Contested or established? A comparison of legislative powers across regimes

In research on authoritarian institutions, legislatures are portrayed as capable of resolving dilemmas between the leader and opposition members. Nevertheless, repeated interactions between a leader and their ruling coalition can lead to both contested dictatorships, in which institutions constrain the leader, and established dictatorships, in which the leader exercises near-complete control. To date, however, no one has examined the patterns by which powers vary across legislatures in different settings and over time. Using data from the Varieties of Democracy Project on legislative powers between 1900 and 2017, we conceptualize changes in the powers afforded to the national congress to characterize the development of regimes in either direction. The study expounds on the content of legislatures across regimes and the ways in which they change, encouraging scholars to further consider the relationship between regime dynamics and legislative institutionalization.     

Who wins the most when everybody wins? Predicting candidate performance in an authoritarian election

ABSTRACT

What explains the variation in vote shares received by candidates in single-party authoritarian elections where everybody wins? The scholarly literature has often ignored institutional variations, treated all authoritarian elections as similar, and explained the variation of vote shares as a consequence of clientelism, coercion or electoral fraud. We employ a unique data set for Cuba’s 2013 National Assembly election to show an alternative answer: even in authoritarian regimes, institutional settings shape voters’ behaviour and candidates’ strategies. When the number of candidates on the ballot equals the number of parliamentary seats and yet voters can express some preference among multiple candidates, valence can become a predictor of candidate performance. Voters reward high-quality politicians, but not incumbents or Communist Party members, while candidates have no incentives to actively distinguish themselves and converge toward the general support of the single united slate.     

Are lions democrats? The impact of democratization on economic growth in Africa, 1980–2010

If we look back at the past two decades, timing seems to point to a close connection between democratic reforms and economic growth in sub-Saharan states. Most countries in the area introduced multiparty politics and made dramatic – if incomplete – democratic progress between 1990 and 1994. Quite strikingly, it is exactly from 1994 to 1995 (and particularly from 2000) that the region began to undergo a period of significant economic progress. Because of the undeniable temporal sequence experienced in the region – that is, first political reforms, then economic growth – some observers pointed to a nexus between democratic progress and economic performance. But is there evidence in support of a causal relationship? As of today, no empirical research has been conducted on the democracy–growth nexus in the early twenty-first century's so-called “emerging Africa”. To fill this gap, we discuss the different arguments claiming an economic advantage of democracies, we present our theoretical framework and carry out an empirical analysis of the growth impact of political regimes in 43 sub-Saharan states for the entire 1980–2010 period. Our findings confirm that African countries, many of which had long suffered the combination of authoritarian rule and predatory practices, derived some economic dividends from democratic progress.     

Does economic inequality breed political inequality?

Does economic inequality generate political inequality? While there is a large literature on the effect of inequality on regime change and support for democracy, there is little research on its effect on political equality across socioeconomic positions. Yet democracy and political equality, although related, are distinct concepts. While political power tends to be more evenly distributed in democracies than in autocracies, there is substantial variation in both regime types. This study argues that economic inequality should decrease political equality through multiple mechanisms: (1) it increases the resources of the rich relative to the poor; (2) it widens the gap in policy preferences across income groups; (3) it reduces participation; and (4) it depresses support for democracy. Using three measures of inequality and data on more than 140 countries between 1961 and 2008, it was found that economic inequality tends to increase political inequality, even when one controls for the level of democracy. Results hold when the sample is restricted by regime type. Finally, evidence in favour of the mechanisms is provided.     

民主的倒退与民主的尴尬：泰国政变的合法性分析

2006年9月,泰国军队发动政变推翻了他信看守内阁,接管了国家权力。这次政变的爆发,与他信政府在利益、道德等方面发生一定程度的合法性危机有关,也与泰国民主发展不完善,即民主的尴尬有关。军事政变一方面作为结束遭遇合法性问题的统治者的手段具有一定的合理性,但另一方面它严重影响了泰国的民主化进程。完善的民主制度是解决政治纷争的有效方法,只有它才能为政治体系提供长久的合法性基础。     

Party research: Western European bias and the ‘African labyrinth’

For a long time Africa's political parties have been neglected in political science research, although they have mushroomed during the last decade and are being seen as crucial for the democratic development of the continent. Part of the neglect was due to the very specific western European bias of political science party research, while Africanists claimed the uniqueness of the subject. Despite this bias, the article argues that the framework of established party research can be applied to African parties as well – provided that some modifications are considered. These necessary modifications are explained for four ‘fields’, namely the functionalist approach, the cleavage model, the inclusion of informal politics, and finally whether a distinctively ‘African’ or a universal party typology approach should be applied.     

Why do some Arab citizens see democracy as unsuitable for their country?

Why do some Arab citizens regard democracy favourably but see it as unsuitable for their country? Modernization theory contends that economic development creates modern citizens who demand democracy. Cultural theories see Islam and democracy as incompatible. Government performance theories argue that citizens who perceive the current authoritarian government as acting in a transparent manner will demand greater democracy. I argue that attitudes toward democracy are shaped by beliefs about its political, economic, and religious consequences, including those related to sectarianism. I test this consequence-based theory using Arab Barometer data from six nations. Sixty percent hold favourable views of democracy generally and for their country, while 7% reject democracy. Twenty-seven percent support democracy generally but see it as unsuitable for their country. Beliefs that democracy will have negative consequences and perceptions of poor government performance are the most important predictors of democracy's unsuitability. Modernization theory receives support, but Islamic identity and beliefs do not consistently predict attitudes in the expected direction. These findings offer a more nuanced understanding of Arab public opinion and suggest that concerns about the consequences of free elections affect support for democracy as much as assessments of the political and economic performance of the current authoritarian regime.