N. A. Graebner,R. D. Burns,and J. M. Siracusa,Reagan, Bush,Gorbachev: Revisiting the End of the Cold War

Faced with creating a grand strategy for American foreign policy in the post–Cold War world, the Clinton Administration launched the strategy of ‘Democratic Enlargement.’ This analysis makes two contributions to the existing literature on the topic. First, it investigates the role of Wilsonianism and the ‘Democratic Peace Thesis’ in the discourse of the strategy of ‘Democratic Enlargement’ based on public speeches with a focus on the relationship between democracy and security. Second, it utilises securitisation theory to analyse how Clinton’s Administration used the linkage of democracy and security to legitimise humanitarian interventions in Haiti and Kosovo. By addressing ‘Democratic Enlargement’ in security terms, the Administration securitised democracy promotion and, thereby, created a discourse that helped legitimise a gradual move towards a more militaristic foreign policy during Clinton’s presidency. This discourse offered arguments later utilised by the George W. Bush Administration.     

Domestic Costs, the U.S. Public, and the Isolationist Calculus

This article examines and tests two models of the circumstances shaping the extent of the American public&;apos;s isolationist sentiment. The first, termed the "elastic band" model, assumes a constant popular disinclination toward foreign involvements, one that may, at most, temporarily be stretched to accommodate responses to major external threats. A second model assumes the operation of a "cognitive shortcut" based on low-information rationality. It proposes that acceptable levels of domestic involvement depend on the gravity of the domestic opportunity costs of foreign involvement, and it is termed the "domestic costs" model. While the former model implies a constant public resistance to international activism, a resistance that is relaxed only in proportion to the gravity of external threats, the latter model suggests that the U.S. public displays a relatively constant internationalist attitude, and that variations around that threat are largely explained by fluctuations in the perceived domestic opportunity costs of international involvement.
Both models are subjected to statistical testing, a testing that vindicates the domestic costs model. Further insights are obtained by examining attitudes toward internationalism as they are affected by levels of education. Although internationalism increases with education, and although levels of education predict differential impacts of the variables encompassed by the model, each segment of the public seems to operate within the general parameters of the "domestic costs" model.     

A. Adamishin and R. Schifter,Human Rights,Perestroika, and the End of the Cold War

The international community's March 2011 military intervention in Libya contrasts sharply to its reluctance during the preceding forty years to halt the Qadhafi regime's sponsorship of transnational terrorism and pursuit of WMD. American diplomacy, eventually supported by international sanctions, was a four decade effort to end Qadhafi's violent foreign policy. This commentary discusses how diplomacy and the American judicial process combined to achieve this successful outcome. Diplomatic and legislative efforts to compel Libya's payment to terrorism victims helped create judicial remedies enforceable in US Courts and ultimately, a bilateral claims settlement agreement that, while disappointing to the terrorism litigants, normalized relations between the Libya and the United States.     

Managing Military Transformations: Agency,Culture, and the U.S. Carrier Revolution

The marketplace of ideas within a mature democracy such as the United States is supposed to fairly reliably vet foreign policies through open, wide-ranging debate. It is widely recognized that the U.S. marketplace of ideas failed during the 2002-03 debate over going to war in Iraq. Examinations of this market failure have emphasized executive powers and public fear after 9/11 as the main reasons threat inflation succeeded; I show neither explains this case. The majority opposition was silenced throughout early 2002 and ultimately defeated in a struggle over the Iraq War Resolution by pressures to be patriotic. I contend that this silencing patriotism should not be considered ordinary patriotism for a democracy as it is anti-democratic. I discuss how two critical norms of behavior which silence debate of national security policies and cause deference to the executive branch on war powers became established as part of the militarized political culture that took root in the United States during the Cold War. Thus these norms, enforced by what I term to be militarized patriotism left over from the Cold War, silenced debate over Iraq and led to the failure of the marketplace of ideas.     

Tragedy,Realism, and Postmodernity: Kulturpessimismus in the Theories of Max Weber,E.H. Carr,Hans J. Morgenthau,and Henry Kissinger

Many realist international relations theorists characterize realism as a perspective grounded in a firm grasp of the tragic constancy of human nature and the autonomous role that power plays in human politics. Realism is thus cast in opposition to the hopeful, but often naïve, optimism of liberals who seek to steer international relations theory and ethics away from these historical realities. This paper examines the philosophical roots of theories developed by four realist thinkers, Max Weber, E.H. Carr, Hans J. Morgenthau, and Henry Kissinger, in postmodern epistemology and ethics, perspectives not often associated with constancy or notions of objective historical truths. I argue that the origin of their respective theories in Nietzschean epistemology plays a profound role in undermining their ability to develop a credible view of international ethics. Though each of them is, in his way, committed to democratic principles, their works assert an existential, private morality that is incompatible with the ethical requirements of a modern, democratic society.     

Ⅲ. Greater Periphery and China, the U.S. and Neighbors

Lu: The world situation tends to be relaxed generally. Big powers often interact, especially in Asia, because China is developing and Asia is developing as well. When we review peripheral and regional situations, we can see it. In China's concept of diplomacy, periphery is put at the foremost position and China's periphery is in a sense the U. S. 'strategic front. Therefore, building a greater peripheral environment,coping well with China's relations with the U.S. and China's Neighbors has a bearing on China's geo-strategic environment. As the issue covers a broad range, let us begin from the greater periphery.     

Greater Periphery and China, the U. S. and Neighbors

Lu: The world situation tends to be relaxed generally. Big powers often interact, especially in Asia, because China is developing and Asia is developing as well. When we review peripheral and regional situa- tions, we can see it. In China's concept of diplomacy, periphery is put at the foremost position and China's periphery is in a sense the U. S. ' strategic front. Therefore, building a greater peripheral environment, coping well with China's relations with the U. S. and China's Neigh-…     

Stuck in the Middle: Taiwan's Semiconductor Industry,the U.S.-China Tech Fight,and Cross-Strait Stability

The Trump administration has worked to restrict the People's Republic of China's ability to manufacture and acquire semiconductor chips since 2018. Caught in the crossfire of this burgeoning tech war is Taiwan, which is home to Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), the world's largest semiconductor chip manufacturer. With the United States banning companies that use U.S. technology in their chip manufacturing process from doing business with Huawei, TSMC can no longer do business with the Chinese tech company, one of its most important clients. Until the Trump administration announced the license restriction on Huawei, TSMC had managed to walk the fine line of doing business with both China and the United States, without riling either. This article argues that the TSMC example is indicative of how great power competition between the two countries will play out for the foreseeable future. TSMC has announced that it will build a new factory in Arizona as it faces Chinese firms poaching its employees and Chinese actors hacking its systems and code for trade secrets—all actions demonstrating how great power competition will play out for tech dominance. Avoiding direct live-fire conflict, China and the United States will work to restrict the other's actions and development by forcing important tech companies, such as TSMC, into picking a side.