International Missions as a Way to Improve Civil–Military Relations: The Spanish Case (1989–2015)

At the end of the twentieth century (after a long history of coups d’état, a military uprising, a civil war, and a four-decade dictatorship) the Spanish public had serious doubts about the democratic nature of the armed forces. In 1989, the Spanish armed forces first took part in an international mission. Now, after 25 years of continuous active participation in overseas missions, public opinion polls rank the armed forces as the second most trusted institution in the country. International missions have contributed to (1) modernizing the Spanish armed forces; (2) changing the mentality of the Spanish military; and (3) improving Spanish society’s perception of the armed forces’ role. All in all, the armed forces’ performance abroad has helped improve domestic civil–military relations.     

A Russian Citizen in Uniform? Assessing the Applicability of the German Model of Civil—Military Relations to the Armed Forces of a Democratising Russian State

A key element in determining the prospects for success in transforming totalitarian political systems into democratic political systems is the extent to which the armed forces can be included in the democratisation process and brought under constitutional, civilian and political control. In the aftermath of the 1998 financial crisis in Moscow and the probable retreat of democracy in Russia, this utterly critical question assumes even more importance. This article is concerned with the problem of devising a new system of civil—military relations for a democratising post-Soviet Russian state, particularly the relevance of the German citizen in uniform model to the armed forces of the Russian Federation. After a brief history of the German system of civil—military relations, the author proceeds to analyse the German model in detail. The paper then assesses the current context of the Russian state, society and armed forces before evaluating the prospects for the successful application of the German system of civil—military relations to Russia. The author concludes that the German system is inapplicable because Russia does not presently possess the socio-political structures and norms to sustain such a system of civil—military relations. However, the article proposes an immediately viable third strategy for democratising Russian civil—military relations which does not rely either on the inappropriate German model or on meekly managing the intolerable status quo.     

Politics and the Turkish military

As NATO prepares to expand into Eastern Europe, the military of one its longest-standing members, Turkey, is openly at odds with the country’s democratically elected government. Turkish Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan, under pressure from his generals for months, has been forced to concede political power. The military’s successful challenge to civilian authority, in keeping with Turkey’s praetorian traditions, could have dangerous consequences. The very threat that it now struggles against – radical Islam – could deepen its hold on Turkish society as a result of the armed forces’ challenge to the political order.     

Public critic or secretive monitor: party objectives and legislative oversight of the military in Canada

Abstract

This paper analyses how democratic legislatures oversee the military, using Canada as a case. The paper argues that the tendency to engage in intrusive oversight versus reactive oversight is shaped by institutional structures and party preferences. Canadian institutional structures discourage parliamentary defence committees from engaging in intrusive oversight of the armed forces to achieve policy influence, and encourage opposition parties to focus on reactive oversight efforts that complement their vote-seeking preferences. Vote-seeking, the paper argues, incentivises opposition parties to be public critics of the government’s handling of military affairs, rather than informed but secretive monitors of the armed forces. The paper then addresses a key case where the opposition was able to use an exceptional constitutional power of the House of Commons to force the executive to disclose classified information regarding the military: detainee transfers by the Canadian Armed Forces in Afghanistan. This case highlights the trade-offs that parliamentarians face when they demand information to perform more intrusive oversight of the armed forces. This suggests that party preferences are a significant, yet understudied, aspect of how legislatures vary in their oversight of the military.     

Unforgiven: Russian intelligence vengeance as political theater and strategic messaging

The poisoning of former Russian intelligence officer and MI6 agent Sergei Skripal highlights the enduring Russian ardor for poisoning enemies of the state as a warning to others who contemplate disloyalty. Beyond treating the event itself, we explore Russian conceptions of theatrical murder as a peculiar element of state power. We historicize this development and inquire whether assassination as political theater and strategic messaging is a tool embraced in particular by Vladimir Putin or rather emblematic of the Russian state. We explore why and how Putin opted to strike at the moment he did to seek vengeance against Skripal, concluding that a confluence of structural and human factors at the intersection of British government policies with Russian domestic politics led Putin to his decision. We conclude with the implications of these findings for western governments.     

Turkey and the Kurds

Turkey’s military is once again claiming new successes in its 13-year war against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The armed forces increasingly recognise the need for social and economic measures to address the plight of the Kurdish population in south-east Turkey. Among Turkey’s political élite there is also some acceptance of the need for a political solution. But if the Army has become less obsessed with a purely military solution, it shows no willingness to make any concessions to the Kurds’ cultural and national aspirations. There thus appears little end in sight to an insurgency which is increasingly damaging Ankara’s relations with the West.     

Democratising the military: Lessons from Mediterranean Europe

This article analyses the factors and processes involved in democratizing the armed forces of Spain, Greece and Portugal in the 1970s and 1980s. After a brief comparative review of the history of civil‐military relations in the three countries, the article examines the role of societal, institutional (military professional) and international factors in the democratisation process. The article concludes that military professionalism can be a stimulant to intervention and de‐intervention, depending on societal considerations and the perceptions of the military at a given time. Explanations accounting for military democratisation can be found at the level of value‐congruency between society (including the international arena) and the armed forces.     

