The EU as an International Counter-terrorism Actor: Progress and Constraints

During the first decade after the 9/11 attacks, the European Union (EU) has developed into an international counter-terrorism actor in its own right, a role increasingly accepted by third countries. This is a result of many influences, including a more favourable legal basis after the Amsterdam Treaty reforms; enhanced institutional capabilities, such as the growing importance of the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator; the use of a broad range of instruments, such as intelligence sharing; and the application of geopolitical priorities, guided by meetings at the United Nations and the Council of Europe (among other fora). At the same time, the EU's counter-terrorism role has remained subsidiary, both legally and politically, to that of its member states. Furthermore, a lack of its own operational capabilities, its institutional complexity, and its problems of cross-policy coordination continue to act as powerful constraints on the EU's counter-terrorism responsibilities.     

TLAMs in Syria

The United States' Tomahawk cruise-missile strikes on the Syrian regime's Shayrat Air Base in retaliation for the regime's sarin attack are unlikely to advance peace in Syria. The regime and its main supporters, Russia and Iran, remain defiant, and the Trump administration appears inclined to frame the strikes as a relatively narrow deterrent against chemical weapons attacks and keep counter-terrorism its main priority in Syria for now.     

Strategic Implications of the Ambush in Niger

The October jihadist ambush in Niger that left four American soldiers on a combined patrol with Nigerien forces dead has raised questions about the extent to which US military personnel should advise and assist local military operations overseas. It has also produced controversy about civil-military relations in the Trump administration. As a result, Congress's post-9/11 Authorization of the Use of Military Force, delegating broad powers to the president to initiate counter-terrorism efforts, may be curtailed.     

The limits of autocracy promotion: The case of Russia in the ‘near abroad’

In recent years, observers have raised concerns about threats to democracy posed by external support for authoritarianism coming from regional powers such as Russia, China and Venezuela. This article assesses the efficacy of autocracy promotion through a close examination of Russian efforts to shape regime outcomes in the former Soviet Union. It finds that while Russian actions have periodically promoted instability and secessionist conflict, there is little evidence that such intervention has made post‐Soviet countries less democratic than they would have been otherwise. First, the Russian government has been inconsistent in its support for autocracy – supporting opposition and greater pluralism in countries where anti‐Russian governments are in power, and incumbent autocrats in cases where pro‐Russian politicians dominate. At the same time, the Russian government's narrow concentration on its own economic and geopolitical interests has significantly limited the country's influence, fostering a strong counter‐reaction in countries with strong anti‐Russian national identities. Finally, Russia's impact on democracy in the region has been restricted by the fact that post‐Soviet countries already have weak democratic prerequisites. This analysis suggests that, despite increasingly aggressive foreign policies by autocratic regional powers, autocracy promotion does not present a particularly serious threat to democracy in the world today.     

Uncertain allies or uncomfortable neighbors? Making sense of China–North Korea Relations, 1949–2010

Abstract

This study is based upon two premises: (1) the available literature, though voluminous, fails to provide systematic understandings of the complex and evolving relations between China and North Korea; and (2) China and North Korea had been short of being trusted allies bound in blood and belief even before the launch of post-Mao reforms and the normalization of Beijing–Seoul relations. This article dissects this curious relationship into four questions: (1) What does history inform us about China's relations with (North) Korea? (2) Has China communicated effectively with North Korea? (3) Have China and North Korea been ‘trusted allies’? (4) How effective has China been in inducing North Korea to comply with its demands over the years? The authors argue that, geo-strategically, China can hardly afford to put North Korea in an adversarial position. Furthermore, residues of the Factional Incident of 1956 and North Korea's deep-rooted suspicion of China still linger on. These have been the sources of Beijing's dilemma in consistently opting for ‘soft’ measures despite that North Korea's provocative acts and nuclear weapons programs have negatively affected China's interests. From the outset, China and North Korea had been more uncertain allies who had to cooperate with each other under the ideological and geopolitical imperatives of the difficult times. The authors also suggest that it would be misleading to put Sino–North Korean dynamics in a usual category of big power–small nation relations where power asymmetry generally works against the latter. North Korea has undoubtedly been an atypical ‘small nation’. It is due to these limitations that China's pressurizing has not been always effective and that Beijing's reactions have been continuously cyclical. This cyclical trend is not likely to be broken since the upcoming drama of Sino–American rivalry is bound to close the window of such opportunities for China, which will nevertheless regard North Korea increasingly as a liability, if not uncomfortable neighbor.     

