The Kurds’ precarious balancing act in Syria

The Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party’s (PYD) utility to the US-led coalition against the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL, has bolstered its military capability and territorial position in Syria – despite Turkey's opposition. But if the eventual defeat of ISIS results in a scaling back of US involvement in Syria, the PYD will be weakened and will probably seek a more durable alliance with President Bashar al-Assad's regime and its ally, Russia.     

An Assessment of Anti-Satellite Capabilities and their Strategic Implications

ABSTRACT

The success of space-based communications, navigation and reconnaissance programs – in both the commerical and military arenas – presents a significant vulnerability. Intuitively, as the economic importance and military indispensability of space systems grows, so will their attractiveness as targets. Although attacks against satellites would involve significant operational challenges, economic costs and diplomatic risks, it is well within the realm of technological possibility. For example, China's decision to research ASATs is an indication of its long-term strategic goal of weakening America's monopoly on military space capabilities. This essay describes the current capabilities of anti-satellite (ASAT) technology, assesses its military impact and considers its broader policy and security implications. In light of the broad implications of ASAT weapons on the debate about missile defense in particular and space weaponization in general, the author concludes that the best way to protect America's space-related economic and military functions is to avoid ASATs development.     

Reappraising the debate and practice of US strategic ambiguity/clarity in cross-strait relations

Abstract

China's influence in the South Pacific appears to be growing rapidly. Some analysts are concerned that China is on its way to replacing the West as the dominant power and China's rise in the region poses a major threat to the West. However, there is no clear evidence to suggest that China's deepening involvement in the South Pacific is a calculated strategic move for its military security. The move can be strategic mainly in the sense that it has strong implications for China's reunification strategy and it serves China's long-term development strategy. The strategic value of the South Pacific to China's national security is limited at present and will remain so in the foreseeable future. China also lacks the military capability to challenge the US-led West in the region in the years to come. Chinese influence in the region is not deep-rooted and is largely based on its ‘no-strings-attached’ aid and its increasing economic interactions with the region. China has serious image problems in the region and these problems are unlikely to be resolved in the near future. China thus has neither the hard power nor the soft power to become a genuine hegemon in the region.     

To revise or not to revise: the ‘peace constitution’, pro-revision movement,and Japan's national identity

Why do conservative nationalists in Japan continuously seek to revise the constitution despite the past failures, and what is the likelihood of successful revision and its impact on Japan's norm of pacifism and its use of force? The article offers an analytical framework for the issue based on national pride and national security, and argues that the ‘revisionists’ seek to create a new national identity, one that infuses a greater sense of national pride among the public and enables the exercise of collective self-defense, thereby removing Japan's postwar psychological and institutional limitations on nationalism and military activities. The LDP's 2012 draft is most explicit and ambitious in this regard, with the current revision attempt under Abe having the highest chance of success since the 1950s. Successful revision would significantly expand Japan's security activities, particularly within the framework of the US–Japan Security Alliance, and entail the end of Japan's unique postwar institutionalized pacifism, although the norm of pacifism will linger on as a constitutional principle. For a smoother return to the international military scene, the Japanese government must distance itself from historical revisionism and utilize its enhanced military role to promote regional public goods rather than merely protecting its narrow national interests.     

The changing political economy of Taiwan‐Southeast Asia relations

This paper examines the possibility that the United States could ‘capture’ the Asia‐Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and use it to impose America's economic agenda on the region. It discusses Washington's ability to shape the choices of APEC's East Asian members at APEC negotiations to reflect US interests through employing its military, economic, cultural, and ideological resources as instruments of leverage and influence. While interdependence constrains Washington's use of military and/or economic leverage to influence the choices of APEC's East Asian members, the complex bargaining and consensual decision‐making features of APEC further prevent Washington from imposing its agenda on APEC. On the other hand, Washington's capture of APEC could be facilitated if East Asian policy‐making elites were socialized through the APEC process to accept American norms. This would tend to lead to preference convergence since the values of both the US and East Asia would coincide. The analysis suggests, however, that American norms are unlikely to prevail within APEC in the near to medium term primarily because APEC's East Asian members consider East Asian norms to be superior. American culture and especially ideology are not sufficiently attractive to East Asian elites and are thus unable to be used as instruments of influence. For these reasons, the paper concludes that the United States will find it difficult to impose its economic agenda on the region through APEC.     