Myanmar’s intelligence apparatus and the fall of General Khin Nyunt

As Myanmar’s Chief of Intelligence from 1983 until 2004, General Khin Nyunt presided over the development of a large and powerful security apparatus that underpinned military rule and played a major role in the country’s international relations. So influential did the key military intelligence organisation become, however, that it was seen as a threat by other parts of the armed forces, including the ruling State Peace and Development Council. In 2004, Khin Nyunt was arrested and his intelligence empire largely dismantled. The purge seriously weakened the regime’s capabilities, but was considered necessary to maintain its position as the supreme arbiter of power in Myanmar.     

Burma's intelligence apparatus

Since it regained its independence in 1948, Burma has developed a complex structure of intelligence and specialized security agencies. After General Ne Win's coup d'etat in 1962, and led by the Military Intelligence Service (MIS), this apparatus was completely dominated by the armed forces, which used it not only to gather combat‐related intelligence but also to stamp out any challenges to continuing military rule. So powerful did the MIS become that, at times, it was seen as a threat to the Ne Win regime, and purged of key personnel. After the creation of the State Law and Order Restoration Council in 1988, the resources devoted to Burma's intelligence agencies greatly increased. Under the Directorate of Defence Services Intelligence, more attention was given to purely military intelligence, but there was also closer surveillance of both the armed forces and the civilian population. Since late 1997, this policy has continued under the State Peace and Development Council. Several intelligence failures in recent years, however, have raised serious questions about the ability of even this expanded apparatus to meet all the demands being placed upon it.     

The Trump administration and the Russia probes

Special Counsel Robert Mueller heads the most aggressive of five investigations of possible collusion between US President Donald Trump's campaign and Russia to influence the 2016 US presidential election. Trump has continued to pursue a conspicuously friendly relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Trump will probably continue to attack the special counsel’s legitimacy and avoid unequivocally acknowledging Russian interference for as long as possible.     

Domestic Attitudes Towards International Jurisdiction over Human Rights Violations

Building on research regarding the influence of national identity salience on attitudes towards international institutions and the impact of nationalism on foreign policy preferences, in a case study of America, I explore the role of chauvinistic nationalism to understand its impact on attitudes towards international jurisdiction of punishment for alleged human rights violations by members of the American military. Using binomial regression of survey responses from the 2014 Cooperative Congressional Election Study, I find that respondents with higher levels of chauvinistic nationalist sentiment also have higher levels of opposition to the jurisdiction of international legal institutions to prosecute members of a nation’s military. This study is the first of its kind to offer a systematic and multivariate explanation for public opinion towards the jurisdiction of international human rights institutions over a nation’s armed forces using national survey data.     

The relationship between crime victimization,corruption, and public attitudes of Mexico’s armed forces

This paper studies the relationship between self-reported crime victimization, perceptions of corruption, and attitudes of Mexico’s armed forces. We find that perceptions of corruption along with individual and state-level factors are important predictors of support for Mexico’s Army and Navy. While crime and violence have had a tremendous impact on Mexican society, crime victimization does not seem to undermine public support for the armed forces. In contrast, corruption in these institutions does undermine support. Given the historical and contemporary significance of the armed forces, this research has significant implications for the role of the coercive apparatus of the Mexican state.     

Perpetuating the Military Myth – Why the Psychology of the 2014 Australian Defence Pay Deal Is Irrelevant

There is a widespread belief that members of the armed forces have a unique psychological relationship with their institution and their nation, and that it is this relationship that leads to loyalty and self‐sacrifice. Yet this ‘military myth’ does not hold. Many soldiers serve for ‘occupational’ rather than ‘institutional’ reasons, and as the experience of private military contractors demonstrates, this need not reduce operational effectiveness. In this article, we argue that the concern expressed in the recent commentary in this journal by Williamson et. al. (2015) that the dispute over the 2014 Australian Defence Pay Deal may damage the ‘psychological contract’, turn it from ‘relational’ to ‘transactional’, and undermine operational effectiveness is unfounded and seems to buy into this military myth.     

Taming the tigers? Reforming the security sector in Southeast Asia

Abstract

Despite global trends towards military reform characterized by processes of professionalization and democratization, militaries in Southeast Asia have continued to play prominent roles in domestic politics since 11 September. This suggests that wider patterns of global military reform have not had as great an impact on the control, capacity and cooperative functions of armed forces in Southeast Asia as they may have elsewhere. In order to explore why the security sector reform agenda has had so little impact in the region, we investigate recent patterns of civil–military relations in Southeast Asia by focusing on the experiences of four of the region's militaries: Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia. We argue that the security sector reform agenda is informed by a predominantly North American approach to civil–military relations based on a number of core assumptions that do not reflect Southeast Asian experiences. Hence, we ask whether the reform agenda itself could be modified to better suit the Southeast Asian context. We suggest that although the regional military sector has not reformed along a ‘Western’ path it is nonetheless possible to see other types of, and potential for, reform.     

