China–Taiwan diplomatic competition and the Pacific Islands

Abstract

China and Taiwan have become important actors in South Pacific affairs due to their diplomatic rivalry. Securing the diplomatic recognition of the Pacific Islands countries is expensive for China and Taiwan. There are limits to what the rivals are willing to spend, and they attempt to reduce costs. This dynamic shapes how Taiwan and China engage Pacific Islands politicians. It also motivates their high level official visits to the region, and how they engage South Pacific regional organizations. Despite criticisms that China–Taiwan rivalry corrupts and destabilizes the South Pacific, the issue of whether China and Taiwan's diplomatic rivalry has been beneficial or detrimental to the region remains contentious. China and Taiwan appear to have recently called a truce in their decades-old rivalry. This tacit agreement is still tentative, and the involvement of China and Taiwan in the region has yet to change significantly. However, Taiwan has reportedly begun to reduce funding, and is likely to reform its aid delivery in order to satisfy demands from the South Pacific region's dominant power, Australia, and to improve its image as a humanitarian aid donor. China is also likely to reduce funding while the truce holds. However, China considers its ties with South Pacific governments more important than responding to Australian pressure, and is unlikely to reform its South Pacific aid programmes as a result of the diplomatic truce.     

The more the merrier? Sino-Japanese security relations in the context of complex interstate rivalry in the Asia-Pacific region

Abstract

This paper analyses the evolution of Sino-Japanese rivalry in the security sphere concentrating on the Chinese perspective, and placing it within the wider context of complex interstate rivalry between China, Japan and the United States. From a theoretical viewpoint, this research contributes to the literature on interstate rivalry from multiparty perspective, which has been overlooked in existing research. China–Japan–US complex interstate rivalry includes elements of positional, spatial and ideological rivalry simultaneously. When rivalries mix two or more rivalry types, they become more difficult to resolve. The two broad trends of China’s military build-up and deepening US–Japan alliance evolve in tandem intensifying rivalry dynamics and increasing positional elements of rivalry. There are many indications on various levels that for China, controlling Japan’s international ambitions has become less important and more attention is paid to ways in which Japan helps the United States in reaching its objectives in Asia through their alliance agreement. The cases analysed to display complex interstate rivalry include the Taiwan question, territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas, and the North Korean nuclear issue.     

Asymmetrical rivalry between China and Japan in Africa: to what extent has Sino-Japan rivalry become a global phenomenon?

Abstract

To what extent is China–Japan rivalry a global phenomenon, and what is the nature of the rivalry they engage in outside their own region? Literature on Sino-Japanese rivalry abounds, but it pays scant attention to the relevance of the rivalry outside East Asia. This article argues that Sino-Japanese rivalry has indeed become a global phenomenon, that various forms of the rivalry are evident in Africa, and that they are mostly of an asymmetrical nature. Quantitatively, China’s contribution to Africa is far greater than that of Japan, with the exception of foreign direct investment (FDI). Qualitatively, though, Japan has a stronger sense of the rivalry than China has, revealing a psychological aspect to the asymmetry as well. Contextually, the types of activity that Chinese and Japanese actors carry out in Africa are not necessarily the same, which makes the rivalry all the more asymmetrical. The rivalry has become more apparent recently, not only because of the rise of China but also because of a change in the meaning of ‘Africa’ – from a region of ‘poverty’ and ‘hunger’ to a region of ‘economic opportunities’. That said, Africa – to a greater or lesser degree in each of its countries – still suffers from conflict and instability. As a result, the ability of Japan and China to exert power and influence throughout Africa is somewhat restricted.     

Introduction: Dimensions of Sino–Japanese rivalry in a global context

Abstract

This special issue analyzes the evolving notion of Sino–Japanese rivalry and its effects on concrete foreign policy measures of both states in a global context. China’s emergence as a great power and Japan’s attempts to ‘normalize’ its foreign relations took place alongside both countries increasing their political engagement in world regions beyond Northeast Asia. As a result, there has been increasing mutual monitoring of and increasing concern expressed about the intentions and actions of the respective other on these different levels of world politics. This has largely been neglected in the literature. This special issue closes the gap in the literature by providing answers to the following questions: Is there a Sino–Japanese rivalry in the first place? Which factors define this rivalry? Are there different levels and/or kinds of rivalry? Which factors influence Sino–Japanese rivalry in different regions and on different levels of the international system? Do these factors differ across regional and institutional boundaries? Answering these questions requires us to conceptualize what is meant by rivalry as well as to focus on Sino–Japanese interaction in different world regions and on the level of international institution building. This special issue also contributes to the literature on interstate rivalry by challenging common understandings of the concept of rivalry and by adding new facets and interpretation of rivalry based on the concrete empirical cases. It will therefore provide a broadened perspective on the characteristics of Sino–Japanese relations, the mutual impacts of Japan’s and China’s globalizing foreign policies, and on our understanding of the determinants and mechanisms of interstate rivalries.     

