An information network of officials? Dissecting the role and nature of the network of parliamentary representatives in the European Parliament

Enhancing the role of national parliaments in the European Union’s decision-making process has for some time been a popular way in which policy-makers have sought to address legitimacy problems in the European Union, the Early Warning Mechanism being only one example. In response to these developments, an increasing number of scholars have addressed the question of how parliaments make use of these powers in practice. An important dimension of the process – the role of parliamentary officials in parliamentary scrutiny and control – has so far been neglected in the literature. Against this background, this article examines the role of the representatives of national parliaments in the European Parliament with the aim of understanding the role and the nature of this ‘bureaucratic network’. While falling short of an epistemic community, these officials play an important role in enabling parliamentary scrutiny through the dissemination of information.     

The Creation and Transformation of Regional Parliamentary Assemblies: Lessons from the Pan-African Parliament

This article analyses the genesis and recent evolution of the Pan-African Parliament (PAP), one of the key institutions of African integration. Based on theories relating to the European Parliament, it argues that the dynamics surrounding the establishment of the PAP result from a blend of internal and external factors. On the one hand, the decision to create a PAP can be traced back to the problems of the Organisation of African Unity and to the will of African leaders to revive Pan-Africanism. On the other hand, the establishment and design of the PAP are partially inspired by international precedents such as the European Parliament. Over and above this observation, which is informed by the theory of mimetic institutionalism, the existence of regular interactions between Europe and Africa and, more generally, the outward activities of the PAP, would seem propitious to the self-assertion of this institution. Ultimately, the objective of the article is to lay the ground for a more ambitious theory of regional parliamentary assemblies.     

Repairing the Divide

Abstract

In this paper, we use responses from a 1998 Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) and Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) survey to investigate how the concept of community policing and the individual strategies associated with this public safety policy shape African American, Latino, and white perceptions of police officers. Community policing exerted differential effects on Latino, African American, and white perceptions of the police. Despite intentions to improve police-minority relations, community policing most strongly and positively affects whites' perceptions of neighborhood police. Both the public pronouncement and actual tactics of community policing had a greater impact on white perceptions of the police than they did for Latino and African American views toward the police, even though community policing also fulfills its promise to reduce tensions between the police and racial and ethnic minorities. Understanding the differences among African Americans, Latinos, and whites is critical to the evolution of community policing policies. Recognizing the importance of these differences, instead of adopting a “one size fits all” approach, puts the police and community members in a position to better realize the potential benefits of community policing.     

Regional parliaments in the EU multilevel parliamentary system

ABSTRACT

European integration has created a multilevel political system that is dominated by executive actors. Despite the increasing competences of the European Parliament, a growing EU-awareness of national assemblies and an emerging attention of regional parliaments for EU affairs, the EU polity still lacks a sound parliamentary representation. As the EU presents itself as a representative democracy, the current set-up raises questions from the perspective of democratic legitimacy. The establishment of multilevel parliamentarianism may be part of the remedy. This introduction focuses on the position that regional parliaments take in such a European multilevel parliamentary system. The authors address three relevant questions: what roles do regional parliaments take up in terms of legislation, scrutiny and networking? To what extent are they empowered by the Lisbon Treaty? And what explains the variation in their activities? The authors develop hypotheses that are, to varying degree, addressed by the contributions in this special issue.     

To have a voice in the matter: A comparative study of the Swedish and Danish European committees

This article deals with the issue of how the national parliaments might be strengthened in order to decrease the democratic deficit within the EU. It examines the parliamentary European committees in the Danish and Swedish Parliaments and concludes that their potential to influence and control their respective governments’ EU policies mainly depends on the Government's parliamentary base and opportunities for legislative influence open to parliamentary oppositions. Moreover, it examines various organisational aspects of the European committees, including distribution of tasks and internal co‐ordination within the Parliament, at what stage in the decision‐making process the European Committee and the Parliament are involved and information management. With some conspicuous exceptions, Denmark and Sweden have chosen the same organisational arrangements for dealing with EU affairs both in the Parliament as a whole and, specifically, in the European committees. The principal conclusion is that the European committees in Sweden and Denmark are effective means for giving the national parliaments a voice in EU matters, but the article also addresses some reforms to strengthen their positions.     

