Privatization Within the Chinese State

This article suggests that China's public and collective enterprises have contributed to its economic growth and socio-political stability. The efficiency of these enterprises has been improved not through the privatization of the state (transferring public ownership to private hands) but privatization within the state (decentralization, appropriation, and marketization). This article first provides statistics to juxtapose the growth of the Chinese economy to the continued expansion of public and collective enter-prises. I t then explains the causes and benefits of privatization within the Chinese state. A case study of privatization within the state in Shanghai City follows. The article concludes that China's economic reform has been a transformation of socialism, not a transition to capitalism, and that it is a less costly but more effective alternative to the privatization of the state approach. The former communist countries in Europe have painfully followed this latter approach and have suffered from its political, social, and economic consequences.     

英国公用事业的民营化改革及其经验教训

英国公用事业的民营化改革具有深刻的经济、政治原因,英国采取了多种民营化形式,并取得了一定的成效;英国民营化后建立了由政府管制立法、执法和社会监督组成的管制框架;英国民营化改革的经验教训是多方面的,其中包括:法律制度是公用事业民营化改革的准则,政企分离是公用事业民营化改革的关键,竞争是提高公用事业经济效率的根本途径,有效竞争是制定公用事业管制政策的目标导向,政府应按照经济原理制定公用事业的管制价格。     

Public Service Under Challenge in the Age of Privatization

During the second and third quarters of this century, the scope of public service expanded significantly in almost all societies irrespective of their social, economic, political, and ideological predilections. In the past, such an expansive public bureaucracy came under criticism for its various shortcomings and pathological implications. However, recently, a more serious form of assault on the public service has been introduced by the proponents of the current privatization movement. The advocacy of privatization by the dominant national and international forces has created three major forms of challenges to the public service: a challenge to its legitimacy, a challenge to its ethical standards, and a challenge to its motivational foundation. In this article, the nature and intensity of these challenges are analyzed, the claims and assumptions of privatization are reexamined, and some possible remedies are explored.     

A Political Perspective on Contracting Out: The Politics of Good Times. Experiences from Danish Local Governments

Privatization has been on the political agenda for the last two decades. The literature points to two major explanations of privatization. One explanation is political-ideological, considering privatization to be a Liberal-Conservative strategy. Economic crisis or fiscal stress is the other main explanation of privatization. The two theses are investigated by evaluating the determinants of contracting out in Danish local governments. The analysis shows that fiscal stress is strongly, but inversely related to contracting out, while Liberal-Conservative political leadership is not associated with higher levels of contracting out than Social Democratic governance. Thus, the richer a local government becomes, the more it contracts out. Although party politics is not decisive for contracting out, the motivation seems to be political rather than economical. Specifically, it is argued that in a strongly decentralized public sector with influential public employees, contracting out is possible in good times when revenue and public expenditure are easier to increase, which reduces public employee resistance to contracting out.     

Campfire decision-making and strategic management: A politics and leadership approach to economic development

Privatization is recommended unconditionally by some scholars as the optimal means for achieving economic development. While privatization can be helpful medicine, it provides no universal cure for all the ills associated with low economic growth. A country's economic and political institutions are intertwined. Mandating privatization without being mindful of both political and economic consequences to such a policy can bring undesirable consequences during and after policy implementation. This paper proposes that to enhance the likelihood of economic growth a leader should blend economics with politics. Sensitive political leadership can stimulate a bonding among citizens, a bonding which can generate the commitment to risk by investing personal savings, to work the long hours which much precede the rewards, and often to be satisfied by a job well done rather than with material reward. Analogous to the chief executive officer of a successful corporation, the effective political leader involves stakeholders, steers decision processes, takes reasonable risks, encourages private investment, and rations public resources according to national priorities. Collective decision-making guided by the political leader, who also acts as a strategic manager during implementation, is offered as a model for development.     

Political transition,economic liberalization and civil service reform in Malawi

This article reviews the efforts aimed at reforming the civil service of Malawi at the same time as the country has been undergoing political transition and economic liberalization since 1991. Some of the measures in the civil service reform programme interfaced with either the political transition process (for example, the Public Service Act) or with economic policy reform (for example, privatization). In a few other cases, it was a mixture, a political economy perspective (for example, curbing corruption). The article draws attention to the achievements and problems of implementation, including the coordination of donor support, and highlights the lessons learned and the prospects for the remaining years of the decade and beyond. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Public Admin. Dev. Vol. 17 : 209–222 (1997). No. of Figures: 2. No. of Tables: 2. No. of Refs: 9.     

