Structuring Committee Decision-Making: Rules and Procedures in US State Legislatures

The rediscovery of rules and procedures as an important element for understanding legislative decision-making has become very apparent in recent summaries of research on Congress and European Parliaments. Institutional factors are now seen as critical factors that structure and restrict how individual legislators can go about their decision-making responsibilities. The goal of this article is to provide a landscape of the evolution of committee system structure in US state legislatures so that future research will be able to test current theories of institutional change. The major conclusion of this research is that US state legislatures have formalised the structure of their committee systems over the course of the twentieth century and that many similarities and few differences exist in committee system structure between US state legislative upper and lower chambers. Further, this article discovers that four distinct dimensions - property rights, codification of basic structure, internal democracy and minority party rights - of committee system structures exist in US state legislative chambers.     

How Parties Create Electoral Democracy,Chapter 2

Parties neither cease to exist nor cease to compete for office when the general election is over. Instead, a new round of competition begins, with legislators as voters and party leaders as candidates. The offices at stake are what we call “mega‐seats.” We consider the selection of three different types of mega‐seats—cabinet portfolios, seats on directing boards, and permanent committee chairs—in 57 democratic assemblies. If winning parties select the rules by which mega‐seats are chosen and those rules affect which parties can attain mega‐seats (one important payoff of “winning”), then parties and rules should coevolve in the long run. We find two main patterns relating to legislative party systems and a country's length of experience with democratic governance.     

Re-election isn't everything: legislators’ goal-seeking and committee activity in Japan

A number of political scientists have explained legislators’ behaviour as a function of their re-election, influence, and policy goals, but these goals are sometimes incompatible. This study seeks to explain under what conditions legislators emphasise the goals of building influence or shaping policy over re-election. The study focuses on Japanese legislators’ Diet committee attendance as a proxy for their attention to an influence or policy goal. It shows that legislators elected from an open-list proportional representation seat are most likely to emphasise building influence or shaping policy, while legislators elected from a district using a single non-transferable vote system are least likely to do so. Legislators are more likely to do so in a non-election year than in an election year. In addition, electorally stronger legislators are more likely to focus on influence or policy goals in an election year, while electorally weaker legislators are more likely to do so in a non-election year.     

Intra-party delegation in the Portuguese legislature: assigning committee chairs and party coordination positions

In European parliamentary democracies political parties control candidate selection, maintain cohesion in the legislature and support governments. In addition to these classic functions, parties also organise the legislature delegating power to legislators, specifically as committee chairs and party coordinators. Delegation is inherently dangerous, involving potential agency loss. Parties, however, have ex-ante and ex-post institutional mechanisms to deal with agency problems. In this paper, a case study is made of the Portuguese legislature, arguing that parties make use of their pivotal role in selecting legislators as committee chairs and party coordinators to keep tabs on legislators to thwart shirking from the party line. This paper finds that political parties use incumbency as an ex-ante screening mechanism of committee chairs and party coordinators in looking for reliable signals of past behaviour to decrease uncertainty. Additionally, evidence suggests that extra-parliamentary party structure is used as an institutional arena for ex-post control of party coordinators.     

Electoral Institutions,the Personal Vote,and Legislative Organization

What is the relationship between electoral institutions and the internal organization of legislatures? Existing research on the U.S. Congress suggests that electoral incentives shaped by the candidate‐centered nature of congressional elections explain the emergence of strong committees in that legislature. Exploring the issue from a comparative perspective, it is argued that the impact of ballot structure on committee system structure is dependent on how legislators cultivate personal votes. Committees will be stronger when legislators supply fiscal legislative particularism (pork), but weaker when legislators cultivate support by delivering extra‐legislative constituency service. Statistical analysis, combining original data on committee design in 39 democratic legislatures with measures of ballot structure and mechanism to cultivate a personal vote (MCPV), confirms the expectation.     

Exchanging Favours: The Predominance of Casework in Legislators' Behaviour in Jordan and Lebanon

Responsiveness to constituents' demands and needs is considered an essential element of representation. Responsiveness takes several forms – service, allocation (casework), policies, and symbolic responses – and legislators usually respond to constituents using a combination of these means. However, this article discusses a category of Jordanian and Lebanese legislators, called ‘Favours legislators’, who respond to their constituents only through casework. These legislators use all tools available to them (party/parliamentary bloc, bureaucracy, and fellow legislators) to improve their access to services important to successful casework. Favours legislators assume that by providing a successful favour, constituents who received the favour will reciprocate in kind and vote and/or encourage others to vote for them.     

Circumventing Legislative Committees: The US Senate

Committees have been established to improve legislation and make expert recommendations. However, many bills do not appear in committees, and how they reach the Senate floor varies in style and strategy. We develop and test expectations for when, as well as how, bills bypass Senate committee proceedings. The procedures legislators use to circumvent committees and what makes committee bypassing more probable are explored. The findings clearly demonstrate that bills introduced by ideologically extreme minority-party members are more likely to bypass committees. We also show a clear shift in the procedural choices senators make as the Senate becomes increasingly polarized. This article highlights the procedural choices members make, how these choices produce differing outcomes, and suggests evidence of positive agenda power for individual minority-party senators.     

