Entente Neo-Coloniale?: Ernest Bevin and the Proposals for an Anglo–French Third World Power, 1945–1949

Ernest Bevin made the Third World Power project his own. He sought an imperial grouping led by Britain and France with economic and defence components and social-democratic values. It was to be a way to access raw materials and bolster European economies, and in time to create a global, strategic space between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Bevin's alternative vision failed, in part because the demands of cold war bipolarity trumped the Third World Power concept. The project was also poorly conceived and badly managed, and did not stem antagonism between Britain and France. France, unlike Britain, was also soon able to upgrade its imperial commercial interests through the European Communities.     

Anglo–American Relations and the Cold War in 1950

1950 was a crisis year in the Cold War and saw a growing rift between the United Kingdom and the United States over how best to wage it. It was in the Far East that the most dangerous crisis occurred. Britain recognised the People's Republic of China, not only because the Communist regime clearly controlled the mainland, but also because it was felt that it was not irretrievably linked to the Soviet Union. The United States, on the other hand, regarded China as a Soviet satellite and displayed a consistently hostile attitude towards it. The situation worsened with the outbreak of the Korean War in June. Although the United States and Britain agreed that the invasion of South Korea must be repelled, the British were anxious not to broaden the conflict, whilst the Americans used it as a stick to beat the Chinese. The war also prompted accelerated rearmament and the Americans favoured the rearmament of West Germany. Things came to a head in November, with the large-scale Chinese intervention in Korea, followed in early December by a visit to Washington by the British Prime Minister, Clement Attlee. The British believed that the United States had already concluded that a global war was inevitable, whereas they wished to avoid it if possible. As this article shows, the events of 1950 amply demonstrated the subordinate position of Britain in the “special relationship.”     

Palmerston and Anglo–French Relations, 1846–1865

Conventionally, it was Palmerston's political nemesis, Lord Aberdeen (foreign secretary 1841–46), who brokered an entente cordiale with François Guizot and France in the early 1840s, which the belligerent and unequivocally “English” Palmerston then systematically destroyed when he returned to office in 1846. However, not only is this a distortion of the relationship between Britain and France prior to 1846, it also fails to appreciate the nuances of Palmerston's approach to Anglo–French politics. Naval scares and rhetorical constructions of English and British identities certainly drew Palmerston to adopt aggressive positions towards France on occasion, but against this must be set his close personal ties with leading French statesmen, not least Napoleon III himself, and his desire to maintain peaceful harmonious relations with France in order to free Britain's diplomatic hand elsewhere in the world. Although superficially swinging between extremes of amity and enmity, therefore, Anglo–French relations under Palmerston's guidance were in fact far more cordial and close than has sometimes been allowed.     

Anglo–French Imperial Relations in the Arab World: Intelligence Liaison and Nationalist Disorder, 1920–1939

Faced with intractable problems of popular protest and nationalist insurgency, French and British imperial administrations across the Arab world frequently exchanged various forms of covert intelligence with one another. Much of this information was open source human intelligence relating to local political activity. Higher grade material, and particularly signals intelligence was less regularly shared, not least as the Entente partners continued to spy on each other throughout the inter-war years. Ironically, while the French and British colonial security services shared similar pre-occupations and objectives, their common threat perceptions were not enough to break down the abiding mutual suspicions between them. As a result, their networks of information exchange remained patchy. This only made the tasks of imperial government and the containment of disorder harder than might otherwise have been the case.     

The Anglo–French Victory on the Somme

The British historiography of the 1916 battle of the Somme fails to engage with the alliance dimension of the campaign. This article considers the battle in the strategic framework of the Allied General Offensive agreed on in 1915, and puts it in the context of French and British strategic, operational and tactical progress on the western front in the First World War. In particular it brings out the significant French role in the planning and conduct of the battle. It concludes that the battle was a victory because it turned the course of the war in the western allies favour.     

