Frozen political liberalization in Jordan: The consequences for democracy

Prompted by serious economic difficulties, in 1989 the Jordanian government launched a series of political liberalization measures aimed at rejuvenating the country's parliament and party politics, and restoring freedom to the media. Despite much initial enthusiasm, the liberalization process has become frozen and there have been few substantive moves toward a meaningful transition to democracy. Two developments have combined to result in this democratization freeze. One is the reluctance of the state to give up many of its powers in relation to the forces of civil society. A second is the inability of professional associations and the emerging parliamentary opposition bloc to formulate and institute viable links within themselves and with other social actors in an attempt to pressure the monarchy for more political concessions. The hybrid, semi‐democratic, absolutist monarchy that has emerged in the process has enhanced its popular legitimacy by adopting certain democratic trappings, which, in the short run at least, appear detrimental to a more meaningful transition to democratic rule.     

How well ordinary citizens understand democracy: the case of the South Korean electorate

How do mass citizens understand democracy? Are they capable of distinguishing it from its non-democratic alternatives? Does their understanding about democracy matter? To reveal the contours of cultural democratization in South Korea, this article addresses these questions largely overlooked in earlier survey-based studies. Analyses of the 2010 Korea Barometer survey indicate that all segments of the Korean electorate, including the young and the college-educated, are neither accurately nor fully informed about what distinguishes a democratic regime from its non-democratic alternatives. Moreover, the study provides strong evidence of democratic learning in that an increase in democratic knowledge leads to committed support for democracy. The findings together imply an urgent need to improve the quality of civic education for the development of democratic political culture in Korea and new democracies.     

Transnational citizenship: problems of definition,culture and democracy

There is widespread disagreement over whether transnational citizenship provides defensible extensions of, or meaningful complements to, national citizenship. A significant strand of criticism relies upon empirical arguments about political motivation and the consequences of transnationalism. This paper addresses two questions arising from empirical arguments relating to the nation state and democracy. Do the alleged cultural requirements for effective political action provide an insuperable barrier to transnational citizenship? Does transnational citizenship necessarily require a commitment to transnational democracy? I argue that these largely empirical criticisms do not succeed in casting doubt upon the normative plausibility or practical viability of transnational projects. On the first question, I point to a growing transnational political culture that serves to motivate transnational citizens. On the second question, I argue for a legitimate category of transnational citizenship that, although inspired by cosmopolitan morality, is different from it, and that does not require transnational democracy.     

Public confidence in the judiciary: the interaction between political awareness and level of democracy

Apart from the studies that focus on public attitudes toward higher courts in advanced democracies, we know little about the factors that can explain public confidence in the judiciary in a comparative setting. In this regard, the goal of this study is to explain whether, and to what extent, the country's level of democracy moderates the impact of political awareness on public confidence in the judiciary. This study uses hierarchical linear models to analyse the interaction between individual and country level factors by using the World Values Survey (2005–2009) data for 49 countries and various other data sources. Our empirical results show that in advanced democracies political awareness variables like education and political participation have a positive impact on public confidence in the judiciary, whereas in countries with weak levels of democracy higher political awareness leads to increased cynicism about the judiciary. These results suggest that a one-size-fits-all approach to explain confidence in the judiciary is not possible when we are dealing with a wide range of societies that vary in terms of many characteristics, both institutional and cultural.     

Constraining political corruption: an empirical analysis of the impact of democracy

The present article addresses the relationship between democracy and political corruption. Extending past studies, this article introduces important refinements that respond to theoretical and methodological concerns. The theoretical framework proposed here is developed based on an electoral conception of democracy, which makes it possible to avoid the potential endogeneity problems associated with substantial definitions of democracy. I argue that despite the influence of other important aspects of democracy, elections and inter-party competition per se help to constrain political corruption. The article examines two analytical dimensions of democracy, the current level of democracy and its degree of consolidation over time. Unlike previous studies, a cross-national empirical analysis of a sample of more than 100 countries reveals that when tested together, the level of democracy and its degree of longitudinal variation are both significantly related to the control of corruption. The level of democracy affects corruption in a non-linear way. Hybrid regimes that are more autocratic than democratic show a lower level of corruption control than democracies, near-democracies, and closed dictatorships. The analysis also confirms that, despite having adopted different measures, more consolidated democracies are more powerful in constraining corruption.     

