The Making of an Accidental Crisis: The United States and the NATO Dual-Track Decision of 1979

This analysis re-examines the Carter Administration’s formulation of policy on the theatre nuclear force issue following the neutron bomb affair. It demonstrates that European leaders did not foist the arms control component of the NATO dual-track decision on Jimmy Carter. Rather, the Carter Administration understood the merits of an arms control component following the August 1978 PRM-38 review and thought that Soviet–American arms control negotiations would play a crucial role in resolving the conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact over theatre nuclear forces. This analysis also considers the previously unexamined interactions between the United States and the Soviet Union in the months leading to the dual-track decision. It reveals that American officials underestimated the degree of Soviet anger over the dual-track decision, believing that arms control negotiations with the Soviets on theatre nuclear forces would be possible and productive. The Carter Administration did not foresee the Euromissiles crisis.     

卡特政府与伊朗巴列维国王的倒台

伊朗巴列维国王在第二次世界大战后美伊亲密关系建立和发展过程中起到举足轻重的作用.不过到20世纪70年代后期,巴列维的独裁统治陷入严重危机.1977年入主白宫的卡特起初并没有意识到伊朗局势的严重性,所以仍把巴列维国王视为唯一可以稳定伊朗的国家领导人.随着伊朗危机的日益加剧,伊朗国王的地位摇摇欲坠,对此,美国各部门围绕对伊朗政策产生激烈纷争,并最终坐视巴列维国王倒台.美伊长达近30年的友好关系也宣布终结.     

Beyond the Blank Cheque: Arming Iran during the Ford Administration

When President Gerald Ford decided to maintain and deepen arms relations with Iran, he cemented a momentum that became near impossible for a successor to break by continuing the policy of his predecessor Richard Nixon. Nixon had given the Shah of Iran a “blank cheque” to purchase whatever American arms he desired—short of nuclear weapons. Although Ford’s authority would be challenged by members of his own Administration and a Congress seeking to claw back some of its authority, the need to support allies in the Middle East against the threat of the Soviet Union, even during a time of détente, remained paramount.     

The Personalization(s) of Politics: Israel, 1949–2003

The relationship between the United States and Iran has had an important influence on world affairs during the past two decades. Accordingly, the U.S. news media have an instrumental role in portraying U.S.‐Iran relations to the public. The Iranian Revolution and hostage crisis of 1979–1981, the TWA hijacking of 1985, the Irangate controversy of 1986–1987, and the Persian Gulf War of 1990–1991 are examples of important media events that have impacted public opinion regarding U.S. policy toward Iran. This research analyzes government and print media portrayals of the Reagan administration's U.S.‐Iran policy during Irangate. Results supported the prediction that the print media would fulfill their “watchdog” function by providing more critical portrayals of the United States' policy toward Iran than the Tower Commission Report, an investigative document published by President Reagan's Special Review Board. Among the three leading newspapers analyzed, there was significant diversity in the reporting of U.S.‐Iran relations. Results indicate the Reagan administration's attempt to “spin” its version of Irangate did not successfully pressure the media to neglect their watchdog role. Although the Tower Commission Report was less critical of U.S. policy toward Iran than the print media, all four print media sources portrayed the Reagan administration's policy as a flawed approach that degenerated into trading arms for hostages. Implications of these findings for future research are discussed.     

The Champion of Human Rights Meets the King of Kings: Jimmy Carter,the Shah,and Iranian Illusions and Rage

Building on the recent re-discovery of the Iranian Revolution, this analysis examines the policies of the Carter Administration and their effects on Iran and the Iranian opposition. Starting with Jimmy Carter's election and hopes for a new era in American–Iranian relations, there occurred the progressive creation and expansion of a rift between the Carter Administration and the Iranian opposition. This rift was exacerbated by stubborn American support for an increasingly weak Shah, and by the complete unwillingness, both in Washington and at the American Embassy in Tehran, to meet with opposition members, let alone with Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. In this sense, the horizon of the analysis of the origins of the Iran hostage crisis is expanded with a longer-term perspective. The taking of the hostages represented the final act of a troubled relationship that had probably begun before Carter took office.     

