Using civil society as an authoritarian legitimation strategy: Algeria and Mozambique in comparative perspective

Recent research on civil society in authoritarian regimes shows that civil society can contribute to legitimating authoritarian rule. This finding has not, however, been connected with the nascent literature on authoritarian regime legitimation. This article seeks to bridge this gap by synthesizing the relevant theoretical literature and presenting an in-depth comparative analysis of Algeria and Mozambique. We argue that in both cases the ruling authoritarian regime has used civil society as a legitimation tool. The article identifies five patterns according to which authoritarian regimes can use civil society for legitimation purposes.     

The three pillars of stability: legitimation,repression, and co-optation in autocratic regimes

Why do some autocracies remain stable while others collapse? This article presents a theoretical framework that seeks to explain the longevity of autocracies by referring to three pillars of stability: legitimation, repression, and co-optation. These three causal factors are derived by distilling and synthesizing the main arguments of classic and more recent research efforts. Particular emphasis is paid to re-incorporate legitimation in the explanation of stable autocracies. The article conceptionalizes the three pillars and discusses methods of concrete measurement. It then moves on to explain the stabilization process. How do these pillars develop their stabilizing effect? It is argued that reinforcement processes take place both within and between the pillars. They take the form of exogenous reinforcement, self-reinforcement, and reciprocal reinforcement. To illustrate the inner logic of these processes, I draw on empirical examples. I also state what we would need to observe empirically and how we can approach the three pillars methodically. A theoretical framework of this nature has two advantages: it is able to take the complexity of autocratic regimes into account while remaining parsimonious enough to be applicable to all autocratic regimes, irrespective of their subtype; and it integrates a static view to explain stability, with the emphasis on the underlying stabilization mechanisms and facilitates within-case and cross-case comparisons.     

Internationalized regimes: a second dimension of regime hybridity

Traditional approaches have conceptualized political regimes almost exclusively with reference to domestic-level political factors. However, many current and historical political regimes have entailed a major role for international actors, and in some cases the external influence has been so great that regimes have become internationalized. This article explores the concept of ‘internationalized regimes’ and argues that they should be seen as a distinct form of hybrid regime type that demonstrates a distinct dimension of hybridity. Until now, regime hybridity has been conceived along a single dimension of domestic politics: the level of competitiveness. Yet, some regimes are characterized by a different type of hybridity, in which domestic and international authority are found together within a single political system. The article explores the dynamics of internationalized regimes within three settings, those of international occupation, international administration and informal empire.     

Mapping ‘Hybrid Regimes’: Regime Types and Concepts in Comparative Politics

This article addresses the conceptual challenges involved in mapping political regimes. The first section offers a critique of regime typologies that adopt a uni-dimensional approach to differentiating between political regimes. The second section shows why a two-dimensional typology is better grounded in liberal democratic theory as well as for analytically grasping the empirical variation between political regimes and regime change. The penultimate section proposes a classificatory scheme on the basis of a clear set of defining attributes of the two constitutive dimensions of liberal democracy – electoralism and constitutionalism. Equipped with this two-dimensional classificatory device the article proceeds in the last section to propose a regime typology with four main types of regime: democratic, constitutional-oligarchic, electoral-autocratic, and authoritarian. This provides a conceptual map in which the categories and subcategories developed by the literature on hybrid regimes can be located and analytically related to each other. The last section further divides the category of democratic regimes into four subtypes: liberal, constitutional, electoral, and limited.     

Terrorist Assassination and Institutional Change in Repressive Regimes

ABSTRACT

Missing from the political violence literature is an in-depth and systematic examination of the effects of terrorist assassination on state political institutions in repressive regimes. By broadening the scope and depth of empirical research into terrorist assassinations, the potential exists to enhance our understanding of the outcomes of assassination by terrorist actors as well as our overall understanding of political violence in repressive regimes. Utilizing survival analysis and data from the Global Terrorism Database, the Polity IV Project, and the Political Terror Scale, this project focuses on the post-terrorist assassination institutional outcomes in repressive regimes. While the effects are long-term, the most repressive regimes are the most likely to experience political institutional shifts in the wake of terrorist assassinations. The direction of the institutional shifts is mixed, but results indicate that the level of state repression in existence prior to a terrorist assassination matters to post-terrorist assassination outcomes.     