A weak pillar for American national security: The CIA's dismal performance against WMD threats

American preemptive or preventive military action against WMD-armed adversaries in the future will simply not be feasible without high-quality and timely intelligence. But is American intelligence up to this load-bearing task for the post-11 September national security? This article surveys the Central Intelligence Agency's record of gauging potential WMD threats for more than a decade and assesses its overall performance as dismal. The CIA's recent intelligence debacle against Iraq was one of the greatest in a long series of failures that has publicly exposed the Agency's profound weaknesses. These intelligence failures were due in large measure to the CIA's poor human intelligence collection and shoddy analysis, areas that cannot be remedied alone by the creation of the new Director of National Intelligence post. This article recommends steps needed to increase the quality of intelligence produced by CIA, or elsewhere in the new intelligence community, to move American intelligence in lockstep with military transformation to give the Commander-in-Chief realistic options for countering hostile nation-states or terrorist groups seeking or acquiring WMD.     

An Afrocentric critique of China's security concerns in Africa: The cases of Mali and South Sudan

China's security concerns in Africa has recently become a subject of much academic debate. Most of the academic studies on this subject have wrongly assumed a continental standpoint, which does not take into contemplation the distinctive national captivates of China toward each distinctive African State. Such analytic discourse analysis were also heavily subjected to North [ern] angled perspectives as expressed in either liberal or realist contextual lens, views, and critics. Despite this, the Scholarly discourse on the security concerns of China towards Mali and South Sudan have not been proportionately apprehended. Based on the alternative Afrocentric perspective, this article seeks to employ Mali and South Sudan as test cases to critique the Security Concerns of China toward Mali and South Sudan. The central argument of this article is that, China's Security Concerns towards Mali and South Sudan can best be understood when located within the context of mineral resources complex. Methodologically, this article is based on document review and interdisciplinary discourse analysis in their comprehensive form.     

The Influence of Technology on Space Strategy

The influence of technology on the conduct of warfare and the development of strategy is still largely misunderstood. This confusion also holds true regarding technology's influence on space warfare and the development of space strategy. Judging from history, we can expect that advances in space-related technology will be used in ways commensurate with the current paradigm, especially with respect to military operations. Therefore, space operations will probably play supporting roles to operations on land, at sea, and in the air, at least in the near term. It will likely be some time until the strategic advantages of space-based or space-enabled operations are fully appreciated and effectively employed. Additionally, the historical theory and principles of general warfare remain valid, even when considering military operations in space. While advances in space-related technology or space-based weaponry will not change the fundamental nature of warfare, they are expected to change warfare's conduct and character. Through a better understanding of technology's influence on military operations, it is possible to develop a more complete theory and more fully developed strategic principles of space warfare.     

The Prohibition against Torture: Why the UK Government is Falling Short and the Risks that Remain

While the UK's official position is that it neither uses nor condones torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment (CIDT), it is now a matter of public and parliamentary record that UK security services and military personnel colluded in rendition, torture, and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, both as part of the CIA's Rendition, Detention and Interrogation (RDI) programme, at military detention facilities in Afghanistan and Iraq, and through involvement in the detention and interrogation of prisoners by allied security forces. This paper will explain why the government is falling short of its obligations under international law, and why considerable risks remain that UK intelligence and security services will continue to collude in torture and CIDT .     

Pakistan's Sharif: testing relationships

Nawaz Sharif, Pakistan's new prime minister, faces important challenges if he is to improve his country's economic and security situation, as well as make progress in relationships with Kabul, New Delhi and Washington. His first priority, however, will be to forge a good working relationship with the military.     