Sovereignty and Human Rights: Re-examining Carter’s Foreign Policy Towards the Third World

This analysis examines the evolution of Jimmy Carter’s human rights policy towards the Third World during the course of his Administration. By exploring the impact of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Soviet-backed Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, it analyses how Carter responded to international outcry by pairing sovereignty as a human right, which specifically appealed to the concerns of newly independent nations in the late 1970s. Carter’s shift is explained first by a brief outline of his initial human rights policy and stumbling blocks; second, by examining Third World responses to the dual invasions; and, finally, exploring how this affected Carter’s human rights policy. It moves beyond claims that Carter abandoned his human rights agenda as he encountered an increasingly volatile international environment, instead examining the very real ways that he re-imagined this policy in the face of a changing global landscape.     

Why Does the United States Keep Helping Iran?

Since the Jimmy Carter administration, Iran has been America’s most consistent enemy. Strangely, however, the United States repeatedly helps its opponent. Following the 9/11 attacks, Washington aided Iran’s interests in six episodes: toppling the Taliban; overthrowing Saddam Hussein; suppressing the ISIS caliphate; backing the Saudi intervention in Yemen; withdrawing from the Iran nuclear deal, and assassinating the Iranian general Qasem Soleimani. Of course, Washington does not deliberately assist its opponent. Rather, the United States unintentionally helps Iran by creating power vacuums, into which Tehran steps, and triggering power surges, or coercive campaigns against Iran, which also tend to backfire and bond Iran more closely with third parties.     

EU Foreign Policy in the Italian Parliament: The Debates on China and Iran

Governments have always been more reluctant to accept parliamentary oversight in foreign policy than in any other domestic policy field. This examination of the recent performance of the Italian Parliament in Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) scrutiny and control in the two case studies of the EU's arms embargo against China and negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program shows that institutional arrangements concerning parliamentary control in this field have significant shortcomings. Although limited, the reforms under discussion in the new intergovernmental conference could contribute to improving the performance of parliaments and to creating a common awareness of the problem of democratic deficit in CFSP among the parliamentarians of EU member states.     

Forever young: START and aftermath

Abstract

The New Strategic arms reduction treaty nuclear arms control agreement signed by US President, Barack Obama, and Russian President, Dmitry Medvedev, in 2010 is likely to achieve ratification in both Washington and Moscow, but it is too early to break out the champagne or vodka. Even successful ratification of this agreement is, at best, an important but incremental part of the US–Russian policy ‘reset’ and the larger agenda for both states with respect to arms reduction and nonproliferation. Further reductions in both states’ inventories of strategic nuclear weapons are a necessary preface toward credible leadership in stopping the spread of nuclear arms – especially in the looming test cases of Iran and North Korea. In addition, both states have to decipher a policy-strategy nexus for emerging missile defense technologies: in particular, whether missile defenses should be seen as possible means of cooperative security, as between NATO and Russia, or whether they are firewalls in the way of further progress in offensive nuclear arms reductions.     

Carter and the Soviets: The Origins of the US Return to a Strategy of Confrontation

Conventional wisdom holds that American foreign policy took a decisive turn towards confrontation under President Ronald Reagan after 1981. However, a reconsideration of the administration of President Jimmy Carter shows that it was Carter who broke with the failed policies of his detentist predecessors, and made opposition to the Soviet system a moral rather than geopolitical issue. These policies were not, however, part of a coherent strategy, but rather were a reaction to the unrestrained nature of Soviet military and geographic expansion; still, the confrontational strategy that emerged in 1981 was rooted in Carter's rejection of détente after 1977.     

