Belgian regional parliaments and the European Union: an analysis of parliamentary scrutiny in agricultural and environmental policies

ABSTRACT

Drawing on qualitative case studies of two specific European decision-making processes in the agricultural and environmental sectors, this paper discusses how and why Belgian regional parliaments activated (or not) their control mechanisms to scrutinise their respective regional ministers. The findings show that parliamentary scrutiny of the agricultural and environmental policy fields has undergone a process of institutional and behavioural Europeanisation. Belgian regional parliaments rely mostly on classical parliamentary tools aimed at gathering information and, to a lesser extent, on constraining instruments aimed at influencing their government. Rather than trying to influence the EU negotiations, the MPs try to assess the potential impact of the reforms on their regional policy sectors. The findings also demonstrate that domestic media coverage and political salience of the EU negotiation associated with important implementing powers of regional parliaments have a positive effect on the level of scrutiny conducted by Belgian regional assemblies.     

Party unity in parliamentary democracies: A comparative analysis

The level and causes of party unity are under-researched topics in parliamentary democracies, particularly in comparative perspective. This article presents a non-formal model explaining party unity in legislative voting as the result of individual legislators' decisions reacting to the incentives and constraints created by their respective institutional environments. Hypotheses derived from the model are tested against empirical data on party unity in 11 western parliamentary democracies since 1945. On the system level, central party control over nominations and intra-parliamentary resources as well as the strength of parliamentary committees with regard to policy decisions are shown to affect party unity as expected by the model. On the level of individual parties, governing parties are less unified than opposition parties and larger parties show higher unity than smaller ones. Both results shed doubt on frequent claims in the literature.     

Regional parliaments in the EU multilevel parliamentary system

ABSTRACT

European integration has created a multilevel political system that is dominated by executive actors. Despite the increasing competences of the European Parliament, a growing EU-awareness of national assemblies and an emerging attention of regional parliaments for EU affairs, the EU polity still lacks a sound parliamentary representation. As the EU presents itself as a representative democracy, the current set-up raises questions from the perspective of democratic legitimacy. The establishment of multilevel parliamentarianism may be part of the remedy. This introduction focuses on the position that regional parliaments take in such a European multilevel parliamentary system. The authors address three relevant questions: what roles do regional parliaments take up in terms of legislation, scrutiny and networking? To what extent are they empowered by the Lisbon Treaty? And what explains the variation in their activities? The authors develop hypotheses that are, to varying degree, addressed by the contributions in this special issue.     

Institutional change in the European Parliament: balancing legislative ethics and parliamentary independence

Research on legislative ethics has shown how scandals often trigger ethics reform; yet, the content of the reform often differs from that of the scandal. Why is this the case? And if scandals don't explain legislative ethics reform outcomes, then what does? If not this kind of external shock, then what factor(s) shape legislative reform outcomes? These questions provide the point of departure for a case study of the European Parliament's 2011 ethics reform. Drawing from the legislative ethics literature and from recent theories of institutional change, the article examines the impact of the scandal that initiated the reform, the interests and strategies of reform agents who wanted a quick reform process that would not undermine the EP's independence; and the institutional order in which those actors were embedded. It argues that an institutional logics perspective offers a convincing and comprehensive account of EP ethics reform, and suggests a new analytical framework that might be used by researchers in future research on legislative ethics.     

Designating the official opposition in a Westminster parliamentary system

Of all Westminster‐type representative assemblies, Canada's presents an unusually high number of cases where parties rank equal in second place, disputing the role of official opposition, both in the aftermath of an election or during a parliamentary session when party fortunes change. Although exceptional, the phenomenon is not at all uncommon; however, the uncertainty that characterises each of its occurrences indicates that no general rule has ever been drawn from doctrine or jurisprudence, as attested by the latest (1999) decision rendered by Speaker Scott in Nova Scotia. Thus, speculation persists whenever the situation presents itself. This paper attempts some rulings based on the distinction of context proper to 12 historical cases studied. It may help remove the uncertainty that plagues democratic systems in Canada as well as in any other Westminster‐type legislatures around the world.     

Judicial scrutiny of gender-based employment practices in the criminal justice system

Purpose

This article examines employment practices of criminal justice agencies within state and federal court decisions that have interpreted sex discrimination claims under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.

