Stand-alone private antitrust damages: (how) should competition authorities react?

The European Commission has recently set up a framework that facilitates the access to the courts by victims of antitrust injury, even in the absence of a ruling by a competition authority (so-called stand-alone private damages, or SPD, actions). Here, I study a game where both public and private antitrust enforcement play a role. Plaintiffs face information acquisition costs (evidence-gathering) if they want to bring an SPD action, but they do not internalise the opportunity cost of the courts?? resources. First, I show that any gain in deterrence has to be traded off against costly litigation and enforcement costs, and that these tradeoffs are heterogeneous across market sizes. Second, taking the competition authority??s actions as exogenous, SPDs can improve welfare only if the competition authority is sufficiently effective: private damages are a complement to (good) public enforcement, not a substitute. Third, a resource-constrained competition authority, upon the introduction of SPDs, should investigate a larger proportion of industries (even at the cost of a higher error rate). That is, whilst a ??hands-off?? approach might have been warranted absent SPDs, this is no longer true once stand-alone actions are introduced.     

Antitrust, health care quality, and the courts

Antitrust law represents the principal legal tool that the United States employs to police private markets, yet it often relegates quality and nonprice considerations to a secondary position. While antitrust law espouses the belief that vigorous competition will enhance quality as well as price, little evidence exists of the practical ability of courts to deliver on that promise. In this Article, Professors Hammer and Sage examine American health care as a vehicle for advancing understanding of the nexus among competition, quality, and antitrust law. The Article reports results of a comprehensive empirical review of judicial opinions in health care antitrust litigation between 1985 and 1999, with specific attention to courts' handling of quality and other nonprice concerns. Professors Hammer and Sage conclude that, although antitrust law cannot be expected to serve as the sole oversight mechanism for industries as complex and quality dependent as health care, courts have been successful incorporating some nonprice factors into antitrust analysis.     

The Inefficiency of Quasi–Per Se Rules: Regulating Information Exchange in EU and U.S. Antitrust Law

It is well understood that the exchange of information between horizontal competitors can violate competition law provisions in both the European Union (EU) and the United States, namely, article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and section 1 of the Sherman Act. However, despite ostensible similarities between EU and U.S. antitrust law concerning interfirm information exchange, substantial differences remain. In this article, we make a normative argument for the U.S. antitrust regime's approach, on the basis that the United States’ approach to information exchange is likely to be more efficient than the relevant approach under the EU competition regime. Using economic theories of harm concerning information exchange to understand the imposition of liability in relation to “stand-alone” instances of information exchange, we argue that such liability must be grounded on the conception of a prophylactic rule. We characterize this rule as a form of ex ante regulation and explain why it has no ex post counterpart in antitrust law. In contrast to the U.S. antitrust regime, we argue that the implementation of such a rule pursuant to EU competition law leads to higher error costs without a significant reduction in regulatory costs. As a majority of jurisdictions have competition law regimes that resemble EU competition law more closely than U.S. antitrust law, our thesis has important implications for competition regimes around the world.     

COMPETITION POLICY IN CHINA AND ITS RELEVANCE TO SMES

Competition policy has great relevance to all the firms in any economy. Even though it is unlikely that small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have enough market power to constrain competition through a misuse of such power, they may still face prosecution if they are involved in a boycott of competitors or suppliers, price-fixing, output-restriction and other monopoly agreements. This article discusses antitrust issues pertaining to SMEs with a focus on China’s Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) and its implementation rules. Contrary to the popular view that SMEs benefit from competition laws, evidence shows that they are reluctant to get involved in antitrust litigation against large firms partly because of the high legal costs involved. There is an urgent need to promote an awareness of antitrust compliance in China and to educate SMEs about the need to avoid breaching the new antitrust law and its associated regulations. In the meantime, SMEs should take full advantage of the antitrust laws to fight against the abuse of market dominance directed at them, and to gain equal opportunities to market access.     