The Return to the Pressure Track: The Trump Administration and the Iran Nuclear Deal

During the 2016 United States presidential election campaign, Donald Trump promised to “renegotiate” the July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, better known as the Iran nuclear deal. The deal does not prevent Iran from building nuclear weapons and in some ways actually makes it easier for Iran to go nuclear in the future. The mere continuation of the current deal could undermine America’s interests in the Middle East and its global non-proliferation policy. How then can the Donald Trump Administration work to renegotiate the deal? This analysis provides a strategy that the Trump Administration can follow to improve American policy toward Iran, namely do what Iran is doing to the United States: abide by the strict terms of the agreement, whilst competing in all of the ways not covered in the deal. From an American perspective, increasing pressure on Tehran will constrain Iran’s destabilising influence in the region. Over time, Washington can leverage the pressure to force Iran back to the table to strike a renegotiated agreement that eliminates, not just delays, the Iranian nuclear and missile threat.     

Foreign Policy in Transition? Human Rights, Democracy, and U.S. Arms Exports

During the Cold War, U.S. foreign policy was dominated by the strategic goal to contain Communism. Human rights and democracy were of secondary importance. In the post-Cold War period, the promotion of human rights and democracy as foreign policy concerns rose in prominence. In the spirit of Andrew Pierre, who once characterized arms transfers as "foreign policy writ large ," this study questions whether the transfer of U.S. arms mirrors America's foreign policy goals. To what extent do U.S. arms transfers reflect a concern for human rights and democracy? As a foreign policy instrument, do U.S. arms transfer patterns mark a transition between Cold War and post-Cold War worlds? To address these questions, I examine the empirical linkage between U.S. foreign policy goals and arms export agreements with developing countries for the years 1981–2002. I use a two-stage model to evaluate the decision-making process. The first-stage addresses whether a country is eligible to receive U.S. arms. If a country successfully passes through the selection stage, it progresses to the second stage where a decision is made about the amount of arms transferred. I use a Heckman model to estimate empirically the determinants of arms at both the initial selection stage and the subsequent amount stage. The findings indicate that during the Cold War years, human rights were not a significant determinant of arms transfers—although democracy was positively linked to U.S. arms in the selection stage. In the post-Cold War period, both human rights and democracy had a meaningful impact in determining the eligibility of a country to receive arms.     

To Prevent a Revolution: John F. Kennedy and the Promotion of Democracy in Iran

John F. Kennedy came to power in 1961 with Iran on the verge of revolution against the Shah's unpopular policies. To stabilise the situation, his Administration attempted to promote democracy through a development plan based on the precepts of modernisation theory. Backed by academic theorists who argued that promoting democracy was the best way to secure victory in the Cold War, Kennedy developed an ambitious plan to transform Iran. This policy was seen as essential to replace the inevitable uncontrollable revolution and subsequent loss of Iran, with one controlled and directed by Washington. This analysis provides the first comprehensive examination of this plan and its foundations that has heretofore been overlooked. Kennedy's policy towards Iran illuminates the role that external powers can have in manufacturing, supporting, and encouraging a country's transition to democracy. Its failure, and the absence of any replacement plan to ensure political reform, made inevitable the uncontrollable revolution which eventually came in 1978.     

The Muslim Brotherhood and the Emerging ‘Shia Crescent’

To form a more prudent foreign policy toward the Muslim Brotherhood, we must understand it not only as a domestic actor, but also as a major regional player. In fact, the Brotherhood has a complex relationship with Iran and the Shias, which blurs the lines of the so-called Shia Crescent. This article addresses the Muslim Brotherhood's foreign/regional policy by analyzing its attitude toward the Shias and Iran, thus placing it within the context of the emerging regional order. Addressing the complex relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Shias/Iran will help to clarify the regional fallout were the Brotherhood to gain control of a major Sunni Arab state. This is a vital issue for policy makers who are considering the U.S. position vis-à-vis the Brotherhood.     

Russia as a Gravity Pole of the GCC’s New Foreign Policy Pragmatism

Abstract

Despite the obvious differences over the Syrian crisis and Iran, the GCC countries do not seem to be distancing themselves from Russia politically. To a large extent that is due to Russia’s growing military role (in Syria) and military cooperation (with Iran), as well as the diminishing role of the United States under Obama. Having accepted the situation in Syria (after the fall of Aleppo) as a fait accompli, the GCC’s elites seem to be looking at Russia as a powerful player able to reduce the scope of Iran’s expansion in the region. Their approach involves a carefully established mechanism of economic interaction exploiting Russia’s need for GCC finances and arms acquisitions.     