Sectarian Rebellions in Post-Transition Nigeria Compared

The Boko Haram, a radical Islamic group based in north-east Nigeria, has killed over 1,000 people since mid-2011. This article explores the historical origins and structural drivers of Boko Haram and puts them into context. It argues that the Nigerian government's coercive response to Boko Haram has perpetuated a cycle of violence and undermined endogenous sources of moderation based on cultural, institutional, and political conditions. State repression to implement a counter-terrorism strategy has radicalized the group, created incentives to find international sympathizers, and contributes to fragmentation that impedes political solutions. A comparison with rebellions in the oil producing Niger Delta helps identify some barriers to and opportunities for conflict resolution.     

Cold War counter-terrorism: the evolution of international counter-terrorism in the RCMP Security Service, 1972–1984

This piece provides a detailed case study of the evolution of counter-terrorism within a specific domestic security agency of a liberal-democratic state in the context of the Cold War. It does so by examining the creation of a counter-terrorism unit within Canada’s Royal Canadian Mounted Police Security Service and how it responded to international terrorism. This occurred in between major terrorist attacks in Canada in 1970 and 1985 and included a growing focus on counter-terrorism even as counter-subversion remained a top priority within a still dominant Cold War domestic security framework. Ultimately, the article, based on thousands of pages of previously secret documents, argues that the Security Service could conceive of in a broader strategic sense the threat of terrorism but found it more challenging, for a variety of reasons, including the dominance of the Cold War and the difficulties around infiltrating ethnic communities, to collect intelligence.     

Border Controls as a Dimension of the European Union's Counter-Terrorism Policy: A Critical Assessment

This article critically examines the use and effectiveness of border controls in the European Union (EU)'s counter-terrorism policy. It shows that the EU has made substantial progress towards achieving the objectives that it had set for itself in this policy area, but has not managed to fulfil all of them, and certainly not by the deadlines originally set. It further argues that, contrary to their usual depiction in EU official documents, these border control measures make a limited contribution to the actual fight against terrorism, whilst having some negative effects. From that viewpoint, the fact that the EU has failed to meet all of its objectives in the use of border controls for counter-terrorist purposes may paradoxically be seen as a positive outcome.     

The European Parliament in the External Dimension of EU Counter-terrorism: More Actorness,Accountability and Oversight 10 Years on?

The Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force in 2009, considerably reinforced the powers of the European Parliament. This article examines to what extent the European Parliament has become an important actor in EU counter-terrorism by focusing on the external dimension of this policy. It also analyses the impact that this potentially changing role has had on the external dimension of EU counter-terrorism. This article puts forward two inter-related claims. Firstly, the role of the European Parliament in the external dimension of EU counter-terrorism has significantly grown in recent years. Following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009, the European Parliament has become a fully-fledged actor in the external dimension of EU counter-terrorism. Secondly, the reinforcement of the role of the European Parliament has also led to a strengthening of both accountability and oversight in the external dimension of EU counter-terrorism, although there are still some limitations in that respect.     

The EU's Eastern Partnership: mixed prospects

A summit of the EU's Eastern Partnership initiative, which offers integration as a reward for reform to six former Soviet republics, has been widely portrayed as a watershed moment. But the countries’ own shortcomings and Russian obstruction have demonstrated the limits of the EU's approach.     

The North Korean abduction issue: emotions,securitisation and the reconstruction of Japanese identity from ‘aggressor’ to ‘victim’ and from ‘pacifist’ to ‘normal’