Sanction Power, Jurisdiction, and Economic Policy-making: Explaining Contemporary Telecommunications Policy in Japan

Variation in policy-making is an important analytical issue in public policy analysis, but it has not been extensively discussed in the literature on Japanese politics and political economy. Focusing on the interaction between state and societal actors, this article presents a causal argument to account for variation in Japanese economic policy-making. It is argued that variation in policy-making patterns is determined by the strength of a bureaucracy's sanction power and the exclusivity of its jurisdiction. This argument is elaborated through analysis of four related cases of Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT) policy-making: the privatization process of Nippon Telegraph and Telephone (NTT), the regulation of telecommunications after NTT privatization, the promotion of advanced telecommunications, and the reorganization of NTT. The causal framework is also applied to contemporary Ministry of International Trade and Industry economic policy-making to highlight the argument's preliminary applicability to Japanese policy-making. This analysis of Japanese policy-making lays a base for further analysis of variation in policy-making in general.     

Ideologies, vested interest groups, and postal saving privatization in Japan

The privatization of Japan’s postal saving system has been a politically charged issue since it first started being debated in the late 1980s, and yet it provides a useful setting in which political economy of economic policy-making can be investigated empirically. Analyzing the pre-election survey of the House of Representatives candidates in 2003 and also the voting patterns of Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) members on a set of postal privatization bills in 2005, this paper asks why some politicians fiercely opposed (or supported) privatization. The econometric results show that multiple factors are important: the private interests of local postmasters and postal workers, politicians’ fundamental ideologies on the size and role of government, party disciplines and factional affiliations within the LDP. Legislative behavior on postal privatization in Japan, thus, turns out to be one case in which legislative behavior is more complex than any single theory predicts.     

Institutional preconditions of privatization in market-based political economies: Implications for Jordan

Concepts of privatization have been adopted on a global scale. Yet few studies examine issues other than economic and selected political ones. This article argues, however, that a broad spectrum of institutional considerations must be evaluated in order to assess the viability of any proposed privatization strategy. A further distinction must be made between countries with developed markets and those market-based political economies (MBPEs) whose extant institutional configurations have not reached a level of independence to fully support extensive privatization measures. Jordan, Turkey and Egypt would be examples of such countries. This article contends that the enactment and implementation of privatization policies will achieve its avowed goals only (a) if the state-controlled enterprises (SCEs) are sufficiently independent of their supervising bureaucracies (presumably a ministry, the treasury or development planning organization) prior to their transfer to a private partner and (b) if the government possesses requisite monitoring capacity to ensure the fulfilment of contractual obligations of the privatized entity. An ancillary thesis suggests that the societal and organizational culture must be succinctly separated to warrant a full-scale transfer of SCEs to the private sector. In Jordan, privatization has been discussed for a number of years, but no projects have been attempted so far. The article assesses the likelihood of large-scale privatization occurring soon.     

Bridging the Ideological Divide: Trust and Support for Social Security Privatization

Using a pair of national surveys, this article analyzes the individual-level sources of public support for Social Security privatization. Given the inherent risks associated with privatization, we argue that the political trust heuristic affords untapped theoretical leverage in explaining public attitudes toward privatization. We find that, among certain individuals, political trust plays an instrumental role in structuring privatization preferences. Political trust increases support for privatization, but only among liberals. This heterogeneity in trust’s impact is best explained, we argue, by the unbalanced ideological costs imposed by the potential privatization of Social Security. Among liberals, embracing privatization requires the sacrifice of core values, thereby making political trust a potent consideration. Political trust is inconsequential among conservatives because supporting privatization requires no comparable sacrifice for them.

Waiting for privatization in developing countries: Towards the integration of economic and non-economic explanations

The intention of this paper is to examine the political and administrative limits on the effective implementation of privatization in developing countries and so to present a challenge to the view that slow progress is primarily attributable to economic constraints. After examining these economic aspects, the paper provides an explanatory framework which incorporates those political and administrative processes central to an understanding of what happens to state economic policies in practice. The significance of these processes is demonstrated by drawing on research material from India, Pakistan, Thailand, and Sri Lanka. The conclusion drawn is that responses to pressures for economic reform will be determined, not so much by economic criteria as by the political and bureaucratic resources available to decision makers. Since policy processes in developing countries show considerable variety it is likely that there will be substantial variations in the practical achievement of privatization objectives.     

Beliefs About Corporate America and the Structure of Opinions Toward Privatization

This research analyzes the individual-level factors associated with public support for the private provision of public goods and services. Given that privatization requires the transfer of authority from public to private entities, we argue that beliefs about private companies are an important and overlooked source of heterogeneity in explaining public policy preferences toward privatization. We test this expectation using survey data from the 2014 Cooperative Congressional Election Study. We find that support for privatization is associated with positive beliefs about the motivation of private companies and with favorable views about corporate accountability relative to the accountability of government. Opposition to privatization is associated with beliefs about corporate influence in politics. Preferences for limited government are also associated with support for privatization. These results highlight the potential for beliefs about private companies to serve as a group heuristic in political reasoning and the ability of citizens to make reasoned choices on complex public policy issues.     