Confining conditions and breaking with the past: Historical legacies and political learning in transitions to democracy

Historical factors have more often been assumed than explored in democratization studies. Their importance has been acknowledged broadly in reference to matters of change and continuity, including the effects of predecessor dictatorships on transition trajectories. But historical factors can have varied and sometimes persistent influences on the democratization process as a whole. These influences therefore need examining in a systematic way that considers also their implications for democratic consolidation. Developing from Kirchheimer's thesis of ‘confining conditions and revolutionary breakthroughs’, the discussion turns to forms of interaction and the changing balance between past impacts and the dynamics and changing agenda of regime change. A three‐part approach is presented and applied: historical patterns and historical memory; historical legacies and ‘overcoming the past'; and, then, political ‘learning’ and its ability to look to the future. It is generally argued that focusing on ‘history’ opens up new avenues in the study of regime change.     

Local participatory innovations and experts as political entrepreneurs: The case of China's democracy consultants

This study is concerned with understanding the dynamic behind participatory innovations in China. The case of China provides a contrast to the literature on participatory innovations in democracies. While participatory innovations in democratic countries are seen as a way to deepen and improve democracy, in China these innovations are to some extent developed in order to provide an alternative to electoral democracy. In this article I introduce the concept democracy consultant to describe expert political entrepreneurs involved in the development of participatory innovations. Research on local participatory innovation in China is abundant but the role that experts play in this process has previously not been analysed. Based on in-depth interviews with democracy consultants and local officials, the study finds that democracy consultants frequently act as bridges between central and local levels of government by providing expertise, information, legitimacy, and connections. This is especially true in localities where local leaders want to gain the attention of the central level but lack the required expertise and connections.     

Political culture in Turkey: Connections among attitudes toward democracy,the military and Islam

Against the background of Turkey's continuing but unconsolidated democratic transition, this article examines the nature and determinants of attitudes toward democracy held by ordinary Turkish citizens. Using data from the World Values Survey conducted in Turkey in 1997, it seeks to contribute to a growing body of literature concerned with the relationship between political culture and democratization. Although this relationship has not been fully explicated, the authors share the view of those scholars who believe that the existence of democratic attitudes and values among a country's population is no less important than are democratic institutions and procedures for advancing and eventually consolidating a democratic transition. Accordingly, the study seeks to shed light on the following interrelated questions: To what extent does the Turkish population hold attitudes supportive of democracy? What are the most important determinants of popular support for democracy? What factors account for any observed variance in relevant political attitudes? What is the relationship between attitudes toward the military and attitudes toward democracy and governance? What is the relationship between personal religious attachments and attitudes toward democracy and governance?     

Absolute politics and judicious pragmatism: political culture in democratization by reforma

Comparing the political cultures of Spain and Greece before and during the dictatorships, the article seeks to explain the different outcomes of the regimes’ self-transformation attempts, the one that succeeded (Spain) and the other that failed (Greece, the little-known “Markezinis experiment”). Its position is that the abandoning of hard-line ideological stances that have been called “absolute politics”, which was the main contributor to the Spanish Reforma’s success, did not work in Greece due to the persistence of the post-civil war and pre-dictatorial cleavages in both elites and civil society, thus rendering the mellowing of confrontation lines and the consensual politics necessary for the negotiations and mutual concessions between elites and counter-elites unfeasible. The result was, in contrast to the Spanish reforma Pactada, a reverse to authoritarianism perpetrated by the hard-line officers, prolonging the regime for eight crucial months.     

简析中亚国家政治转型中的部族政治文化因素

历史上,中亚地区由于没有稳定的国家概念和固定的国家边界,人们的部族属性往往成为民族认同的重要标志之一,而带有宗法制和家长制的部族政治文化对于中亚各民族的政治行为方式、部族内部的稳定以及部族问的和睦共存,起到了积极的促进作用.本论文将对各具地区特色的部族政治文化及其基本特征进行剖析,探究中亚地区这一传统的政治文化现象对中亚各国的政治发展进程所产生的现实影响.     

Towards consolidating democracy: The paradoxical role of democracy groups in Thailand

Civil society is thought to contribute to consolidating democracy, but exactly how this happens is not especially well understood. This article examines the recent experiences of ‘democracy groups’ in Thailand. While acknowledging there are other factors that contribute to democratic consolidation, it finds the cumulative effect of Thailand's intermediating organizations, such as democracy groups, appears to be a redistribution of information and resources in ways that are causing changes in state‐society relations, making the country more pluralistic and contributing to consolidating democracy. Democracy groups and other civil society organizations are providing a widening circle of Thais with virtually unprecedented opportunities to participate in the policy‐making process. Yet despite their accomplishments, these groups might have greater consolidating effects if they themselves adhered more to democratic norms and procedures. Nevertheless, without democracy groups and other civil society organizations, Thailand would be less democratic than it is, although democracy is not fully consolidated yet.     