Legislative Efficiency and Political Inclusiveness: The Effect of Procedures on Interest Group Mobilization in the European Parliament

This paper contributes to discussions surrounding interest group representation in the European Parliament. Drawing from conceptualizations of legitimacy, and theoretical work on information-access we argue that different procedures bestow a different type of authority to parliamentary committees affecting their legitimacy orientation, in turn impacting the balance between private and public interests mobilised. We assess a population of 10,000 accredited lobbyists, and the procedural output across the 7th legislature’s committees (2009–2014). Our analysis indicates that committees with a higher ratio of Ordinary Legislative Procedures to Own Initiative Reports see greater private interest mobilisation. Conversely, in committees where the procedures’ ratios are inverse we observe greater public interest mobilisation. Theoretically, we provide a novel approach for framing the committee’s nature from a procedural perspective, bridging discussions on interest group mobilisation and the democratic deficit. Empirically, the results overturn the premise of business dominance across the institution’s committees through a unique dataset.     

The evolution of the political criteria for accession to the European Community, 1957–1973

This article describes the evolution of political conditions for accession to the European Community from 1957 to 1973 on the basis of the responses of the Community and national parliaments to applications for association (Article 238 EC Treaty) and membership (Article 237 EC Treaty) and to a US foreign policy initiative. It challenges the thesis that the European Community was originally uninterested in the political nature of its members as long as they were non‐communist and that the Community made a volte face in 1962 in reaction to a request for an association agreement by Franco's Spain. It argues that the Copenhagen political criteria, except minority protection, were firmly established by 1973 after a series of pronouncements and decisions by the European Parliament, national parliaments (both 1962), the Commission (1967) and the Council (1973). The article aims to contribute to the early history of the constitutionalization of the Union and discusses how demands from outsiders prompted the Six to define the constitutional requirements for (candidate) members. It is partly based on new archival research.     

Brazilian Parliament and digital engagement

ABSTRACT

This paper examines how new technologies are employed by the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies to stimulate experiences of digital engagement. It also evaluates how new technologies are put in practice by the institution, considering its potentialities and limitations in mediating the relationship between the parliament and the citizens. This analysis is anchored in concepts put forth by Polsby about arena parliaments and transformative parliaments, in order to evaluate which of these models of engagement tools have greater potential. The study concludes that the use of digital technologies by the Brazilian Parliament is very diverse, with a variety of tools that allow for the interaction and engagement of citizens, although these tools have the greatest potential for the arena parliament model.     

Democratic Accountability and National Parliaments: Redefining the Impact of Parliamentary Scrutiny in EU Affairs

Abstract:  The question of strengths and weaknesses of national parliaments in EU affairs, one of the most salient in the debate on the democratic legitimacy of the EU, is generally answered by assessing formal parliamentary powers which can influence their governments' EU policy. Such an evaluation, however, is flawed: Formal mandating rights are usually incompatible with the overall logic of parliamentary systems, which explains why most national parliaments make very little use of them. Even more importantly, it unduly reduces parliamentary functions to the legislative or policy-making function. Drawing on agency theory, it will instead be argued that the functions of public deliberation and of holding the government publicly to account are at least as important and therefore need to be included in a redefined concept of parliamentary strength. In particular, the article proposes a distinction between two different elements of accountability—monitoring and political scrutiny—which recognises parliamentary majority and opposition as two distinct agents of the electorate.     

Party system change and parliamentary scrutiny of the executive in Italy

Conventional wisdom suggests that internal institutionalisation of parliamentary procedures causes greater policy effects on executive decisions and secondary legislation. The role played by parliaments in policy-making depends on internal processes, but it also depends on other factors, such as the changing structure of the party system – the bipolarisation of which determines the legislative opposition's strategy and performance. The empirical research discussed in this paper shows that the Italian parliamentary process for approving and implementing secondary legislation changed considerably – from pervasive and substantive to formalistic and procedural – during the 1990s, as a result of the parliamentary opposition behaving differently in response to the accomplished alternation in government. Despite the greater institutionalisation of the Italian Parliament, parliamentary scrutiny of secondary legislation has in fact had a diminishing impact on policy. This paper evaluates the increasingly limited power of parliamentary committees to amend delegated legislation in draft against a comparative analysis of the law-making process and performance of the opposition. The effect on policy of parliamentary scrutiny of secondary legislation is found to be proportionately related to consociational practices during the legislative process. The scrutiny of parliaments is greater when the balance between the legislative majority and opposition is characterised by consociational practices.     

