Humanitarian Intervention After Iraq: Legal Ideals vs. Military Realities

The theory of humanitarian intervention has received new attention since the humanitarian crises of the 1990s and the United States’ becoming the world's sole superpower. The actual practice of humanitarian intervention, however, has declined. It is difficult to forge the political will for it when the countries composing the global organizations that could provide the political legitimacy disagree on an intervention, and with so few countries—mainly the United States and Great Britain—capable of providing the required expeditionary forces. Moreover, the Afghanistan and Iraq wars have diminished the United States’ political will, military capability, and diplomatic credibility to conduct future humanitarian interventions. In particular, those wars precluded its intervention in the current genocide in Darfur. Regional bodies such as the African Union may be the only entities that can, with aid and training, undertake effective interventions.     

Forecasting crime and narcobusiness: Iraq after the war

While it is still too early to analyse the consequences of the war in Iraq, the chaos and crime that immediately followed the end of the war has led to an analysis of the post‐war strategy. What we have specifically to explore is how certain assumptions and ‘blind spots’ have prevented us from formulating a useful strategy for dealing with illicit activity in the aftermath of conflicts. As a result, we are constantly surprised by upsurges in crime and drug production and trafficking, and thus are being forced to react to situations that we are not prepared for, nor fully understand. This need not be the case as we have the experience of the last two decades to draw upon, provided we analyse it in a more sophisticated manner.     

伊拉克战后的俄美关系

俄在美发动伊拉克战争问题上与美意见分歧,严重影响俄美关系。然而出于长远战略利益需要,美不得不考虑修补美俄裂痕。双方都留有余地,两国关系不会因此破裂。     

American Grand Strategy after Iraq

To the extent that a grand strategy can be discerned in the first year of the Obama Administration, its defining features are not a break from the past but continuity. As the President himself has analogized since taking office, crafting grand strategy is like parallel parking. He has only been able to make changes to grand strategy around the margins since a number of existing commitments limit his freedom of action. This article first identifies the structural determinants of grand strategy, pointing to the international distribution of power, American bureaucracy, and public as the key sources of strategic constraint and opportunity. It then shows how shifts in these factors—comparatively less U.S. power, an overstretched military organized around counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and an American public weary from an aggressive grand strategy—produced a shift in grand strategy that predated the 2008 election and that remains consistent with the current strategic setting. It is for these reasons that the 2008 “change” election has produced considerable continuity in American grand strategy.     

伊拉克战后的航空货运

20 0 3年3月1 8日美国对伊拉克战争正式打响,不到一个月,萨达姆政权就倒台了,伊拉克政权的变更比人们预想的要快得多,但伊拉克战后经济基础设施的重建,却比人们预想的要缓慢、复杂和困难得多。国际商人在争先恐后地涌向伊拉克,在伊拉克各地,尤其是首都巴格达,来自世界各国的航空货运代理人员渐增,其首要任务是在巴格达和伊拉克各地为自己的贸易公司与合伙人建立航空货运办事处、联络点,忙着与伊拉克贸易公司和批发商签订贸易代理协议。已抵达伊拉克和迅速开展商业活动的航空货运代理们希望在伊拉克的航空货运上发一笔大财。据悉,伊拉克有相…     

Humanitarian Intervention and Communal Civil Wars:

How do policymakers in democratic nations mobilize support for hard-line strategies? Existing answers to this question emphasize the exaggeration of external threats. Yet this overlooks an important dilemma: because democratic citizens expect their leaders to explore peaceful solutions or less aggressive alternatives when foreign dangers are ambiguous, the same conditions that make threat inflation necessary also make it difficult to employ successfully. To mobilize support for hard-line measures when the public wants its leaders to demonstrate restraint, policymakers may therefore attempt to shift blame onto an adversary by using “counterfeit diplomacy.” Specifically, democratic leaders may adopt more cooperative or less coercive options than they believe are necessary, but which they anticipate will fail. This approach can be a risky one, however, because an opponent might accept a nation's demands, accede to its conditions, or offer counterproposals in the hope of diffusing support for more confrontational measures.     

