Editorial: From Kyoto to The Hague: European Perspectives on Making the Kyoto Protocol Work

International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics -     

'Alive and Kicking': The First Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol

Long confined to the realm of political uncertainty, the Kyoto Protocol finally entered into force on 16 February 2005. As for its substantive bearing, however, the Protocol is, at best, an initial framework for more detailed rules deferred to later Meetings of the Parties. Convening for the first time in Montreal, Canada, from 28 November to 9 December 2005, the Kyoto Protocol's Meeting of the Parties decided on important operational aspects of the Protocol, approving the Marrakesh Accords and thereby implementing the Protocol's flexibility mechanisms and compliance regime. Arguably of even greater magnitude was the agreement to engage in consultations on future mitigation commitments, notably with a view to the period after 2012, when current commitments expire. This article outlines principal decisions passed at the meeting in Montreal, affirming that, while daunting challenges still lie ahead, one thing has now been shown for certain: contrary to many premature obituaries, the Kyoto Protocol is anything but dead.     

The price of non-compliance with the Kyoto Protocol: The remarkable case of Norway

One of the ways to induce compliance is for an international enforcement mechanism to authorize the use of punitive consequences against a non-compliant country. However, such consequences should not cause significant damage to other (compliant) countries. The compliance mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol fails to meet this requirement. The Enforcement Branch of the Compliance Committee is instructed to impose punitive consequences on a non-compliant country that will have considerable adverse welfare effects for compliant countries as well. Using a numerical model, we show that in the case of Norway, the welfare effects can actually be worse if another country is punished than if Norway itself is punished.

The effectiveness of Kyoto Protocol and the legal institution for international technology transfer

Kyoto Protocol has certain provisions concerning environmentally sound technologies (ESTs) transfer, primarily including the direct provisions, the clean development mechanism and the fund mechanism, which are supposed to favor technology transfer for reducing the emission of greenhouse gases (GHG) in the world. However, mainly due to the flaws of these provisions, ESTs have not been transferred as smoothly as possible to realize the Kyoto Protocol’s objectives. Therefore, the international community shall take the effectiveness of Kyoto Protocol as a fresh impetus to consummate the legal system of international technology transfer, that is, to develop a uniform technology transfer agreement under the WTO with a focus on promoting ESTs transfer, which may make the developing countries to acquire the technologies they need under the fair terms and help them build their capacities for sustainable development. China does not need to perform the obligation of reducing GHG emissions until 2013 according to Kyoto Protocol, but precautions shall be taken to improve its legal systems on technology transfer to make preparations for implementing the policy of scientific development and playing significant roles in related international legislation.     

Coerced and Unfree in the Private Sector

We style ourselves as liberal polities and law purports to sustain liberal values. It does not claim to maintain and perpetuate capitalist goals as such. Yet, its adherence to the sacrosanct nature of private property, individualism and freedom to contract allow it do just that. To further this unmentioned objective, law is twisted and bent to ignore the supposed right of workers as individuals to be autonomous decision-makers. The indefensible assumptions made give capitalists coercive powers that inhibit the working class from achieving economic and political autonomy. The owners of the means of production are given political and economic privileges by a legal system that pretends to serve the liberal project. The contradiction between liberal law and its capitalist orientation is plain, leading to occasional and always transitory reforms. This is illustrated by this overview of the legal mechanism of adjustment devised by supposedly liberal law to regulate capital/labour conflicts.     

论《京都议定书》对国际政治和国际经济的潜在影响

《京都议定书》是国际社会在防止全球气候变暖的国际合作方面取得的一份具有里程碑意义的国际法文件。《京都议定书》对国际政治将产生如下影响:发展中国家,尤其是中国、印度等发展中大国承受着越来越大的减排压力;推动欧盟一体化的进程,并进一步提升欧盟的国际政治地位;发展中国家阵营内部呈现出进一步分化的趋势。《京都议定书》对国际经济的影响主要表现在:对各国总体的经济福利产生影响;《京都议定书》产生的“碳泄漏”问题可能使得缔约国在竞争力和产业结构调整等方面发生一系列变化;对国际资本流动产生影响;《京都议定书》将推动能源技术的进步,尤其是推动低碳技术和高能效技术的创新与扩散。     

Green Markets: Environmental Regulation by the Private Sector*

The article begins with a review of recent trends in the devolution of state functions to nongovernment institutions, and discusses how private interests may be enlisted in furtherance of public policy. It then outlines a variety of institutions and instruments which might comprise a system of regulation for environmental protection, and suggests some of the forms of interaction between them. The focus then turns to commercial activity which can further the interests of environmental protection. It summarizes eight emerging trends in “green commerce” and concludes that in some settings, the constructive influence of commercial forces can exceed that wielded by government agencies.     

Biotic Carbon Sequestration and the Kyoto Protocol: The Construction of Global Knowledge by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

This paper explores the dynamics of the production of global knowledge by an international knowledge organization, in this case the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Based on previous notions of international boundary organizations, the idea of international knowledge organizations emphasizes the knowledge generation function of such organizations rather than their convening function. Using the case of controversial Kyoto Protocol biotic carbon sequestration policies, I argue that boundary work and uncertainty management are the essential dynamics in the successful construction of global knowledge by international knowledge organizations. This uncertainty management occurs in a manner broadly, although not completely, in conformance with the institutional preferences of powerful policy actors. Global knowledge can legitimate and help refine global policies, but the process of its construction must be iterative and transparent if it is to be credible for global environmental governance over the long-term.     

An Economic Analysis of Flexible Permit Trading in the Kyoto Protocol

This paper evaluates the relative gains from augmenting or restricting several of the flexibility mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol. A nonlinear programming model of international emissions trading is used to assess the net benefits of extending trading across time periods and across countries (Joint Implementation), and including the developing world (Clean Development Mechanism). The effect of limiting permit purchases (supplementarity) is also evaluated. The analysis is intended to help guide further climate negotiations by identifying flexibility mechanisms that contribute the most to enhancing the gains from greenhouse gas mitigation and identifying restrictions that detract the most from these gains.     

Convergence Criteria for Participation in the Flexible Mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol

We suggest a multi-layered system of three convergence criteria – similar to those used in the run-up to the European monetary union – that define the notion of "demonstrable progress" towards reaching the emission commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. These are the existence of an independently evaluated national emissions inventory, the level of domestic policies and measures, and the quantitative convergence of emissions towards the Kyoto target. While the first of these criteria constitutes a necessary condition for use of the Kyoto Mechanisms, the other two should determine the degree of participation allowed for any given Annex I country.