Abstract

After Kim Jong-il's confession in 2002 that North Korean agents had abducted thirteen Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 1980s, North Korea has become the most detested country in Japan, and the normalisation of bilateral relations has been put on the back burner. The abduction issue has taken precedence in Japan even over North Korea's development of nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. It has also grossly overshadowed the atrocities for which Imperial Japan was responsible in the 20th century. Why has there been such strong emphasis on an issue that could be disregarded as comparatively ‘less important’? This article understands the ascendency of the abduction issue as the epitome of an identity shift under way in Japan – from the identity of a curiously ‘peaceful’ and inherently ‘abnormal’ state, to that of a more ‘normal’ one. The differentiation of North Korea as ‘abnormal’ emphasises Japan's own (claim to) ‘normality’. Indeed, by incarnating the perils of Japan's own ‘pacifist’ ‘abnormality’, which has been so central to the collective sense of Japanese ‘Self’ in the post-war period, the abduction issue has become a very emotional argument for Japan's ‘normalisation’ in security and defence terms. The transformation from ‘abnormal’ to ‘normal’ is further enabled by Japan trading places with North Korea in the discourse, so that Japan is defined as ‘victim’ (rather than former aggressor) and North Korea as ‘aggressor’ (rather than former victim). What is at stake here is the question whether Japan is ‘normalising’ or ‘remilitarising’, and the role of the abduction issue discourse in enabling such foreign and security policy change.     

Chinese migration: still the major focus of Russian Far East/Chinese North East relations?

Abstract

In contrast to Sino-Russian relations at the state-level, regional cooperation between the contiguous Russian Far East and Chinese North East has been difficult to achieve, despite the existence of seemingly natural economic complementarities. This article asks why this is the case and argues that one important stumbling block, i.e. negative reactions to Chinese labour migration, has become less problematic. Situating Russian Far East/Chinese North East relations in a regionalist framework the article compares the salience and framing of major issues in regional relations in Chinese and Russian media at the national and regional levels. Contrary to earlier research, the findings suggest that economic and regional development issues, and not Chinese migration into the Russian Far East, are by far the most salient sets of issues on both sides. However, significant differences in the framing of these issues suggest that a convergence of opinion on the desirability of regional cooperation masks contradictory expectations for the direction of regional development.     

The Trump administration and the Russia probes

Special Counsel Robert Mueller heads the most aggressive of five investigations of possible collusion between US President Donald Trump's campaign and Russia to influence the 2016 US presidential election. Trump has continued to pursue a conspicuously friendly relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Trump will probably continue to attack the special counsel’s legitimacy and avoid unequivocally acknowledging Russian interference for as long as possible.     

The social desirability bias in autocrat's electoral ratings: evidence from the 2012 Russian presidential elections

In authoritarian regimes, election polls can be vastly polluted by measurement error, namely the social desirability bias, which can contribute to substantial inflation in the publicized estimates of an autocrat's electoral support and voter turnout, seeming to validate falsified election outcomes that match the inflated estimates. This study provides an in-depth analysis of the magnitude of social desirability bias in polling estimates released before and after the 2012 Russian presidential elections by focusing on the implications of Noelle-Neumann's “spiral of silence” theory. The empirical data analysis is based on list experiments from four data samples collected during the Russian presidential campaign. The estimated magnitude of the social desirability bias in Putin's electoral support is statistically significant and reaches approximately 15%. For voter turnout, however, I find social desirability bias of the same order as in Western democracies. My main conclusions are further validated by an alternative urns experiment conducted by one of the national pollsters. The detection of significant social desirability bias in the Russian presidential campaign raises the issue of survey research quality in authoritarian regimes and its effect on election outcomes.     

The post‐cold war security agenda of Russia: Implications for Northeast Asia

The end of the cold war has seen the emergence of new political and geo‐strategic rivalries for Russia. The major aspect of change has been an intensification of an eastern focus in Russian security policy. The identification of changing security concerns, be they the intensification of local conflicts on Russian borders or potential territorial claims from neighbours, poses new problems for the Russian army. This paper looks at Russia's post‐cold war security agenda and military modernization questions in the light of these potential problems. In regional terms the paper focuses on the implications of these wider questions for Russia's relations with Northeast Asia, especially in its dealings with the Korean peninsula issue and remaining border questions with China and Japan.     

State transformation and resource politics: Australia and the regional political economy

Abstract

Although the 1994 Agreed Framework offers a solution to the North Korean nuclear crisis, many problems may prevent its successful implementation. Should the Agreed Framework break down, the United States and South Korea have indicated that they will ask Japan to join them in a trilateral economic sanctions regime.

Japanese participation would include the severance of trade and financial flows, including money sent to North Korea from Japan's ethnic Korean community. In this paper I examine this financial flow, and, finding it a valuable linkage to the North Korean economy, conclude that Japanese participation is vital for a successful sanctions regime against North Korea.