Herbert Hoover,Anglo–American Relations and Republican Party Politics in the 1920s

Herbert Hoover is often portrayed as a business-centric relatively non-political historical figure. In particular during his time as Commerce Secretary in the administrations of Warren Harding and Calvin Coolidge, Hoover is often described as supporting a United States foreign policy that first and foremost served the needs of American corporations. This article attempts to recalibrate that picture by stressing Hoover’s political self-interest as a motivating factor in his policies. Far from being politically unconcerned, Hoover was a man desperate to become president of the United States. His disastrous campaign for the Republican nomination in 1920 made him doubly determined to use his power in the Republican cabinets to improve his chances for the nomination later. This can be seen in one of the most famous of Hoover’s foreign policy interventions, the Anglo-American rubber crisis. Far from serving the needs of American business, during this crisis Hoover was acting mostly from political self-interest. In particular attacking the British allowed him to reframe his image, which was seen as Anglophiliac in 1920. In the end it was a very successful rebranding, as Hoover was able to run for the presidency in 1928 from a position of strength when it came to foreign affairs.     

Lord Home and Anglo–American Relations, 1961–1963

This article focuses on the role of Lord Home, the British Foreign Secretary, in the conduct of Anglo–American relations between 1961 and 1963. It studies three controversial policy areas: the newly independent states of Laos and the Congo, along with the debate over the decolonization of British Guiana; the key Cold War issues of Berlin and Cuba; and a variety of nuclear weapons–related matters. It is argued that Home, in constantly striving to maintain the alliance, was more pro-American than Macmillan. He exercised an important restraining and calming influence on the Prime Minister, preventing him from pursuing potentially damaging initiatives. However, the relationship between the two men was strong. Home’s diplomacy usually complimented Macmillan’s interventions and they often worked together.     

From “War-in-Sight” to Nearly War: Anglo–French Relations in the Age of High Imperialism, 1875–1898

The 1904 entente has cast a long shadow across the twentieth century. As a political “myth,” the notion of an entente cordiale between the two longstanding European enemies and overseas rivals France and Britain has overtaken the event itself, in so far as its historical importance is concerned. In this way, the notion of the entente has tended to obscure important aspects of a more complex and ambiguous history of cross-Channel relations. Using a range of British and French diplomatic, naval and private papers, this chapter examines the tensions in Anglo-French relations, caused by balance-of-power considerations in Europe and overseas imperial competition, between the “War-in-Sight” crisis of 1875 and the 1898 Fashoda stand-off.     

Oleaginous Diplomacy: Oil,Anglo–American Relations and the Lausanne Conference, 1922–23

There has been considerable controversy as to the significance of oil in the Lausanne Conference of 1922–1923, in particular British attempts to retain Mosul as part of Iraq. However, as this article explores, the conference also had important implications for the composition of the British-registered Turkish Petroleum Company, which was expected to win the Iraqi oil concession. In the first phase of the conference, the United States observer delegation's stance persuaded the British Government to put pressure upon the British companies involved in the TPC to admit American companies upon the latter's terms. Despite this, in the second phase, the Americans supported the Turkish delegation in its opposition to clauses in the proposed Treaty, which would have guaranteed the rights of the TPC, and forced a British compromise on the issue. The Lausanne Conference played a significant role in the Anglo–American “oil war” of the inter-war period.     

Anglo–American Relations 1950–51: Three Strikes for British Prestige

In 1949–1950, Britain rejected ideas of being a third force between the post-war Superpowers and adopted instead an approach that has been the keystone of British foreign policy from that point onwards: “hugging America close.” The aspiration was to establish a position closely related to the United States yet sufficiently independent, effectively to harness American power to British ends. This now familiar position has been much-debated recently in the context of post-9/11 military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan especially. However, this analysis examines three crises immediately following the British decision in 1949–1950 to give priority to the Anglo–American “special relationship” to demonstrate that, for Britain, this policy from the onset was both advantageous and potentially difficult. The outcomes of crises over NATO's Atlantic Command, Iranian oil, and ANZUS demonstrate how expansion of United States influence benefitted Britain but sometimes also required painful British adjustment and loss of prestige.     

Abba Eban and the Development of American–Israeli Relations, 1950–1959

Abba Eban, Israel’s ambassador in Washington and representative at the United Nations from 1950 to 1959, had a central role in the transformation of American–Israeli relations during a period of frequent discord over key strategic issues. This analysis examines the influence of one prominent actor upon bilateral ties that would eventually become the American–Israeli “special relationship.” Eban’s oratory talent, linguistic skills, and effective style of diplomacy augmented both Israel’s image in the view of the American public and relations with official Washington. The article explores several critical elements of these relations during the 1950s, re-examining both Eban’s involvement in events such as Israel’s approach toward the problem of borders, its policy of military retaliation, and the response to severe American pressure following the 1956 Sinai campaign. Whilst not attributing the development of close relations between the two Powers solely to the works of a single individual, evidence suggests that Eban was the right man in the right place and time to provide the necessary foundations for the elevation of American–Israeli relations to “special” in the following decade.     