Polarization Between Occupier and Occupied in Post-Saddam Iraq: Colonial Humiliation and the Formation of Political Violence

This article analyses the mechanisms of colonial humiliation in post-Saddam Iraq. A case study of the city of Fallujah, where participant observation was carried out on two occasions, provides an account for the polarization between its population and occupation forces, which culminated in the partial destruction of the city in November 2004.     

The Arms Collaboration Dilemma: Between Principal-Agent Dynamics and Collective Action Problems

One of the most dramatic developments in the field of armaments has been the rise of international collaboration over the last several decades. Nowhere has this phenomenon been more pronounced than the domain of military aircraft, where few states possess the resources to remain autonomous. Surprisingly, despite the theoretical advantages of interoperability and economies of scale, armaments collaboration has rarely, if ever, proven efficient. This article examines how states have employed governance structures, over time, to improve the collaborative process. To preview the conclusion, a stark trade-off exists between states’ ability to control principal-agent dynamics and minimize collective action problems. Consequently, the dilemma of armaments collaboration is that any attempt to address principal-agent dynamics will aggravate collective action problems and vice-versa. With this in mind, it may be futile to continue reforming armaments collaboration because any governance structures will result in a deleterious combination of principal-agent dynamics and collective action problems.     

伊拉克战争后的中东问题--中国社会科学院第六届国际问题论坛综述

10月 11日至 12日 ,中国社会科学院科研局和西亚非洲研究所联合承办了该院第六届国际问题论坛。中国社会科学院副院长陈佳贵、外交部前副部长杨福昌、外交部西亚北非司前司长安惠侯出席了本届论坛。出席这次论坛的还有 :中国社会科学院西亚非洲研究所、世界经济与政治研究所、世界宗教研究所、中国国际问题研究所、中国现代国际关系研究院、北京大学、总参谋部外交学院、对外经济贸易大学、上海社会科学院、云南大学、上海外国语大学、环球时报、世界知识出版社等单位的专家、学者和新闻工作者 4 0余人。中国社会科学院西亚非洲研究所所长杨…     

Humanitarian futures and adaptive failures

Scientific and technological change will intensify over the next two decades, profoundly affecting the global economy and the environment, as well as demographic trends and political and security structures in most parts of the world. An unintended consequence may be an exponential rise in human exposure to disasters and emergencies. Such humanitarian crises may, in no small part, be due to planners’ inability to anticipate potential hazards and to appreciate their significance, and to decision-makers’ inability to reconcile competing demands for resources. This article suggests that most disasters and emergencies are the result of an individual and institutional failure to respond effectively to change, new information and contending interests. It explores various psychosocial approaches to individual and group dynamics, and utilises a range of organisational and political-science models to evaluate potential constraints on adaptive capacities. Ultimately, it proposes a five-point strategy to assist both policy-planners and decision-makers in thinking in a more ‘non-linear’ fashion and in being more responsive to the direction and implications of change.     

伊拉克战争后的国际形势发展

美英以绝对军事优势很快打赢了伊拉克战争,但因出师无名而输掉了道义。这场战争的影响深远:引发了美欧之间的深层次矛盾;传统的国际关系准则受到较严重的冲击。伊拉克正在成为“新帝国”政策的试验场。但美国的愿望很难如愿以偿,伊拉克将有可能成为其长期陷入的新“泥潭”。     

The Humanitarian Factors: An ICRC Perspective

More than ten years have passed since the beginning of the Global War on Terror and the consequent launch of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.Today,at the dawn of intemational forces' withdrawal,some substantive improvements are recorded in the field of infrastructure,power,communication,and education.The question is whether this relative progress is sustainable and whether the Afghan population will get the help it will actually need in an unpredictable,but a priori extremely difficult,future.     

Empowerment and survival: Humanitarian work in civil conflict

This two-part article explores the experience of living and working for povertyfocused NGOs in a civil war whose roots lay in the chronically inequitable distribution of power and access to resources. Drawing on 12 years' work in Central America, the author reflects on the demands and constraints placed on international aid workers in the context of civil conflict; and on the ways in which relationships with local counterpart organisations and NGOs are affected. Empowerment and participation are examined from the perspective of those who refuse to play the role of war victims. Part Two explores the immediate and longer-term impacts of war and political violence both on those who survive, and on local and international workers who are concerned to address its causes and consequences.