Given this, I examine whether or not Tokyo's cooperation will be forthcoming. Japan would be inclined to participate given that it has a strong interest in eliminating a regional nuclear threat. Furthermore, Japan would also feel pressure from its allies to display diplomatic leadership in the Asia‐Pacific region, as befits a country of its economic importance.

Despite these international reasons for Japanese participation, domestic factors will be likely to prevent Tokyo from joining a sanctions regime: constitutional questions, the possibility of terrorist reprisals, interest in Pyongyang's regime maintenance, concerns for the rights of Japan's ethnic Korean community, and political ties between North Korean and Japanese politicians. I find that these domestic factors will outweigh international pressures for Japanese participation, and thus conclude that in the event of a breakdown in the Agreed Framework, alternatives to a trilateral sanctions strategy against North Korea must be considered.     

European air combat capabilities

The United Kingdom electorate's unanticipated vote to leave the European Union risks worrying NATO allies about the UK's reliability as a defence partner at a time when Russian threats appear to be rising. To allay this concern, the British government could expand its customary multinational collaboration with European partners on defence aerospace projects, such as a new crewed combat aircraft.     

China's engagement-oriented strategy towards North Korea: achievements and limitations

In response to the challenge of unstable North Korea (weak economy, weapons of mass destruction [WMD] development), China has followed an engagement-oriented strategy based on diplomatic persuasion, economic interaction and moderate economic sanctions. Intensified engagement (2009–2012) facilitated North Korean convergence with China in respect of economic reform but divergence has persisted over WMD development. Despite the widening of divergence since 2013, China has refrained from applying crippling sanctions. This article seeks to explain these diverging results and their implications for China's strategy towards North Korea. Reviewing recent literature and data, it will argue that Chinese economic input reinforced the trend of economic reform that formed the basis of political consolidation under the new hereditary regime. On the other hand, the prospect of stable dependence on China ran counter to that regime's pursuit of WMDs as the basis of security and diplomatic diversification. These mixed results reveal the limits of China's strategy: its economic input involuntarily reinforces North Korea's WMD potential but it is not prepared to accept the risks of enforcing WMD restraint by crippling sanctions either. With limited room for manoeuvre, the attainment of China's strategic objectives ultimately depends upon policy change from the US or South Korea.     

State‐Building and the European Union's Fight against Corruption in the Southern Caucasus: Why Legitimacy Matters

This article asks under which conditions the state‐building efforts of external actors in areas of limited statehood are likely to be effective. We argue that the legitimacy of the specific norms promoted by external actors among local actors is crucial for their success in strengthening state capacities. International efforts need to resonate with prevalent social norms. To substantiate this argument, we focus on the European Union's (EU) anticorruption programs and their implementation in one of the most corrupt regions in the world, the Southern Caucasus. We show that legitimacy can explain why the EU's fight against corruption helped reduce corruption in Georgia but not in Armenia. In both countries, political elites could selectively use anticorruption programs as an instrument against political opponents, using enhanced state capacities to stabilize the incumbent regime. Only in Georgia, however, was the fight against corruption facilitated by sustained domestic mobilization for anticorruption policies that added pressure on political elites “from below.”     

Japanese policy and the North Korean ‘soft landing’

Abstract

The nature of security on the Korean Peninsula has undergone fundamental change in the post‐Cold War period, characterized by the growing recognition on the part of the major regional powers that there is a need for economic as well as military approaches to security and conflict avoidance. The chief manifestation of this trend is the emergence of the US Department of State's ‘soft landing’ and other engagement policies as attempts to resolve North Korean security threats. Some commentators have seen the soft‐landing policy as an opportunity for Japan to use its economic power to contribute to regional and international security. This article examines the evolution and rationale of the soft‐landing policy, how Japanese policy‐makers evaluate its potential as a solution to the North Korean security problem and the current extent of Japan's contribution to it. The article also points out the‐limitations of Japanese support for the soft landing due to international restrictions on the Japanese government's room for diplomatic manoeuvre, domestic political obstacles to engaging North Korea and the general lack of Japanese private business interest in the North. Finally the conclusion shows that, despite the recognition of the need to engage North Korea economically, Japanese policy‐makers have devoted their energies principally to the redefinition of the US‐Japan military alliance based on the legitimacy of the North Korean threat.