Not the Third World War: The Heathrow Succession Rights Affair and Anglo–American Relations 1990–1991

Whilst the British and Americans expended blood and treasure together in the Kuwaiti desert in 1991, bureaucratic blood from both sides was also visible on carpets in London and Washington. The reason was attempts to replace the access to Heathrow airport of two failing airlines, Pan American World Airways and Trans World Airlines, with American and United Airlines. This succession rights affair was one of the most difficult diplomatic negotiations ever on civil aviation between the United States and Britain. How and why that controversy developed, its resolution, and what impact on, and feedback from, the broader Anglo–American relationship that it had are the main concerns of this analysis.     

Yvon Delbos and Anthony Eden: Anglo–French Cooperation, 1936–1938

The period of tenure of Anthony Eden and Yvon Delbos as the foreign ministers of their respective countries coincided with a remarkable improvement and convergence in Anglo–French relations. This was no accident. Both men had similar ideas in relation to the challenges confronting Britain and France in international affairs. Neither wanted really close relations with Soviet Russia and both supported non-intervention in the Spanish Civil War despite their growing concern over German and Italian intervention. Delbos was highly critical of Mussolini's Italy and was firmly opposed to a Franco–Italian rapprochement while Eden, having originally given the Duce the benefit of the doubt, came to distrust him and to oppose even conversations with Italy without prior concessions, such as the withdrawal of Italian volunteers from Spain. Finally, both supported the appeasement of Nazi Germany, including colonial concessions, although Delbos towards the end of his period as foreign minister became more sceptical as to the prospects for success.     

Turkey's New Foreign Policy and the Future of Turkey–EU Relations

When European Muslim citizens are involved in social conflicts or when they contest the place that is given them in Europe, these political claims are often seen as radical and inspired by external influences. If an attempt is made to understand what part the influences of the so-called Muslim “countries of origin” play in the way Muslims contest European models of society and integration, it turns out that the roots of radicalisation are often purely European. The idea that it is the Islamic and communitarian nature of the European Muslim way of life which is at the base of their failing integration has to be challenged. Indeed, the initiatives of religious actors have failed to channel the radicalisation of European Muslims’ political demands. The role of the religious variable is of much less importance in political radicalisation than the lack of an institutional response to the demands for greater social and economic integration.     

British Foreign Policy,the Financial Elite,and the Nationalisation of the Constantinople Quays Company, 1934–1945

The analysis examines the role of British financial institutions, namely the Bank of England and the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders [CFB], in the making of British policy towards Turkey. The nationalisation of the Constantinople Quays Company, a port operator purchased in 1907 by the British and French governments, serves as a case study through which business–state relations, the role of finance in the conduct of international relations, and the impact of perceptions on policy decisions are explored. In this case, the financial elite’s role was minimal during most of the period considered, becoming more important in the final war years in a framework of the Anglo–Turkish debt restructuring negotiations of 1944. Significantly, the CFB, rather than the Bank, represented the British government in the negotiations. There exists an abundance of evidence of the divergent views between Whitehall and the financial elite about Turkey’s trustworthiness as a debtor and a signatory to treaties. The British government’s perceptions were much more positive than those of the financial elite. This difference stemmed from the different interests involved: Whitehall sought to secure Turkey’s collaboration in the increasingly unstable global security environment while the Bank and the CFB were more concerned with investor and bondholder interests and attempted to avoid further financial losses.     

America,Britain, and Swaraj: Anglo-American Relations and Indian Independence, 1939–1945

In the years before and during the Second World War, the Roosevelt Administration played an important and often overlooked role in encouraging Britain's disengagement from the Indian subcontinent. Roosevelt's motivations in pressing for Indian independence were varied. They included a mix of principled opposition to colonialism, practical concern for the outcome of the war and pragmatic jockeying for influence with post-colonial nations when the war was won. Churchill's government was wary of being pushed by Washington to move more quickly to “quit India” than it thought prudent. U.S. policy and actions clearly influenced the direction of events toward independence, but U.S. caution as the war ground on led to disillusionment among nationalist leaders. This reaction would have consequences once swaraj was won and India came into its own, at a time when the Cold War was becoming the dominant factor in America's view of the world.