民营上市公司财务监督问题——兼评《上市公司治理准则》《证券法》的相关修订

在日本设置监查委员会等三类委员会的公司中,监查委员会和会计监查人为公司财务监督的最终把门人。日本立法者虽然给予了这两大监督机构一定的独立性,但是东芝公司财务造假事件的发生却反映出这两大机构背后的许多问题。我国《上市公司治理准则》和《证券法》对公司财务监督的有关修改难以解决民营上市企业的财务造假问题。在我国,作为民营上市公司内部财务监督把门人的审计委员会和日本的监查委员会一样,有着交叉任职和缺乏专业性的问题,这使得聘任财会专业的专职审计委员显得有所必要。同时,类似于日本的情形,独立性、会计师事务所的强制轮换制度缺失和时间压力是会计师事务所担任我国民营上市公司外部财务监督把门人时所面临的问题,对此可采取的改革措施有赋予审计委员会对会计事务所的选解任权和报酬决定权、限制每年年初前4个月签字会计师审计的公司数量等。     

The Strategic Use of Legislative Voting Procedures

Legislative votes can be taken by roll call—noting the position of each individual member—or by some form of indication (sitting or standing, shouting yea or nay, etc.)—noting only an aggregate outcome. Cameral rules define one method of voting as the standard operating procedure and how to invoke any alternative voting methods. We develop a series of hypotheses related to position taking to explain why, when procedures would typically lead to a vote taken by indication, legislators choose to vote by roll call—a means that makes it much easier for actors outside the chamber to observe the positions taken by individual legislators and partisan blocs. With data from Argentina and Mexico, we test these hypotheses regarding the strategic choice of vote procedures and their relationship to observed party unity.     

Understanding Change in Committee Assignments between Elections: Evidence from the Danish Case

The study of committee assignment politics is very limited in parliamentary systems. Even more limited is the study of the change in committee assignments that occurs between elections. In this article, a first attempt to rectify this, both theoretically and empirically, is presented. What might have an impact on committee reassignments and what relationship one would expect to find are discussed. Using data of all Danish committee assignments 1994–2007, the proposed relationships are tested. The results show that: (1) it varies which parties experience the more change; and (2) it is often related to internal problems, but vote share, seniority and whether an MP is involved in a ministerial reshuffle or not also have a significant influence on change of committee assignments.     

Term Limits,Campaign Contributions,and the Distribution of Power in State Legislatures

Using campaign contributions to legislators as an indicator of member influence, we explore the impact of term limits on the distribution of power within state legislatures. Specifically, we perform a cross‐state comparison of the relative influence of party caucus leaders, committee chairs, and rank‐and‐file legislators before and after term limits. The results indicate that term limits diffuse power in state legislatures, both by decreasing average contributions to incumbents and by reducing the power of party caucus leaders relative to other members. The change in contribution levels across legislators in different chambers implies a shift in power to the upper chamber in states with term limits. Thus, the impact of term limits may be attenuated in a bicameral system.     

Low-cost policy specialisation,district characteristics and gender. Patterns of committee assignment in Romania

ABSTRACT

Committee assignment can influence the efficiency of legislative work, the success of parties in reaching their policy goals and even the electoral fates of individual legislators. Nevertheless, little is known about this process in the legislatures established in the Central and Eastern European democracies. These legislatures faced severe informational, electoral and partisan challenges which raised the stakes of efficient committee-seat allocation. Simultaneously, most parliaments in the region were endowed with strong committees. The Romanian Parliament is representative for this combination of conditions. Drawing on a dataset that covers the careers, sector knowledge, partisan and electoral attributes of all the members serving in five terms of the Chamber of Deputies the article shows that committee assignment is used to facilitate low-cost policy specialisation, district characteristics matter for gaining seats in committees with distributive potentials, while female legislators are confined to committees dealing with feminised policy areas.     

Recurring bills and the legislative process in the US congress

Recurring bills may be interpreted in two very different ways. First, there is the ‘legislative loser’ perspective, which posits that legislators introduce bills repeatedly for symbolic reasons, not intending or expecting them to go very far. Alternatively, there is the ‘softening up’ perspective, which assumes that legislators introduce bills more than once for policy reasons. They first test the waters, making a second attempt more successful. In this research article, we test these assumptions by examining the legislative impact of recurring bill status at various stages in the US House and Senate: initial committee attention, committee passage, attachment to an omnibus package and enactment. The evidence is mixed for the first stage of the process, while the findings for subsequent stages support the softening up interpretation. We discuss the implications for representation and future research.     