Bringing direct democracy back in: toward a three-dimensional measure of democracy

Most procedural definitions and measurements of democracy are missing one crucial component: direct popular decision-making. This is an important gap that does not allow users of data to ascertain some important variation among democracies. Thus, I propose a new measure that is strongly anchored in a procedural definition of democracy but includes this missing dimension. The proposed measure is well rooted in the literature and introduces a dimension whereby citizens may become the masters of their political fate at any time and without the consent of elected authorities, while avoiding the inclusion of extraneous attributes that are not highlighted in democratic theory. Tests of the validity of the new indicator, using Latin American cases, show that there is enough room for its inclusion without the typical collinearity problems this literature faces. This indicator is not only sound, but it is empirically appealing as it performs better than others when testing relevant hypotheses.     

Collective memory of the Spanish civil war: The case of the political amnesty in the Spanish transition to democracy

This article focuses on two interrelated, but relatively ignored, factors in the Spanish transition to democracy (1975–78): first, the most important political mobilizations of the period in which the people demanded an amnesty for the political prisoners of the dictatorship; second, the presence of a collective memory of the Spanish civil war (1936–39), whose repetition was now to be avoided at all costs. It argues that the many collective actions that took place in Spain in favour of an amnesty were, to a great extent, inspired by a widespread desire for reconciliation among Spaniards. Spanish society had suffered a deep split as a consequence of the civil war and, because of the presence of the Francoist regime, no symbolic measures to reach national reconciliation had taken place. The climate generated by the often violent confrontations between police and demonstrators (and not only during demonstrations in favour of the amnesty), and the number of resulting deaths and injuries, made the people remember the serious problems of public order that had confronted the Second Republic (1931–36), whose collapse marked the beginning of the Spanish civil war. These factors help explain why the main political parties of the left felt the need to contain the very mobilization process that they had helped to create. The generous amnesty of October 1977, passed by a democratically elected parliament, was interpreted as the symbolic overcoming of the division among Spaniards that resulted from the dramatic civil confrontation of the 1930s.     

Transition in El Salvador: A multi-layered process

This paper reflects on the obstacles facing Salvadoran NGOs in the transition from war to peace. Firstly, on the difficulties inherent in the peace process itself: insufficient structural change; the trap of electoral politics; a transition process that was too narrowly defined; and the impossibility of reconciliation without addressing the need for collective memory, public responsibility, or justice. Secondly, on the difficulties peculiar to NGOs and popular organisations in El Salvador: the difference between the skills and resources they had developed in war and those needed in peace; the problems in establishing their role in the national reconstruction plan; and the fact that they were themselves made up of people who were still suffering the psychological wounds of war.     

The economic transition in Central Asia: Implications for democracy

Ten years have now passed since the August coup of 1991 heralded the collapse of the Soviet Union. Whilst many of these states have successfully navigated themselves through the processes of democratic transition and consolidation, others have not. Although each of the states within the Central Asia region have held elections so that we can speak of some sort of formal democracy having been established, substantive democracy within these states is either absent or falls short of the mark. This article identifies the obstacles to democratic transition and consolidation arising from current economic circumstances and the leaders' appraisal of the political costs of further democratization.     

The ambivalence of populism: threat and corrective for democracy

Two images of populism are well-established: it is either labelled as a pathological political phenomenon, or it is regarded as the most authentic form of political representation. In this article I argue that it is more fruitful to categorize populism as an ambivalence that, depending on the case, may constitute a threat to or a corrective for democracy. Unfolding my argument, I offer a roadmap for the understanding of the diverse and usually conflicting approaches to studying the relation between populism and democracy. In particular, three main approaches are identified and discussed: the liberal, the radical and the minimal. I stress that the latter is the most promising of them for the study of the ambivalent relationship between populism and democracy. In fact, the minimal approach does not imply a specific concept of democracy, and facilitates the undertaking of cross-regional comparisons. This helps to recognize that populism interacts differently with the two dimensions of democracy that Robert Dahl distinguished: while populism might well represent a democratic corrective in terms of inclusiveness, it also might become a democratic threat concerning public contestation.