Democratic legitimacy in the European Union: Fulfilling the institutional logic

The European Union's delicate institutional balance between intergovern‐mentalism and supranationalism has been the source of both the EU's successes and its problems. This balance is under scrutiny as representatives of Member States and EU institutions pursue their particular visions of democratic legitimacy in the course of the 1996–97 Intergovernmental Conference. This essay examines three competing conceptualisations of democratic legitimacy: the Gaullist view, which associates legitimacy narrowly with national sovereignty; a national culture perspective that posits a unique correspondence of national character and national parliaments; and a parliamentary view that associates legitimacy with the role played by parliaments in scrutinising the behaviour of executives, whether at national or European level. Only the last of these perspectives acknowledges that democratic legitimacy is a continuous variable rather than an all‐or‐nothing concept, and that the EU may therefore accumulate legitimacy by improving both the process and substance of policy making within the logic of existing institutional structures.     

Developing an index of EX-POST parliamentary oversight of public finance

For the past decade, scholars and practitioners have developed indexes to measure both legislative powers in general, and of the legislative power of the purse, in particular. Initial focus was on the development of a comprehensive index of legislative powers, and on assessing the ex-ante role of the legislature in the budget process.

This article substantially deepens extends previous research on ex-post oversight, by developing a more comprehensive index to measure ex-post oversight, by using more up-to-date data bases and by including more countries. We can partially confirm the emerging consensus that ex-post budget oversight is stronger in parliamentary – and especially Westminster – systems than in countries with other forms of government, thereby somewhat offsetting the previously identified weaknesses of Westminster parliaments in budget formulation.

When used in combination Wehner’s [2006. Assessing the power of the purse: An index of legislative budget institutions. Political Studies, 54, 767–785] index of ex-ante legislative oversight, this index provides a comprehensive picture of legislative power of the purse regarding the budget process.     

Open parliament policy applied to the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies

ABSTRACT

This article will analyse the implementation of an open parliament policy that is taking place at the Chamber of Deputies, in accordance with the guidelines of the Open Government Partnership international programme (OGP), regarding the action plan of the Opening Parliament Work Group in particular, one of the subgroups of OGP. The authors will evaluate two blocks of initiatives for open parliaments executed by the Chamber in the last few years, that is, digital participation in the legislative process and Transparency 2.0, in order to observe their impasses and results obtained until now. In the first part the authors will study the e-Democracy portal and in the second part the authors will focus on open data, collaborative activities to use those data (hackathons) and the creation of the Hacker Lab, a permanent space dedicated to open parliament practices. The analysis considers the initiatives that the authors evaluated as part of the transformative and arena profiles of the Brazilian Parliament, according to Polsby's classification, with exclusive characteristics.     

Financial Indiscipline in Zambia's Third Republic: The Role of Parliamentary Scrutiny

Contrary to the thesis that claims weak legislative power vis-à-vis the executive is essential if economic modernisation and development are to be driven forward in third world countries, Zambia's developmental interests would be served by making the powers of parliamentary oversight of the public finances more effective. The problematic of 'financial indiscipline' in the public sector is analysed in terms of a nest of principal-agent relationships, between legislature and executive, political executive and bureaucratic executive, Ministry of Finance and Economic Development and the spending arms of government. Evidence from the Public Accounts Committee is used to illustrate the case for more enforceable mechanisms whereby government can be made accountable for the public finances. At the same time it is argued that more wide-ranging political changes are necessary if there is to be a significant reduction in 'financial indiscipline'.     

Democracy and Rule-making Within the EC: An Empirical and Normative Assessment

The object of this article is to consider the democratic legitimacy of the structure of legislative authority which exists within the EC. The analysis draws upon the work of Joseph Weiler, and accepts that different conceptions of democracy may best explain different aspects of the Community. The present article addresses only what Joseph Weiler terms the supranational aspects of the Community and suggests that a replication model of democracy can help us to understand the division of competence in this area. While changes can undoubtedly be made which will improve the operation of democracy within this sphere of the Community, and such changes are suggested in the subsequent analysis, it is argued that the republican model provides a sound basis on which to build.     