State legislative staff influence in health policy making

State legislative staff may influence health policy by gathering intelligence, setting the agenda, and shaping the legislative proposals. But they may also be stymied in their roles by such institutional constraints as hiring practices and by turnover in committee leadership in the legislature. The intervening variable of trust between legislators and their support staff is also key to understanding influence and helps explain how staff-legislator relationships play an important role in designing state health policy. This study of legislative fiscal and health policy committee staff uses data from interviews with key actors in five states to model the factors important in explaining variation in the influence of committee staff on health policy.     

The Effects of Term Limits on State Legislatures: A New Survey of the 50 States

Term limits on legislators were adopted in 21 states during the early 1990s. Beginning in 1996, the limits legally barred incumbents from reelection in 11 states, and they will do so in four more by 2010. In 2002, we conducted the only survey of legislators in all 50 states aimed at assessing the impact of term limits on state legislative representation. We found that term limits have virtually no effect on the types of people elected to office—whether measured by a range of demographic characteristics or by ideological predisposition—but they do have measurable impact on certain behaviors and priorities reported by legislators in the survey, and on the balance of power among various institutional actors in the arena of state politics. We characterize the biggest impact on behavior and priorities as a “Burkean shift,” whereby term‐limited legislators become less beholden to the constituents in their geographical districts and more attentive to other concerns. The reform also increases the power of the executive branch (governors and the bureaucracy) over legislative outcomes and weakens the influence of majority party leaders and committee chairs, albeit for different reasons.     

Re-election and political career paths in the Uruguayan Congress, 1985–99

Given the presumed marginal – or at best the ‘rubber-stamp legitimising’ – character of Latin American legislatures, they ‘have escaped careful scrutiny’. Even in cases where legislatures are supposed to play a much more significant role than the continental average, such as Chile, Costa Rica and Uruguay, knowledge of legislative politics is still far from conclusive. This article studies re-election patterns of legislators in Uruguay during the four post-authoritarian elections. During these elections in Uruguay, we observed a decreasing but still high rate of turnover of legislators. These high rates of legislative turnover are affected by a significant number of legislators who do not seek re-election. While inter-party electoral volatility strongly influences the rates of incumbent re-election, intra-party volatility does not seem to have an impact on this phenomenon. Lastly, the closed and blocked lists in conjunction with the Uruguayan multiple simultaneous vote, and the fact that a legislator belongs to the Senate, are additional institutional features that help to explain the turnover and incumbent re-election in the legislature.     

The hidden electoral connection: analysing parliamentary questions in the Chilean Congress

Legislators in presidential countries use a variety of mechanisms to advance their electoral careers and connect with relevant constituents. The most frequently studied activities are bill initiation, co-sponsoring, and legislative speeches. In this paper, the authors examine legislators’ information requests (i.e. parliamentary questions) to the government, which have been studied in some parliamentary countries but remain largely unscrutinised in presidential countries. The authors focus on the case of Chile – where strong and cohesive national parties coexist with electoral incentives that emphasise the personal vote – to examine the links between party responsiveness and legislators’ efforts to connect with their electoral constituencies. Making use of a new database of parliamentary questions and a comprehensive sample of geographical references, the authors examine how legislators use this mechanism to forge connections with voters, and find that targeted activities tend to increase as a function of electoral insecurity and progressive ambition.     

The talk–listen–respond (TLR) model of representatives on Twitter

Despite the existing research on how elected representatives use Twitter, there are few comparative studies and none that considers Israel, a country that differs from most democracies in its electoral system. This study has two levels of analysis. The first is the country level, in which the author compares and explains how representatives in four countries – the US, Canada, Australia and Israel – use the talk, listen and respond model to achieve their goals. The second is the individual level, in which the author analyses how personal characteristics such as gender and age, and political characteristics such as seniority and membership in the opposition or coalition affect the frequency of use of Twitter. Using quantitative data, it is demonstrated that representatives vary in the frequency of their use of Twitter. On the country level, Australian representatives use Twitter more often than their counterparts in other countries. On the individual level, first-term members, members of the opposition, and older representatives use Twitter more often than those with more seniority, coalition members, and younger legislators.     

Party Strategies,Constituency Links,and Legislative Speech

This article examines how parties organize legislative speech. Electoral incentives and legislative institutions affect speech participation. When electoral systems create personal vote‐seeking incentives, parties are less concerned with screening speeches and more supportive of members seeking to garner name recognition. But in many countries, legislative rules and norms constrain opportunities for individual position taking during the lawmaking debates. We argue that parties resolve this dilemma by organizing speech participation into nonlegislative speeches and lawmaking debates. In each instance, different types of legislators are more likely to speak. We examine the case of Chile and test the implications of our theory with data on congressional speeches.     

Why Information? Choosing Committee Informativeness in U.S. State Legislatures

Using a new dataset drawn from American state legislatures, I modeled the informativeness of legislative committees as a choice over institutions. I found higher informativeness to be associated with better preparedness for information transfer, morepartisan chambers, and higher demand for information combined with greater incentives to control committee assignments. These associations shed light on congressional committee informativeness. A simple model of committee informativeness can predict the informativeness of the U.S. House's committees.