Democracy,autocracy and the news: the impact of regime type on media freedom

Mass media is critical for the functioning of every contemporary political system. Thus, we can expect a variation in media freedom depending on the type of government since political regimes differ with regard to the political, legal and economic framework in which news coverage operates. This article investigates the effects of regime types, namely democracy and autocratic subtypes, on media freedom. It is argued that regime legitimation and governance are the driving forces behind diverging media policies in autocracies. From this theory, hypotheses regarding media freedom and regime type are derived and tested empirically, relying on statistical analyses that cover 149 countries over a period from 1993 to 2010. The empirical results demonstrate that democracies lead to significantly higher levels of media freedom than autocracies, with other things being equal. Within the autocratic spectrum, electoral autocracies, monarchies and military regimes have the freest media, whereas the most illiberal media can be found in communist ideocracies, where the ruling party holds a communication monopoly. Media freedom in personalist and non-ideological one-party regimes is on an intermediate level.     

An externally constrained hybrid regime: Hungary in the European Union

The paper focuses on the unique, role model characteristics of the Hungarian hybrid regime, the Hungarian political system’s new incarnation forged in the past years’ democratic backsliding process. Following the short review of the main hybrid regime literature and the key analyses putting the democratic quality of the Hungarian political system under the microscope, the paper argues that Hungary’s European Union (EU) membership, the competencies of EU institutions, and the scope of EU law have played a crucial role in the development of the system’s unique characteristics. Based on this argument, the paper qualifies Hungary as an “externally constrained hybrid regime”. However, the EU does not only fulfil system constraining functions regarding the Hungarian regime, but performs system support and system legitimation functions as well. Ultimately, the changing scope of these functions, determined by the European integration’s internal dynamics, influences first and foremost the Hungarian power elite’s strategic considerations about the country’s future EU membership.     

Personal rule,neopatrimonialism, and regime typologies: integrating Dahlian and Weberian approaches to regime studies

The concepts of personal rule, neopatrimonialism, sultanism and related conceptual labels have been widely used in political research, yet remain inadequately conceptualized. To make it a useful analytical category for comparative research, this article clarifies the concept of personal rule, derives its minimal definition and shows its proper genus, state authority structure. A new typological framework is advanced as an improved conceptual scheme that is able to capture variation on two salient dimensions of contemporary regimes in the developing and postcommunist worlds, the extent of political competition and the type of state authority structure.     

Rhetoric,Legitimation, and Grand Strategy

This introductory framing paper theorizes the role of legitimation—the public justification of policy—in the making of grand strategy. We contend that the process of legitimation has significant and independent effects on grand strategy's constituent elements and on how grand strategy is formulated and executed. Legitimation is integral to how states define the national interest and identify threats, to how the menu of policy options is constituted, and to how audiences are mobilized. Second, we acknowledge that legitimation matters more at some times than others, and we develop a model specifying the conditions under which it affects political processes and outcomes. We argue that the impact of legitimation depends on the government's need for mobilization and a policy's visibility, and from the intersection of these two factors we derive five concrete hypotheses regarding when legitimation is most likely to have an impact on strategy. Finally, we explore who wins: why legitimation efforts sometimes succeed in securing public assent, yet at other times fall short. Our framework emphasizes what is said (the content of legitimation), how it is said (technique), and the context in which it is said. We conclude by introducing the papers in this special issue, revisiting the larger theoretical stakes involved in studying rhetoric and foreign policy, and speculating about how changes in the technologies and sites of communication have, or have not, transformed legitimation and leadership in world politics.     

Authoritarian backsliding and the concentration of political power

This article introduces the concept of authoritarian backsliding as a class of strategies for the concentration of incumbent political power in hybrid regimes. Such actions include manipulating elections, violating civil liberties, creating an extremely uneven playing field for the opposition, and reducing the institutional constraints on executive power. While often falling short of a full regime change, backsliding can significantly alter the level of political competition in a country and reduce the quality of its political life. This article develops a theoretically-grounded strategy to identify and measure backsliding events since 1989, showing that they have been much more common than is typically appreciated. The article also shows the utility of the concept of backsliding for better understanding regime stability. Using cross-national analysis of backsliding events from 1989–2004, we find that threats such as opposition electoral gains or economic crises in resource-dependent regimes create incentives for authoritarian backsliding.     

Hitting the saturation point: unpacking the politics of bureaucratic reforms in hybrid regimes

How do the survival incentives facing incumbents in hybrid regimes affect the engineering of bureaucratic reforms? This article tackles this question by departing from the literature on competitive authoritarianism and with the help of detailed empirical evidence from Georgia’s public administration reforms (2004–2012). It first argues that in order to preserve their hold on power, dominant parties have to tilt the political playing field, while still upholding popular support. I posit that this dual incentive structure leads the incumbents to promote efficiency of public service, but to also curb these policies at a point that would jeopardize their ability to use administrative resources for partisan ends. Consequently, bureaucratic reforms reach a saturation point, beyond which no more reforms can be endured.     