Washington's perceptions and misperceptions of Beijing's anti-access area-denial (A2-AD) ‘strategy’: implications for military escalation control and strategic stability

Washington has become increasingly concerned that Beijing's anti-access area-denial (A2-AD) capabilities will put at risk US military assets and forward forces operating in the Western Pacific region, enabling China to deter, delay and deny US intervention in future regional conflict and crisis. US defence analysts in their assessments have frequently, and often erroneously, conflated a Chinese operational capability with an underlying strategic intention that conceptualises the United States as its primary (if not sole) target. The central argument this article proffers is that US perceptions of A2-AD have been framed by specific analytical baselines that have overlooked the evolution of Chinese operational and doctrinal preferences, and over-reliant upon military material-based assessments to determine Beijing's strategic intentions, and formulate US military countervails. The article concludes that the strategic ambiguities and opacity associated with Chinese A2-AD capabilities and its ‘active defence’ concept reinforced Washington's reliance upon capacity-based assessments that in turn, exacerbated misperceptions confounded by cognitive bias of Chinese strategic intentions. The critical framing assumptions of this article draw heavily upon the ideas and rationale associated with the international relations ‘Security Dilemma’ concept.     

Iraq: The Mother of all intelligence failures

The most important American intelligence failure in Iraq was the widespread belief among top administration officials that Saddam could be overthrown at little cost and successfully replaced by a pro-American regime. We trace the causes of these and related intelligence failures to the administration's hubris. It led the Secretary of Defense and Vice President – the men most responsible for the Iraq decisions – to formulate unrealistic expectations about America's ability to impose its will in the Middle East and to rig the feedback networks in the military and intelligence communities to provide them with confirming estimates while downplaying discrepant information.     

CHINA: A GROWING MILITARY SPACE POWER

ABSTRACT

During the last few decades, space has gained considerable importance in many facets of military operations. China has always believed proficiency in space technologies to be an essential ingredient of its overall national strength. Since its beginning, the Chinese space programme has had a definite military orientation. This article examines the impact of Chinese manned space missions and their investment in Europe's proposed global navigation and positioning system (Galileo) on their military space capabilities.     

Determinants and directions for Chinese weapons imports

This article assesses and presents the determinants and directions of Chinese acquisitions of weapons and weapons technology from abroad, focusing on major conventional weapons and their relevant technologies. Following a brief development of historical themes which continue to affect Chinese military‐related imports today, the study considers the principal contemporary domestic and international determinants which contribute to shaping Chinese arms import policies, and the type of foreign arms acquisitions likely to result from those policies. In analysing past and current security policies, weapons development policies, foreign weapons procurement policies, the study reaches four main conclusions. First, a wide range of problems — including prohibitive cost, political and bureaucratic infighting, absorptive capacities, managerial and administrative roadblocks, and supplier controls — stand in the way of a Chinese military modernization strategy based on foreign procurement. Second, with the exception of Sino‐Soviet cooperation in the 1950s, Chinese arms and arms technology acquisitions from abroad have consistently been relatively modest, sporadic, and problematic. Even in the case of current transfers from such suppliers as Israel and Russia, it is unclear the extent to which these countries are willing to part with significant amounts of top‐of‐the‐line systems and technologies. Third, the impact upon international security of the improvement of Chinese military capability through the acquisition of foreign weapons and technology is not likely to manifest itself in violent military disruptiveness, but rather in the nuanced and steady expansion of Chinese power and influence in parts of East Asia around China's periphery. Fourth, the military capabilities of China's arms clients will probably not be significantly improved through the acquisition of foreign weapons and weapons technologies by China. In sum, Chinese military modernization through arms and technology imports will continue to be a slow and painful process.     

The United States’ Syria quandary

Following the collapse of the latest ceasefire, the Obama administration faces increasing pressure from interventionists for more robust military action against the Assad regime. But the United States' military options are problematic. The administration's Syria policy will probably not change substantially before he leaves office in January, though Hillary Clinton – his likely successor – has indicated that she would lean farther forward, in particular by imposing no-fly zones.     

Leadership,regime security,and China's policy toward Taiwan: prospect theory and Taiwan crises

Abstract

Traditional analyses of Taiwan crises have relied mainly on deterrence theory for their explanatory power. This approach fails to account for China's risk-taking behavior, which can be explained by prospect theory. We suggest that Chinese leaders are more likely to use more risky military coercion against Taiwan's pro-independence movements within a domain of losses, i.e., when their regime faces serious domestic and international challenges to its security. Conversely, Chinese leaders are more likely to employ less risky political pressure to oppose Taiwan's pro-independence forces if their decision making takes place in a domain of gains, i.e., when the security of China's regime is not challenged. We conclude that maintaining a good US–China relationship is the best strategy for the United States to help prevent military crises in the Taiwan Strait.     