Political Compromises: The Privatization of Small- and Medium-Sized Public Enterprises in China

One important feature of China’s privatization process is that insider privatization prevailed, and that outsiders could hardly gain access to buying state enterprises. Why was a majority of small- and medium-sized public enterprises sold to the firms’ former managers (and workers)? How did the tightened regulatory environment affect local privatization in China? Building on insights into institutional change, I argue that the choice of a specific privatization strategy results from political compromises among local officials, workers, and managers of public enterprises under specific regulatory constraints. Local officials’ incentives for privatization and their reactions to the changing regulatory environment had a great impact on the dynamics of local privatization.     

Privatization in Kosovo: ‘Liberal Peace’ in Practice

This article examines internationally led privatization in Kosovo as an example of international statebuilding. It concentrates on the period from 1999 to 2008, when privatization was planned and implemented under formal international management. International statebuilding is typically sought justified with the idea of ‘liberal peace’, and this article shows how the tension between the political and economic tenets of the idea of liberal peace manifested itself in Kosovo's internationally led privatization.     

Delayed privatization

This paper studies the timing of privatization in 21 major developed economies in the 1977–2002 period. Duration analysis shows that political fragmentation plays a significant role in explaining government’s decision to privatize: privatization is delayed longer in democracies characterized by a larger number of parties and operating under proportional electoral rules, as predicted by war of attrition models of economic reform. Results are robust to various assumptions on the underlying statistical model and to controlling for other economic and political factors.     

Community Development Block Grant Spending Revisited: Patterns of Benefit and Program Institutionalization

This article analyzes Community Development Block Grant (CDBG)spending by local governments between 1988–1992. We addressfour issues examining actual expenditure patterns in a smallcentral city and five satellite cities in Michigan: changesin CDBG expenditure patterns; levels of social targeting; theextent of institutionalization of expenditure patterns; andthe level of privatization of CDBG spending. We conclude thatwhile spending for housing and public works is related to thefiscal health of cities, expenditures for economic developmentand social services are related to political characteristics.Further, local governments exceed federal social targeting guidelines.Finally, while there is little privatization, the communitiesstudied evidence modest levels of program innovation in thelater years of the CDBG program.     

Privatization and the Courts: How Judicial Structures Shaped German Privatization

This article examines how legal institutional structures shaped the process of East German privatization by the Treuhandanstalt. It argues that the courts, as an important venue for oversight and accountability, were central to achieving the rapid and narrowly defined privatization carried out by the agency. Moreover, the experience of privatization after 1989 suggests the courts played a far more important role in shaping economic policy than one would have expected from traditional scholarship on public agencies, the courts, or the German legal system.     

Alternative patterns of welfare state development: The case of public assistance in the Netherlands

Among the numerous studies of the development of welfare states, less attention has been paid to the smaller European democracies. In an attempt to address this problem, this article investigates the development of public assistance programmes in the Netherlands. The historical record shows that the development of the Dutch public assistance programme has been more contentious than the development of similar programmes in other countries. An explanation for political controversy surrounding Dutch public assistance focuses on the manifestation of corporatism in a policy area that involved private charity organisations, rather than labour and capital interests. The incorporation of private charities permitted them to slow state encroachment on their activities. Implications of the case for the study of corporatism in other countries are discussed.     

Privatisation and regulation in an Asian transitional economy: the case of Mongolia

Mongolia's transition to a market economy has entailed rapid and extensive privatisation accompanied by, inter alia, stabilisation, liberalisation and de‐regulation. The primary objective of this strategy was to cement the new political and economic order. Little weight was given to the problems created by the privatisation programme and only limited consideration given to questions of regulation in the economic, social and environmental spheres. However, the failure of the economy to translate economic growth into poverty reduction and the acceleration of the privatisation programme, which includes the progressive transfer of land, and proposals to privatise health, educational and cultural assets, have made regulation a more pressing issue. New, powerful social classes and interest groups have emerged, which have contributed to regulatory failure and capture and have undermined public policy. We identify a range of issues relating to privatisation and regulation and discuss the degree to which they are being addressed by the post‐1990 political class. Although there exist a number of regulatory agencies, there is a lack of political commitment, and only piecemeal implementation and enforcement. The scarcity of experienced and technically competent staff capable of establishing and operating effective regulatory agencies and ensuring compliance is also a major problem. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

UK Privatisation Revisited: Ideas and Policy Change, 1979–92

Privatisation in the UK was facilitated by the interplay of ideas, institutions, actors, and economic interests. The motivations of the programme were ideational and political, but the objectives were economic and administrative. Together these paved the way for the success of the policy. Although several rationales were at play in the unfolding of privatisation, the ideological predilection of the Thatcher governments underpinned this far-reaching policy reform. This explains why the Thatcher government did not reform nationalized industries within the public sector, but instead shifted them into the private sector. Privatisation succeeded because it was championed by new right policy entrepreneurs, was supported by interest groups prepared to support, or least not impede, such dramatic policy change, and when the public enterprise status quo was deemed in need of reform. Of course, ideas only act as a catalyst for policy change when an established policy agenda having withered, been worn-out or otherwise discredited, can then be successfully challenged.