Justice,Legitimacy and the Authority of Legislation within the European Union

What are we to make of the authority of legislation within the EU? EU lawyers have questioned the significance of legislative decision‐making within the EU. This article challenges these views and argues that the EU legislature must enjoy adequate freedom to shape EU law with the general interest in mind. Institutional accounts that seek to curtail the authority of legislation tend to rest upon ‘content‐dependent’ conceptions of political legitimacy, according to which the legitimacy of a decision depends on its moral qualities. Such conceptions overlook reasonable disagreements on justice and rest upon an overly optimistic (pessimistic) view of the Court (the legislature). The article argues for a content‐independent conception of legitimacy, following which the benefits of legislative decision‐making are more easily understood. The authority of legislation deserves wider recognition among EU lawyers for reasons of political legitimacy and because the EU legislature is better positioned to decide in the general interest.     

Parliamentary Opposition Under Hybrid Regimes: Evidence from Egypt

Why do opposition political parties choose to run for parliament in semiauthoritarian systems? Existing literature emphasizes the benefits that these parties derive from campaigning and running for elections, while paying little attention to the politics that occurs within legislative institutions under these regimes. Supplementing election‐centric theories, we argue that opposition actors in semiauthoritarian systems also benefit directly from serving in weak parliaments and that this helps explain their participation in biased elections. We demonstrate this by examining the Muslim Brotherhood's legislative performance in Mubarak's Egypt, highlighting the mechanisms through which it used its minority presence in parliament to its advantage.     

我国地方立法权扩张的政治后果分析

本文以建国以来中央——地方立法权限演变的历史说明地方立法存在的必要性。认为市场化发展和民主化改革是地方立法权扩张的动力,并以事实和数据剖析了我国地方立法发展的现状,从社会影响角度分析了地方立法权限扩张的政治后果,从保证中央立法权威、党政关系以及国家在经济发展中的作用三个方面论证了目前我国立法分权的发展还不能影响到国家的单一制结构形式,因此,应将注意力从关注"到底放不放立法权"的问题转向"如何放好地方立法权"的问题。     

National Parliaments in the European Union: Are There Any Benefits to Integration?

Abstract: Scholars and observers alike agree that the European Union has weakened national parliaments. This article posits that such a view, while generally accurate, ignores ways in which the EU has helped national parliaments in their function as regulators of society. It identifies two key mechanisms: precedent setting and policy transfer. First, the EU has produced laws on topics considered beyond the traditional remit of national parliaments. The EU's intervention has justified the production of unprecedented domestic laws that go well beyond the incorporation of EU principles. This has expanded the legislative reach of national parliaments. The article considers the experiences of Italy and The Netherlands in the area of antitrust. Second, the EU has fostered an environment conducive to cross‐national lesson drawing. The resulting knowledge has helped the design of more effective domestic legislative frameworks. This has confirmed the viability of national parliaments as regulatory institutions. The article examines the Open Method of Co‐ordination and its application to the areas of employment and social inclusion. It concludes with a discussion of parliaments in future Member States and in Mercosur.     

European Parliament and Executive Federalism: Approaching a Parliament in a Semi-Parliamentary Democracy

Abstract: The European Parliament has often been understood along the lines of theories of European integration—compared to regular parliaments by Federalists or belittled as merely an international assembly by intergovernmentalists. This paper proposes an understanding of the European Parliament not along theories about what the EU should become, but what it is and surely will continue to be, that is a very distinct federal structure. The European Parliament is a parliament in an executive federalism—with far‐reaching consequences for its form and functions. After outlining the characteristics of this federal structure, these consequences will be demonstrated by analysing the European Parliament in contrast with two ideal types of parliaments: the working parliament, separated from the executive branch and centred around strong committees (like the US Congress), and the debating parliament, characterised by the fusion of parliamentary majority and government as well as plenary debates (like the British House of Commons). Dwelling thus on a comparison to a legislature in a non‐parliamentary federal system, like the US Congress, this paper argues that the European Parliament might best be understood as a special case of a working parliament. Finally, it will be proposed to consider the influence of executive federalism not only as fundamentally shaping the European Parliament but also as rendering the EU generally a semi‐parliamentary democracy.