China–Japan interaction in the Middle East: a battleground of Japan's remilitarization

As most studies on Middle East–East Asian relations focus on the interregional dimension, the manner in which relations between East Asian powers influence, and are influenced by, their policies in the Middle East are largely overlooked. Attempting to add another layer to the study of Sino-Japanese relations, this article explores whether Sino-Japanese rivalry extends to the Middle East. This undertaking requires a conceptual distinction between measures related to Sino-Japanese competition in the Middle East and measures which are related to their rivalry. Building on a minimal definition of interstate rivalry, the article argues that neither the effort to secure energy supply nor their economic or political competition there is shaped by their rivalry. The only field that can be associated with that rivalry is Japan's quasi-military activity in the Middle East, which may enhance its security policy's revision. That, in turn, causes much concern and criticism in Beijing, thus assigning the region a certain role in their relations.     

Rivalry in the Middle East? Japan’s CEAPAD initiative and China’s rise

Abstract

Ever since the so-called rise of China has started, Sino-Japanese relations have been increasingly described as a rivalry between both states. For the most part, this assumed rivalry has been analyzed on the global level or within the boundaries of the East Asian region, while the consequences of this rivalry for other world regions, such as the Middle East, have been largely neglected in the literature. In order to fill this gap, this article investigates how China’s growing presence in the Middle East, and in particular regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, influences Japan’s own foreign policy in this troubled region. It utilizes a modified concept of the strategic rivalry approach, called ‘asymmetric rivalry’, which challenges the widespread notion that rivalry needs to be mutually perceived by both sides and thus analyzes the assumed Sino-Japanese rivalry in the Middle East from a Japanese perspective. By focusing on the case of Japan’s CEAPAD initiative, which aims at coordinating East Asian countries’ developmental assistance towards the Palestinian Authority while deliberately excluding China, the present article shows that the perception of Japan’s foreign policy elite of China as a rival decisively influences how Japan’s foreign policy is shaped in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.     

Conceptions of the good,rivalry, and liberal neutrality

Liberal neutrality is assumed to pertain to rival conceptions of the good. The nature of the rivalry between conceptions of the good is pivotal to the coherence, scope and realisation of liberal neutrality. Yet, liberal theorists have said very little about rivalry. This paper attempts to fill this gap by reviewing three conceptions of rivalry: incompatibility rivalry, intra-domain rivalry and state power rivalry. I argue that state power rivalry is the morally relevant conception of rivalry, and that it has significant implications for the scope and realisation of liberal neutrality. I conclude that in the light of state power rivalry, the only feasible liberal neutral state is a very minimal one.     

When War Brings Peace: A Dynamic Model of the Rivalry Process

This study develops a dynamic model of the rivalry process, explicitly connecting the conflicts that form rivalries. The model demonstrates how these conflicts combine to form an especially conflict‐prone relationship. Using numerical simulations of the model, I deduce and test a hypothesis connecting dyadic conflict and rivalry termination. High‐concentration conflicts increase the probability of rivalry termination by causing a sharp and sustained drop in public support for future military action. Dyadic conflict between rivals can bring peace, under the right circumstances. The article concludes with a discussion of the model's implications for policymakers seeking to limit international violence.     

Watching the Race: Where You Sit Affects What You See

States do seem to compete in making welfare policy. This competition,however, does not drive states inexorably toward a race to thebottom. Instead, this competition is a political rivalry ofthe kind that leads to unpredictable and unstable outcomes.This rivalry entails interstate learning and results in adaptation,but it stems from its political utility in appealing to votersand gaining personal recognition in the political arena     

When Doves Cry: International Rivalry, Unreciprocated Cooperation, and Leadership Turnover

Varied research traditions suggest that dovish leaders will be thrown out of office under harsh external circumstances. Below, I elaborate a model of rivalry maintenance that draws on and refines the insight from studies of leadership tenure and foreign policy. Specifically, I expect a leader who offers unreciprocated cooperation to a rival (a dove) to be more likely to be deselected from power than a leader that takes a harder line vis-à-vis the rival (a hawk). I test this expectation using event history techniques and data spanning the 1950–1990 time period and find strong evidence that dovish leaders pay an electoral price within a rivalry context. The findings suggest an internationally contingent domestic incentive to maintain rivalry and conflict over time .     

China and the May 1998 riots of Indonesia: exploring the issues

This paper explores the causes for China's change of policy from silence to making public demands that Indonesia do more to protect its ethnic Chinese population in the wake of the riots in Jakarta and other parts of Indonesia in May 1998. First, China saw it in its own interest to minimize potential damages to its state-to-state ties with Indonesia, allowing as little room as possible for Taiwan to exploit in the long-lasting China-Taiwan diplomatic rivalry. Second, Indonesia, in spite of its domestic problems, remains a country of significance to China in regional issues like the South China Sea disputes. Third, China needed to retain its reputation as a responsible actor in the process of regional economic crisis. Finally, the loyalty of the Indonesian Chinese to China continues to be a question and China could further weaken that loyalty if it contributed to the worsening of their predicament. In short, China may have wished to maximize its possible gains and minimize the potential risks through its action over the May riots.     