The economic analysis of antitrust consents

Henry G. Manne, our friend, Mentor, and colleague, was a pioneer in the economic analysis of law. By consistently challenging the notion that existing institutions were well understood, he expanded the domain of economics to new and fertile ground. In that spirit, our goal in this article is to bring out of the shadows an institution that has thus far evaded the light of economic analysis: antitrust consents. In our view, competition authorities around the world should be asking themselves what ratio of litigation to settlement is optimal for their agency. Over the last 35 years, the United States Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice have shifted dramatically toward greater reliance upon consent decrees than upon litigation to resolve antitrust disputes. As an aid to national competition agencies considering the desirability of adopting a similar approach, we focus upon the importance of economic analysis in evaluating movement along the continuum from a law enforcement model to a regulatory model of agency behavior. We draw upon the U.S. experience to substantiate our claim that the costs associated with a shift toward the regulatory model, including the potential distortion in the development of substantive antitrust doctrine, may be under-appreciated and discernable only in the long run. We acknowledge that consent decrees can and should be an important tool in an antitrust agency’s toolkit for resolving antitrust disputes. We contend, however, that a full economic analysis of reliance primarily upon consent decrees is necessary to inform each competition agency’s strategic decision about the optimal mix of law enforcement and regulatory techniques.     

美国反垄断法豁免中的诺尔——本灵顿原则评析

诺尔——本灵顿原则是由美国联邦最高法院通过几个案例确立的联邦反垄断法中的一个原则,其主要含义是:根据《美国宪法第一修正案》的规定,即使竞争者通过游说政府而改变法律将会削弱竞争,其行为也不违反反垄断法。诺尔——本灵顿原则是协调《谢尔曼法》的重要目标与公民请愿权利和各级政府有效决策之间关系的产物。诺尔——本灵顿原则对中国的反垄断法执法也有一定启发意义,在执法过程应当全面协调经营者的竞争利益与其他经营者的宪法权利、与政府行为的关系。     

Examining exclusionary conduct of HMOs and PPOs: a case comment on Northwest Medical Laboratories v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Oregon.

As the climate of the health care industry has changed to one of cost-containment and competition through the growth of HMOs and PPOs, health care providers have become the subjects of antitrust litigation. One such case, Northwest Medical Laboratories v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Oregon, involved a medical laboratory and a radiology center who claimed that they were victims of an illegal group boycott after defendant's pre-paid health plan denied them preferred provider status. The Oregon Court of Appeals, using the traditional antitrust analysis applied to other industries for decades, failed to consider the intricacies that exist within the health care industry. This result led to an inaccurate market share computation and an inadequate rule of reason analysis. This Comment examines the shortcomings of the Northwest Medical opinion and argues that, in applying the antitrust laws to the health care industry, courts in future cases must recognize and respect the unique features of the business of providing health care.     

The WTO's First Antitrust Case - Mexican Telecom: A Sleeping Victory for Trade and Competition

A World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute panel has decided theWTO’s first antitrust case. It resolved the matter infavour of the United States’ claim that Mexico had anticompetitivelyfacilitated exploitative prices and a cartel that raised theprice of terminating cross-border telephone calls in Mexicoand thereby harmed trade and competition. The case is Mexico– Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services (April2004) (‘the Mexican telecom case’). This essay arguesthat if the WTO’s antitrust clause was in fact triggered(which is a point of contention), Mexico’s conduct violatedits obligations. Furthermore, it argues that the GATS antitrustobligation in the telecommunications sector should be acknowledgedas occupying an important place at the intersection of trade,competition and industrial policies. Antitrust law is the otherside of the coin of liberal trade law. Antitrust law opens marketsby prohibiting private and other commercial restraints, whiletrade law opens markets by prohibiting public restraints. BeforeMexican telecom, no legal discipline was regarded as copiousor flexible enough to address combined public and private restraints.In particular, nations were allowed free rein to privilege nationalchampions that harmed competition in and out of their country,imposing costs on outsiders as well as on their own people.A positive reading of the antitrust clause helps to fill thegap.     