Methods

After collecting and analyzing appellate court cases through the LEXIS-NEXIS and WESTLAW databases, the article examines lower state and federal court decisions that have been applied by the U.S. Supreme Court to criminal justice workplaces.

Results

The findings show that employment practices are valid if the employer can demonstrate: first, the disputed discriminatory action is based on considerations not solely dependent on the plaintiff's gender; and second, such considerations are more than mere pretext, making them justifiable under the circumstances.

Conclusions

Courts have considered a wide range of employer practices in both law enforcement and corrections agencies at various stages of the employment process, such as hiring, assignment of duties, promotion, discipline, and termination. Title VII is violated when the employers’ adverse employment action is motivated by discriminatory intent and is based on gender stereotypes. Even so, employment actions are legal when employers prove their employment actions are not based on sex stereotypes, but are either business-related or justified by “legitimate,” “important,” or “compelling” interests.     

Switzerland Trust in the system: The trust arena is on the brink of change in Switzerland, with a new Bill waiting for parliamentary approval

The final version of the Swiss government's Bill on trusts,released on 5 December 2005, was approved by the Upper Housewithout reservations on 23 March 2006. The message sent out by the chairman of the reporting commissionwas clear: ‘[Switzerland] has to ensure that it does notfall behind its competitors in the Anglo-Saxon part of the worldand Singapore. What happened with investment funds should nothappen again.’ The Upper House agreed.     

我国行政权力制约体系中存在的问题及其应对策略

当前,就行政权力而言,一方面,其地位和作用越来越突出;另一方面,行政权力被滥用也是不争的事实。因此,对行政权力进行制约显得十分必要。但目前我国的行政权力制约体系还很不完善,存在着一些不容忽视的问题。本文在对这些问题进行分析的基础上,探讨了相应的对策。     

Corruption,Party Leaders,and Candidate Selection: Evidence from Italy

Research indicates that voters are not particularly effective at removing corrupt politicians from office, in part because voters make decisions on the basis of many competing factors. Party leaders are much more single-minded than voters and will choose to deselect implicated legislators if it means maintaining a positive party reputation and improving the odds of winning a legislative majority. We examine renominations to Italy’s legislature in two periods marked by corruption. We compare these renomination patterns with those from the prior legislature, when corruption lacked political salience. Our analysis shows that incumbent renominations are negatively associated with the number of press mentions that link the incumbent to corruption—but only when corruption is salient to the public. Our study highlights the importance of party leaders in forcing malfeasant legislators out of office—and reducing corruption—and redirects attention from voters to political elites as a critical channel in enforcing democratic accountability.     

Creating change in the legal system

Focuses on the potential contributions that community psychology models can make to theory, research, and practice in the area of psychology and law. The author, in his presidential address to the American Psychology-Law Society, looks specifically at the criminal and juvenile justice systems and the impact that these systems, and law and policy more broadly, have on individuals. He argues that community psychology perspectives would help shift the focus away from the disproportionate and often incorrect emphasis that our system of justice places on individual deficit models and individual level interventions, and concludes that a community psychology approach would also reinforce efforts to promote prevention programs that in the long term might prove more effective in dealing with the problem of crime in our society.This article is a revised version of the American Psychology-Law Society (Division 41 of the American Psychological Association) Presidential Address, read at the American Psychological Association Convention, Los Angeles, August, 1994. I want to thank Ray Corrado, Steve Hart, John Monahan, Jim Ogloff, Julian Rappaport, Dick Reppucci, Kathy Roesch, and Ed Seidman for their comments and feedback on earlier versions of this paper.Simon Fraser University.     

Post-legislative scrutiny in the UK Parliament: adding value

ABSTRACT

Legislatures appoint committees for different purposes. Both Houses of the UK Parliament separate legislative committees from non-legislative, or select, committees. Each is unusual in that it utilises select committees to engage in post-legislative scrutiny. We examine why each engages in this type of scrutiny, given competing demands for limited resources. Distributive and informational theories are utilised to explain the difference between the two chambers, identifying why the form of asymmetrical bicameralism to be found in the United Kingdom facilitates scrutiny that would otherwise not be undertaken. The genesis and impact of post-legislative scrutiny committees are considered, with a focus on the House of Lords and why the use of such committees plays to the strengths of the House.     