Britain and its Armed Forces Today

As defence becomes a political football once again this article examines the relationship of the UK's military with the country from which it is drawn and which it serves. It argues that all three elements of the classic Clausewitzian trinity: the state, the people and the military, there are major problems. These are undermining the capabilities of the armed forces and will ultimately place far greater limitations on future government's use of the armed forces in support of British policies overseas. This will have significant implications for Britain in the future if it wishes to continue to "punch above its weight".     

武装力量与建国大业——首届全国政协中的军队代表及其政治影响

“人民政协为新中国的建立做出了重大贡献。”人民军队也为人民政协的召开和新中国的成立做出了重大贡献。解放军是新政治协商会议的筹备者,也是第一届全国政协会议的重要组织者和参与者。新政治协商会议筹备会由23个单位共134人组成,解放军是筹委会委员最多的单位之一。第一届政协代表中不仅有一批威名远扬的著名将帅,也有很多可歌可泣的战斗英雄,解放军代表也是第一届全国政协会议中的大明星。在首届政协代表中,还有一批引人注目的“特殊”代表,即来自国民党军队的起义或投诚人员。第一届全国政协会议中大量军人代表的存在,在一定程度上明确展示和充分表明了武装力量在新中国政权建设中的重要地位和积极作用。     

United Nations Peacekeeping and Civilian Protection in Civil War

Does United Nations peacekeeping protect civilians in civil war? Civilian protection is a primary purpose of UN peacekeeping, yet there is little systematic evidence for whether peacekeeping prevents civilian deaths. We propose that UN peacekeeping can protect civilians if missions are adequately composed of military troops and police in large numbers. Using unique monthly data on the number and type of UN personnel contributed to peacekeeping operations, along with monthly data on civilian deaths from 1991 to 2008 in armed conflicts in Africa, we find that as the UN commits more military and police forces to a peacekeeping mission, fewer civilians are targeted with violence. The effect is substantial—the analyses show that, on average, deploying several thousand troops and several hundred police dramatically reduces civilian killings. We conclude that although the UN is often criticized for its failures, UN peacekeeping is an effective mechanism of civilian protection.     

The political economy of the Kachin revolutionary household

Applying a feminist political economy analysis of the Kachin military movement, this article will be mapping women's involvement in the armed uprising since the outbreak of the conflict in 1961, demonstrating the centrality of gender relations for the war. Using primary data, this article will show how the household provides essential support to the Kachin war effort in the shape of emotional, physical and material labour, thus underscoring the critical role played by women in maintaining the conflict. Examining the relationship between narratives of gendered insecurity in the community and notions of militarized duty, this article will argue that the Kachin armed forces have employed gendered notions of security and duty to legitimize and sustain the conflict. The importance of normative gender relations for providing labour and emotional and material support for the conflict will then be examined, showing how the household is situated as the nucleus of the armed revolution. The findings in this article thus reveal a need to take into account the relationship between the household and the armed conflict, arguing that the household is a site inseparably linked to nationalistic objectives, underpinning the economic and ideological structures of military movements. Interventions aiming at resolving the conflict in Kachin must therefore consider the importance of gender relations in upholding the political-economy infrastructure of the military movement.     

Soviet Espionage in Israel, 1973–1991

In June 1967, the Soviet Union abruptly cut off diplomatic relations with Israel and withdrew its embassy staff from Tel-Aviv, including its large KGB Rezidentura. To develop new sources of intelligence in Israel, the KGB recruited under duress hundreds of Russian Jews to spy in Israel in return for allowing their families to leave the Soviet Union. Most of these ‘recruits’ abandoned their task once they reached Israel, leaving Soviet intelligence with only a small number of agents in Israel who were handled by KGB illegal case officers working out of Russian churches. These agents were able to make careers in Israel and obtain some access to confidential military information, but generally failed to reach Israel's inner circle of political and military decision makers. This inner circle was only breached in 1983 by the treachery of a highly placed former Mossad officer who offered his services to the Soviets and became the KGB's best source for secret information deep inside the Israeli government.     

Unravelling the Putin Myth: Strong or Weak Caesar?

Having left office, the legacy of Putin will be examined in a multitude of different ways and from a variety of contrasting positions. The approach suggested here is that Putin can be seen as a leader who embarked upon a series of Caesarist strategies in order to create a stable and distinct sociological base for the post-communist Russian state. Its success can be assessed by whether Putin managed to appear as a 'strong prince' and/or succeeded in harmonising Russian civil and political society towards a hegemonic state, or whether he ultimately failed to solve the problems of instability that were left by his predecessor.