New strategies for an old rivalry? China–Russia relations in Central Asia after the energy boom

China and Russia both have interests in bordering Central Asia. China's thirst for energy has seen its footprint expand rapidly in the region relative to that of Russia, Central Asia's historical hegemon. With the two powerful neighbors’ history of competition and conflict, the shift in relative influence between them risks a resurgence of bilateral rivalry. Referencing the scholarly literature on strategic rivalry, this article examines how energy relations have helped shaped the trajectory of China-Russian relations in Central Asia, particularly after the shock that came with the collapse of oil and gas prices in 2008–2009.     

Disruptive innovation and R&D ownership structures

Public Choice - This paper provides a theoretical explanation as to why breakthrough innovations seem to be possible only within capitalist economies (Kornai in Dynamism, rivalry, and the surplus...     

ASEAN as the ‘regional conductor’: understanding ASEAN's role in Asia-Pacific order

This paper analyses ASEAN's prominence in regional order negotiation and management in Southeast Asia and the Asia-pacific through the lens of social role negotiation. It argues that ASEAN has negotiated legitimate social roles as the ‘primary manager’ in Southeast Asia and the ‘regional conductor’ of the Asia-Pacific order. It develops an English School-inspired role negotiation framework and applies it to three periods: 1954–1975 when ASEAN's ‘primary manager’ role emerged from negotiations with the USA; 1978–1991 when ASEAN's role was strengthened through negotiations with China during the Cambodian conflict; and 1991-present when ASEAN created and expanded the ‘regional conductor’ role. Negotiations during the Cold War established a division of labour where great powers provided security public goods but the great power function of diplomatic leadership was transferred to ASEAN. ASEAN's diplomatic leadership in Southeast Asia provided a foundation for creating its ‘regional conductor’ role after the Cold War. ASEAN's ability to sustain its roles depends on maintaining role bargains acceptable to the great powers, an increasingly difficult task due to great power rivalry in the South China Sea.     

Competition in the weapons acquisition process: The case of U.S. warplanes

Consistent with the recent national trend to dismantle or limit the scope of regulatory agencies and controls, the military services are taking increasing advantage of competition to secure low, realistic prices and costs, as well as improved performance and reliability, for weapons and replacement parts. Using the purchase of combat aircraft and related systems as examples, this article assesses the effects of market structure on competition. Although competition can be effective, the unusual incentives flowing from interservice rivalry and the parochial interests of individual legislators often allow contractors to underbid or “buy in” on early development and production contracts and to “get well” on later contracts. Expanding the role of competition within the present institutional framework holds the potential for some improvement in the procurement process. More fundamental change is necessary to alter the role of Congress and eliminate the influence of undesirable rivalry among the services.     

The Saudi–Turkish antagonism

The long-standing rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Turkey has given way to open hostility and a power struggle extending across the Middle East and the Horn of Africa. The antagonism is affecting Ankara and Riyadh’s ties with actors from outside the region and complicating the policies of these actors in the Middle East.     

Understanding the development of fundamentalism

We use economic theory to examine the intensity of fundamentalist sects in which leaders work to enhance their followers’ observance level. We model three stylized situations under which fundamentalist groups function, examining the intensity of observance in each. We find that, under reasonable conditions, rivalry among fundamentalists makes them more extreme.     

Lebanon’s interlocking challenges

Lebanon currently faces major interlocking challenges that threaten its stability. These include potential hostilities between Israel and Hizbullah (as Iran's proxy); Sunni–Shia strategic rivalry in the region; and the erosion of Lebanon's economy by the Syrian civil war.     

Bequests, sibling rivalry, and rent seeking

We examine bequest-sharing rules where sibling rivalry creates wasteful competition for intergenerational transfers. We show that equal division of bequests minimizes rent-seeking expenditures by siblings while primogeniture maximizes rent-seeking costs. Our results lend theoretical support to the empirical findings of equal bequests without appeal to complex models of the parent-child relationship.     

Proportional representation under three voting procedures: An Israeli study

This paper attempts to evaluate, by means of a public opinion survey, the likely effects on the Israeli political system of replacing the extant electoral procedure of proportional SV (where every voter can vote just for one party) with either proportional AV (where voters can vote in favor of as many parties as they like), or proportional CAD (where voters can vote in favor, as well as against, as many parties as they wish). It also shows how the results of proportional AV and CAD enables one to measure the extent of affinity or rivalry existing between individual parties or party bloes. The main results are: (1) These three alternative proportional representation schemes would have considerably different effects in terms of the number and type of parties gaining representation, as well as in terms of governmental coalitions. (2) The extent of affinity (or rivalry) existing between blocs of parties is usually not symmetrical—one bloc can approve (or disapprove) of another bloc significantly more than vice versa. (3) Voters tend to vote sincerely (rather than strategically) under the proportional SV procedure. Theoretical issues and practical implications of these procedures are discussed.