is to strengthen the protection of fundamental rights of regulated parties and create the real democratic legitimisation of NRAs, while not undermining those regulatory objectives that are already accorded at the EU level.     

European integration from the agency theory perspective

European integration is a process in which national governments look for higher levels of integration and promote new requests for allocations from the supranational authority while the balance between the benefits and costs of the supranational collective action becomes increasingly favourable. This process may be analyzed as an agency problem where different national governments, acting as principals, try to lead a single agent—the supranational authority—to make a decision on the level of integration. In this paper, decisions on integration of equilibrium are studied as the result of a non co-operative two-stage game, where national governments outline their political support strategies in the first stage and the supranational authority decides the level of integration in the second stage. JEL Classification D72     

Strong parliament of a small eu member state: The Finnish parliament's adaptation to the EU

If even the minister participating in the meeting of the Council of Ministers does not know the agenda of the day, not to say anything of whether the minister has all relevant documents available, how can anyone imagine that the Parliament could influence the decisions?

The Finnish Ex‐EU minister Mr Pertti Salolainen (Cons).¹

The article gives a presentation of the Finnish Parliament's early adaptation to EU membership. Our main argument is that the Finnish Eduskunta is stronger that the other national parliaments with respect to dealing with EU issues, because the Eduskunta is pro‐active and because the whole Parliament, all standing committees included, is involved in the preparation of Finnish national EU policies before decisions are taken in the Council of Ministers. The Finnish Parliament is thus in a strong position to influence in advance, on an established routine basis, the position of the Finnish representative in the Council of Ministers. We also point out some practical and informational problems, and analyse the main procedural and organisational reforms inside the Eduskunta. Utilising interviews with the party functionaries in the Eduskunta, the article ends with a discussion on the main problems facing the Finnish parliamentarians, a way forward and some conclusions.