The balance between equity and efficiency; reflections on the goals of the new Nigerian competition law

In January 2019, the Nigerian Government finally enacted its first competition law after several attempts to do so previously failed. Since all competition regimes advance one or more goals, the paper provides a critical evaluation of what the goals of the Nigerian Competition Law ‘is’ or ‘are’ and/or what they should be. This paper posits that discussion on goals must relate fundamentally to the true reason(s) the nation ‘needs’ an antitrust legislation and the relationship between these reasons (as reflected in the preamble of the legislation) and the prohibitory aspects of the law.Although the goal of competition is generally thought to be relating to promoting economic efficiency, however, for developing countries (including Nigeria), competition must compose of an important equity dimension. Ironically, the work uses the ‘developed’ experience of the EU in later stages to show that the goals of an antitrust policy are never static but dynamic and may not necessarily always admit of ‘efficiency’ considerations. This paper’s argument is that Nigeria needs a welfarist approach to competition which means efficiency should sit as a top objective and that any compromise on economic efficiency as the goal must be accommodated only to the extent that basic principles of a market driven competition is not harmed. Consequently, the work reflects on how the new Nigerian law has provided a balance between market efficiency and other goals of competition and how the new Nigerian competition body can operationalise this balance in the development of the nation’s antitrust policy. In this regard, the EU also provides some important enforcement lessons.     

反垄断诉讼的价值定位与制度建构

反垄断诉讼是反垄断法实施的重要机制之一,是反垄断法理论研究和司法实践中的重要问题。对此问题有两种研究思路：一是以个人权利为中心,将诉讼看作争议解决机制;二是以秩序建构为中心,将诉讼看作建构理想秩序的重要机制。反垄断法的产生、发展与有机社会的生成同步。垄断行为属于风险行为,其造成的损害具有不确定性、延伸性、难以恢复性,因而反垄断法属于现代社会规制法。与此相应,反垄断诉讼应是秩序建构诉讼,在价值上注重竞争秩序的建构,在功能上主张司法能动、积极回应社会在竞争上形成的价值共识,在构造上主张放宽原告条件,建立多元参与的诉讼机制。     

障碍与释疑:反垄断法适用于银行业的理论澄清

法律适用的明晰是开展法律规制实践的必要前提。虽然反垄断法的适用障碍表现出法律效力的"自我否定"倾向,但是这种制度设计源于对行业发展规律和合理规则方法的尊重。伴随市场经济的发展和管制行业的开放浪潮,反垄断法适用障碍具有主客观两方面的消弭倾向,其适用范围不断扩张。市场化进程的推进使得作为垄断性行业的银行业逐渐回归市场竞争的发展本质,"新型"的反垄断规制和"传统"的金融规制也会因此产生此消彼长的态势转变。《反垄断法》适用于银行业的实然逻辑在于既有法律规则范畴下的解释合法性、银行业市场发展演变的行业合理性以及我国反垄断规制发展脉络下的可期待性。     

Ready or not? A systematic review of case studies using data-driven approaches to detect real-world antitrust violations

Cartels and other anti-competitive behaviour by companies have a tremendously negative impact on the economy and, ultimately, on consumers. To detect such anti-competitive behaviour, competition authorities need reliable tools. Recently, new data-driven approaches have started to emerge in the area of computational antitrust that can complement already established tools, such as leniency programs. Our systematic review of case studies shows how data-driven approaches can be used to detect real-world antitrust violations. Relying on statistical analysis or machine learning, ever more sophisticated methods have been developed and applied to real-world scenarios to identify whether an antitrust infringement has taken place. Our review suggests that the approaches already applied in case studies have become more complex and more sophisticated over time, and may also be transferrable to further types of cases. While computational tools may not yet be ready to take over antitrust enforcement, they are ready to be employed more fully.     

The institutional-evolutionary antitrust model

The purpose of this article is to provide an alternative antitrust model to the mainstream model that is used in competition policy. I call it the Institutional-Evolutionary Antitrust Model. In order to construct an antitrust model one needs both empirical knowledge and considerations of how to adequately deal with norms. The analysis of competition as an evolutionary process that unfolds within legal rules provides the empirical foundation for the model. The development of the normative dimension involves the elaboration of a comparative approach. Building on those foundations the main features of the Institutional-Evolutionary Model are sketched out and it is shown that its use leads to systematically different outcomes and conclusions than the dominant antitrust ideals. JEL Classification B52. D83. K21     

反垄断法中联合限制竞争行为的比较研究

联合限制竞争行为的主体必须为两个或两个以上,且目的在于限制竞争;根据不同的分类法,可将其分为横向与纵向、协议与协同、禁止与豁免等种类;考虑其在经济上既能产生消极效果亦能产生积极效果,因此不能简单适用本身违法原则,有时需通过经济学分析以区别豁免情形;欧美竞争法规制联合限制竞争行为在立法体例、价值目标、执法机制、例外制度方面等均不尽相同;我国反垄断立法应以欧美竞争立法经验为基础,同时体现我国的特色.     