Spokes in the wheel. European affairs and the parliamentary administration of German Landtage

ABSTRACT

Over the last decades, regional parliaments were considered to play a minor role in European affairs. Not only was the salience of the EU low at the regional level, but politicians elected into these bodies also often lacked vested interests and capacities to become more involved in dealing with complex multi-level questions. After the constitutional strengthening of regional parliaments in EU decision-making, this paper considers one under-researched aspect behind the growing appetite of regional parliaments to become more involved in the scrutiny of EU affairs: the role of unelected parliamentary officials. Based on qualitative interviews in 12 German regional parliaments, the authors highlight how regional parliaments exert control over their governments and what role horizontal administrative networks among parliamentary staff play in the engagement of regional parliaments in EU affairs.     

A theory of executive dominance of congressional politics: the committee system in the Brazilian chamber of deputies

This article analyses the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies committee system using rational choice theories developed originally for the US Congress. We suggest that pure versions of these theories are unable to explain Brazilian committee politics, and point out the necessity of building a specific theory that takes into account key institutional characteristics which give the Brazilian Executive considerable power to control the legislative process to assure outcomes consistent with presidential preferences. We demonstrate that committees in Brazil operate to some degree as agents of the executive. For this reason, we call it the Theory of Executive Dominance.     

Electoral foundations of parliamentary questions: evidence from the European Parliament

Parliamentary questions (PQs) provide a useful tool for members of the European Parliament (MEPs) to control the executive at supranational level and to promote their reputation among relevant groups (party, interest groups and constituency). Previous works have just focused on macro-functions of questions, neglecting the opportunity for MEPs to use them as a re-election and re-selection strategy (micro-functions). In this article, it is argued that PQs are a relevant instrument in the hands of parliamentarians in order to increase their reputation and build up their political image. In particular, it is considered how variation in electoral systems might affect legislative behaviour and, especially, the number of questions asked. Using a new data set on oral and written questions to the European Commission and the Council, the article demonstrates how candidate-centred electoral systems incentivise MEPs to ask more questions than legislators elected under party-centred systems.     

The hidden electoral connection: analysing parliamentary questions in the Chilean Congress

Legislators in presidential countries use a variety of mechanisms to advance their electoral careers and connect with relevant constituents. The most frequently studied activities are bill initiation, co-sponsoring, and legislative speeches. In this paper, the authors examine legislators’ information requests (i.e. parliamentary questions) to the government, which have been studied in some parliamentary countries but remain largely unscrutinised in presidential countries. The authors focus on the case of Chile – where strong and cohesive national parties coexist with electoral incentives that emphasise the personal vote – to examine the links between party responsiveness and legislators’ efforts to connect with their electoral constituencies. Making use of a new database of parliamentary questions and a comprehensive sample of geographical references, the authors examine how legislators use this mechanism to forge connections with voters, and find that targeted activities tend to increase as a function of electoral insecurity and progressive ambition.     

Presidential influence on parliamentary election timing and the electoral fate of prime ministers

Most presidential heads of state in parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies have constitutional powers to influence early election calling, which enable them to influence the conditions under which prime ministers are held accountable by the electorate. We examine whether presidents use theses powers to shape the timing of early elections for partisan advantage and to influence the electoral performance of prime ministers. Drawing on data from 193 elections in 18 European democracies (1945–2013), we find that presidents with significant dissolution powers enable incumbents in governments that include the president’s party to realise a significant electoral bonus compared with governments that exclude the party of the president.     

The effect of multiple-office holding on the parliamentary activity of MPs in the Czech Republic

This article deals with multiple-office holdings by legislators in the Czech Republic during the VI. Chamber of Deputies, 2010–2013. First, both positive and negative theoretical consequences of simultaneously holding multiple political offices are depicted. Then, a uniquely detailed database of member of parliament-periods is constructed for quantitative research. Multiple-office holding is demonstrated to be a frequent behaviour among Czech deputies. The analysis results suggest that some of the deputies’ parliamentary performances were influenced both positively and negatively. Multiple-office holders probably save time on certain activities, and focus more strongly on others. Different mandates held simultaneously by deputies affect their activity differently; local and non-executive mandates’ effects tend to be positive compared with regional and executive mandates’ effects.