America's freedom to act in the Caspian Area

After the break up of the Soviet Union the conflict over energy resources in the Caspian area has flared up again. The United States has entered the stage, but the only remaining superpower finds it hard to forward its security policy interests and interests in the economic sphere in the area. The creation of a US‐dominated hegemony in the area would be beneficial for the United States, but the policy of containment of Iran and Russia, and US policy towards Azerbaijan seriously limits this possibility. Thus it is not possible to secure American influence in the Caspian area. In the long term this leaves the area open to Russia and Iran, or new actors such as China and the EU, unless the United States is willing to soften its policy vis‐à‐vis Iran and/or Azerbaijan in order to create the needed hegemony, and in this way achieve economic and political influence in the former Soviet republics.     

The transatlantic dialogue on Iran: the European subaltern and hegemonic constraints in the implementation of the 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran

This article analyses the US–EU transatlantic dialogue on the Iranian nuclear dossier with a particular view to the implications for EU foreign policy on Iran. Doing so, it uses neo-Gramscian scholarship to put the EU’s “over-compliance” with Iran sanctions into perspective. Constrained by the imperatives of hegemonic coercion in the form of US financial Iran sanctions against third country entities and with the hegemonic consent of a Western US-led “historic bloc”, Europe was relegated to a subaltern below its mediatory potential. It will be shown how this finding complicates the EU’s ambition to renew relations with Iran. Drawing on semi-structured interviews with experts and delegation members from the P5+1, this article thus analyses “the normative element” in the transatlantic security dialogue on Iran at a time where the latter is undergoing a sea change in the wake of the implementation of the “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” of July 2015.     

Master of the Game: The Relationship between the United States and Iran Revisited, 1969-1972

ABSTRACT

How and why did the Richard Nixon Administration end up with an Iran policy more in line with the preferences of the Shah of Iran than of the United States? At its onset, the Administration did not have a clearly defined or formalised Persian Gulf policy. Attempts to create over-arching guidelines regarding American conduct toward Iran were of little consequence, as the pro-Iranian inclinations of leading decision-makers led to day-to-day decisions that strongly favoured the Shah. This limited room for manoeuvre amounted to little more than acceptance of what was already established procedure. The Shah’s strenuous lobbying of American decision-makers, using their common Cold War considerations to his advantage and the effective sidelining of critical voices within the Nixon Administration, explain this outcome.     

Technical discourse in defense of public virtue: Ronald Reagan's explanation of the Iran/contra affair

Contemporary political communication is marked by an evolving dialectical tension between public and technical forms of discourse. Using Ronald Reagan's explanation of the Iran/Contra arms‐for‐hostages initiative as a case study, this article explores the rhetorical uses of technical rationality and the dangers these appeals pose for public deliberation. A close reading of Reagan's March 4, 1987, Iran/Contra defense speech demonstrates that Reagan employed the Tower Commission Report's technical judgments to separate the ethical realm of the public from the nonethical realm of the technical. As a result, he was able to define the Iran/Contra affair as an instrumental problem of bureaucratic organization rather than a betrayal of the public trust. This strategy of demarcating the moral realms of agent from agency is conceptualized as both a moral dodge and an instance of what Kenneth Burke calls ironic discourse. The article concludes by contrasting Reagan's strategy with other recent political crises in which public servants did not separate their public virtue from their administrative responsibility.     

伊朗核强硬政策的逻辑分析

自核问题爆出以来,伊朗一直坚持核强硬政策。其逻辑来源首先在于,伊朗认为本国在核不扩散问题上实现了权利与义务的统一,因而其核活动具有合法性。其次,伊朗的核强硬政策,是民族独立和民族自强的体现,保持与伊朗国家利益的一致性。再次,伊朗的核强硬政策有坚持的必要性和成功的可能性。必要性来自伊朗对其历史经验的总结和对当前安全状况的考虑;可能性来自伊朗对自身地缘政治地位和战略资源的自信,以及对当前大国间微妙关系的乐观评估。