Historical legacies,clientelism and the capacity to fight: exploring pathways to regime tenure in Tanzania

While regimes in countries like Cameroon, Guinea, Togo and Tanzania have survived the transition from single to multiparty rule, this article suggests two unique characteristics for the case of regime tenure in Tanzania. First, while transitions in other cases were characterized by widespread protests and/or popular opposition movements, opposition in Tanzania's transition environment was minuscule by comparison. Secondly, while repression is still widespread in Tanzania, overt repression appears to be less prevalent in Tanzania when compared to most other strong tenure cases. This study first explores the comparative role of overt repression as a viable explanation for the strong tenure of the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM). Upon closer examination, however, the article argues that accounting for the structures and processes that shape the capacities of political actors to engage in political battles might provide for a more complete appreciation of the CCM's ability to remain the country's dominant political actor, despite the multiparty transition.     

The enfranchisement of resident aliens: variations and explanations

What explains the timing of the liberalization of citizenship laws? Although scholars have offered a number of competing explanations for differences among citizenship regimes, few have examined the timing of liberalization and retraction of rights for non-citizens. To investigate the timing of both liberalization and reversal, this study examines the historical expansion of voting rights for non-citizen residents (VRA). Given both the symbolic and substantive consequences of VRA, democracies may proceed slowly when liberalizing political rights and may retract them quickly. Two bodies of scholarship offer competing explanations. The “national resilience” thesis suggests that differences in cultural definitions of citizenry, political institutions, and social policies produce national citizenship regimes that evolve slowly. By contrast, the “policy constraints” thesis asserts that domestic institutions enact human rights norms that expedite convergence around a common set of political rights. This study tests these explanations by examining the timing of liberalization of VRA in 25 democracies between 1975 and 2010. It finds factors that drive the timing of liberalization differ from those that cause the reversal of rights. While policy constraints best explain the timing of liberalization, policy constraints interact with national resilience factors to explain the retraction of rights.     

Time for a haircut: political regimes and sovereign debt restructurings

ABSTRACT

Conventional wisdom claims that reputation leads sovereign states to full debt repayment. However, defaults are recurrent, some debtor countries take a lot of time to end them, and some extract costly concessions from investors. This article argues that these differences are largely explained by the political regimes in the borrowing countries. While previous research examines whether democracies make more credible commitments, we analyze how democracies affect bargaining with foreign investors after a default occurs. Democracies, with their institutional checks, electoral uncertainty, greater transparency, and public deliberation, make swift decision-making harder, create incentives to pander and posture, and give leverage to minimize the win set of viable agreements. We test our theory on a comprehensive dataset of debt restructurings with private creditors in the period 1975–2017. The event history analysis indicates that democracies experience longer restructurings and the double-hurdle regression analysis shows that democracies obtain larger creditor losses. Further, there is interesting variation among democracies and autocracies. Our findings suggest that political regimes are crucial to explaining why cooperation fails in international debt markets.     

Configuring authority over electoral manipulation in electoral authoritarian regimes: evidence from Mexico

How do electoral authoritarian autocrats choose strategies for manipulating elections? Most scholars assume that autocrats strategize all electoral manipulation from above, with local regime agents charged with carrying out these top-down strategies. In contrast, a few assume that local regime agents strategize all electoral manipulation from the bottom up. More likely, reality lies in between. To make this point, I build an argument for how autocrats might configure the distribution of decisions over electoral manipulation among regime agents. I argue that autocrats delegate decisions about electoral manipulation to local regime agents in core regime districts – to ensure aggregate support – and to regime agents in recently marginal regime districts – to ensure territorial control. In contrast, autocrats determine strategies in long-time marginal districts and in those turned adverse to the regime. Statistical analysis of a unique political reform in one state in electoral authoritarian Mexico – where autocrats transferred the authority to restrict political rights and the secret ballot to some regime agents but not to all – supports the argument. It also reinforces the proposition that wholly centralized/decentralized decision-making about electoral manipulation only occurs under specific political conditions, raising questions about the empirical validity of these assumptions in current research.     