论反垄断法的伦理基础

对反垄断伦理的研究能够给反垄断提供更加深刻的解释力。竞争正义是反垄断法的伦理基石,反垄断法研究必须解答何谓正义的竞争这一问题。竞争自由是竞争正义的前提条件,竞争效率是反垄断法的核心理念,竞争公平是反垄断法永恒的价值追求。     

反垄断法视野中的低于成本价销售行为

反垄断法规范限制竞争的低于成本价销售行为虽然在一定程度上限制了市场主体的经营自主权 ,但却维护了竞争机制 ,有利于实现社会整体利益最大化。试图从现有的法律规定出发来研究反垄断法规范低于成本价销售行为的一些具体问题 ,揭示出反垄断法并不是禁止所有的低于成本价销售行为 ,而只是禁止具有市场支配地位或者经济优势的企业从事目的在于限制竞争 ,行为后果已经限制或可能限制竞争的低于成本价销售行为 ,防止竞争执法机构陷入禁止所有低于成本价销售行为的执法误区     

我国反垄断行政诉讼的困境及因应——基于165份判决书的实证分析

行政诉讼在我国反垄断执法体系中居于重要地位。通过165份司法判决文书的实证分析,表明我国反垄断行政诉讼虽有发展,但总体呈现发展起点低、案件总量低、执法机构被诉比例低、原告胜诉率低等"四低"现象,这与反垄断行政诉讼的原告资格认定困难与合法性审查范围偏窄等内因不无关系。反垄断立法条文模糊、执法专业性强等特点易使反垄断执法存在不确定性,要消除这种不确定性,除了实体规范的细化保障外,程序保障亦不容忽视。所以说,为反垄断行政诉讼确立特殊的程序规则不但具有理论必要性,也存在现实紧迫性。申言之,在反垄断行政诉讼中应当尽快确立以程序参与为基础的利害关系认定制度,建立司法审查对程序性执法细则制定的督促机制,并适度加强法院实质审查的力度。     

THE STOCHASTIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PATENTS AND ANTITRUST

This article develops a novel theory by which to construe theinteraction between the patent and antitrust laws. The rulesof these respective disciplines are often portrayed as conflictingin means, yet harmonious in purpose. Although the intellectualproperty and antitrust laws have ostensibly divergent viewson the role of competition, their interaction is typically limitedto one of constraint. More specifically, antitrust rules havebeen (poorly) designed to limit the exclusivity inherent ina patent grant to the claimed invention alone. This article,however, articulates a new vision for the role of antitrust:it posits that competition rules operate as a stochastic regulatorof exclusionary patent rights. The Sherman Act constrains patentees'efforts to positively transform the probabilistic nature oftheir intellectual property rights through contract. Yet, becausethe empirical calculation of optimal innovation rates is anelusive, if not Sisyphean, task, the normative desirabilityof the foregoing fact is abstruse. Nevertheless, policymakers'inability to pinpoint precisely the ex post rewards requiredto trigger ideal levels of ex ante investment need not bindour hands to inaction. If contemporary rates of innovation aredeemed acceptable (even if not necessarily perfect), there maybe ways to trigger equivalent levels of ex ante investment withlower social cost. In this regard, it is clear that currentlyenacted competition rules significantly accentuate the uncertaintysurrounding patents' apotropaic effect. Concluding that contractssecuring otherwise stochastic rights may be highly desirable,the article calls for the incorporation of this concern intocontemporary rules, with modest substantive effect, and furtheradvocates a qualified antitrust immunity for "gold-plated" patentsif and when they are introduced.     