China's security agenda after the cold war

The end of the cold war has changed China's basic perception of world politics and its conception of national security. In the cold war era, Chinese leaders tended to view national security from the perspective of global balance of power and China's strategic relations with the two superpowers. It was in Beijing's security interests to maintain a comfortable position in a strategic triangular relationship with the Soviet Union and the United States. When the Soviet Empire and the East European communist regimes collapsed, the structure of the postwar international system dissolved, and the old parameters for Beijing's security strategy disappeared. The Chinese leadership suddenly found itself in a totally new world in which China needed to reorient and redefine its security strategy on a new strategic axis.

Beijing's security strategy after the cold war is redefined by its domestic priorities, growing foreign economic relations, the new security environment in Asia, and concerns over territorial disputes. In a sense, the myopic conception of security based on war and peace is fading away. Beijing's thinking on national security becomes more inclusive, diverse, and complicated. The nature and intensity of external threats has changed. China's growing economic ties with the outside world have redirected Beijing's attention to economic interests and security. The Chinese leadership realizes that its security is affected not only by the military forces of other countries, but also by political, economic, societal, and environmental factors in international relations Beijing needs to employ both traditional military defence and non‐military actions to safeguard its territorial integrity and to realize its full capacity in world affairs.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse China's security agendas after the cold war. It first examines the impact of the end of the cold war on China's thinking on national security, then discusses Beijing's threat perception and changing defence strategy. This is followed by an examination of domestic stability considerations and economic interests in Beijing's security strategy. Finally, it discusses the implications of China's growing power for regional security.     

Israel's violated republican equation

Historically, Israel's ability to sustain a situation of armed conflict for a long time was predicated on the republican equation in which the dominant group – the secular Ashkenazim – exchanged military sacrifice for social dominance. Nonetheless, an imbalance between military burden and social rewards, which emerged during the 1970s and1980s, led the middle-class Ashkenazim to undertake collective action aimed at reducing the burden of military service through protest and peace movements, along with more individual tactics. These modes of action, together with the attenuated status of the military, spurred on national-religious and Mizrachi groups to integrate themselves into the traditional equation, or to formulate an alternative one (the Gush Emunim and the Orthodox route). Arguably, the status of each group in the military, which itself saw an erosion in its social status, played a major part in shaping the nature, scope and strategy of each group's collective actions. The groups capitalized on the opportunities that the military offered them in accordance with their capacity to utilize the resources they had at their disposal.     

‘The rock that can't be moved’: China's revised geostrategies in Myanmar

ABSTRACT

Since 2011, Myanmar has undertaken a series of domestic and foreign policy reforms, including democratisation and peacebuilding, before and after the watershed November 2015 elections in the country. These reform processes have called into question whether China, which has been Myanmar's dominant great power neighbour throughout the previous era of military government in the country formerly known as Burma, would find its strategic position eroding as Myanmar further opens to the international community. However, the concept of China ‘losing’ diplomatic ground to other actors, including the West, in Myanmar implies a zero-sum game that does not adequately address Beijing's still-formidable geostrategic presence vis-à-vis its southern neighbour. China has now started to implement a more multi-faceted, ‘resilience network’-building approach to maintaining its special status in Myanmar's foreign policy, a situation which will persist as Myanmar continues its uncertain path towards further reform.     

Defending the Realm: The Appointment of Female Defense Ministers Worldwide

Though the defense ministry has been a bastion of male power, a growing number of states have appointed women to this portfolio. What explains men's dominance over these positions? Which factors predict women's appointments? With comprehensive cross‐national data from the post–Cold War era, we develop and test three sets of hypotheses concerning women's access to the defense ministry. We show that women remain excluded when the portfolio's remit reinforces traditional beliefs about the masculinity of the position, particularly in states that are engaged in fatal disputes, governed by military dictators, and large military spenders. By contrast, female defense ministers emerge when expectations about women's role in politics have changed—that is, in states with female chief executives and parliamentarians. Women are also first appointed to the post when its meaning diverges from traditional conceptions of the portfolio, particularly in countries concerned with peacekeeping and in former military states with left‐wing governments.