How authoritarian rulers seek to legitimize repression: framing mass killings in Egypt and Uzbekistan

How do authoritarian rulers legitimate repressive actions against their own citizens? Although most research depicts repression and legitimation as opposed strategies of political rule, justified coercion against some groups may generate legitimacy in the eyes of other parts of the population. Building upon this suggested link between legitimation and repression, this article studies the justifications of mass killings. To this end, framing theory is combined with recent research on the domestic and international dimensions of authoritarian rule. We contend that frames are directed towards specific audiences at home and abroad. Moreover, given the common threats at the global level and the diffusion of repressive tactics, we assume that learning processes influence discursive justifications of repression in authoritarian regimes. We provide an analysis of government rhetoric by comparing the protest crackdowns of Rabi’a ‘Adawiya Square in Egypt and Fergana Valley in Uzbekistan, taking into account the audiences and the sources of the frames that justify repression. In both cases, we find the terrorism frame to emerge as dominant.     

Borrowing Trouble: Sovereign Credit,Military Regimes,and Conflict

Changes in relative military power in the international system are seen as an impediment to peace. This article will focus on one particular avenue for states to increase their relative military power: sovereign borrowing. States’ ability to borrow inexpensive credit can undermine credible commitments in international relations, but only for those states that habitually use credit for military purposes. I argue that military regimes are more likely to use fiscal resources such as sovereign credit toward military spending, which leads to sudden increases in military power. As a result, adversarial states have incentives to use preventive action against military regimes before these regimes use credit for military purposes. To test this argument, I examine target behavior in militarized disputes as a function of expected borrowing costs credit and regime type. The empirical analysis demonstrates that military regimes, expected to have improved borrowing costs, are more likely to be the target of militarized disputes.     

Legitimacy and protest under authoritarianism: explaining student mobilization in Egypt and Morocco during the Arab uprisings

Political protests constitute a major concern to authoritarian regimes. Existing research has argued that they indicate a lack of regime legitimacy. However, empirical evidence on the relationship between legitimacy and protest participation remains rare. Based on new survey data from Morocco and Egypt, this study investigates whether legitimacy played a significant role in student mobilization during the 2011 uprisings. In doing so, we first develop a context-sensitive concept of legitimacy. This allows us to differentiate the ruler’s legitimacy claims and the citizens’ legitimacy beliefs. Furthermore, we distinguish between two different objects of legitimacy: the broader political community and specific regime institutions. Our empirical analysis suggests that legitimacy had an independent and significant impact on students’ protest participation, yet in more nuanced ways than generally assumed. While protest participation was driven by nationalist sentiments in Egypt, it was motivated by dissatisfaction with the political performance of specific regime institutions in Morocco.     

Are lions democrats? The impact of democratization on economic growth in Africa, 1980–2010

If we look back at the past two decades, timing seems to point to a close connection between democratic reforms and economic growth in sub-Saharan states. Most countries in the area introduced multiparty politics and made dramatic – if incomplete – democratic progress between 1990 and 1994. Quite strikingly, it is exactly from 1994 to 1995 (and particularly from 2000) that the region began to undergo a period of significant economic progress. Because of the undeniable temporal sequence experienced in the region – that is, first political reforms, then economic growth – some observers pointed to a nexus between democratic progress and economic performance. But is there evidence in support of a causal relationship? As of today, no empirical research has been conducted on the democracy–growth nexus in the early twenty-first century's so-called “emerging Africa”. To fill this gap, we discuss the different arguments claiming an economic advantage of democracies, we present our theoretical framework and carry out an empirical analysis of the growth impact of political regimes in 43 sub-Saharan states for the entire 1980–2010 period. Our findings confirm that African countries, many of which had long suffered the combination of authoritarian rule and predatory practices, derived some economic dividends from democratic progress.     

Elite Co-optation,Repression, and Coups in Autocracies

This article provides an explanation for the significant variation in coups in autocracies. The existing theoretical literature focuses on the strategies that leaders use to thwart mass mobilization and survive in power. However, most autocratic leaders lose power through a coup, indicating that the main threats to political survival in autocracies emerge from insiders and not from outside the incumbent coalition. This article focuses on leaders’ strategies to mitigate elite threats and argues that autocrats’ strategies of co-optation and repression within the ruling elite and the armed forces affect the risk of coups in opposite ways. Elected authoritarian legislatures are instruments that leaders employ to co-opt members of the incumbent coalition and are expected to decrease the likelihood of coups. In contrast, purges of insider actors constitute a repressive strategy that depletes bases of support and increases the risk of coups. We find empirical support for these hypotheses from a sample of all authoritarian regimes from 1950 to 2004.