PATENT HOLDUP AND OLIGOPSONISTIC COLLUSION IN STANDARD-SETTING ORGANIZATIONS

Current controversies over patent policy place standard-settingorganizations (SSOs) on a collision course with antitrust law.Recent theoretical research conjectures that, in an SSO, patentowners can "hold up" patent users in the sense of demandinghigh royalties for a patented input after the SSO has adoptedthe patented technology as an industry standard and manufacturerswithin the SSO have incurred sunk costs to design end productsthat incorporate that standard. Consistent with this conjecture,actual SSOs have recently sought no-action letters from theAntitrust Division for a variety of amendments to SSO rulesthat would require or request, at the time a standard is underconsideration, the ex ante disclosure by the patent owner ofthe maximum royalty that the patent owner would charge underthe regime of fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory licensing.This price information—which is characterized as the "cost"of the patented input—would, under at least one recentSSO rule modification, be a permissible topic for potentialusers of the patent to discuss when deciding whether to selectit in lieu of some alternative standard. This exchange of informationamong horizontal competitors would occur ostensibly becausethe cost of the patented technology had been characterized assimply one more technical attribute of the standard to be set,albeit an important technical attribute. The Antitrust Divisionand the Federal Trade Commission have jointly stated that suchdiscussion, by prospective buyers who are competitors in thedownstream market, of the price of a patented invention thatmight become part of an industry standard should be subjectto antitrust scrutiny under the rule of reason rather than therule of per se illegality. The rationale that the antitrustagencies offer for applying the rule of reason to such conductis that such horizontal collaboration might avert patent holdup.The Antitrust Modernization Commission (AMC) similarly endorsedthe view that rule-of-reason analysis is appropriate for exante discussion of royalty terms by competing buyers of patentedtechnology. This rule-of-reason approach, however, is problematicbecause it conflicts with both the body of economic researchon bidder collusion and with the antitrust jurisprudence oninformation exchange and facilitation of collusion. Put differently,because of their concern over the possibility of patent holdup,the U.S. antitrust agencies and the AMC in effect have indicatedthat they may be willing in at least some circumstances to forgoenforcement actions against practices that facilitate oligopsonisticcollusion by encouraging the ex ante exchange of informationamong competitors concerning the price to be paid for a patentedinput as an implicit condition of those competitors' endorsementof that particular patented technology for adoption in the industrystandard. However, neither the proponents of these SSO policiesnor the antitrust agencies and the AMC have offered any theoreticalor empirical foundation for their implicit assumption that theexpected social cost of patent holdup exceeds the expected socialcost of oligopsonistic collusion. This conclusion does not changeeven if one conjectures that such collusion will benefit consumersby enabling licensees to pass through royalty reductions intheir pricing of the downstream product incorporating the patentedtechnology. Proper economic evaluation of the plausibility ofthe pass-through conjecture will require information about thecalculation of royalty payments; the demand and supply elasticitiesfacing the licensees; and the structure of any industries furtherdownstream between the manufacturer and the final consumer.Consequently, the magnitude of this effect will likely be amatter of empirical dispute in every case. Moreover, such ajustification for tolerating horizontal price fixing finds nosupport in antitrust jurisprudence. Given the analytical andfactual uncertainty over whether patent holdup is a seriousproblem, it is foreseeable that antitrust questions of firstimpression will arise and affect a wide range of high-technologyindustries that rely on SSOs. However, there is no indicationthat scholars and policy makers have seriously considered whetheroligopsonistic collusion in SSOs is a larger problem than patentholdup.     

COMPETITION POLICY WITH OPTIMALLY DIFFERENTIATED RULES INSTEAD OF "PER SE RULES VS RULE OF REASON"

Both in U.S. antitrust and EU competition policy, a developmentto a broader application of rule of reason instead of per serules can be observed. In the European discussion the attemptto base competition policy on a "more economic approach" ismainly viewed as improving the economic analysis in the assessmentof specific cases. In this paper it is shown from a generallaw and economics perspective that the application of rulesinstead of focussing on case-by-case analyses can have manyadvantages (lower regulation costs, rent-seeking, and knowledgeproblems), although an additional differentiation of rules througha deeper assessment can also have advantages in regard to thereduction of decision errors of type I and II. After introducingthe notion of a continuum of more or less differentiated rules,we show—based upon law and economics literature upon theoptimal complexity of rules—in a simple model that a competitionrule is optimally differentiated if the marginal reduction ofthe sum of error costs (as the marginal benefit of differentiation)equals the marginal costs of differentiation. This model alsoallows for a more detailed analysis of the most important determinantsof the optimal degree of rule-differentiation. From this lawand economics perspective, competition policy should consistmainly of (more or less differentiated) rules and should onlyrarely rely on case-by-case analysis. Therefore the main taskof a "more economic approach" is to use economics for the formulationof appropriate competition rules.